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Autonomy, Equality, and Respect for Difference: 
Investigating Principle-Based Approaches to Technologically Mediated Reproductive Contexts 
Abstract 
The objective of this project will be to explore how the principles of autonomy, equality, 
and respect for difference are formulated and applied when disability diagnostic technologies 
affect women's reproductive decision-making. The author will use feminist disability theory and 
will engage legal research methodology in order to interpret and challenge those three principles 
as they are presented in both bioethics and jurisprudence. Specifically, the following questions 
will be explored: 
• Does reproductive autonomy lead to undue maternal responsibilities, especially in 
instances when disabilities can be or have been diagnosed? 
• Are there tensions between reproductive autonomy and reproductive equality, 
specifically between reproductive autonomy on the one hand, and disability 
equality on the other? 
• Does the (either implicit or explicit) assumption in bioethics and law that 
reproductive technologies be used for the purpose of disability de-selection reflect 
tensions between reproductive autonomy and equality on the one hand, and the 
principle of respect for difference on the other? 
This research will identify the principles at the heart of discourses and disagreements on 
reproductive decision-making in an effort to clarify how these principles are being 
conceptualized, to evaluate whether there is still use for a principle-based approach, and to 
consider what their best instantiations would look like. 
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Autonomy, Equality, and Respect for Difference: 
Investigating Principle-Based Approaches to Technologically Mediated Reproductive 
Contexts 
Chapter 1 : Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
The objective of this project will be to explore how the principles of autonomy, 
equality, and respect for difference are formulated and applied when disability diagnostic 
technologies affect women's 1 reproductive decision-making. These principles are 
conceived both morally in bioethics, and legally in jurisprudence. My project will use 
feminist disability theory to interpret and challenge those three principles as they are 
presented in both fields. Specifically, I will explore the following questions: 
• Does reproductive autonomy lead to undue maternal responsibilities, 
especially in instances when disabilities can be or have been diagnosed? 
• Are there tensions between reproductive autonomy and reproductive 
equality, specifically between reproductive autonomy on the one hand, and 
disability equality on the other? 
• Does the (either implicit or explicit) assumption in bioethics and law that 
reproductive technologies be used for the purpose of disability de-selection 
reflect tensions between reproductive autonomy and equality on the one 
hand, and the principle of respect for difference on the other? 
These three principles are often invoked in discussions pertaining to reproductive 
decision-making in general and decision-making that incorporates reproductive 
technologies in particular, although those making the invocations may have different-
1 While this study will focus on women, I acknowledge that gender is largely a social 
construction and that it is possible for someone to be pregnant and not identify as a 
woman. 
even contradictory-interpretations of the principles in question. Because formulations 
of autonomy, equality, and respect for difference can be disparate and even in conflict, 
those engaging in discourses on reproductive decision-making may be disconnected or 
miscommunicating despite the vocabulary they share in common. This research will 
identify the principles at the heart of discourses and disagreements on reproductive 
decision-making in an effort to clarify how these principles are being conceptualized, to 
evaluate whether there is still use for a principle-based approach, and to consider what 
their best instantiations would look like. 
1.1.1. Chapter Outline 
In the following sections of this introductory chapter, the methodologies for this 
project-specifically feminist disability methodology and legal research methodology-
will be explained. This chapter also considers the nature of principle-based approaches, 
and whether such approaches can be experientially grounded. In a presentation of the 
fields of analysis, I will consider how bioethics is grounded, and how Canadian 
constitutional law is interpreted. Finally, I will explain the reproductive context in 
Canada, including abortion services and their barriers, as well as reproductive 
technologies. 
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The chapter following will pertain to the principle of autonomy: moral autonomy 
of Kantian philosophy, personal autonomy in liberal theories, and relational autonomy in 
feminist theories. I will explore bioethical concepts of consent and decisional capacity, 
and will locate autonomy in section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
3 
(1982): the rights to life, liberty, and security of the person. This project will go on to 
characterize reproductive autonomy, legally established in R. v. Morgentaler (1988). 
Finally, I will discuss reproductive autonomy in relation to disability. Reproductive 
technologies arguably enable autonomous decision-making by making more choices 
available and by informing decisions. Notwithstanding, the routinization of these 
technologies may be transforming reproductive choices into obligations. Pregnant 
women are rendered responsible, that is, are saddled with pregnancy-related 
responsibilities insofar as they are considered separate entities from the fetuses they are 
carrying. The conceptual separation of woman and fetus via ultrasound technology 
allows for the pitting of the interests of women against those of the fetus. This separation 
may be compatible with a notion of personal autonomy, but may contradict the concept 
of relational autonomy. 
In the third chapter, I will chart the historical development of equality theory, 
including Aristotelian formal equality, liberal equality of opportunity, and feminist 
substantive equality. I will account for how each of these theories is made manifest in 
bioethics, and I will evaluate the medicalization of pregnancy and disability under 
distributive health models. I will go on to consider the development of substantive 
equality-found under s. 15 of the Charter-in Canadian case law. When discussing 
reproductive equality (a concept not often invoked in Canadian law, a notable exception 
being Doe et al. v. The Government of Manitoba, 2004), I will note that the concept may 
redress current barriers to reproductive services, but not as long as it is weighed down 
with the rhetoric of liberal theory. In reference to disability, one might argue that making 
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genetic technologies available is a matter of equal opportunity and resource distribution. 
I will determine whether arguments about access to pregnancy-related resources apply to 
reproductive technologies. In contrast, the availability and normalization of technologies 
may have created a need for their use. According to disability critiques, the promotion of 
reproductive technologies hinges on a discriminatory attitude against disability. I will 
investigate whether disability critiques generate a tension between disability equality and 
women's reproductive rights. 
For the subsequent chapter, I will discuss the principle of respect for difference, 
which entails accepting and understanding identity features as instances of human 
diversity. I will use the concept, as well as its roots in postmodern theory, to further 
deconstruct autonomy and equality, and to contextualize and embody reproductive 
decision-making. Although it is not often invoked in bioethics literature, I will consider 
how a politics of difference transforms the application of autonomy and equality to 
bioethics issues of consenting subjects and functional health, especially in relation to 
disabled and other marginalized persons2 • I will go on to evaluate whether the promotion 
of reproductive technologies for the purpose of disability avoidance reflects a tension 
with the principle of respect for difference. For example, pre-implantation genetic 
2 The term "disabled people" is deliberately employed, and will be used throughout this 
project. Although people-first language-"persons with disabilities"-is more common 
in recent disability theory and advocacy, Titchkosky (2001, 2007) argues that people-first 
language is used to stress personhood and to separate out disability from personhood: 
"people-first language codes may reconfirm the notion that there are some people in this 
world whose humanness is debate-able" (2007, p. 196). This study will explore what it 
means to understand humanity as diverse. I will also problematize notions of personhood 
that have excluded disabled people and thus legitimized their oppression. It therefore 
seems fitting to use the term "disabled people," rather than to become entangled in the 
implications of people-first language. 
diagnosis is sometimes used for the purpose of producing disability. Any resistance to 
this practice may reveal societal discrimination against disability. 
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Finally, I will close this work by drawing together and analyzing the implications 
to my discussions of the principles in previous chapters. I will consider how bioethical 
and legal issues regarding reproductive decision-making with respect to disability ought 
to be approached. I will further lay out my recommendations for future research and 
application. 
1.1.2. Contributions 
This project will seek to disentangle concepts that have long histories and 
complicated formulations, as well as profound implications for how reproductive 
decisions are made and honoured, and how bodies are treated. These issues have been 
explored by critical theorists interested in feminism and disability studies, yet not enough 
work has been done to connect this critical theory with medical and legal praxis. As a 
contribution to my field, I will attempt to determine how the connections might be better 
forged, that is, how critical interpretations of autonomy, equality, and respect for 
difference apply to bioethical and legal protections of reproductive decisions and 
regulation of reproductive technologies. 
Further, Canadian law has arguably not developed in a rigorous or systematic way 
regarding reproductive decision-making as it relates to reproductive technologies. Few 
cases deal with issues around the promotion of fetal health (Dobson (Litigation Guardian 
of) v. Dobson, 1999; Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) v. G. (D.F.), 
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1997). The Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists of Canada (SOGC) recently 
developed guidelines for various reproductive technologies, such as prenatal screening 
(2007a, 2007b), ultrasound technology (2007a), and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis 
(2009). Assumptions regarding disability de-selection can be found in these guidelines3, 
although actual policy advocating disability de-selection has not developed in Canada. 
The void may be intentional, or perhaps law and policy have not yet caught up to 
technological advancements. In either case, there is value to drawing academic and 
political attention to the topic if only to begin the conversation, and to ensure the terms 
used in such a conversation are clearly defined. 
This project is also meant to include a prescriptive component. My intention is 
not only to evaluate the formulations of the three principles found at the core of 
arguments about reproductive decision-making, but also to put forward a theoretical 
framework that may have the best implications for both women and disabled people. I 
will do so by employing a conceptual lens that draws from bioethical theory tempered by 
or grounded in feminism and disability studies. This lens is principle-based, or at least 
makes use of principles, but also values experience and identity politics. Incorporating 
experience and identity into rights discourse may be a way of resolving abstract problems 
in which rights outrank or conflict with one another. 
As an example, Sherwin (1998) notes that the apparent dichotomy between the 
principles of autonomy and equality crops up in legal and medical contexts: "autonomy 
3 For instance, as discussed later in this study, the SOGC defines prenatal screening in 
2007( a) guidelines: "screening is the process of surveying a population, using a specific 
marker or markers and defined screening cut-off levels, to identify the individuals in the 
population at higher risk for a particular disorder" (p. 14 7). 
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provisions are sometimes interpreted as functioning independently of and outweighing all 
other moral values. More specifically, autonomy is often understood to exist in conflict 
with the demands of justice" (p. 25). Rather than dwell on how these principles may be 
in conflict, Rodgers (2006b) focuses instead on how they are related in the context of 
women's reproductive capacities: "reproductive autonomy is key to women's equality 
and essential to women's full and constitutionally protected membership in the Canadian 
state" (p. 1 ). 
I will consult theoretical literature in an effort to determine what the principles 
found in bioethical and legal decisions may be missing, and how these principles could-
perhaps should-be re-conceptualized. This project will contribute to discourses on 
reproductive issues and technologies a defence of women's reproductive rights: a defence 
which can account for recent advances in modem technology, namely the technologies 
that have drastically changed reproductive decision-making; and that can also ground 
reproductive rights in carefully articulated principles of autonomy, equality, and respect 
for difference, without losing clarity or creating conflict. 
1.2. Methodology 
This project involves both philosophy and law, and so it will employ two 
methodologies. In the following sections, I will explain critical theory as a general lens 
of analysis, for critical theory will equip me with the tools needed for identifying and 
critiquing social realities. Legal research entails mining legal cases for philosophical 
arguments to understand and deconstruct, and so this research can also be subjected to 
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critical theoretical analysis. The field of jurisprudence additionally requires a 
methodological approach especially tailored to suit it, designed for lawyers and 
paralegals who must also engage in legal research. For this reason, I will employ legal 
research methodology, which is compatible with critical theory to the extent that both 
may be used to flag and chart the development of concepts, and both may be used for 
transformative purposes. In the sections that follow, I will defend the particular 
conceptual model employed in this project, as well as the selection of autonomy, equality, 
and respect for difference above other moral and legal principles. 
1.2.1. Overview of Research: Feminist Methodology 
I will employ critical theory, an umbrella term for a range of philosophies 
entailing critiques of society and proposals for making society just. The field includes 
the German idealism of the Frankfurt School and the analytical traditions of the Vienna 
Circle, as well as Heideggerian phenomenology and Rawlsian social justice theory. 
When theories moved away from abstract Kant-inspired philosophy, they came to grapple 
more readily with injustice and oppression (Rush, 2004). Horkheimer (1982) of the 
Frankfurt School describes critical theory as a transformative project: "[critical theory is 
meant] to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them" (p. 244). 
Rush (2004) elaborates: "critical theory is not merely descriptive, [but is instead] a way 
to investigate social change by providing knowledge of the forces of social inequality that 
can, in tum, inform political action aimed at emancipation (or at least diminishing 
domination and inequality)" (p. 9). 
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Thus, work in this area entails both descriptive and prescriptive components. 
Alvesson and Skolberg (2009) explain: "critical theory is characterized by an interpretive 
approach combined with a pronounced interest in critically disrupting social realities . 
.. .Its guiding principle is an emancipatory interest in knowledge" (p. 144 ). Social 
conditions and realities are explained, inadequacies and injustices are identified, and 
recommendations for transformation are offered. The seeds for transformation are 
contained within social realities. Exceptions and contradictions may challenge the 
standard and open this standard up to change. For critical theorists of the Frankfurt 
school, democracy is the vehicle for social change, that is, for the emancipation of those 
who experience oppression within their social context (Horkheimer, 1982). 
I will focus on a specific strand of critical theory-feminisms-according to 
which minority groups are the vehicle for social transformation and emanicipation. 
Feminist research methodology became a focus for second wave feminisms of the 1980s 
(Harding, 1987; Reinharz, Bombyk, & Wright, 1983). Across disciplines, proponents of 
feminist theories were considering alternative approaches to research. For De Vault, 
"feminists seek a methodology that will support research of value to women, leading to 
social change or action beneficial to women" (1996, p. 34). Research of this nature is 
thus meant to specifically target oppressive social organization; it is meant to identify 
problems and pursue social change relevant to women (racialized women, impoverished4 
4 Much like "disabled person," the terms "racialized" and "impoverished" are used to 
highlight that there is a social component and power dynamic entangled in these minority 
identity markers. 
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women, queer women, disabled women, and so forth would be recognized later in 
feminism's history). 
For Harding (1987), epistemology (how we come to know reality) and 
methodology (theory on how to practice research) are separate but related. Landman 
(2006) notes that feminist methodology engages, even seeks to reinvent, knowledge 
productive processes: 
Feminist methodology is specifically concerned with how, or whether, 
knowledge produced about social life can be connected with the social 
realities of women in the context of any methodology that is dominated by 
men and that neglects consideration of the gendered nature of social life 
(p. 430). 
Feminisms employ a social epistemology according to which gender and other identity 
categories are understood to play a significant role in knowledge production: "[feminist 
epistemology] investigates the influence of socially constructed conceptions and norms of 
gender and gender-specific interests and experiences on the production of knowledge" 
(Anderson, 1995, p. 54). Our realities are therefore built based on social and political 
influences. They are pluralistic, and even competing. Longino (2002), a philosopher of 
science and feminist epistemologist, developed a theory of contextual empiricism, 
according to which the standard of objectivity is grounded in discourse. That is, 
knowledge claims are tested through the critical scrutiny of communities. The more 
diverse and inclusive the community, the more rigorously knowledge claims can be 
pursued and tested: "a diversity of perspectives is necessary for vigorous and 
epistemically effective critical discourse" (p. 131 ). 
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We therefore see a contextualizing of objectivity in feminist methodology and a 
favouring of subjectivity. De Vault (1996) explains: "feminist methodologists ... seek 
methods that can incorporate, or at least do not deny, subjectivity. Thus, for those 
working on feminist methodologies, theorizing links between experience and knowledge 
has been a central concern" (p. 41 ). Some proponents of feminisms have embraced 
standpoint theory, according to which knowledge production is a matter of perspective 
(Anderson, 1995; Haraway, 1988). Smith (1990) advocates taking one's embodiment 
and experience as a starting point for inquiry. Knowledge production processes have 
been known to hinge on the power and privilege invested in particular vantage points 
(Harding, 1987). The experiences of women have long been ignored, while "men's 
standpoint is represented as universal and neutral" (Morris, 1992, p. 263). 
I will ground the principles relevant to this study experientially by identifying the 
experiences and embodiments of women, but not just women. Advocates of third wave 
feminisms opened up feminisms to intersections with other socially marginalized identity 
characteristics (Crenshaw, 1991, 1998; Walker, 1995). Crenshaw (1998) defines 
intersectionality as overlapping membership to other social categories that are subject to 
discrimination. She argues that women's experiences of disadvantage are vastly different 
depending on other identity characteristics: "any analysis that does not take 
intersectionality into account cannot sufficiently address the particular manner in which 
Black women are subordinated" (p. 315). I will therefore also note other identity 
characteristics that intersect with gender and that as such have been acknowledged in 
feminist discourses, including the following: race (Fuss, 1989; Walker, 1992, 1995), class 
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(Fraser, 1989), and-especially for the purpose of this study-disability (Garland-
Thomson, 1997a, 1997b; Pothier & Devlin (Eds.), 2006; Sampson, 2006; Wendell, 1997). 
Garland-Thomson (l 997b ), for example, proposes developing feminist disability 
discourse in response to feminisms she would regard as ableist: "the identity category of 
disability can pressure feminist theory to acknowledge bodily particularity and history" 
(p. 284). 
Disability theory might be a useful method of analysis to the extent that it pertains 
to a social category that challenges traditional notions of embodiment and personhood. 
Disability disrupts and deconstructs rigid, exclusionary moral systems and legal and 
political standards, for it presents the exception to all the rules, an exception that demands 
accommodation and reconfiguration. Titchkosky (2007) suggests that disability should 
not be appended to the list of intersections feminists consider, especially since disability 
has long been ignored in feminisms. She argues instead that disability has the power to 
radically transform political and intellectual discourses: 
Since disability has typically been left out of the politics and theorizing of 
gender, race, and class, it can serve as a prime discursive field where the 
meaning of alterity under contemporary conditions can be considered. 
Disability is not merely the Other to normalcy, but is rather an irreducible 
productive identity and difference. From here identity politics might move 
on to address the powerfully political process of recognizing how 
identities have and have not been recognized, formed, and narrated by 
everyday life (p. 7). 
With this in mind, I will employ a feminism that takes disability as the standard 
lens of analysis. I am interested in how disability as alterity confronts medical and legal 
discourses on reproduction, and so I will explore how pregnant bodies function within 
these discourses as though they are disabled. The comparison is imperfect, for women 
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and disabled people have different kinds of experiences of embodiment and oppression. 
When Garland-Thomson (1997b) imagines feminist disability theory, she considers how 
female and disabled bodies are treated differently: "feminization prompts the gaze, while 
disability prompts the stare. Feminization alterations increase a woman's cultural capital, 
while disabilities reduce it" (p. 287). In both cases, while these two types of 
embodiments are treated differently, they are both subjected to the same standard for 
managing and producing embodiment. In the case of women, pregnant bodies are 
especially medically managed, in ways that I intend to demonstrate are comparable to the 
ways in which disabled bodies are medically managed. This project will therefore not 
only analyze how disability is framed through the application of reproductive 
technologies, and will note that some pregnant bodies are also disabled bodies, but will 
also treat pregnant bodies as comparable to disabled bodies, at least insofar as the 
analogy is useful to this study, given that in reproductive contexts women share in 
common very similar experiences of oppression. 
I intend to contextualize the principles that are used (or can be used) in bioethical 
and legal discourses to protect women from being controlled and oppressed in 
reproductive spaces. These principles as they are currently being characterized may not 
be doing the work needed to safeguard reproductive decision-making, and so a 
contextualization will ensure they are informed by the experiences and embodiments of 
women, of those who have stakes in this issue. It may be possible to achieve social 
transformation through an application of these principles so re-conceived. 
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1.2.2. Overview of Research: Legal Research Methodology 
Additionally, the proposed research will use established legal research 
methodology, a process Myron Jacobstein and Mersky (2002) define in the following 
way: "the process of identifying and retrieving information necessary to support legal 
decision-making [which] begins with an analysis of the facts of a problem and concludes 
with the application and communication of the results of the investigation" (p. 1 ). That 
is, established legal research involves charting and evaluating the development of 
concepts or positions throughout the history of relevant case law. I will embark on an 
analysis of the theoretical and legal development of principles that have been used or 
perhaps should be used to ground reproductive rights and to regulate reproductive 
technologies. I will consider how these principles have applied to reproductive decision-
making and what might happen should they be applied. 
Legal research methodology involves, firstly, primary research: namely, case law 
and policy in a specific jurisdiction, in this case Canada. Further, I have investigated 
legislation and regulations, as well as legal and policy debates on reproductive processes. 
Much of the primary research can be found in cases from the provincial courts of justice 
and the Supreme Court of Canada. Courts are responsible for articulating and developing 
principles like autonomy, equality, and respect for difference, and for building 
protections based on these principles. In order to enrich my analysis of these three 
concepts in relation to reproductive decision-making, I will discuss how they differ from 
the concepts developed in case law outside Canada, for example privacy-based arguments 
in the American cases Roe v. Wade (1973), and the equality-based argument guaranteeing 
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reproductive rights in Colombia (Ordolis, 2008). I will account for international 
legislation on reproductive technologies-New Zealand, for example (NECAHR, 
2005)-as regulation of these technologies is a relatively new global practice, and I will 
consider whether Canadian positions on disability compare to New Zealand's, which 
might help indicate whether Canada's policy gap is meant to reflect a position on 
disability, or whether Canada has merely not kept pace with technology. 
In order to determine how the principles of autonomy, equality, and respect for 
difference have been formulated and whether these formulations are adequate, I will look 
outside law, to interpretations of law and critical theory. Secondary legal authorities have 
been consulted, such as law reviews and legal journals. I will draw from feminist legal 
theory and disability studies scholarship in order to critique legal articulations of the 
principles in question. As Boyd and Sheehy (1989) demonstrate when charting the 
history of Canadian feminist scholarship, this history has developed alongside Canadian 
jurisprudence; for instance, feminist formulations of equality changed in reaction and 
relation to Canadian legal applications of equality rights. Critical theories which focus on 
oppression, as feminisms and disability studies do, are not only informed by 
jurisprudence, but can also identify what jurisprudence is missing. They are thus of vital 
importance to include in a critical evaluation of legal principles. 
Lastly, I have consulted non-legal sources, such as bioethical evaluations of, and 
feminist and disability studies critiques on, reproductive technologies. They can 
predominantly be found in bioethics, feminisms, and disability studies. I will investigate 
what these sources contribute to discussions about reproductive decision-making. There 
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are non-legal experts on reproduction insofar as the topic is not simply a legal issue but is 
also an ethical issue. These experts will be used for the purpose of assessing the 
reproductive contexts that law is designed to regulate, and will interweave bioethics with 
law to paint a more comprehensive picture of how reproductive activities are approached. 
Moreover, the recent trend toward using and promoting reproductive technologies has not 
been comprehensively regulated within the Canadian legal context, although there are 
Canadian policies (SOGC, 2007b) and international conventions (CBD, 1992; DHGHR, 
1997) that address questions about the technologies. Theoretical analyses of and 
responses to reproductive technologies will be crucial when this project determines how 
principles might practically apply to reproductive contexts. 
1.2.3. Conceptual Framework 
This project will explore principle-based approaches. That is, it will consider 
approaches taking for granted that the application of principles is an effective way of 
framing reproductive decision-making and the use of reproductive technologies. 
Principles are values that inform legal decisions and social norms; rights are entitlements 
and protections that are based on principles. Principles and rights are invoked in 
bioethics and law to protect women's decision-making powers in reproductive contexts. 
There are different ways of conceptualizing or formulating principles, and the differences 
affect how they frame reproductive decision-making. 
Principle-based bioethics, where many of the arguments on reproductive matters 
can be found, has been supported by Engelhardt (1986), Macklin (1987), and Veatch 
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(1981, 1997), as well as early religious contributors (McCormick, 1981; Ramsey, 1970). 
Beauchamp and Childress, responsible for the influential work Principles on Biomedical 
Ethics (2009), set out to defend four clusters of moral principles, including two principles 
I aim to assess: "respect for autonomy (a norm of avoiding the causation of harm) ... [ and] 
justice (a group of norms for distributing benefits, risks, and costs fairly)" (p. 12). 
Framing moral and legal issues with principles and rights is not without criticism. 
Principles may be too abstract, functioning in such a way that they erect barriers which 
distance rights-bearers from one another (Dillon, 1992; Harvey, 1999). Davis (2006) 
criticizes human rights, specifically in the context of disability, claiming that inherent in 
the concept of human rights is "the idea of the complete, independent subject, endowed 
with rights (which are in actuality conferred by privilege)" (p. 241). Strictly principle-
based paradigms have been cast aside by some in favour of a more experiential approach 
(Gilligan, 1982; Toulmin, 1981). 
Reich (1996) notes, however, that this new approach "that takes moral experience 
more seriously [has not] replaced the previously dominant, principle-based paradigm 
[because] most properly, bioethics involves both approaches" (p. 103). Harvey (1999), 
too, believes it is possible to use principles as long as they are construed in such a way 
that accounts for the relationships that are at the core of human experience. An analysis 
of principles does not have to discount the acknowledgement that reproductive decision-
making must also be contextualized. Indeed, feminists have sought to conceptualize 
autonomy as relational-a conceptualization which is predicated on a relational self 
constituted by interpersonal and political connections (Colker, 1992; Nedelsky, 1989, 
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1993; Sherwin, 1998). In the case of equality, the ideal formulation of the principle 
might not emanate from a distributive justice model according to which justice is 
determined by how equitably goods (including rights) are parcelled out (Dworkin, 1981; 
Rawls, 1999), for such a model has been criticized for being disempowering (Harvey, 
1999; Malhotra, 2006). 
Autonomy and equality are well established principles with conceptual 
developments that can each be traced through Canadian case law. They are also two of 
the four key principles used in bioethics (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009). As such, they 
are appealed to by bioethicists who have analyzed reproductive decision-making, 
including and especially decision-making that involves diagnoses of fetal impairments 
(Buchanan et al., 2000; Callahan, 1970; Purdy, 1996). There has been substantial work 
done in feminism to critique both autonomy (Glendon, 2003, 2006; Nedelsky, 1989, 
1993; Sherwin, 1998) and equality (Colker, 1992; Rodgers, 2006a, 2006b), as well as to 
consider which formulations of these principles best apply to reproductive decision-
making. Autonomy (Ho, 2008; Jackson, 2001; Sherwin, 1998) and equality (Minow, 
1991; Rioux & Valentine, 2006; Silvers, 1994, 1998a) have also been examined from a 
disability studies perspective, both in general and in relation to reproduction. It is thus of 
crucial importance that this project focuses on these two principles, as opposed to lesser 
known legal principles that pertain to reproduction (such as privacy, and freedom of 
conscience) or bioethical principles (such as the principle of beneficence). As this project 
seeks to provide conceptual clarity for an old and complex legal and philosophical 
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problem, it ought to focus on the two concepts that have been widely invoked in legal and 
non-legal discourse alike on the subject of reproductive rights. 
In contrast, the principle of respect for difference is not often identified in 
arguments pertaining to reproductive rights, certainly not to the extent that autonomy and 
equality are. Respect for difference is, however, relevant to disability rights and as such 
is found in the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD, 2006). 
Other principles in the Convention include accessibility and non-discrimination, although 
more so than these other principles, respect for difference might elucidate how disability-
relevant concerns factor into the theoretical grounding of reproductive decision-making. 
1. 2. 4. Time and Setting Selection 
Bioethics, which will both be evaluated as a field that pertains to reproductive 
decision-making and incorporated into the conceptual model for this project, has existed 
for thirty years (Viafora, 1996), although moral applied philosophy certainly predates the 
field of study. Further, I will focus on Canadian case law from approximately the last 
forty years. It is difficult to settle on a specific cut-off date for this project given that the 
conceptual development of the principles in question have long histories, but work that is 
particularly relevant to reproductive rights today is clustered around the women's and 
disability rights movements of the 1960s and 70s, the establishment of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, and the R. v. Morgentaler decision in 1988. 
Feminist and disability-related critiques of reproduction and reproductive technologies 
constitute a relatively recent body of literature, for disabled people and allies have only 
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within the last few decades found their voices in academia and public policy, beginning 
with political movements and the rise of feminism. Canadian law and theory shifted with 
the establishment of the Charter, so much so that the cases before and after the Charter 
came into effect have very different outcomes; Bliss v. Canada (Attorney General) 
(1979), for example, was criticized for its reliance on the concept of equality of sameness 
(Boyd & Sheehy, 1989; Porter, 2006; Young, 2006). I am also covering a time period 
when abortion legislation shifted dramatically in Western history, roughly corresponding 
to when the Morgentaler case was decided in Canada. Glendon notes in her comparative 
study of abortion legislation (including Canada), which was published in 1987: 
The first striking finding of a comparative survey of abortion regulation is 
that fundamental change has occurred in this area all over the W estem 
world in a relatively short period of time. Within less than two decades all 
but three of these twenty nations abandoned strict abortion laws-
introduced for the most part in the nineteenth century-in favour of a more 
permissive stance (p. 10). 
Even as she wrote this passage, Canada's current position on abortion had not taken form 
in Morgentaler (1988). I will focus on jurisprudence and policy that has developed since 
the shift made in Morgentaler because it is at around this point in Canadian history that 
we see principles like autonomy protecting women in reproductive contexts-the central 
focus of this work. 
The few policies and cases meant to regulate reproductive technologies are recent 
because the technologies themselves have only recently been developed, and so policy 
and law have only recently begun the work of catching up to technological 
advancements. In addition, wrongful birth suits have aided in the framing of 
reproductive decision-making in relation to developing reproductive technologies, but 
have only in recent decades more specifically pertained to technologies and instances 
when women gave birth to disabled infants (Arndt v. Smith, 1997; Krangle v. Brisco, 
2002). 
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This study will focus on Canada; it will incorporate foreign policy and law by 
means of comparison, and will engage international policy and law to the extent that it 
applies to Canada. Granted, important discourses on bioethics and critical theory exist 
outside the country and will be used. Just as is the case with time, conceptual 
developments have a tendency to transcend national borders. When discussing 
reproductive contexts, however, there is value to limiting the scope of this project given 
that reproductive contexts vary drastically from one country to the next (Henshaw, 2008). 
Moreover, legal principles found and developed in Canadian contexts differ in contrast 
with other contexts, which Chief Justice Dickson of the Supreme Court of Canada 
pointed out in Morgentaler: "we would, in my view, do our own Constitution a disservice 
to simply allow the American debate to define us, all the while ignoring the truly 
fundamental structural differences between the two constitutions" (1988, p. 53). 
1.3. Fields of Research 
The three principles evaluated in this project may be conceived medically and 
legally. As such, they are found in both bioethics (a field of applied ethics related to 
medical matters) and law. Throughout this project, I will highlight the points of overlap 
for the two fields, those instances when jurisprudence has been applied to medical-
especially reproductive-issues, and medical discourses have informed legal decisions. 
The following sections explore how bioethics is currently grounded and how Canadian 
constitutional law is interpreted. 
1.3.1. Bioethics 
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This project will explore the tenets and possible limitations of bioethics, a thirty-
year-old field of study which developed in reaction to medical abuses that took place, 
most notably, during World War II and throughout the Tuskegee Syphilis Study (Teays & 
Purdy, 2001 ). Says Viafora: "stimulated by perplexities and hopes, fuelled by the 
extraordinary biomedical progress, bioethics was initially conceived as a reflection on the 
conditions for dealing responsibly with the power of modem medicine" (1996, p. 7). 
Bioethics involves the formulation of ethical guidelines for understanding and regulating 
health-related matters. The movement advocates practical, applied ethics, representing a 
departure from "high ethics"-ethical theories which are not meant for any particular 
context. 
Engelhardt (1986) questions whether it is possible to establish an objective 
foundation for ethical canon. If one were to appeal to either intuitions or consequences, 
the problem of ranking and comparing competing intuitions or outcomes would require 
theoretical foundations, and "the possibility of establishing such a theory is exactly what 
is at issue" (p. 34). One might also posit the possibility of a hypothetical observer, a 
rational agent who would make choices from behind a veil of ignorance (Rawls, 1999). 
Engelhardt rejects this possible grounding of bioethics as well, arguing that the 
disinterested party can only judge concrete health-related dilemmas by weighing benefits 
and harms, and can only do so by referencing one of many competing hierarchies of 
benefits and harms. 
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Engelhardt concludes by further rejecting the use of natural law to ground 
bioethics. Natural law is typically predicated on a higher power creating an essential set 
of laws that human law is meant to emulate. There are influential Christian bioethicists 
who find natural law to be an acceptable way of grounding the field (Lebacqz, 1986; 
McCormick, 1981 ); Ramsey (1970) mounts a critique of in vitro fertilization with a 
theology-based natural law approach, for instance. As noted in Callahan (1990) and 
Viafora (1996), however, bioethics has become more secularized, such that current 
bioethicists tend not to rely on natural law or a deity to serve as a basis for moral rules 
and reasoning. 
Beauchamp and Childress (2009) propose instead that ethics is grounded in the 
consensus of communities: "morality refers to norms about right and wrong human 
conduct that are so widely shared that they form a stable (although usually incomplete) 
social consensus" (pp. 2-3). Such an ethics may be provisional, hinging on the 
composition of the community holding consensus. It may also be in danger of silencing 
voices in the minority; consensus as General Will-reminiscent of Rousseau-seems 
impossible in pluralities, and a moral consensus via a majority rules standard requires that 
people in the minority are outvoted. However, in the absence of a sound explanation for 
how one might ground ethics in a transcendent, abstract foundation, our best recourse 
may be to rely on people in contexts to deliberate and decide-as well as to test and 
revise--ethical codes by consensus. 
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A principle-based paradigm has dominated the history of bioethics (Engelhardt, 
1986; Macklin, 1987; Veatch, 1981, 1997). Such a paradigm relies on principles to 
ground ethical codes and conduct. According to Reich, "a principal shortcoming of the 
principle-based approach is that, by emphasizing the abstract features of a universal ethic 
(such as universal rights, equal dignity, etc.) it has excluded much of the particular moral 
experience of the moral agents involved" (1996, p. 102). An experiential-based paradigm 
has emerged in bioethical literature, but it means to incorporate experience into analysis 
ofbioethical principles rather than do away completely with principles (Gilligan, 1982; 
Reich, 1996; Toulmin, 1981). 
There is value to a more experiential paradigm as long as the experiences 
accounted for include those experiences of marginalized peoples. Originally developed 
in order to represent the interests of marginalized groups, bioethics has been criticized for 
taking a different direction since its professionalization (Holmes, 1999; Purdy, 2001). 
Feminist bioethics has emerged in an effort to prioritize the vantage points of those who 
lack privilege but have a stake in health matters. This brand of bioethics is experientially 
grounded because abstractions tend to gloss over already marginalized perspectives 
(Holmes & Purdy, 1992). The experience that grounds feminist bioethics can be found in 
relational interactive frameworks as well as personal embodiment, especially given that 
women have experienced inequality as a result of the medical treatment of their bodies 
(Bordo, 1993; Mahowald, 1993). Feminist bioethicist Wendell (1996) introduced to 
bioethics the intersection of gender and disability, proposing that both female and 
disabled bodies are subject to prejudice in the medical field. 
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Given that bioethical issues often intersect with disability, it is especially valuable 
to account for disabled people's perspectives when considering how to proceed with 
bioethical discourse (Grosz, 1994; Shakespeare, 2006; Wendell, 1996). Scully (2008) 
argues for the inclusion of the voices of disabled people in the shaping of bioethics: "to 
address the gaps in our understanding bioethics needs more than just empirical data. The 
subjective experience of disabled people is a necessary part of grasping what it is like to 
live within an impaired embodiment" (p. 154). Shildrick (1997) cautions against the 
historical study of ethics that "has produced numerous more or less monolithic systems of 
explanation" (p. 1 ). She advocates a feminist postmodern bioethics that destabilizes 
paternalistic epistemologies, and that is rooted in embodiments: 
The postmodern perspective ... seems to undermine not only the hitherto 
entrenched givens of a male en-gendered epistemology, but also the very 
ground on which women might seek to position their own project. In so 
far as the deconstruction of boundaries and the recognition of radical 
differences is at the heart of postmodernist feminist enterprise, the very 
category of 'women' becomes difficult to appeal to in any unambiguous 
way. Where signification is acknowledged as slippery and treacherous, 
the issue becomes not the creation of new normative standards, but a 
persistent endeavour to forefront the instability and provisionality of the 
concepts with which one is dealing (p. 2). 
Keeping in mind the disagreements in bioethical discourse, I put forward that this 
project will engage bioethics as both a field worthy of evaluation and an evaluative tool. 
I intend to present and assess the field of bioethics and its contributions to the theoretical 
development of principles that have been applied to reproductive contexts and 
technologies. The conceptual model that will serve as a lens for my assessment will draw 
from bioethics, specifically strands of bioethics which have been or can be grounded in 
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critical feminism and disability theory, both of which hold experience and embodiment to 
be important starting points for theory. 
1.3.2. Law 
When investigating the legal field, this project will focus predominantly on cases 
involving constitutional law-namely, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
Established in 1982, the Charter came into effect in 1985 and replaced the Canadian Bill 
of Rights (1960). Whereas the Bill was a federal statute and as such was both limited in 
scope and too easy for Parliament to amend, the Charter as part of the Canadian 
Constitution did not share these shortcomings. The establishment of the Charter 
enhanced "the role of the judiciary in the governance of Canada" (Sharpe, 2000, p. 191) 
as the body responsible for upholding and enacting the protections found in the 
document. The statute consists of rights and freedoms that are held to be essential in a 
"free and democratic society" (s. 1). These rights and freedoms are the benchmarks that 
judicial courts use in order to determine whether laws, institutions, and practices are just. 
The Supreme Court of Canada developed a purposive approach to interpreting 
and applying the Charter and other statutes. According to the purposive approach-"the 
cornerstone of Charter interpretation" (Sharpe, 2000, p. 208)-courts are not to enact the 
letter of the law, that is, are not to take the wording in statutes literally. Instead, they are 
to enact the spirit of the law-the original intention that legislators had when drafting the 
statute, or the rationale behind the statute. 
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The purposive approach is characterized in Hunter v. Southam Inc. (1984), the 
first time the courts considered the Charter's s. 8 right to privacy. The provincial 
government of Alberta had ordered a search of Southam Newspaper before the enactment 
of the Charter, though the search took place after. It was determined that the Combines 
Investigation Act, under which the search was ordered, was inconsistent with the Charter 
and thus no longer had effect. In this case, C.J. Dickson characterized the purpose of a 
constitutional document. For him, a constitutional document must have room for 
development over time and with changes in context, "to meet new social, political, and 
historical realities often unimagined by its framers" (supra note 69). He went on: "the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is a purposive document. Its purpose is to 
guarantee and to protect, within the limits of reason, the enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms it enshrines" (p. 156). Chief Justice Dickson reiterated the meaning of the 
purposive approach elsewhere: 
In my view, this analysis is to be undertaken, and the purpose of the right 
or freedom in question is to be sought by reference to the character and the 
larger objects of the Charter itself, to the language chosen to articulate the 
specific right or freedom, to the historical origins of the concepts 
enshrined, and where applicable, to the meaning and purpose of the other 
specific rights and freedoms with which it is associated within the text of 
the Charter. The interpretation should be ... a generous rather than a 
legalistic one, aimed at fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee and securing 
for individuals the full benefit of the Charter's protection. At the same 
time it is important not to overshoot the actual purpose of the right or 
freedom in question, but to recall that the Charter was not enacted in a 
vacuum, and must therefore ... be placed in its proper linguistic, philosophic 
and historical contexts (R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd, 1985, supra note 555). 
5 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. (1985) was the first case to consider the Charter's s. 2, 
freedom of conscience and religion. In this case, the store Big M Drug Mart was charged 
with selling goods on a Sunday contrary to the Lord's Day Act. The Supreme Court of 
Canada found that the Act did indeed violates. 2. 
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In this seminal passage, C.J. Dickson advocated interpreting Charter rights and freedoms 
generously, and applying the original intention behind the wording. In this way, the 
constitutional document continues to be relevant and may yet change in light of the 
contexts to which it is applied. 
As an example, a later legal case reinforcing the purposive approach to statutory 
interpretation is Rizzo & Rizzo Ltd. (Re) (1998), in which a bankrupted company claimed 
that they owed employees neither termination nor severance pay under the Employment 
Standards Act. According to the Act, termination and severance pay were owed only 
when the employer was responsible for terminating employment, but bankruptcy was not 
included in the "termination by an employer" language. The Supreme Court of Canada 
decided that the purpose of both the Employment Standards Act and the provisions for 
termination and severance pay is to protect employees. It would therefore be inconsistent 
with the spirit of the Act and these provisions to rule that bankruptcy does not qualify as 
an instance when the employer is responsible for termination. 
Rather than focus on the wording in the Employment Standards Act, the Court 
considered the intention behind it: 
Statutory interpretation cannot be founded on the wording of the 
legislation alone. The words of an Act are to be read in their entire context 
and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme 
of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament (pp. 2-3). 
This statement, reiterated by Justice Iacobucci, drew from Driedger (1983), a Canadian 
legal scholar and leading expert on the purposive approach to statutory interpretation. 
For Driedger, the letter of the law, the explicit wording in a document, is not as important 
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as its purpose, and the intention of the legislators. Justice Iacobucci also noted in his 
ruling that according to Ontario's Interpretation Act (1990), every Act "shall be deemed 
to be remedial" and shall "receive such fair, large and liberal construction and 
interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the Act according to its 
true intent, meaning and spirit" (as cited in Rizzo, 1998, p. 3). 
According to Sharpe: 
The most difficult issue in the interpretation of Charter rights is 
reconciling the rights of the individual with the competing rights of others 
and with the interests of the community at large. The problem is 
especially acute when rights are broadly defined, as they were likely to be 
following the purposive approach (2000, p. 208). 
In light of this potential challenge, the Charter imposes a limit to constitutional 
protections, built into its first section. When applying the Charter in legal cases, the 
Court undergoes a two-step process. It must determine firstly whether a right has been 
violated, and secondly whether the violation can be saved under the statute's s. 1: "the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in 
it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society". The burden of proving the violation rests with 
the claimant in the first step; it then shifts to the defendant in the second step, to prove the 
violation is justifiable in this one case in order to uphold freedom and democracy. 
Section 1 therefore involves reconciling competing collective (the free and democratic 
society) and individual interests (the Charter violation) (Sharpe, 2000). 
The test for determining whether a violation can be saved under s. 1 was 
developed in the case of R. v. Oakes (1986). Charged with possession of narcotics that 
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were allegedly medicinal, David Edwin Oakes challenged the Narcotic Control Act on 
the grounds of s. 11 ( d)' s presumption of innocence guarantee. Section 8 of the Act 
involves an onus on the accused to prove lack of possession for the purpose of 
trafficking. This onus contradicts the guarantee that the accused is presumed innocent. 
The Court ruled that the shift of onus violated s. 11 ( d) of the Act and s. 7 of the Charter, 
and could not be saved under s. 1. 
In this case, the Court developed the Oakes Test; under this Test they identified 
the exceptional criteria according to which rights can be justifiably limited under s. 1. 
The two functions of s. I were identified: "first, it guarantees the rights and freedoms set 
out in the provisions which follow it; and second, it states explicitly the exclusive 
justificatory criteria ... against which limitations on those rights and freedoms may be 
measured" (p. 4). That is, Charter rights are to be upheld, albeit limited by specific 
conditions that are justifiable in a free and democratic society. Such a society serves as 
the standard for limiting Charter rights under s. 1 because the purpose of the Charter is 
to guarantee that society be free and democratic. The standard was defined in Oakes as 
follows: 
The Court must be guided by the values and principles essential to a free 
and democratic society which I believe embody, to name but a few, 
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment to social 
justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect 
for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political institutions 
which enhance the participation of individuals and groups in society (p. 
40). 
The first of two justificatory criteria is as follows: "first, the objective to be served 
by the measures limiting a Charter right must be sufficiently important to warrant 
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overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom" (p. 5). That is, the overarching 
collective interest in saving the infringement to a constitutional right must far outweigh 
the individual interest in not having one's right infringed. For the second criterion, "the 
party invoking s. 1 must show the means to be reasonable and demonstrably justified" (p. 
5). The limit must be reasonable and justifiable, as determined by a proportionality test. 
This test consists of three components: 
To begin, the measures must be fair and not arbitrary, carefully designed 
to achieve the objective in question and rationally connected to that 
objective. In addition, the means should impair the right in question as 
little as possible. Lastly, there must be a proportionality between the 
effects of the limiting measure and the objective-the more severe the 
deleterious effects of a measure, the more important the objective must be 
(p. 5). 
For the first component of the proportionality test, the law which would violate a 
constitutional right must be rationally connected to achieving a certain aim. In so doing, 
should the law lead to an infringement, this infringement must be minimal, that is, must 
only infringe upon a right to the most necessary extent. Lastly, the Court must weigh the 
objective or the aim of the law-an objective which has been rationally connected with 
the legislation being tested-against the extent to which there are effects to limiting 
Charter rights. A Charter limit must be in proportion to a pressing objective. 
1.4. Reproductive Context 
In what follows, I review Canadian policy on reproduction and the delivery 
services available. The dearth in abortion regulation has resulted in vastly different 
services across provinces and territories, and the barriers that have sprung up will be of 
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interest as this study develops. Further, I will consider the disability diagnostic 
technologies made available to pregnant women or women seeking to become pregnant. 
These technologies, I will go on to argue, reshape our legal and moral discourses on 
reproductive decision-making, and call for a re-framing of the rights applied. 
1. 4.1. Abortion Services in Canada 
Abortion for health-related reasons was decriminalized in 1969 when the Trudeau 
administration amended s. 251(4) (later found under s. 287) in the Criminal Code: 
abortion was only possible if"the continuation of the pregnancy of such female person 
would or would be likely to endanger her life or health", as determined by an abortion 
committee comprised of medical professionals. According to abortion advocate Saporta 
(2009), abortions at the time had to be approved by the Therapeutic Abortion Committees 
established in hospitals, and cases were only approved if the pregnancy endangered life 
or health: 
In order to obtain a legal abortion, women were forced to face an 
intimidating process of going before a hospital committee to petition for 
care. This policy established unequal access to abortion throughout the 
provinces and territories, and made it particularly difficult for women 
outside major urban centres to obtain abortion care. It is estimated during 
this time that 35,000 to 120,000 illegal abortions took place each year (p. 
3). 
In R. v. Morgentaler (1988), Dr. Henry Morgentaler (along with two other 
physicians) was charged with illegally inducing miscarriages in his clinic in Toronto. 
The Supreme Court of Canada ruled five to two that s. 251 violated s. 7 of the Charter 
(1982) in such a way that was not in accord with the principles of fundamental justice, 
and could not be saved by s. 1. Morgentaler went on to advocate for the expansion of 
reproductive rights in more legal cases (R. v. Morgentaler, 1993; Morgentaler v. New 
Brunswick, 1994; Morgentaler v. Prince Edward Island, l 995, Morgentaler v. New 
Brunswick, 2008), and the decision made in Morgentaler (1988) was reinforced in 
subsequent cases (Borowski v. Canada, 1989; Tremblay v. Daigle, 1989; R. v. Sullivan, 
1991; Dobson (Litigation Guardian of) v. Dobson, 1999). 
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The Morgentaler decision did encounter resistance. The Progressive 
Conservative federal government at the time introduced Bill 43, which would have re-
criminalized abortion, although the Bill was defeated by Senate in 1991 (Richer, 2008). 
In 1989, Nova Scotia intended to prohibit abortions outside hospitals and deny abortion 
funding, in an effort to prevent a two-tiered health system and to ensure high quality care; 
the Supreme Court of Canada struck down this policy in 1993 (Erdman, 2008). New 
Brunswick also attempted to enact law to prohibit abortion clinics, and this policy too 
was struck down by the Supreme Court (Erdman, 2008). In 2008, four private members' 
bills pertaining to abortion were introduced, and Bill C-484-according to which 
harming or causing the death of an unborn child while committing an offence against the 
mother would constitute a crime--passed second reading but was ultimately defeated 
(Richer, 2008). 
Abortion is considered a medically necessary procedure by all provincial and 
territorial colleges of physicians and surgeons in Canada. Inasmuch as abortion is a 
medically necessary procedure, provinces and territories are bound by the Canada Health 
Act to provide free access to the service in order to qualify for their full federal funding 
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for healthcare; however, federal governments have not taken many measures to ensure 
that provinces and territories comply (Richer, 2008). The Liberal Independent Health 
Facilities Act (IHFA, 1990), originally introduced in order to enable governments to 
regulate and facilitate the delivery of health services, once gave preference to funding 
non-profit, Canadian-owned providers such as abortion clinics; but with the Conservative 
Bill 26, this preference in the IHF A was removed, leading to a redefining of medically 
necessary services and extra billing for those no longer deemed medically necessary 
(Gilmour, 2002). Says Gilmour: 
The IHF A might have provided a framework for increased availability of 
and choice in abortion services. Owing to political pressures, fears of 
harassment and violence, limited resources and personnel, and disapproval 
or indifference, abortions are not available at many hospitals. Often a 
free-standing clinic is women's only option. While the statue could have 
been employed to facilitate the establishment of independent health 
facilities performing the procedure, it was not (p. 286). 
Abortion access varies according to the province or territory. Prince Edward 
Island lacks in-province abortion services, although women in the province can access 
funding for out-of-province services as long as they obtain a referral from their physician. 
New Brunswick only offers abortions in hospital settings, and requires that abortions are 
performed by gynaecologists in the first trimester of pregnancy, only after two physicians 
have deemed the procedure medically necessary. Prairie provinces typically offer 
services near the southern US/Canada border, requiring that some women travel vast 
distances. Only British Columbia, Quebec, and Ontario provide abortions past twenty 
weeks of pregnancy; in these provinces, waiting lists vary, and are especially long for 
women in rural areas (Dunn, 2008). 
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1.4.2. Reproductive Technologies 
The SOGC (2007a) defines prenatal screening in the following way: "screening is 
the process of surveying a population, using a specific marker or markers and defined 
screening cut-off levels, to identify the individuals in the population at higher risk for a 
particular disorder" (p. 14 7). The SOGC goes on to discuss the purpose of prenatal 
screening-screening for chromosomal anomalies: "in Canada, the option of invasive 
testing has been recommended when a woman's risk of having a pregnancy with a 
chromosome anomaly was higher than the risks associated with the common invasive 
procedure (amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling)" (p. 148). Both of the listed 
invasive procedures are considered prenatal genetic tests: DNA is extracted from fetal 
cell sampling and is tested for chromosomal anomalies (MacKay & Fraser, 1993; SOGC, 
2009). Amniocentesis may be used to detect abnormal levels of alpha-fetoprotein, which 
are associated with congenital impairments (MacKay & Fraser, 1993 ). 
Prenatal screening, specifically amniocentesis, was introduced to Canada in the 
late 1960s, and medical genetic centres using amniocentesis were established in major 
cities by 1971. By this time Dr. Malcolm Brown was federally appointed to investigate 
the health risks associated with amniocentesis, which had by then become a matter of 
public concern. The report he and his team released in 1977 found that the risks were 
negligible and that the procedure along with genetic counselling were effective in the 
detection of genetic impairments (MacKay & Fraser, 1993). 
Less invasive and far more pervasive, ultrasound technology can now also be 
used to identify some chromosomal anomalies, such as Down Syndrome (Trisomy 21). 
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Ultrasounds produce images of what is interior to the body through the use of sound 
waves (SOGC, 2008). A reason for submitting to an ultrasound when pregnant include, 
among other reasons, "to check for signs of a possible genetic problem" (SOGC, 2008, p. 
2). First used to identify anencephaly, or the absence of a skull and upper brain, 
ultrasounds have been employed frequently "to detect increasingly subtle structural and 
functional abnormalities such as gastrointenstinal tract anomalies, urinary tract 
anomalies, congenital heart defects and skeletal dysplasia" (MacKay & Fraser, 1993, p. 
15). The SOGC (2005) makes the following recommendation regarding ultrasounds: 
The screening ultrasound at 16 to 20 weeks should evaluate 8 markers, 5 
of which ... are associated with an increased risk of fetal aneuploidy, and in 
some cases with nonchromosomal problems, while 3 ... are only associated 
with an increased risk of nonchromosomal abnormalities when seen in 
isolation (p. 592). 
An alternative to testing in utero, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis "involves the 
diagnosis of a genetic disease before a pregnancy has been established" (SOGC, 2009, p. 
762), such as instances of in vitro fertilization when embryos can be tested before 
implanted in the uterus. The SOGC recommends pre-implantation genetic diagnosis for 
carriers of single gene disorders6 and chromosomal anomalies (or aneuploidies 7), women 
who repeatedly failed either to conceive via in vitro fertilization or to carry to term, and 
older women trying to bear children (SOGC, 2009). 
6 The most common single gene disorders detected by pre-implantation genetic diagnosis 
are identified by the SOGC as follows: cystic fibrosis, beta-thalassemia, spinal muscular 
atrophy, sickle-cell anaemia, Huntington disease, myotonic dystrophy type 1, muscular 
dystrophy, haemophilia, and fragile-x syndrome. 
7 Aneuploidy refers to an atypical amount of chromosomes, leading to genetic 
impairments. For example, Trisomy (three copies of a chromosome when chromosomes 
otherwise tend to come in pairs) produces Down Syndrome (Trisomy 21), Edwards 
Syndrome (Trisomy 18), and Patau Syndrome (Trisomy 13). 
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The SOGC (2007a) recommends the following in their recent clinical practice 
guidelines for prenatal screening of fetal aneuoploidies: "all pregnant women in Canada, 
regardless of age, should be offered, through an informed consent process, a prenatal 
screening test for the most common clinically significant fetal aneuploidies in addition to 
a second trimester ultrasound for dating, growth, and anomalies" (p. 149). The SOGC 
(2007b) provided the logic motivating this shift away from the previous practice of only 
recommending screening to women over thirty-five or at medical risk: "it is our belief 
that to deny women access to any information about the health or development of their 
child, when this information is readily available, is wrong and a disservice to Canadian 
women and their families" (unpaginated). The technology has thus come to be 
considered an aid in reproductive decision-making, a way of enabling women to make 
more informed reproductive choices. 
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Chapter 2: Autonomy 
In this chapter, I will examine how autonomy frames reproductive decision-
making in the context of disability diagnosis. To begin, I will explore autonomy theories, 
and will determine how feminist disability discourse confronts these theories. I will then 
consider bioethics, where the canonical principle of autonomy is made manifest in 
informed consent and decisional capacity; and law, where autonomy is protected by the 
Charter's s. 7 rights to life, liberty, and security of the person. These themes will be tied 
together in reference to reproductive autonomy, especially in reproductive contexts that 
involve reproductive technologies. In these contexts, autonomy language tends to frame 
the matter in terms of maternal responsibility. I will consider how the burden of 
responsibility to promote fetal health, even to avoid fetal impairments, is predicated on a 
specific, and problematic, definition of autonomy. 
2.1. Theories of Autonomy 
This chapter will chart the conceptual development of autonomy, beginning with 
the moral autonomy of Kantian moral philosophy. I will next characterize personal 
autonomy, the cornerstone of liberalisms. Finally, I will introduce relational autonomy, 
found in feminisms and disability theories. In every section, I will mount a critique 
grounded in feminist disability theory. Disabled bodies and pregnant bodies, because 
they represent leaky, uncomfortable alterity, disrupt autonomy theories-especially those 
theories that radically isolate individuals and are predicated on abstract notions of 
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personhood. Given the rich history of the philosophies, this section may require broad 
brush strokes. I will focus on watershed moments in the conceptual development of the 
principle, specifically the ones which will best apply to later arguments in this project. 
2.1.1. Moral Autonomy 
Overview of Kantian Theory 
The concept of autonomy has been foundational to moral and political 
philosophies since the rise of Enlightenment humanism of the 1700s, a time which 
ushered in new scientific, philosophical, and political advances that would define modern 
Western thought (Lukes, 1973). In his account of the history of modem moral 
philosophy, Schneewind (1998) credits Enlightenment intellectual Kant with inventing a 
concept of morality that equates with autonomy. Moral autonomy of the Kantian 
tradition refers to a person's capacity to self-impose universal moral law, that is, to make 
choices in accordance with one's moral obligations: "the will of every rational being [is] 
a will that legislates universal law" (Kant, 1993, 2.431 ). Kantian moral philosophy 
represents a departure from (or at least a drastic refashioning of) natural law theories 
predating the Enlightenment, according to which morality was grounded in God (Crowe, 
1977; Haakonssen, 1996). Although God still has a place in Kantian theory, the 
philosopher argues that autonomy consists in self-governance rather than obedience to a 
deity. He laments: "we still have a long way to go before men as a whole can be in a 
position ... of using their own understanding confidently and well in [political and 
religious] matters, without outside guidance" (Kant, 2002, p. 3). 
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For Kant (1999), morality entails acting in accordance with universal law, the 
source of which must derive solely from form rather than content. That is, universal law 
is discernible only via reason, and cannot be empirically grounded. This is because 
empirically grounded moral systems-those based on subjective interests and 
motivations-cannot provide a standard by which we might act morally or judge human 
actions as moral. Any action motivated by an interest in happiness or one's own welfare, 
for instance, would not be considered a moral action, for it would be driven by the 
personal rather than the universal, or by a standard which may not be shared by other 
moral beings (O'Neill, 2002). 
Kant (1999) argues that there is only one universal law, that is, one law with 
content that consists in its form: the categorical imperative. According to a formulation 
of the categorical imperative, one must "act only according to that maxim whereby you 
can at the same time will that it should become a universal law without contradiction" 
(1993, 2.421). A maxim is a subjective principle for action or a practical rule. For a 
maxim to be moral, it must theoretically hold as a universal law without admitting of any 
logical contradictions. In one of Kant's examples (1993), a man who is hard-pressed for 
money considers whether he could universalize the maxim that someone in financial need 
may borrow money on the false promise that he can repay the loan. This maxim is 
impossible to universalize because if everybody lied in order to receive loans, that would 
lead to a lack of trust on the part of those giving money, and as a result the practice of 
pay lending would collapse. The logical contradiction inherent in a hypothesized, 
universalized practice of lying indicates that the maxim is immoral. 
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Kantian moral theory is predicated on the human will, by which one chooses 
actions. The philosopher interprets pure practical reason (a combination of objective and 
subjective reasoning) as will. The actions that the will is capable of choosing may be 
subjective maxims "when the condition is regarded by the subject as valid only for his 
own will", and objective laws "when the condition is recognized as objective, that is, 
valid for the will of every rational being" ( 1999, p. 14 ). Arriving at the categorical 
imperative requires that the agent can choose his8 own actions independent of external, 
heteronomous factors (hetero meaning different or other, and nomos meaning law or 
governance). It is not enough to say that a moral being obeys moral law; rather, a moral 
being wilfully chooses actions in accordance with moral law, which can be discerned 
through rational thought. The will as a condition for morality entails independent 
reflection, choice, and action. 
Kant on Autonomy 
Moral autonomy thus plays a central role in the exercise of the will (Kant, 1993, 
1999; Korsgaard, 1996). In Kant's (1993) own words: 
Autonomy of the will is the property that the will has of being a law to 
itself .... That the above principle of autonomy [the categorical imperative] 
is the sole principle of morals can quite well be shown by mere analysis of 
8 I employ male pronouns only when dealing with authors who did the same. The use of 
male pronouns to indicate neutrality is a common literary device with built-in sexist 
assumptions about what has historically been considered neutral, legitimate, and 
authoritative. Many early modem Western philosophies were arguably not meant to 
account for women, and this is a significant point to note and to preserve given that it is 
my intention to mount a feminist critique of these philosophies. That is, it is my intention 
to point to who is missing in these theories, and why their absence renders these theories 
problematic. 
the concepts of morality; for thereby the principle of morals is found to be 
necessarily a categorical imperative, which commands nothing more nor 
less than this very autonomy (2.440). 
For this philosopher, a moral being may be motivated to act by his own desires and 
emotions (in which case he has a heteronomous will and spurious moral principles); or, 
47 
when acting autonomously, he may be motivated by his rational faculties, which like the 
rational faculties of all other moral beings, can arrive at the same categorical imperative. 
Moral autonomy thus provides a basis for moral obligation, for we can only take 
responsibility for our actions if we have the power to choose them. Morality is rational, 
and as such rational beings are capable of recognizing it; those with heteronomous wills, 
wills driven to act by myriad influences external to it, may choose a different course of 
action, but all those capable of recognizing morality are responsible for enacting it. 
As the unit of value in Kant's moral philosophy, autonomy is the justification for 
both judging and respecting other moral beings. For, moral autonomy is central to 
personhood, which is the condition for moral consideration. Given that all moral beings 
are responsible for legislating moral law, it would be immoral not to respect the 
autonomy of other beings like oneself, those other legislators of moral law. Hence the 
second formulation of the categorical imperative, called the Autonomy Formula: "act in 
such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any 
other, always at the same time as an end and never merely as a means to an end" (1993, 
2.429). A moral being may be treated as an end in himself when he is recognized as 
autonomous, as capable of also enacting moral law, and unobstructed from doing so. 
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Honouring autonomy is therefore a condition for good state governance: "freedom 
(independence from being constrained by another's choice) insofar as it can coexist with 
the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only original right 
belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity" (1996, 6.237). A moral society 
consists in honouring the autonomy of its members, rather than imposing any particular 
notion of happiness or welfare on its members. Such a society is characterized as a 
hypothetical kingdom of ends in the third formulation of the categorical imperative: 
"every rational being must so act as ifhe were through his maxim always a legislating 
member in the universal kingdom of ends" (1993, 2.438). The kingdom of ends is Kant's 
utopia-what the ideal contract would look like between other moral beings. Maxims 
that are moral would harmonize with the kingdom of ends insofar as they would not lead 
to the compromising of the autonomy of another person, or the treatment of another 
person as a means rather than as an end in himself. 
That which does not qualify as a person is motivated by "alien causes" (1993, 
3 .446), causes external to it, rather than by will power. The Kantian definition of 
personhood as the condition for moral value includes autonomy, and his 
conceptualization of autonomy is predicated on rationality, that which enables one to 
identify universal law. While persons must be honoured according to the categorical 
imperative, those things which do not qualify for moral consideration are valuable only 
instrumentally, as a means for moral beings to achieve their own purposes. This is 
because things are not rational, cannot will themselves to act, and as such are not 
autonomous. That which is not autonomous needs not be treated as an end in itself: 
Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature have, 
nevertheless, if they are not rational beings, only a relative value as means 
and are therefore called things. On the other hand, rational beings are 
called persons inasmuch as their nature already marks them out as ends in 
themselves (1993, 2.428). 
Critique of Moral Autonomy 
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The universal character of morality is suspicious, especially given that according 
to Kant universal law is only identifiable to those deemed worth moral consideration, 
those members of an exclusionary category. Exclusionary moral systems tend to 
privilege particular perspectives and misrepresent those perspectives as neutral and 
authoritative (Harding, 1995; Longino, 2002; Shildrick, 1997). Those legislators of 
moral law determine who qualifies as a person and how those relegated to the fringes of 
personhood are treated. Positing the universality of law thus has the effect of 
legitimizing oppressive practices and silencing those who have been discredited as 
nonpersons. A definition of personhood that hinges on one's rational faculties and 
discounts subjectivity has historically excluded disabled people and women, among 
others (Bartky, 1990; Koch, 2001; Lloyd, 1984; Sherwin, 1998). According to Kittay: 
"personhood in the past has ... been used ... to exclude specific humans: women, slaves, 
Jews, certain racial groups, the disabled-those who, for one reason or another, were 
believed unworthy or incapable of rationality and self-governance" (2005, p. 101 ). 
Those belonging to unworthy minority categories have often been defined 
corporeally, for the purpose of divesting them of moral consideration, for corporeal-
bound beings cannot access moral law. Some disabled people, for instance, are 
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constantly forced to confront their embodiments as vehicles through which they engage 
with their surroundings. Clare (2007) considers how disability compels both awareness 
of one's corporeal reality and negotiation with one's surroundings. The author illustrates 
how he engages the world through a body that trembles and contorts, uncontrollably and 
even painfully. He is ever present in his body; his body is always reminding him that it is 
there. His knowledge, experiences, and politics are all mediated through an embodiment 
of which he cannot be unconscious: 
My scars don't come from a surgeon's scalpel, an unusual circumstance 
for anyone physically disabled since birth. My quad muscles were never 
cut, sewn back together. Achilles tendons, never severed. Pins, never 
inserted into hips and knees. The bodies of disabled people so often end 
up criss-crossed with scars, childhoods punctuated by surgery. But not 
mine: my skin didn't become a map. For that, I need to go subterranean. 
Muscles knotted, tendons inflamed, vertebrae too sore to touch (p. 77). 
Clare readily admits that he cannot transcend his embodiment. This is not necessarily a 
problem, not unless you are a Kantian. For, Clare cannot reach the heights of abstraction 
and objectivity that Kant expects of him. Through the Kantian lens, Clare's cerebral 
palsy is non-ideal, and it is only through the idealization of the body that theories like 
Kant's can ignore the body, even cut it away from human consciousness. Wendell (1996) 
describes this ideal as that which disabled people struggle to approximate: 
The ideals change from time to time, but there always seem to be ideals. 
Body ideals include not only ideals of appearance, which are particularly 
influential for women (Bartky, 1990), but also ideals of strength, energy, 
movement, function, and proper control; the latter are unnoticed 
assumptions for most people who can meet them, but they leap to the 
foreground for those who are sick or disabled (p. 86). 
To the extent that disabled people are ever present in their bodies, theories like Kant's 
characterize them as lacking in the key markers for personhood, such as "self-
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consciousness, rationality, autonomy, and so on" (McMahan, 2005, p. 235); if they are 
persons at all, they are only marginally so (McMahan, 2005; Vehmas, 2004). When they 
are thusly marginalized, it is not morally obligatory to treat disabled people with respect, 
and it is morally permissible to make decisions on their behalf, for their own good. 
Wendell goes on to argue that the myth of the normalized body justifies cultural control 
over those bodies considered non-ideal. Although Clare (2007) does not admit to this 
being his own experience in the above passage, he indicates, as do other scholars (Asch, 
2006; Marks, 1999; Silvers, 1998a), that there exist disabled people whose bodies are 
medically, even surgically, maintained or repaired because their bodies fall short of a 
functional or aesthetic ideal. 
Women too have historically been considered incapable of transcending their 
pliant, dirty corporeality: 
Women are supposedly rooted in base corporeality. . .. And it is this 
supposed immanence that provides the justification, within the discourse 
of liberal humanism, for the exclusion of women from the attribute of full 
rationality, which is one of the essential parameters of moral agency. As a 
consequence, women are denied control of the very bodies which they 
have failed to transcend (Shildrick, 1997, p. 81 ). 
In a similar vein, Grosz ( 1994) describes how women's corporeal grounding has served 
as justification for their subordination: "patriarchal oppression ... justifies itself, at least in 
part, by connecting women much more closely than men to the body and, through this 
identification, restricting women's social and economic roles to (pseudo) biological 
terms" (p. 14). Examples of disciplinary practices include the use of cosmetics, hair care, 
fashion, as well as feminine gestures and manners (Bartky, 1990; Young, 2005). Bartky 
(1990) discusses how beauty rituals aid in the objectification of women's bodies, a 
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process which denies women their subjectivity; when they are objectified, rendered 
objects, they are thought to be nothing other than bodies: "sexual objectification is a form 
of fragmentation and thus an impoverishment of the objectified individual; it involves too 
the implicit denial of those who suffer it that they have capacities which transcend the 
merely sexual" (pp. 35-36). 
Female bodies are not only sexualized through beauty rituals, for maternal bodies 
are subject to different kinds of control. The social and economic practices identified in 
Grosz ( 1994) refer to the tasks of child bearing and rearing, as though all the 
responsibilities of household maintenance and motherhood are bound to women's 
reproductive capacities. Women so defined by biologically limiting roles are also 
thought to require management, just as disabled bodies have been managed through 
medication, rehabilitation, surgical correction, and so on. The maternal body disrupts the 
notion of a unified, ideal, masculine body, for the bleeding, bloating, lactating maternal 
body is unruly and messy. Kukla (2005) describes the implications: "mothers [have 
historically been] implored to develop self-control and self-discipline in order to 
compensate for their vulnerable and poorly bounded bodies" (p. 85). Where to locate 
reproductive control has historically been at issue because women cannot escape their 
baser corporeal reality, that is, cannot transcend it to make reasoned, abstract decisions 
because the messy processes of an embodiment that is impossible to idealize will be 
constantly reminding the subject that it is there. 
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2.1.2. Personal Autonomy 
Overview of Liberal Traditions 
Kant's work on autonomy permeated modem Western thought, including its 
political movements. His moral system translates into political theory in that the 
categorical imperative involves the honouring of autonomy in other persons (as 
articulated in the imperative's second formulation); moral beings are thus bound to 
certain obligations to one another. He also calls for the harmonization of one's maxims 
with a hypothetical kingdom of ends (as articulated in the third formulation); that is, 
moral beings must seek to emulate the kingdom of ends by acting autonomously, which 
means they are legislating moral law in reality. He is advocating a theory that one 
honours autonomous action via social contract9 (Kant, 1996). 
Social contract theory is a tradition first found in Enlightenment political 
philosophy, championed by influential thinkers including Hobbes (1985), Locke (1980), 
and later Rawls (1999). According to the thought experiment typical to social contract 
theories, human beings are imagined in their hypothetical state of nature (Hobbes, 1985; 
Locke, 1980) or original position (Rawls, 1999)-that which is logically prior to social 
positioning. They leave this state by entering into political society, which is built on a 
contract with one another. This contract is a tacit agreement that human beings will 
cooperate with one another and abide by laws. The value of this thought experiment is 
9 Although, Kelly (2005) describes Kant as "only equivocally contractualist" (p. 25) 
because Kant's model of consent as that which conforms to moral law does not require 
interpersonal agreement. This means that the social contract Kant envisions is entirely 
hypothetical, whereas the political theorists after him had concrete notions about political 
organization (during Kant's time, constitutional monarchies) based on rational consent. 
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that the state of nature from which human beings develop social contracts is a position 
that is free from external control. Ideally, then, decisions are made independently and 
rationally (Gauthier, 1986). Hobbesian (Gauthier, 1986; Hobbes, 1985) social contract 
theories hold that the motivation for entering into contracts is human self-interest, an 
interest in self-preservation; while another set of social contract theories (Locke, 1980; 
Rawls, 1999) draws from Kantian philosophy, according to which human beings are 
motivated by recognition of and respect for one another's autonomy, the basis for moral 
consideration (Kelly, 2005). 
One influential set of political theories stemming from this tradition is liberalism, 
according to which liberty or freedom (which Kant (1993) equates with autonomy) is a 
central political value (Kymlicka, 1996; Lukes, 1973). The legitimate use of political 
power would involve the promotion or protection of the freedom of citizens (Kelly, 
2005). During the Enlightenment, intellectuals concentrated on the contract between 
citizens and monarchies (Hobbes, 1985; Locke, 1980) while more recent theorists 
focused on democratically organized societies (Rawls, 1999), but the central premise 
running through the history of these theories is that a liberal society would not interfere 
with, but instead would serve the purpose of guaranteeing, the freedom of its citizens. 
Liberalisms on Autonomy and Freedom 
Although the development of liberalisms owes much to Kant, there is a significant 
point of departure. Kant holds that it is not enough to say that the will acts independently 
of external influence; the only other motivation for action is a moral imperative, in 
55 
principle accessible to all who are capable of rationality. There is no possibility for 
pluralism, for it is assumed that all rational beings are autonomous only insofar as they 
are enacting the same law. Disparate conceptions of what is right and actions motivated 
by one's own welfare (based on interests, values, and so forth) would indicate that the 
will is heteronomous, not autonomous. A theory that makes room for plurality would 
have to redefine autonomy or freedom: 
Though most or all of the classical conceptions of freedom as autonomy-
in the Stoics, Spinoza and in Kant-are in this sense closed conceptions, it 
may be possible to construct an account of autonomy which does not have 
the feature of requiring access to a single body of objective moral truths, 
but instead demands simply the free exercise of the human intelligence 
(Gray, 1995, p. 58). 
Within liberal traditions, theorists considered how political systems might 
accommodate diverse interests (Dworkin, 1988; Mill, 1978; Rawls, 1999), and theories of 
this nature are predicated on a different definition of freedom. In these theories, there is 
often a differentiation between freedom and autonomy, though the concepts are related 
(Berlin, 1969; Dworkin, 1988). Models of autonomy typically pertain to the states of 
persons, and their motivations for actions (Dworkin, 1988). What many liberal autonomy 
models share in common is the marked shift away from Kantian theory such that 
autonomy is a political rather than moral unit of value (O'Neill, 2002). Personal or 
individual autonomy is a property of persons that pertains to their motivations to act; they 
may be motivated by particular interests, purposes, reasons, values, and so forth, but the 
point is that they are self-motivated, rather than moved to act by external factors or 
constrained from action by other people. Autonomous will as a mechanism for actions 
can be found in Kant, but disparate motivations, plans, and purposes for acting have no 
place in his philosophy, at least not as an ideal. 
Personal autonomy is generally understood to refer to self-rule or self-
government, which in tum means authority over oneself (Christman, 1991; Dworkin, 
1988; Leino-Kilpi et al., 2000). The term itself derives from the Greek autos (self) and 
nomos (government or law). Kantian autonomy also involves a notion of self-
governance, but only to the extent that autonomy is the ability to legislate moral law. 
Self-government in later theories came to entail reflecting on choices and taking action 
independently (Dworkin, 1988). In his theory of individualism, Lukes (1973) links 
autonomy (as well as freedom) to self-direction, "according to which an individual's 
thought and action is his own, and not determined by agencies or causes outside his 
control" (p. 52). He goes on: 
A person is free in so far as his actions are his own, that is, in so far as they 
result from decisions and choices which he makes as a free agent, rather 
than as an instrument or object of another's will or as the result of external 
or internal forces independent of his will. His autonomy consists precisely 
in this self-determined deciding and choosing (pp. 127-128). 
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Autonomous actions are related to freedom to the extent that autonomy deals with 
states and motivations involved in choice, while freedom is more generally the ability to 
make meaningful, independent choices. The concept of freedom itself has multiple 
interpretations. Freedom may be negatively construed as simply an ability to act 
unrestrained by human interference. This interpretation of the concept concentrates on 
the decision-making process rather than the content (reasons, purposes, values) or 
substantive conditions (oppression) affecting of one's decision. It is formally the space 
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needed for making one's own decision. In a seminal work on the concept, Berlin (1969) 
differentiates between negative and positive freedom, and defines negative freedom as 
"the area within which a man can do what he wants" (p. 7). A person may be unfree 
when someone deliberately enters into this area and frustrates his plan. Berlin goes on to 
explain how a man might see his plans frustrated: 
I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of 
men interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply the 
area within which a man can act unobstructed by others. . .. Coercion is 
not, however, a term that covers every form of inability. If I say that I am 
unable to jump more than ten feet in the air, or cannot read because I am 
blind .. .it would be eccentric to say that I am to that degree enslaved or 
coerced. Coercion implies the deliberate interference of other human 
beings within the area in which I could otherwise act (p. 122). 
This definition of freedom as the absence of coercion derives in part from Hobbes: 
"Liberty, or freedome, signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition; (by Opposition, I 
mean extemall Impediments of motion)" (1985, p. 261). Hobbes argued that influence, 
manipulation, pressure, anything other than coercion as physical force, does not qualify 
as an impediment to freedom. Hence, in any instance where decisions are made in the 
absence of coercion, the agent making the decision is autonomous and therefore 
accountable. In other liberal political theories that employ a negatively conceived 
freedom, expected state commitments typically pertain to non-interference (Locke, 1980; 
Mill, 1978). The state's responsibility is simply to ensure no one stands in the way. 
In contrast with his definition of negative freedom as "not being enslaved", Berlin 
(1969) defines positive freedom as "being one's own master" (p. 16). Positive freedom 
for Berlin, then, is when agents make decisions based on their own motivations-the 
freedom to make a decision, as opposed to freedomfrom coercion. Liberal theories 
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predicated on negative liberty have been criticized by Miller (1983) and Oppenheim 
(1961 ), among others, inasmuch as these theories only account for intended constraints to 
freedom. Gray (1995) lists other possible impediments to freedom that would not be 
considered coercion, and he argues that these impediments posit the need for a more 
comprehensive definition of freedom: 
Many modem threats to freedom-propaganda, media manipulation and 
the tyranny of fashion-can be understood, I think, only by invoking some 
[new] conception of autonomy. Freedom may be curbed by means other 
than coercion, and it is a virtue of the idea of freedom as autonomy ... that it 
accommodates this fact (p. 58). 
An extension of constraints to freedom may include undue manipulation and pressure to 
conform that have been internalized, thereby affecting the decisions that persons make. 
Christman (1991) illustrates with the following example: 
Imagine, for example, a woman who is raised in a culture which fiercely 
inculcates in her the idea that women should never aspire to be anything 
but subservient and humble domestic companions to their husbands, no 
matter how unhappy this makes them or how abusive their husbands are. 
Imagine further that this person is suddenly placed in a new culture where 
opportunities abound for women to pursue independent activities. She 
nevertheless shuns these opportunities and remains married to an 
oppressive husband from the old culture (pp. 344-345). 
The woman in this example is only constrained by her desires, and yet she is unfree 
because her values were developed in an oppressive context: "for an individual to be self-
governing it at least must be the case that she is not moved by desires and values that 
have been oppressively imposed upon her" (p. 345). 
Kymlicka's (1989, 1996) project is a defence of a model ofliberalism that 
incorporates cultural context, a model which he holds is actually common in liberal 
theory. He argues that culture provides the context, the options by which one might 
make meaningful choice and thereby exercise individual freedom: 
How does this [individual freedom] relate to membership in societal 
cultures? Put simply, freedom involves making choices amongst various 
options, and our societal culture not only provides these options, but also 
makes them meaningful to us. People make choices about the social 
practices around them, based on their beliefs about the value of these 
practices. . .. And to have a belief about the value of a practice is, in the 
first instance, a matter of understanding the meanings attached to it by our 
culture (1996, pp. 82-83). 
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For him, individual autonomous choice cannot happen in a vacuum. Rather, choices are 
informed by, and actions are motivated by, values that are inscribed by one's culture. He 
does not think that liberalism has to be isolating because individuals are borne out of and 
always entrenched in their cultural contexts. Such a theory involves locating meaning 
production in social situations, rather than in a universal standard that is accessible to 
rational beings. It is thus conceivable that individual autonomy does not have to entail 
transcending one's empirical reality. 
Critique of Personal Autonomy 
But which (or whose) empirical reality is to be considered? The concept of 
disability often found in liberal traditions is controversial, and runs counter to Kymlicka's 
claim that liberalism generally accounts for context. During the Enlightenment, with its 
focus on science and medicine, the category of disability came under the auspices of the 
medical field, as a problem to be diagnosed and cured (Oliver, 1990, 1996; Priestley, 
1976; Siebers, 2008). Disabilities were individualized, regarded as biologically isolated 
impediments to fully functioning. Identifying this framing of disability as the Individual 
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Model, Oliver (1990) argues that this model "locates the 'problem' of disability within 
the individual [caused by] functional limitations or psychological losses" (p. 2). Those 
incapable of fully functioning in their communities would according to this model be 
responsible for their inability to participate, or no one is responsible for their tragedy, for 
their barriers to their fully functioning are natural defects. 
For liberal theories that adhere to Berlin's (1969) classical characterization of 
negative freedom, there is no recourse for redressing the ways in which a disabled 
person's freedom is compromised, for a disability like blindness (an example Berlin 
raised in his account of negative freedom) is a medical problem. Even critics of Berlin, 
Miller (1983) and Oppenheim (1961), consider disability to be a natural phenomenon that 
interferes with a man's abilities, not his freedom. Even when they argue for extending 
constraints to freedom, they differentiate between natural and social constraints-being 
unable versus being unfree--and classify disability as natural, therefore irrelevant to 
discussions about how freedom might be unjustly blocked. A blind man's ability to 
participate in his community is stymied by a physical limitation, and not because he 
exists in a visual-dominant culture that lacks, for instance, Braille translations. While 
medical practitioners under the Individual Model are charged with ~he task of curing 
people of their disabilities, the implication is that governments have few responsibilities 
regarding personal medical matters. There is no room in this example for the possibility 
that the blind man, though uncoerced, would be unduly constrained because he lacks 
meaningful options in an ableist culture. Even if such a man were resigned to living 
without accommodations and never bothered to learn Braille when it was introduced to 
him, one might still argue that his values and character were forged in a context that 
lacked meaningful alternatives. 
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Kymlicka's theory (1996) includes a substantive notion of freedom, one achieved 
through state obligations to facilitate access to meaningful options. A blind man may be 
considered unfree when, in the absence of accommodations, it would be impossible for 
him to pursue an education and certain occupations. He still has the capacity to make 
decisions, but not decisions among all the options available to other members of his 
societal culture. His culture would be illiberal to the extent that it failed to promote 
minority rights, which Kymlicka argues coexist with individual rights: "respecting 
minority rights can enlarge the freedom of individuals, because freedom is intimately 
linked with and dependent on culture" (p. 75). Indeed, unlike the liberal theorists who 
dismiss disability as a natural impediment, Kymlicka identifies disability in his 
characterization of minority rights, putting the identity on par with gender, race, and so 
forth. 
Nevertheless, Kymlicka's theory, as is common in liberal theories, is predicated 
on a notion of individualism, which may be complicated by dissonant bodies-bodies 
that are not only corporeal but intercorporeal, and as such are never fully independent but 
are interdependent: "the body ... is a set of operational linkages and connections with 
other things, other bodies" (Grosz, 1994, p. 120). A blind man may "see" through the 
eyes of his guide, for example, and is led by his guide via touch. Navigating inaccessible 
spaces may happen through connection and communication. That bodies operate in 
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connection with one another contradicts notions of personal autonomy that are located in 
the individual whose body boundaries differentiate him from others. 
The example of the blind man may be imperfect, for with the right tools and skill 
set someone who experiences blindness can isolate himself and function independently, 
at least according to liberal ideological lenses. He might opt for a walking stick rather 
than a guide, for instance, and claim that in this way he need not rely on others. 
Intercorporeality in this instance is not inevitable, and indeed, may only be understood as 
metaphorical. However, there are embodied realities that must be considered quite 
literally intercorporeal. For example, Dreger (2004) describes how conjoined twins 
challenge the prioritization of independence and individuality in Western politics and 
thought: 
In the United States, conjoinment might be especially challenging because 
American culture equates individualism with independence, and 
interdependence with weakness. . .. But even within this context--or 
perhaps as a result of this context-Americans who happen to be 
conjoined felt that they, too, are independent individuals. They do not 
think they need a discrete body to achieve independent status, any more 
than another person needs to grow her own food, sew her own clothes, and 
be her own doctor to count as an independent individual (pp. 31-32). 
In cases of explicit interdependence, there is no dyad between the individual and her 
context, for the individual is constituted by, or at least cannot be understood as separate 
from, interrelations. Dreger makes clear that interdependence is not merely a property of 
disabled people, for nondisabled people function within relations inasmuch as they too 
depend on others for food, clothing, and medical care. That their body bound~es are 
more visibly marked than the boundaries of conjoined twins should not mean that we 
ignore how nondisabled people survive and thrive through interconnectivity. 
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In the case of pregnancy, Mackenzie (1995) also invokes the concept of 
intercorporeality: "[pregnancy] defies a sharp opposition between self and other, between 
the inside and the outside of the body. From the perspective of the woman, there is no 
clear-cut boundary between herself and the fetus" (p. 50). That is, the phenomenology of 
pregnancy poses difficulties for how to account for one's identity according to body 
boundaries. The fetus is the woman, and yet is not; she feels something inside her, 
beneath her very flesh and bones, but there is a qualitative yet difficult-to-discern 
difference between "the baby kicked" and hunger pangs. The experience of pregnancy 
cannot be understood according to clear boundaries, for, especially in this case, "the 
boundaries dividing selves from others are porous and fluctuating" (Donchin, 2009, p. 
34). Shildrick (2002) makes a similar claim: "the pregnant female body ... speaks to an 
inherent capacity to problematize the boundaries of self and other" (p. 31 ). Embodiments 
that bleed and blend into other embodiments, that are "both one and two" (Karpin, 1992-
1993, p. 327), destabilize traditional notions of individualism, and may call for a drastic 
refashioning of autonomy as something other than a property of individuals. 
2.1.3. Relational Autonomy 
Feminist-Grounded Critiques of Autonomy 
Concepts of relational autonomy were developed in feminist theories as 
alternatives to personal autonomy models, which have been criticized for hinging on 
atomistic, individualistic agents (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000; Wolgast, 1987; Young, 
1990). Because relational autonomy developed in response to critiques of autonomy 
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theory that I have already begun to touch upon in the previous sections, I will begin here 
with a more in-depth account of feminist criticisms. 
Even procedural accounts of autonomy require substantive values to the extent 
that they include a prescriptive component regarding how a person ought to be 
conceptualized, and how he ought to conduct himself. Under personal autonomy models, 
persons are autonomous inasmuch as they are self-sufficient and independent (Code, 
1991; Sherwin, 1998). This telos is bound up in "a larger North American cultural ideal 
of competitive individualism" (Sherwin, 1998, p. 34), indicating that the concepts that 
have been associated with autonomy have been imbibed with meaning through culture 
and context. That is, these ideas did not materialize in abstraction, as rationalistic 
philosophers would have us believe, but have a home in Western cultures that prioritize 
rugged individualism (Basser, 2011; Pateman, 1989; Sherwin, 2011; Smart, 1989). 
As discussed, conceptualizations of personal autonomy require that autonomous 
persons are borne out of causal isolation, that is, that sharp distinctions are drawn 
between persons so that they might function autonomously (Baier, 1985). Rationality too 
is a necessary condition to acting autonomously. Even when not directly drawing from 
Kant (1993)--who grounded autonomy in the rational capacity to recognize universal 
law-liberal interpretations of the principle have still required that just states be 
organized such that persons recognize the rationality, and thus the capacity for autonomy, 
in one another (Locke, 1980; Rawls, 1999). All this means that the notion of personhood 
undergirding autonomy theories is defined by specific, common characteristics that 
transcend context (Code, 1991). Although these interpretations are meant to be 
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compatible with pluralistic societies, individuals so framed are interchangeable. The 
content of decisions may differ according to individuals' respective aims and values, but 
a person is autonomous by virtue of a common mechanism by which decisions are made. 
These a priori traits that tend to be associated with autonomy within liberal 
traditions-independence, rationality-have been typically ascribed to able-bodied men. 
Friedman (2000) identifies reason as a common feature to autonomy concepts found in 
popular Western culture, in addition to "other masculine-defined traits, for example, 
independence and outspokenness" (p. 38). She goes on to note that such specific 
formulatio_ns of autonomy only work as long as typically feminine traits are overlooked 
or effaced: "traits popularly regarded as feminine, by contrast, have no distinctive 
connection to autonomy-social interactiveness, for example (p. 39). Code (1991) notes 
how these conceptualizations are male-centric: 
Feminists need to understand the androcentricity of malestream 
epistemology: its near-exclusive concentration on men's experiences, 
masquerading as 'human' experiences, and counted as the sources of 
knowledge. If the language is tailor-made to express those experiences, 
and if women's experiences simply fall through the spaces in that same 
language, the androcentricitry of the theory is scarcely a surprise (p. 60). 
It may be that women and disabled people have been bracketed out of the category of 
autonomous agents because they have more explicitly functioned within social networks 
rather than as isolated individuals. The above sections discuss the corporeality and 
intercorporeality of disabled and female bodies-qualities which prevent abstraction and 
individuation. Disabled people have required varied accommodations depending on their 
disabilities in order to function. Women have functioned within family and household 
relationships, and have been socially, politically, and economically rendered dependent 
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on men. These lifestyles are not strictly defined as independent; conceptually, these 
(non)persons cannot be radically isolated and reduced to the level of individuality. To 
the extent that this is the case, many interpretations of autonomy cannot account for how 
members of these minorities might make decisions autonomously. Instead of continuing 
to bracket minorities out in order to salvage theory, though, perhaps it is time we 
reconsider our theoretical priorities. 
Individualism requires the erection of metaphysical and political barriers that 
distance people from one another (Dillon, 1992; Harvey, 1999). Nedelsky (1993) locates 
personal autonomy within the American philosophical and legal framework of rights as 
limitations, and criticizes the concept for being individualistic, obfuscating, and 
alienating. The concept is individualistic in that it is grounded in notions of 
independence and self-sufficiency: "the essence of autonomy is independence, which 
thus requires protection and separation from others. My argument is that this is a deeply 
misguided view of autonomy. What makes autonomy possible is not separation, but 
relationship" (p. 7). Personal autonomy-based rhetoric obfuscates because it reifies 
autonomy rights as though they are fixed, transcendent entities rather than products of 
consensus and context. Finally, Nedelsky finds personal autonomy theories alienating to 
the extent that they are used to erase relationships: "rights have this distancing effect in 
part because, as they function in our current discourse, they help us avoid seeing some of 
the relationships of which we are in fact a part" (p. 17). The implication to liberal 
theories is that the interrelations that disabled people and women experience act as 
hindrances to the ability to be autonomous. This association can only happen within a 
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framework that effaces the relationships that are essential to all persons. For, as Dreger 
(2004) noted, one need not grow one's own food nor forsake physicians in order to 
qualify as independent and therefore autonomous; those dependencies are merely 
overlooked in personal autonomy frameworks. 
Feminisms on Autonomy 
The trick, then, is to reorient one's approach to autonomy, such that the concept 
developed retains the power to diminish oppression "without.. .its baggage as a concept 
that sustains the ideals of individualism" (Sherwin, 2011, p. 15). Autonomy must imply 
agency and control without ignoring relations of power and privilege. There are 
feminists who have sought to build such a concept, hoping to demonstrate that autonomy 
as a political and moral tool is salvageable. 
Nedelsky (1989) proposes that persons are autonomous not through "isolation, but 
relationships-with parents, teachers, friends, loved ones-that provide the support and 
guidance necessary for the development and experience of autonomy" (p. 12). Feminists 
like Nedelsky, Christman (2004), Code (1991), Downie and Llewellyn (2001), Keller 
(1985), and Sherwin (1998, 2011 ), among others, recommend re-conceiving autonomous 
agents as socially constituted rather than atomistic. Sherwin (1998) explains: "relational 
selves are inherently social beings that are significantly shaped and modified within a 
web of interconnected (and sometimes conflicting) relationships" (p. 35). This alternate 
conception of identity proposes that no person can be reasonably understood as capable 
of functioning outside relationships. Within interpersonal relations, agents develop 
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identities that shape their decisions. As such, they only act autonomously within the 
context of interpersonal relations: "there is no pure, self-determining free will that 
somehow escapes the operations of power, nor is there a true self, there to be discovered 
through introspective reflection" (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000, p. 11 ). 
When the self is defined as relational, autonomous decision-making must be re-
conceived as something other than independent, individualistic, and rational. A re-
conceived model of autonomy would require instead that autonomous decision-making 
be understood as related to the identities and values borne out of connection and 
communication. Reviewing relational autonomy models, Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000) 
question whether interpersonal relations play a crucial role in the development of 
autonomy, or whether autonomy is entirely constituted by these relations, but relational 
autonomy models all have in common that they make the connection between autonomy 
and relationships, however that connection is characterized. 
Autonomy may also function within a larger context of economic, political, and 
social conditions that make impacts on the personal sphere of relations (Meyers, 1989; 
Sherwin, 2002). Says Donchin: "oppressive social conditions privilege the more 
powerful and interfere with the opportunities of others to develop skills necessary for 
exercising autonomy. Unjust prerogative marginalizes many women and minorities, 
depriving them of their fair share of social goods" (2009, p. 34). Relational autonomy 
models that include such a wide explanatory range can account for how relations of 
power have played a significant role in enabling autonomy for some and obstructing the 
development of autonomy in others. 
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Self-Trust as an Essential Conceptual Component 
Some relational autonomy theories include self-trust. This concept refers to an 
attitude shaped by one's feelings for and beliefs about oneself (Govier, 1993, 1997; 
McLeod, 2002; McLeod & Sherwin, 2000). Both self-trust and its correlative, distrust, 
are relational concepts in that they are constituted or affirmed through interpersonal 
relations: "they are moulded to a significant degree by the responses of others and by 
societal norms" (McLeod, 2002, p. 37). Social support can facilitate self-trust such that 
people are capable of autonomous decision-making; whereas experiences of oppression 
can be internalized, leading to self-distrust (Harvey, 1999; McLeod, 2009). McLeod and 
Sherwin (2000) explain how oppression may be internalized: 
Oppression can lead to the internalization of a sense of social 
worthlessness and incompetence that is translated into a lack of self-worth 
and self-trust. When a group is oppressed, the society at large operates as 
if that group is less worthy and less competent than others and devalues its 
members. Members of oppressed groups may then internalize these 
attitudes; many are inclined to accept society's devaluing of their personal 
worth on at least an unconscious level and to doubt their own worth and 
ability to make appropriate choices. This lack of self-worth and self-trust 
may be devastating to agents' autonomy competency, interfering with their 
ability to act according to their own interests at all (p. 262) 
Harvey (1999) explores how people who are oppressed may be internally blocked 
from fully functioning as members of a moral community. She raises an example similar 
to Christman's (1991): denigrated and demoralized, a housewife may lack self-trust 
because of interpersonal relations with an emotionally abusive husband, but may also be 
enacting a gender role that has historically weighed on women's opportunities and social 
conditions. Even ifher first husband leaves her, the housewife may decide to be 
subservient to another man, thus perpetuating the cycle. She may do so because she feels 
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she does not deserve better, or is incapable of better. Even with other options available, 
she is capable of no other choice because of the person she became when in an abusive 
relationship. Says Harvey: "the person lacks appropriate beliefs about his/her proper 
moral status, and also the person's moral self is blocked from functioning properly as a 
member of the moral community-but the block, it seems, has become internal" (1999, p. 
113). 
Harvey's notion of the internal block is tremendously important to include in 
feminist evaluations of autonomy theories that have pushed disabled people and women 
to the very periphery of personhood itself. Ideology has the power to be applied to 
economic, political, and social arrangements. Oppressive rhetoric and exclusionary 
categories can manifest in law, policy, and medicine, as well as personal relationships 
and casual conversation. Through endorsements of Kantian or liberal traditions, we can 
convince those with marginal identities that they are unworthy of moral consideration, 
that they fall leagues short of the ideal embodiment and mental state. We in effect instil 
distrust and teach (non)persons to lower their expectations for themselves. Even if more 
conceptual space was allotted to those once historically marginalized so that they might 
make decisions "freely," only relational autonomy models can account for why they 
might still be incapable of autonomous action. 
2.2. Autonomy in Bioethics and Law 
In this section, I will identify autonomy theories in two fields that have 
tremendous influence over women's reproductive experiences. I will connect the 
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concepts explored in the previous section with the autonomy theories found in these 
fields, and will demonstrate that these concepts carry with them the baggage I previously 
critiqued. In bioethics, autonomy is a canonical principle, grounded in notions of 
informed consent and decisional capacity. In Canadian law, autonomy is framed with 
consent and capacity rhetoric, as well as s. 7 protections of life, libe1ty, and security of 
the person. 
2.2.1. Autonomy in Bioethics: Consent and Capacity 
Autonomy in Bioethics 
Autonomy, alongside justice and beneficence, is central to bi.oethical canon 
(Engelhardt, 1986; Faden, Beauchamp, & King, 1986; Viafora, 1996). The principles are 
typically portrayed as formal in character, meant to provide a general, flexible moral 
framework that can be easily applied to various medical situations (Beauchamp & 
Childress, 2009; Viafora, 1996). According to Beauchamp and Childress (2009), 
beneficence was once the guiding principle for moral action in medical contexts, 
beneficence being "a group of norms for distributing benefits, risks, and costs fairly" (p. 
12). Autonomy has become increasingly more important over time, however, such that 
debates revolve around whether the principle takes priority over all the other principles in 
bioethics frameworks (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009; Faden, Beauchamp, & King, 
1986). 
The bioethical principle of autonomy has been defined in myriad ways that 
correspond with autonomy theories. In a work that charts the historical development of 
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bioethics, Viafora (1996) defines autonomy based on earlier instantiations: "the principle 
of autonomy prescribes acting in such a way as to treat the patient always as an end and 
never as a means; that is, according to his nature of autonomous subject" (p. 26). This 
formulation of the principle adopts Kantian language: respect for autonomy entails 
recognition of a person's worthiness of moral consideration. For Beauchamp and 
Childress (2009), the concept at minimum is similar to the concept of personal autonomy 
found in liberal theories: "self-rule that is free from both controlling interference by 
others and from limitations, such as inadequate understanding, that prevent meaningful 
choice" (p. 58). They warn against relying on only this minimalist definition because it 
focuses too narrowly on the subject as independent and rational. For this reason, 
Beauchamp and Childress conceive of the principle substantively, in such a way that it at 
least in part relates to the concept of relational autonomy found in feminist theories: 
We aim to construct a conception of respect for autonomy that is not 
excessively individualistic (neglecting the social nature of individuals and 
the impact of individual choices and actions on others), not excessively 
focused on reason (neglecting the emotions), and not unduly legalistic 
(highlighting legal rights and downplaying social practices) (p. 57). 
Grounding Consent in Personal Autonomy 
Autonomy is exercised in medical contexts through free and informed consent 
(Berg & Appelbaum, 2001; Faden, Beauchamp, & King, 1986; Grisso & Appelbaum, 
1998; Lindley, 1991; Segest, 1995). Consent has not always been associated with 
autonomy, however, and so it has not always been necessary that consent be free and 
informed. Once justified by the principle of beneficence, consent was bound up in the 
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physician's duties rather than the patient's entitlements, which led to justifications for 
deception for the purpose of obtaining consent (Sidgwick, 1981 )-an idea which predates 
the field of bioethics. Faden, Beauchamp, and King (1986) describe Percival, who wrote 
on medical ethics as early as 1803: "he insisted that honesty, including honest disclosure, 
must be the gentlemanly norm except in emergency situations, terminal situations, and 
situations where harm would be caused by truthfulness" (p. 69). That is, during 
emergencies, as long as it was in the patient's best interest to receive medical treatment, 
and the patient might not arrive at this decision by himself, then the physician was 
ethically justified in lying about the condition or the effects of treatment options in order 
to obtain consent. Within these consent models, the patient's best interest could be 
determined by the physician, and so the physician had moral and medical authority in 
medical decision-making contexts. 
As bioethical discourses developed, they moved away from the idea that consent 
could be obtained through deception, and consent came to be a matter of respecting and 
facilitating the patient's ability to decide what is in his best interest: "the practice of free 
and informed consent is justified both out of respect for the freedom of individuals as 
well as to achieve their best interests" (Engelhardt, 1986, p. 300). Engelhardt explicitly 
makes the connection between autonomy and consent: "consent is the origin of authority, 
and respect of the right of participants to consent is the necessary condition for the 
possibility of a moral community. The principle of autonomy provides the minimum 
grammar for moral language" (p. 86). The reworking of the grounding for consent in 
effect shifts at least some of the authority in medical contexts from physician to patient. 
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The question remains: how is autonomy being defined in this context? Criteria 
for informed consent, provided in Faden, Beauchamp, and King's seminal work on the 
concept (1986), include allusions to personal autonomy in that decisions must be made by 
an individual, free from external control: "consent must not be controlled by influences 
that would engineer the outcome" (p. 54). Consent occurs free from influence, 
manipulation, and coercion. In order for consent to take place, a space must be carved 
out for the agent such that decisions are not affected by externalities. Additional criteria 
include the decision being one's own, in the form of permission: "consent must involve 
the intentional giving of permission for an intervention" (p. 54). These two components 
indicate that Berlin's (1969) classical autonomy model is expressed in medical contexts 
through consent, for consent is only given as long as the patient is not being pushed into a 
decision, and has the ability to take ownership of that decision. In order for consent to be 
informed, it must be understood, and so Faden, Beauchamp, and King (1986) include a 
third criterion: "a patient or subject must agree to an intervention based on an 
understanding of (usually disclosed) relevant information" (p. 54). 
Condition of Capacity 
The conditions of consent-individuality defined by one's separateness from 
others when making a decision, agency expressed in the ability to make a decision, and 
understanding of the stakes involved in a decision-imply that only certain persons can 
provide consent. A child, for instance, may not understand the complexities of a medical 
decision, and so her guardians make the choice for her; someone in a comatose state lacks 
the agency to grant medical permissions required in that moment, and so the physician 
may seek out the patient's advanced directive or loved one. 
75 
Consent can only be given when the patient has decisional capacity, also called 
competence in bioethics literature. Decisional capacity is determined according to the 
reasoning process involved in making a decision, rather than the content of the decision 
(Buchanan & Brock, 1989). That is, those who make what would be considered incorrect 
decisions or decisions counter to other people's, even their own, values may still have 
decisional capacity. Capacity is not static; for instance, people who do not understand 
some complex medical issues might still be equipped to participate in other aspects of 
decision-making, or might later on in the day or week be lucid enough to make decisions 
on their own (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009). 
Various models of capacity share overlapping elements, including understanding 
of the facts (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009; Buchanan & Brock, 1989; Grisso & 
Appelbaum, 1998) and appreciation for the nature of the decision and the stakes involved 
(Grisso & Appelbaum, 1998). "Reasoning and deliberation" (Buchanan & Brock, 1989, 
p. 84) entails the rational manipulation and evaluation of information (Buchanan & 
Brock, 1989; Grisso & Appelbaum, 1998). These conditions might not be satisfied if the 
person at the heart of a medical decision is a child, has an intellectual disability, or is 
mad, as examples. One must also be capable of executing or at least communicating the 
decision (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009; Grisso & Appelbaum, 1998). This condition 
would be impossible to satisfy if the person is in a coma or incapable of conveying her 
wishes due to a physical disability. Another, albeit disputed, element has been identified: 
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"relatively stable values or a conception of the good life" (Buchanan & Brock, 1989, p. 
84). This final component is arguable because it speaks to the substance of the decision, 
while the other components identified pertain to the mechanisms by which decision-
making takes place. 
Patients may be determined to be incapable because they do not satisfy some of 
the conditions identified above when a decision needs to be made. In these cases, there 
are decision-making standards that are meant to uphold the principle of autonomy: 
"individual autonomy should and may be promoted through respect for the process of 
substituted judgment" (Kapp, 1999, p. 57). Buchanan and Brock (1989) put forward 
guiding principles for directing how to make decisions when the patient lacks the 
capacity to give consent, the first of which involves "implementing an advance directive, 
such as a 'living will' or durable power of attorney, that the patient executed while 
competent" (p. 88). The next, in the absence of an advance directive, would be 
"substituted judgment [which is] acting in accordance to what the individual, if 
competent, would choose" (p. 88). A loved one, for instance, may know which decision 
the patient would have made if capable, or may at least know personal, cultural, or 
religious factors that would have influenced the patient's decision. Finally, when wishes 
or values are not already known or cannot be inferred, the substitute decision-maker, be it 
a loved one or the physician (if no one else is available), may invoke a "reasonable 
person" standard (Buchanan & Brock, 1989; Lazar et al., 1996). This standard is meant 
to be what an objective, ideal person would do in the given circumstances, where there is 
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limited information regarding how extenuating, personal circumstances might affect the 
decision. 
Critique of Consent and Capacity 
How is a person determined to be decisionally incapable? That is, who 
determines when and whether a patient meets the conditions for capacity? Capacity is a 
phenomenon that may be constructed based on communication between the patient and 
the physician, and is determined by the latter party (Kerzner, 2006; Stefan, 1993). 
According to Stefan, "questions of competence arise only as a function of a relationship 
between one or more people and ... this relationship is necessarily a hierarchical one, 
characterized by dominance and subordination, by power and powerlessness" (p. 766). 
She describes incompetence, or lack of capacity, as "a characteristic of an individual, 
brought about by forces internal to the individual" (p. 776), such as madness, intellectual 
disability, or substance use10. 
The concept is framed in bioethics and law with the same rhetoric used under the 
individualist model of disability, with little regard for how capacity is determined through 
10 
"Madness" is a term reclaimed by the psychiatric survivor community, and as such has 
fewer pejorative connotations than "mental illness"-a term I only use when quoting 
source material. I choose not to use "psychiatric survivor" because there are clear 
examples (notably Ashley Smith) of people who did not survive the psychiatric system. 
Canadian scholars oft employ "developmental disability" instead of "intellectual 
disability," though I prefer the latter because it highlights how people are disabled on the 
basis of intellectual standards. 
Finally, I choose to use the term "substance use" over "alcoholism," "addiction," 
"substance abuse," or "substance dependency" because this collection of terms over-
emphasizes the individual condition and as such may efface stigma. 
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an interpersonal relationship between the patient and physician, a relationship that we 
should not assume unfolds on a level playing field, devoid of any power dynamic. Ho 
(2008) advocates against the use of the individualist model in the context of medical 
decision-making: "we need to pay attention to the social structure that frames people's 
identity and decisions" (p. 194). Indeed, relations of power shape capacity ("identity" for 
Ho) and determine whether and how consent is freely given ("decisions"). She goes on 
to argue that the individualistic approach to autonomy in the context of medical decision-
making is dyadic, when it should instead by understood within a matrix of social 
influence: "patients' decisions are embedded within a complex set of social relations, 
practices, and policies that structure an individual's selfhood and can significantly affect 
people's ability to exercise autonomy with respect to their choices" (p. 195). As 
examples, financial positioning and social class (Brody, 1980; Seedhouse, 1992) may 
play roles in how, and how much, information is transferred between the physician and 
patient: "physicians provide more information to those in higher social classes than lower 
social classes" (Leino-Kipli et al., 2000). Blander and Hermoren (1993) also consider 
whether structural dynamics within hospital settings-the rules and routines, 
implemented by medical professionals in authority-affect autonomy, such that patients 
consent to medical treatment because they are eager to behave, or are made to feel as 
though they should. 
Given that consent takes place within this dyadic exchange, the power of the 
patient to exercise autonomy in medical contexts is reduced to consent. That is, while the 
grounding of consent in autonomy marked an important paradigm shift, the implication 
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has been that autonomy is limited to consent. The components of consent include 
understanding of the information imparted by a physician, and the ability to permit 
medical intervention. Autonomy as permission is limited, for it occurs within closed 
contexts based on the information that the physician deems reasonable, and it involves 
very little agency or open participation. Shildrick (1997) criticizes health care that is 
built on consent to the extent that the concept "reinforces the intrinsically passive nature 
of patient 'participation'" (p. 85). She explains: 
The notion of a fully informed consent relies currently not on the patient's 
own subjective interests but on what the reasonable (and one might add 
potentially paternalistic) doctor would judge them to be. The assumption 
would seem to be that only disinterested rationality is to count fully and 
that only the professionals are capable of exercising it. It is a case of both 
privileging rationality and denying it to certain specific groups. For 
women, that disempowerment is compounded in that in a society based on 
normative male standards they are not considered fully rational in the first 
place (p. 85). 
For Shildrick, then, consent as the standard for exercising autonomy hems in autonomy 
by rendering the patient passive in medical exchanges. Patient participation hinges on 
merely submitting to medical intervention based on physician advice; the extent to which 
a patient is advised depends greatly on what the physician deems relevant or significant 
advice. When discussing the physician-patient encounter, Wend ell (1996) describes this 
phenomenon as the cognitive power of medical practitioners "to describe us to ourselves 
and others" (p. 24). In her example, a patient may consult a physician on symptoms, but 
is told nothing is wrong when the physician cannot discern a physical cause. In effect, 
the physician invalidates the pain, the fatigue, the dizziness, and so forth that the patient 
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has been experiencing. Wendell elaborates on how the patient is disempowered as long 
as cognitive authority rests in the hands of the physician: 
The cognitive and social authority of medicine to describe our bodies 
affects how we experience our bodies and our selves, how our society 
describes our experiences and validates/invalidates them, how our society 
supports or fails to support our bodily sufferings and struggles, and what 
our culture knows about the human body. It also affects profoundly the 
relationship of medical providers to patients and the quality of care. The 
authority of medicine tends to delegitimize our experiences of our bodies 
as sources of knowledge about them, because the authoritative, that is, the 
medical and scientific, descriptions of our bodies are third-person 
descriptions of physical conditions (p. 119). 
Medical practitioners are authorities in medical exchanges not only because they 
constitute the vanguard that determines what and how much information is given to the 
patient, as well as whether and how the patient is ill, injured, and so forth; but they also 
have some power in determining whether a patient is decisionally capable of giving 
consent. They may even serve as substitute decision-makers in the absence of an 
advance directive or loved one, in which case they employ a reasonable person standard 
that requires idealized, rational thought. Should patients opt not to give their consent, the 
medical professional has the recourse of questioning the patient's decisional capacity, for 
the physician may determine that a decisionally capable person would give consent as 
long as she understood the information provided. Granted, capacity does not hinge on the 
content of a patient's decision, but determinations of capacity may be compounded by 
identity characteristics, such as gender, disability, and various intersections of the two. 
Someone whose record includes a history of madness, for instance, may be questioned 
for the decision she makes: someone who experiences post-partum depression, or has a 
history of alcohol use, or is on anti-anxiety medication may be more heavily scrutinized 
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should she not consent to recommended medical treatment. Capacity may be reductive, 
not only because it reduces the patient to a passive role in the decision-making process, 
but also because it employs a rationalistic standard that someone in authority may 
determine a patient is incapable of achieving. As Shildrick (1997) and others (Porell & 
Matthews, 2001; Gilligan, 1982) have pointed out, rationalism has long served as a 
standard for moral worthiness, a standard that was once and perhaps is still limited to 
(able-bodied) men. 
2.2.2. Autonomy in Law: Consent and Capacity 
Stars on 
In the case of Starson v. Swayze (2003), the Canadian legal model of consent and 
capacity was examined. Diagnosed as biopolar, Scott Starson (who identified as a 
Physics Professor) refused treatment "that included neuroleptic medication, mood 
stabilizers, anti-anxiety medication and anti-parkinsonian medication" (p. 2), although he 
consented to psychotherapy. His past experiences indicated that medication dulled his 
senses and affected his research, so he came to the conclusion that all medication had the 
same negative effect. His attending physician found him incapable of making the 
decision, based on the criteria stipulated in the 1996 Ontario Health Care Consent Act 
(HCCA). Starson contested to the Ontario Consent and Capacity Board, which upheld 
the original decision; then to the Superior Court of Justice, which overturned the 
determination of incapacity. The Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Canada 
upheld the decision. The Supreme Court majority of six Justices ruled that Starson had 
the right to refuse medication. 
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The Court reflected on the HCCA, which presumes a patient's capacity to accept 
or reject medical treatment, meaning patients are presumed to be decisionally capable 
until evidence indicates otherwise: "the presumption of capacity can be displaced only by 
evidence that a patient lacks the requisite elements of capacity provided by the Act" (p. 
3). The elements of capacity identified in the Act are as follows: "a person must be able 
to understand the information that is relevant to making a treatment decision"; and "a 
person must be able to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the 
decision or lack of one" (as cited in Starson v. Swayze, p. 3). These two components to 
capacity share minimum overlap with capacity models found in bioethics literature 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009; Buchanan & Brock, 1989; Grisso & Appelbaum, 1998). 
The Consent and Capacity Board's sole purpose is to determine capacity by 
evaluating evidence that might interfere with the two elements of capacity found in the 
HCCA. The Board determined Starson lacked capacity based on two findings: "that the 
respondent was in 'almost total' denial of a mental disorder, and that he failed to 
appreciate the consequences of his decision [to refuse medication]" (p. 3). The Supreme 
Court of Canada found that the Board's findings lacked basis: "although the patient did 
not conceive of the condition as an illness, he was quite aware that his brain did not 
function normally" (pp. 3-4), which indicated that he did indeed understand, but did not 
frame his condition with the same rhetoric that his physician employed. The Court 
further ruled that the Board had no basis for speculating that the proposed medication 
83 
would "improve his chances at future board meetings" or lead to the "resumption of the 
respondent's work as a physicist" (p. 4 ). 
Finally, it was noted in the Supreme Court case that "the Board misapplied the 
statutory test for capacity" (p. 4). Starson was never asked during the Board hearing 
whether he understood that his condition may worsen should he refuse treatment, and so 
the Board would have been unable to determine conclusively whether Starson truly did 
understand the situation and appreciate the consequences. Further, "although the Board 
found the respondent failed to appreciate the risks and benefits of treatment, it neglected 
to address whether the reasons for that failure demonstrated an inability to appreciate 
those risks and benefits" (p. 4). In other words, capacity cannot be determined based on 
the content of the decision; the Board never determined whether Starson was able to 
grasp risks and benefits despite making what the Board would consider an unwise 
decision: "the Board improperly allowed its own conception of the respondent's best 
interests to influence its finding of incapacity" (p. 4). 
It was thus ruled that the Board did not have the authority to consider the patient's 
best interests when determining capacity. They could not guarantee that medication 
would be ameliorative. Indeed, Starson refused medication on the grounds that "the 
medication dulled his mind and diminished his creativity" (p. 9). It would appear that the 
respondent weighed the risks and benefits; that he made a decision with which his 
physician disagreed did not necessarily reflect that he was unable to consider 
consequences, for he acted based on the negative consequences to accepting medication. 
The physician and the Consent and Capacity Board could not find Starson decisionally 
incapable based on the values that served as grounds for his decision, for their 
prerogative is merely to assess the mechanisms by which decisions are made: "it would 
be erroneous for a Board to find incapacity simply because treatment is in the best 
interests of the patient" (p. 33). 
Analysis 
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The majority decision made in Starson represented a departure from traditional 
interpretations of the HCCA (Roth, Meisal, & Lindz, 1977; Sklar, 2007). The HCCA did 
not apply a capacity test that required that patients act rationally, although it did regard 
the patient's denial of mental illness as central to determinations of incapacity. In this 
case, the majority drew from W eisstub' s 1990 report written for the Ontario Ministry of 
Health, which emphasized "allowing individuals the greatest measure of control of their 
lives [including] the right to act 'unreasonably' and to make foolish decisions should they 
choose" (p. 66). W eisstub argued that patients need not agree with specific diagnoses 
made by inexact psychiatrists but instead need only understand "the broader 
manifestations of illness" (p. 250) in order to satisfy the "understanding" element of 
capacity. The Starson case set the precedent according to which the patient's perceived 
best interests were deemed irrelevant to capacity determinations. 
Sklar describes the fallout from the Starson case: "psychiatrists tend to see the 
legal principle of autonomy, on which the right to refuse is based, as incongruent with 
'true autonomy,' which, they ~aintain, involves 'the choices of the healthier self ... and 
that self's long-term autonomy"' (Saks, 2002; as cited in Sklar, 2007, p. 2). Chief Justice 
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McLachlin, who "penned a vigorous dissent in Stars on" (Wilderman, 2011, p. 265), 
echoed these sentiments when later publicly criticizing the Starson decision, noting that 
Starson remains hospitalized: "Starson's 'liberty to refuse treatment,' she said, had 
resulted in the loss of his liberty to be treated and ultimately released from the hospital" 
(McLachlin, 2005; as cited in Sklar, 2007, p. 6). According to the Chief Justice (2005), 
the decision made in Starson upheld a negative model of autonomy, where psychiatric 
medication represents interference with autonomous action; when the Supreme Court 
should uphold an autonomy model that views medication as enabling autonomy by 
making patients rational. 
Liberal theorist Berlin (1969) has cautioned against efforts to uphold autonomy 
by imagining what a sane, or rational, or healthy person would want for himself. 
Autonomy conceptually collapses for the philosopher when people uphold the principle 
by acting in what they believe should be, but is in fact contrary to, a person's best 
interests. In sum, positive freedom should stop short of paternalism. The majority of 
Justices did not see a conflict between negative and positive freedom when excluding 
value judgments from capacity determinations; forcing unwanted medication would have 
constituted paternalism. Does this mean that it is possible to justify the Starson decision 
with the principle of liberal autonomy, at least those versions of the principle that include 
positive freedom? It would seem that the role of positive freedom in liberal theories is in 
dispute when applied to this case. 
By contrast, in her analysis of Starson, Wilderman (2011) applies Sherwin's 
(2011) version of autonomy, grounded in feminist relational theory. Sherwin criticizes 
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the reduction of autonomy to uncoerced choice among a range of options: "an individual 
cannot always improve her degree of autonomy by improving her w1derstanding of the 
nature of the decision that she is to make or by reducing internal compulsions and 
external threats" (p. 26). Applied to Stars on, this means that C.J. McLachlin' s dichotomy 
is false because relational autonomy challenges the very structuring of decisional 
capacity: "relational theory releases us ... from what may have appeared to be a forced 
choice between negative freedom and psychiatric paternalism. In place of that forced 
choice, we are presented with the work of mutual exploration of the conceptual and 
material bases of decisional capacity" (Wilderman, 2011, p. 280). What are these 
conceptual and material bases? Wilderman suggests that current medical conditions and 
power dynamics serve to induce or exacerbate crisis, which have the effect of eroding 
capacity. A more robust notion of capacity, grounded in relational theory, would work to 
alleviate crisis and would render medical practitioners responsible for enabling and 
building capacity: "mechanisms may include deployment of mobile crisis units trained to 
engage with persons in a respectful manner aimed at de-escalating crisis, and/or 
availability of short-stay venues such as peer-run safe houses" (p. 271). The Starson 
decision and the resultant public debate over capacity turned on notions of liberal 
autonomy, but an application of feminist relational theory demonstrates that not nearly 
enough has been done to ensure capacity is cultivated. 
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Ashley Smith 
Stars on may function as an important step in mental health law, one which 
reflects the legal acknowledgement of and respect for the principle of personal autonomy; 
however, Szigeti (2004) notes that there was a catch: 
The Board has interpreted the Judgment in Starson as lowering the burden 
of proof only in relation to matters of capacity. It maintains the 
'enhanced' onus is required to be met by physicians who seek to continue 
a patient's involuntary status (p. 21). 
That is, while determinations of capacity may be based on the updated, minimal criteria 
stipulated in Starson, Consent and Capacity Boards still curtail patient autonomy based 
on the broader criteria used before the Starson judgment. A patient may see her 
involuntary stay in a mental health facility lengthened and treatment continually enforced 
even when she understands the situation and appreciates the consequences of refusal. 
Ashley Smith's experiences within the mental health system make this point clear. 
In 2002, at fourteen years old, Smith was criminally charged with "offences related to 
public disturbances, trespass or violence" (Office of the Ombudsman and Child Youth 
Advocate, 2008, p. 15). She was sentenced to probation for one year and enrolment in a 
support program, then she was sent to the New Brunswick Youth Centre (NBYC) the 
following year for breach of probation. She found herself released from and returned to 
youth correctional facilities for years thereafter. With each incident of noncompliance, 
additional time was appended to her sentence. As indicated in the Ombudsman Report, 
these incidents often occurred within the facilities themselves: "most of the disciplinary 
measures and incidents involving this young person occurred while she was in prison" (p. 
18). From 2003 until 2006, the NBYC recorded nearly eight hundred accounts of her 
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transgressions, many of which were "related to her acting disruptively on a unit and/or 
refusing staff directives, or to self-harm" (p. 19). 
In 2005, Smith underwent a court-ordered assessment at the Restigouche Hospital 
Center (RHC). The attending psychiatrist concluded that "Ms. Smith clearly understands 
her responsibilities and their consequences" (p. 19). The assessment was not made for 
the purpose of finding capacity so that Smith might have a say in what would happen to 
her, for the court was interested instead in confirming that Smith could be held 
responsible for her crimes, and punished more severely. Indeed, a determination of 
understanding and appreciation was used to justify Smith's involuntary confinement. 
The RHC findings led to the addition of one hundred, eighty days of incarceration to the 
sentence she was already serving. While at the RHC, when Smith refused medication, 
the psychiatrist applied for and was granted "Admission of a Person as an Involuntary 
Patient" under the Mental Health Act in order to have her forcibly medicated. 
Disciplinary strategies-isolation, restricted movement-further served to control 
Smith. As the Ombudsman's report indicates, "there is a stringent policy on 
administering discipline for bad behaviour at the NBYC" (p. 20). For two-thirds of her 
time at the centre, Smith was left in seclusion, in what was called a Therapeutic Quiet 
unit. Restraints were also frequently employed, including full-body restraints referred to 
as the "WRAP:" 
The 'WRAP' consists of applying restraint belts beginning at the inmate's 
feet, all the way up to his or her shoulders, ceasing all possibility of bodily 
movement. Then a hockey helmet is placed on the head which would 
prevent one from injuring themselves in the event they topple over, and 
also preventing the subject from biting anyone. After the 'WRAP' was 
applied, Ashley had to be picked up by staff in order to move her to 
another location, as all movements, including walking, are impossible (p. 
22). 
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Later punishments in adult correction would involve pain: for example, pepper spray and 
tasers were used when Smith refused to submit to a mandatory strip search. 
The NBYC ultimately decided to transfer her to a provincial adult correctional 
system when she reached eighteen years of age. Smith was transferred to the Saint John 
Regional Correctional Centre (SJRCC), and from there she would be transferred to nine 
different federal and correctional facilities outside New Brunswick. The transfer to an 
adult facility meant that Smith's charges and sentences would be altered to fit criminal 
law for adults: 
On October 24, 2006, Ashley appeared in Adult Court and was imposed an 
adult sentence for criminal charges laid while she was still at the NBYC. 
As a result of the additional 348 days of custodial time added to the 
already existing 1,455 days, Ashley was to serve the remainder of her 
sentence in a federal institution due to the fact that this totality exceeded 
two years. 
On October 31, 2006, at the age of 18, Ashley Smith left New Brunswick 
and was transferred to the Nova Institute for Women in Nova Scotia, a 
federal correctional facility (p. 29). 
In October 2007, at the Grand Valley Institution for Women in Kitchener-Waterloo, 
Smith hanged herself in seclusion in her cell, suicide functioning as her means of escape. 
She was nineteen years old (Sapers, 2008). 
While transfers are customarily conducted automatically when youths reach 
twenty years old, Smith's transfer process was applied for, granted, and carried out under 
s. 92 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (2002). According to s. 92: 
When a young person is committed to custody [under specific conditions 
outlined elsewhere in the Act], the youth justice court may, on application 
of the provincial director made at any time after the young person attains 
the age of eighteen years, after giving the young person, the provincial 
director and representatives of the provincial correctional system an 
opportunity to be heard, authorize the provincial directory to direct that the 
young person, subject to subjection (3), serve the remainder of the youth 
sentence in a provincial correctional facility for adults, if the court 
considers it to be in the best interests of the young person or in the public 
interest. 
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The transfer was carried out against Smith's wishes for substantive reasons: for her own 
good and for public safety. And more than this, the transfer functioned as further 
punishment, for the threat of transfer was used until Smith turned eighteen in an effort to 
keep her in line. In her own words: "I am really scared about the thought of going to an 
adult facility with dangerous people. It has occupied my mind for a long time. I have 
wanted to behave to ensure that I would not ever go to adult and was sure that I would 
succeed" (p. 27). 
During the youth transfer hearing, Smith provided a document listing reasons not 
to be transferred: "in it, Ashley emphasizes the fact that contrary to popular belief, she is 
incapable of controlling her outbursts and behaviour although she was very conscious of 
their impact" (Ombudsman, 2008, p. 25). The determination of capacity provided by the 
RHC did not work in her favour in that it rendered her responsible for her actions and 
deserving of the consequences. It did not matter that she had been incarcerated as a 
youth for years, nor that she had been treated poorly throughout her incarceration. 
Starson fought to have his capacity recognized so that he was entitled to refuse treatment; 
whereas Smith had no other recourse than to beg to be stripped of a capacity 
determination just to mitigate her living conditions. The principle of personal autonomy 
built into mental health policy was applied to this case in such a way that Smith had no 
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freedom to control the length and quality of her confinement, and yet this was because 
she was thought decisionally capable, free to choose her actions and behaviours, therefore 
accountable for her faults. She had no control over her life despite being considered 
capable of autonomous choice, and instead was subjected to paternalism, masked in 
beneficence. 
2.2.3. Autonomy in Law: Section 7 
Overview of Section 7 
Legal autonomy is not limited by competence evaluations alone. Autonomy is 
protected constitutionally under s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
According to s. 7: "everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and 
the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice". In Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission) 
(2000) 11 , the Supreme Court of Canada articulated the standard for identifying a s. 7 
violation: "in order for s. 7 to be triggered, one must first establish that the interest in 
respect of which the respondent asserted his claim falls within the ambit of s. 7" (p. 5). 
Further, if any of the three rights is infringed upon, the infringement must not be in 
accord with principles of fundamental justice. 
11 In Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission) (2000), Robin Blencoe, a 
minister of the British Columbia government, had three sexual harassment claims filed 
against him. Due to delays reaching court, his story was covered extensively in the 
media, causing the ruin of his career as well as social and psychological hardship for him 
and his family. 
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The principles of fundamental justice function as "qualifier[ s] of the right not to 
be deprived oflife, liberty, and security of the person, [and as qualifiers], the phrase 
serves to establish the parameters of the interests" (Re B. C. Motor Vehicle Act, 1985, p. 
501 ). The function and criteria "for a rule or principle to constitute a principle of 
fundamental justice for the purposes of s. 7" (p. 6) were explained in R. v. Malmo-Levine 
(2003) 12• The Court decided that the values basic to social organization have the power 
to limit and shape the individual freedoms found under s. 7: "the delineation of the 
principle of fundamental justice must inevitably take into account the social nature of our 
collective existence. To that limited extent, societal values play a role in the delineation 
of the boundaries of the rights and principles in question" (p. 6). 
Regarding the conditions which render a principle relevant to fundamental justice, 
it must firstly "be a legal principle about which there is significant societal consensus that 
it is fundamental to the way in which the legal system ought fairly to operate" (p. 6). A 
principle of fundamental justice must be a tenet central to law, but only insofar as society 
has deemed it to be central. If there is significant disagreement over the nature and 
importance of the principle, then this principle cannot function as justification for the 
infringement of autonomy rights: "before a principle can become a ptinciple of 
fundamental justice, significant public support must have coalesced behind it" (Milton, 
12 In R. v. Malmo-Levine (2003), David Malmo-Levine was charged with marijuana 
possession for the purpose of trafficking. His organization, the Harm Reduction Club, 
used the drug to educate users, and provided it at cost. He argued that the harm principle 
should be considered a principle of fundamental justice under s. 7, such that an element 
of harm must be part of any criminal charge. The Court determined that the harm 
principle did not meet the qualifying conditions for it to be a principle of fundamental 
justice. 
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1995, p. 132). Moreover, "it must be identified with sufficient precision to yield a 
manageable standard against which to measure deprivation oflife, liberty or security of 
the person" (Malmo-Levine, 2003, p. 6). A manageable standard would involve the 
translation of a principle into a practical, workable limitation to constitutional rights 
(Fallon, 2006). It must be possible to devise a clear strategy for implementing a principle 
in order for that principle to function as a limitation to s. 7 rights. 
Liberty: B. (R.) 
Liberty, one of the three elements found under s. 7, was examined in B. (R.) v. 
Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto (1995). Parents who identified as 
Jehovah's Witnesses objected to a blood transfusion for their infant, who was born 
prematurely and had compromised health. The Children's Aid Society was granted 
temporary wardship of the infant according to the Child Welfare Act: "S.B. received a 
blood transfusion as part of the examination and operation for the suspected glaucoma" 
(p. 3). The parents claimed thats. 19(l)(b)(ix) of the Act "which defines 'child in need of 
protection', together with the powers in ss. 30(1)2 and 41 and the procedures in ss. 21, 
27, 28(1), (10) and (12)" (p. 3) infringed on theirs. 7 rights as well as theirs. 2 rights to 
freedom of religion. 
The majority of Supreme Court Justices wrote separate rulings; for the purpose of 
this section, I will focus on the rulings that have bearing on s. 7. The Supreme Court of 
Canada held that citizens' liberty interests must be protected from state interference by s. 
7 as long as the choice in question is nontrivial, and does not come into conflict with 
essential societal values: 
The liberty protected by s. 7 of the Charter does not mean unconstrained 
freedom. Freedom of the individual to do what he or she wishes must, in 
any organized society, be subjected to numerous constraints for the 
common good. The state undoubtedly has the right to impose many types 
of restraints on individual behaviour, and not all limitations will attract 
Charter scrutiny. On the other hand, liberty does not mean mere freedom 
from physical restraint. In a free and democratic society, the individual 
must be left room for personal autonomy to live his or her own life and to 
make decisions that are of fundamental personal importance (p. 4 ). 
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This interpretation is grounded in liberal philosophies, according to many of which a just 
state must not interfere with human choices as long as those choices cause no harm to 
others (Locke, 1980; Mill, 1978). Further, liberal philosophical rhetoric associates liberty 
with self-rule or self-direction, namely the ability to make decisions that pertain to one's 
life plans and purposes (Lukes, 1973 ). The Court thus deliberated over whether the 
decision to refuse a blood transfusion for one's child was a decision of fundamental 
personal importance, and if that were the case, whether there was a principle of 
fundamental justice that legitimized state interference. 
Four Justices ruled the parents' s. 7 right to liberty had been violated but the 
violation was in accord with the principles of fundamental justice insofar as this right had 
to be balanced against the Court's parens patriae jurisdiction. They recognized that "the 
right to nurture a child, to care for its development, and to make decisions for it in 
fundamental matters such as medical care, are part of the liberty interest of a parent" (p. 
5), but "this recognition was based on the presumption that parents act in the best interest 
of their child" (p. 5). The state may intervene in order to act in a child's best interests, 
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and can do so by invokingparens patriae, which was explained in detail in E. (Mrs.) v. 
Eve (1986) 13 : "the parens patriae jurisdiction is ... founded on necessity, namely the need 
to act for the protection of those who cannot care for themselves" (p. 45). Parens patriae 
was identified in B. (R.) v. Children's Aid Society (1995) as fundamental to Canadian 
jurisprudence: "the protection of a child's right to life and to health is a basic tenet of our 
legal system, and legislation to that end accords with the principles of fundamental 
justice" (p. 6). 
Three Justices argued that the exercise of parental liberty in this case fell outside 
the ambit of s. 7 because the life and health of the child would have been seriously 
endangered: "the exercise of parental beliefs that grossly invades those best interests is 
not activity protected by the right to liberty in s. 7. There is simply no room within s. 7 
for parents to override the child's right to life and security of the person" (p. 7). This 
argument signifies the Court's interest in protecting the s. 7 rights of the child, rather than 
the liberty rights of the parents. Given that s. 7 rights are individual rights-"the 
Canadian Charter, and s. 7 in particular, protects individuals" (p. 72)--the interests of 
one party may conflict with the interests of another. Whereas one ruling in this case 
limited the parents' liberty interest with a principle basic to social organization, this 
ruling limits autonomy rights when the boundaries of those rights push against another 
rights-bearer's boundaries. 
13 In E. (Mrs.) v. Eve (1986), Mrs. E. wanted permission to consent to the non-therapeutic 
sterilization of her intellectually disabled daughter Eve. The Supreme Court of Canada 
ruled unanimously in Eve's favour, holding that non-therapeutic, forced sterilization does 
not fall under the jurisdiction of parens patriae. 
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Security of the Person: Rodriguez 
Another right identified under s. 7, security of the person was central to the case 
of Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General) (1993). Sue Rodriguez was 
diagnosed with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), a progressive, terminal disability. 
She wanted to end her life once the disability immobilized her, but at that point ALS 
would render her physically incapable of doing so on her own: "[she] wishes that a 
qualified physician be allowed to set up technological means by which she might, when 
she is no longer able to enjoy life, by her own hand, at the time of her choosing, end her 
life" (p. 3). With one year left to live, she applied to the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia to have s. 241 (b) of the Criminal Code struck down on the grounds that it 
violated s. 7 rights to life, liberty, and security of the person; s. 12 protection against cruel 
and unusual punishment; and s. 15 right to equality. The Supreme Court found in a five 
to four ruling that the prohibition of assisted suicide does not violate Charter rights. 
Again, I will focus on the rulings related to s. 7 rights. Security of the person was 
so defined by J. Sopinka, who wrote the majority decision: "security of the person in s. 7 
encompasses notions of personal autonomy (at least with respect to the right to make 
choices concerning one's own body), control over one's physical and psychological 
integrity which is free from state interference, and basic human dignity" (p. 5). Security 
of the person thus involves the right to make fundamental decisions regarding one's own 
body and mental state. While liberty more broadly applies to fundamental decisions 
about one's life, the security of the person interest more directly relates to corporeal and 
psychological decisions. Reflecting on the case, Milton (1995) notes that "the sanctity of 
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life is the overarching principle [fundamental to Canadian society] but on occasion it is 
subject to exception founded on personal autonomy. As a result, the majority recognized 
a right of corporeal autonomy" (p. 13). He characterizes corporeal autonomy in the 
following way: 
I am a competent adult. I have a right to autonomy. At the very least, this 
right confers on me the right to do what I wish with my body provided no 
one else is harmed. Therefore, I have a freedom to commit suicide. 
Restrictions on aided suicide impair my freedom, and when I am unable to 
commit suicide unaided, the ban creates a complete barrier to exercise of 
my freedom (p. 125). 
In the case of disabilities where one experiences corporeal limitations, suicide might only 
be possible with assistance, such that a physician or loved one acts as an instrument, 
appendage, or extension of the agent making the decision. At least at the time the case 
was heard, Rodriguez was capable of making and communicating the decision, although 
she would eventually be incapable of executing it. While the ability to execute a choice 
is a component of decisional capacity in some bioethics literature (Beauchamp & 
Childress, 2009; Grisso & Appelbaum, 1998), Rodriguez made a case for honouring her 
right to make decisions about her body and her life even when she required assistance to 
carry out the decision. 
The majority found that s. 241 (b) of the Criminal Code violated Rodriguez's 
rights to liberty and security of the person; regarding the latter, the section "deprives the 
appellant of autonomy over her person and causes her physical pain and psychological 
stress in a manner which impinges on the security of her person" (p. 4). It was 
determined, however, that this deprivation "is not contrary to the principles of 
fundamental justice" (p. 4). The principle in question was the state's interest in 
protecting vulnerable populations who in similar contexts could be taken advantage of: 
Given the concerns about abuse and the great difficulty in creating 
appropriate safeguards, the blanket prohibition on assisted suicide is not 
arbitrary or unfair. The prohibition relates to the state's interest in 
protecting the vulnerable and is reflective of fundamental values at play in 
our society. Section 241 (b) therefore does not infringe s. 7 of the Charter 
(pp. 5-6). 
The majority thus ruled that Rodriguez had the right to liberty and corporeal autonomy; 
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she had the right to make fundamentally important decisions regarding her life and body. 
However, she could not carry out her decision without her physician's help, and so the 
Court had to acknowledge that Rodriguez was only capable of acting autonomously in 
this instance if someone facilitated the decision. The Court could not set a precedent that 
ran the risk of abuse in other contexts, against vulnerable people. 
In a similar vein, bioethicist Callahan (2008) considers how decisions regarding 
physician-assisted suicide are always social, produced in dialogue between the disabled 
person and the person assisting. He is wary of the motivations of other people involved 
in the decision, and whether they are abusing their power, for their involvement might 
constrain the autonomy of the disabled person whose life is at stake. Harris (1990) and 
Lindley (1988) hold instead, though, that suicide should not be prohibited when the act 
maximizes autonomy; it has been proposed that suicide when the alternative is a life with 
a disability is one such exception to the rule (Hwang, 2007; Powell & Lowenstein, 1996). 
Some disability rights advocates (Shakespeare, 2006; Silvers, 1998b) even argue that it is 
problematic to characterize disabled people trying to make end-of-life decisions as 
vulnerable. Says Hwang: "among disability activists, supporters of physician assisted 
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death assert that emphasizing vulnerability contradicts the goals of the independent-living 
movement by promoting the image of people with disabilities as a weak class incapable 
of full self-determination" (2007, pp. 20-21 ). Perhaps part of self-determination is the 
decision to die. 
Or, it is possible that this ruling overlooked that end-of-life decisions are not 
always autonomously made, especially given that ableist contexts may produce pressures 
to end one's life (Asch, 2005; Shakespeare, 2006). Ho (2008) argues: 
Without addressing the social context within which people may find no 
feasible option but to seek death, the autonomy argument for assisted 
death reinforces the status quo by not questioning whether imposition of 
isolation, abandonment, and lack of support and opportunity make life 
seem not worth living to people with impairments (p. 203). 
The majority ruling reinforced the individualistic spirit of s. 7, in that it acknowledged 
Rodriguez's freedom to make an end-of-life decision, without acknowledging how ableist 
societal attitudes might be internalized and incorporated into end-of-life decisions. The 
cases discussed in this section reflect a specific notion of autonomy that does not 
incorporate context and relations. Such a formulation of the concept has implications for 
autonomy jurisprudence, implications which are also made manifest in relation to 
reproduction. 
2.3. Reproductive Autonomy 
The following section will grapple with how autonomy theories have been applied 
to reproductive decision-making. It will begin with a consideration of how reproductive 
autonomy is explained in bioethics literature, especially relative to maternal-fetal 
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connections. The next sub-section will present the relevance of and implications to R. v. 
Morgentaler (1988), which grounded reproductive rights in the s. 7 right to security of 
the person. I will demonstrate that security of the person relates to reproductive 
autonomy, and I will evaluate whether this right can adequately protect and facilitate 
reproductive decision-making. 
2.3.1. Reproductive Autonomy in Bioethics 
Personal Reproductive Autonomy 
Reproductive autonomy concerns a range of decisions pertaining to women's 
procreative events or activities, including contraception, impregnation, abortion, as well 
as pre-implantation, prenatal, and postnatal technologies (McLeod, 2002; Roberts, 1997). 
McLeod (2002) makes a case for expanding the definition to such a wide range, when 
reproductive autonomy has historically tended to refer only to abortion decisions: 
Although reproductive autonomy is often understood narrowly in terms of 
women's civil rights of access to abortion and reproductive technologies, 
surely the concept should have wider application. For example, iflittle 
respect is given to women's autonomy once they gain access to 
reproductive technologies, they will lack control over how they reproduce 
or attempt to reproduce (p. 2). 
The concept generally refers to a woman's entitlement to determine and control her 
reproductive activities and to make choices related to her reproductive system. Examples 
range from the choice to use birth control to protection from involuntary therapeutic 
sterilization; from the use of assistive reproductive technology to the refusal to ever bear 
children; from the decision to carry a pregnancy to term to the decision to terminate; from 
access to diagnostic technologies to the right not to know. 
101 
The concept of reproductive autonomy has been legally integrated into Canadian 
law in recent decades, reflecting the theoretical work of liberal scholars. As Glendon 
(1987) notes, "fundamental change ... occurred in [the area of reproductive rights, 
specifically abortion] all over the Western world in a relatively short period of time" (p. 
10). Her assessment is based on legal reforms in twenty W estem countries (including 
Canada) beginning in the 1960s through the 1970s-shifts in law and policy that came to 
the defence of women's entitlement to reproductive control. Glendon speculates over the 
ideological underpinnings to these shifts, holding that "much of family law is no more-
and no less-than the symbolic expression of certain cultural ideals" (p. 10). The cultural 
ideal to which she is referring (and which she, standing in opposition to reproductive 
rights, condemns) is personal autonomy: "I would say to my pro-choice friend ... please 
consider what a set of legal arrangements that places individual liberty or mere life style 
over innocent life says about, and may do to, the people and the society that produces 
them" (p. 62). 
Glendon is using the rhetoric of a rights conflict to frame abortion, and the lens is 
not uncommon. Indeed, she is referencing scholars of the 1970s, among them feminists, 
who championed women's reproductive rights by seeking to resolve a conflict between 
woman and fetus. Jarvis Thomson (1971) and Overall (1987) argue that the fetus has no 
claim to occupying a woman's womb despite any moral standing to which it might be 
entitled, and for this reason women's right to bodily autonomy overrides the interest the 
fetus has in living. A woman who opts to have an abortion, in this light, is not violating 
the fetus's right to life, but is only denying the use of her body, for she is not morally 
102 
required to offer her body at great cost to herself: "having a right to life includes having a 
right to be given at least the bare minimum one needs for continued life. But suppose 
that what in fact is the bare minimum a man needs for continued life is something he has 
no right at all to be given?" (Jarvis Thomson, 1971, p. 3). 
According to an extreme liberal position taken on abortion rights, the fetus has no 
moral standing, that is, does not qualify as a person. If not a person, it lacks competing 
legal, or at least moral, interests. A position of this sort may be defended by identifying 
criteria to personhood that the fetus cannot meet. Singer (1979) and Tooley (1972), as 
examples, argue that personhood begins with self-awareness, which develops months 
after birth. Tooley notes that ascribing value at any point during a pregnancy, including 
conception (fertilization of the ovum), quickening (fetal movement detected by the 
pregnant woman), and viability (the ability to survive on its own despite still being in 
utero ), would only be arbitrary: "in the case of abortion a number of events ... might be 
taken as cutoff points, and it is easy to overlook the fact that none of these events 
involves any morally significant change in the developing human" (p. 38). 
Warren (1973) originally held that the decision to terminate a pregnancy is 
entirely a matter of a woman's right to bodily autonomy because the fetus has no rights, 
for it does not qualify for membership in the moral community until long after birth14• 
14 Warren (1973) concedes that her position on abortion also supports infanticide (a 
practice historically associated with the birth of disabled newborns), in cases where the 
infant has not developed the criteria that would render it a member of the moral 
community: "a man or woman whose consciousness has been permanently obliterated but 
who remains alive is a human being which is no longer a person; defective human beings, 
with no appreciable mental capacity, are not and presumably never will be people; and a 
fetus is a human being which is not yet a person" (p. 6). She challenges infanticide on 
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She cites five conditions to membership in the moral community, or "traits which are 
most central to the concept of personhood" (p. 5): consciousness of objects and pain, 
reasoning capacity, self-motivated activity, communication, and self-awareness. Without 
these characteristics, the fetus has no entitlement to life. Critiquing Jarvis Thomson, 
Warren indicates that abortion is not a "morally serious and extremely unfortunate, even 
though sometimes justified act" but might instead be a "morally neutral act, like cutting 
one's hair" 15 (p. 4). Steinbock (2011) explains Warren's position: "actions have moral 
significance only if they harm or wrong persons. If the fetus is not a person, then the 
decision to abort it is not a moral one" (p. 53). 
Critique 
Warren's position fell in line with those myriad positions taken by liberal 
(sometimes feminist) scholars, positions which were undergirded by the rhetoric of rights 
and entitlements. Warren (1989) defends making use of these concepts: "respect for 
rights provides a moral floor-a minimum protection for individuals which remains 
morally binding even where appropriate caring relationships are absent or have broken 
consequentialist grounds, but she is clear about her determination of personhood, and 
who is excluded from the category. Tooley (1983) also grants that his position on 
abortion is a position in favour of infanticide, and consequentialist Singer (1979) defends 
infanticide in the case of disabled newborns. 
15 Regarding the comparison of terminating a pregnancy to cutting one's hair, Steinbock 
(2011) says of Warren: "Warren later repudiated this analogy in conversation. Her book, 
Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things [1984], while denying 
moral standing to fetuses, gives a more nuanced view of the morality of abortion than her 
1973 article" (footnote 55). I will discuss Warren's later position, but thought it prudent 
to include her seminal 1973 work when discussing early liberal positions on reproductive 
autonomy. 
down" (p. 4 7). She goes on to explain that rights discourse is compatible, not in 
competition, with feminist ethics: 
But is the concept of a moral right necessarily incompatible with the social 
nature of human beings? Rights are indeed individualistic, in that they can 
be ascribed to individuals, as well as to groups. But respect for moral 
rights need not be based upon an excessively individualistic view of 
human nature (p. 47). 
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There is certainly a practicality to the arguments outlined above in that they speak 
the language of law, invoking a specific kind of autonomy-autonomy that is personal, 
liberal, belonging to individuals (Gavigan, 1992). Personal reproductive autonomy is 
predicated on the individuation of parties with potentially competing interests. The 
framing of reproductive matters in this way is not new, for discourses on abortion long 
before feminist activism understood the woman and fetus to be deadlocked in a rights 
conflict, only the fetal interest in life was understood to possess more moral weight than a 
woman's interest in corporeal control (Glendon, 1987; Marquis, 1989). Early defences of 
reproductive autonomy sought to negate or outweigh the moral standing of the fetus, but 
held much of the conceptual presuppositions of the opposition to be true. 
Conceptual individuation has gained much more traction due to a reproductive 
technology that has become "one of the most common rituals of pregnancy in the late 
twentieth-century urban North America" (Mitchell, 2001, p. 3). Karpin (1992-1993), 
Mitchell (1994, 2001), and Petchesky (1986, 1987) claim that the fetal imagery produced 
via ultrasound technology has captured the imagination of our visual-dominant culture. 
More than that, interpretations of this imagery have shaped the cultural imagination for 
fetal-maternal identities and relationships. The tool may be used to render that which is 
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private, public: "the technological removal of the fetus from the 'secrecy of the womb' 
through ultrasound and other prenatal procedures gives the fetus social recognition as an 
individual separate from the mother" (Blank, 1993, p. 73). The relationship that the 
prospective mother forges with the fetus is cultivated through the technological medium 
that makes it possible for mother to meet fetus, for it sharpens the focus between the two. 
For example, in the work featured in the 1965 Life Magazine cover and photo 
spread as well as the book A Child is Born (1986), Scandinavian artist Lennart Nilsson 
took pictures of fetuses in utero. Katz Rothman (1987), Mitchell (2001 ), and Stabile 
(1992) describe the pictures' dark background, sometimes depicting outer space, 
replacing the uterus in which the fetus is actually situated. Stabile (1992) argues that this 
background, as well as the captions discussing the thriving child, have had the effect of 
disappearing the mother: "both visually and textually, the embryo-fetus enjoys a 
thoroughly autonomous status" (p. 187). Images like these have functioned as tools used 
to "personify" (Kukla, 2005) the fetus and to render the female body hostile: the fetus is 
"active, virtually autonomous ... trapped in its mother's womb, begrudgingly serving a 
nine-month sentence of confinement" (Gavigan, 2009, pp. 131-132). The pregnant 
woman's role in fetal development has been erased through the production of fetal 
identity, such that the woman, far from facilitating fetal development, has come to be 
regarded as potentially standing in the way; the relationship between woman and fetus 
has therefore come to be framed as adversarial: 
The potential cultural and political successes of the fetal rights movement, 
then, lie in its ability to both capture the imagination and tap the anxiety of 
people who are receptive to the notion that pregnant women are capable of 
extreme acts of selfishness and irresponsibility. The fetus is presented as 
helpless and vulnerable, the most innocent of innocent victims. Again, 
what is striking is that this campaign has been so successful without 
significant support in Canadian law for its fundamental underlying 
premise: that the fetus is a person with legal rights (p. 132). 
Although the use of the technology during pregnancy is meant to "reduce 
106 
maternal anxiety and to stimulate the parents' emotional 'bond' to the fetus" (2001, p. 4), 
Mitchell describes the effect of ritualizing ultrasound procedures: "it offers a means for 
influencing women into complying with prenatal care recommendations about food, 
cigarette, alcohol and/or drug intake" (p. 4). Kukla (2005), too, explains how 
reproductive rituals like ultrasound have helped shape both fetal identity and the mother's 
role, which in turn affect the politics of abortion: "as a shared pregnancy narrative 
becomes canonized, and the inside of the pregnant body is transformed into a public 
arena, the individual outsides of pregnant bodies are rendered penneable and transparent" 
(p. 122). Ritual legitimizes the cultural understanding of the fetus as fragile and 
vulnerable, and renders the uterus either protective or dangerous for fetal development, 
depending on the mother's compliance. The bifurcation of woman and fetus has thus led 
to personification of the fetus, as well as dehumanization of the woman when her 
interests collide with fetal health, that is, when she is unable or unwilling to maintain and 
discipline her body for the sake of the fetus. 
Katz Rothman (1990) considers the ideological underpinnings that shape 
motherhood and pregnancy, among them technology and patriarchy. These ideologies 
have the power to frame identities and relationships to the extent that they are 
internalized, becoming "part of common sense" (p. 27); and as argued earlier in this 
study, the internalization of oppressive ideology has a deleterious effect on reproductive 
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decision-making. She explains how individuation has been accomplished through the use 
of reproductive technology in a culture that inferiorizes women: "in patriarchy, the sense 
of separation of the fetus and mother was already there as a concept; the new technology 
allows the separation to be reified" (p. 158). That is, the reification of this idea that 
woman and fetus are separate entities, even entities at odds with one another, serves the 
interests of patriarchy. Maternal responsibility, dedication to pregnancy monitoring and 
maintenance, might appear to be autonomously carried out, but instead happen as a result 
of the internalization of ideological systems that seek to control reproduction. 
It would seem, then, that Warren (1989) was wrong about the compatibility of 
liberal defences of abortion with feminist ethics, at least the feminist ethical theories of 
later years. Personal autonomy cannot do the work needed to counter discourses that 
would seek to limit women's reproductive control, for personal autonomy requires that 
the experience of pregnancy be refashioned as a conflict, whether between persons, or 
person and nonperson. This conflict, predicated on the conceptual separation of woman 
and fetus, does not properly convey what the experience of pregnancy is like, but instead 
reflects the effects of technology and patriarchy-ideologies that have become ingrained 
in public consciousness such that they have set the terms of the moral disagreement. 
Feminist Reproductive Autonomy 
While Warren (1989) held that a liberal position on abortion is compatible with 
feminist ethics, even she conceded that not all feminists would agree. Wolgast (1987) 
rejects rights discourses because they require that persons be atomistic and self-
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interested, in competition with others. Gilligan (1982) and Noddings (1984), too, stress 
the value of interpersonal relationships over moral entitlements, seeking to build codes of 
ethics along lines of relations rather than according to distribution to individuals. Should 
the concept of reproductive autonomy be compatible with these feminisms, it cannot be a 
concept derived from liberal ideologies. 
When analyzing those early feminist perspectives on reproductive autonomy as 
outlined above, Colker (1992) criticizes the tendency on both sides of the old abortion 
debate to assume that women and fetuses can be understood separately: 
Feminist pro-choice litigators attempt to argue that we should consider the 
woman's right to autonomy in isolation from the state's interest in 
protecting life. Instead of seeing pregnant women as having an implicit 
connectedness to the fetus, and thus a responsibility to the well-being of 
that fetus, pregnant women are described in isolation from that fetus. Pro-
life advocates do no better. As Rosalind Petchesky has pointed out, they 
try to remove fetuses from women's bodies, and pretend that we can 
protect fetal life without controlling women's lives. Their concern for the 
autonomy or well-being of fetuses causes them to disregard women's lives 
(p. 85). 
For her, discourses on abortion too often fail to account for the necessary connection 
between fetus and mother. This "imperative to describe the mother and fetus as either 
one being or two, but not both one and two", Karpin (1992-1993) argues, "indicates the 
limitations oflogocentric and phallocentric discourse" (p. 327), when women's bodies 
are in reality "least able to conform to an optics of the skin, particularly in the context of 
pregnancy" (2005, p. 195). Katz Rothman (1990) holds that the experience of pregnancy 
challenges arguments rooted in personal autonomy: 
We have motherhood, the physical embodiment of connectedness. We 
have in every pregnant woman the living proof that individuals do not 
enter the world as autonomous, atomistic, isolated beings, but begin 
socially, being connected. And we have in every pregnant woman a 
walking contradiction to the segmentation of our lives: pregnancy does not 
permit it. In pregnancy the private self, the self, familial self, announces 
itself wherever we go. Motherhood is the embodied challenge to liberal 
philosophy, and that, I fear, is why a society founded on and committed to 
liberal philosophical principles cannot deal well with motherhood (p. 59). 
Mackenzie (1995), too, argues that while many feminist perspectives on reproductive 
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autonomy acknowledge that fetal existence and welfare cannot be understood as separate 
from the pregnant woman, they fail to account for the implication that liberal 
interpretations of reproductive autonomy also require that the woman and fetus be 
understood as separate and in conflict. The erection of borderlines around the woman, 
and the continued characterization of the maternal-fetal relationship as oppositional, runs 
counter to the phenomenology of pregnancy. The fetus could have moral value, then, not 
due to abstract notions of individualism, but instead as a result of being "related to the 
human community in and through the bodies of the women who gestate them" (Tong, 
1997, p. 151). 
In her later work, Warren (1989) refines her analysis, arguing that birth, rather 
than simply qualifications for membership into the moral community, is a morally 
significant event that should have bearing on the question of reproductive rights. In her 
own words: 
Birth is morally significant because it marks the end of one relationship 
and the beginning of others. It marks the end of pregnancy, a relationship 
so intimate that it is impossible to extend the equal protection of the law to 
fetuses without severely infringing women's most basic rights. Birth also 
marks the beginning of the infant's existence as a socially responsive 
member of the human community. Although the infant is not instantly 
transformed into a person at the moment of birth, it does become a 
biologically separate human being (p. 480). 
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Recall that earlier in this chapter, it was noted that the experiences of pregnant and some 
disabled bodies as explicitly and profoundly intercorporeal challenge liberal 
interpretations of autonomy. These bodies may serve as entry points into theoretical 
work that needs not be predicated on individual bodies with isolated entitlements. 
Indeed, consider in the above passage that Warren is not saying that birth marks the 
individuation of persons; she is not recommending a new cut-off point for assigning 
moral significance, alongside viability, self-awareness, and the like. She is instead 
arguing that birth marks a transition in relationships, a shift from the profoundly intimate 
bond between woman and fetus, two bodies as one, to engagement with others within a 
greater network of, if not intercorporeality, at least interconnectivity. Price and Shildrick 
(2002) highlight the importance of interconnectivity, using disability as their entry point 
and postmodern language to frame their theory: 
Against an ingrained tendency for disability activists and scholars to claim 
a clear set of identities as disabled people, the trajectory within 
postmodernism has been to fragment the concept of identity in general and 
to substitute a fluid, shifting notion of a process of becoming that defines 
neither its own corporeal boundaries nor a fixed context. In suggesting 
such a radically different approach, our purpose in part is to open up the 
ethical agenda to encompass not just the liberal humanist pursuit of rights, 
interests or even individual moral flourishing-all of which presuppose 
identity-but the post-conventional concerns with encounter, with 
relationship and becoming-in-the-world-with-others (p. 62). 
When we introduce notions of relationships and responsibility to pregnancy, we 
may well be painting a more accurate picture of women's experiences, thereby erasing 
the body boundaries that are foundational to rights conflict rhetoric, but do these notions 
so complicate reproductive autonomy as to render the principle useless? Donchin (2009) 
argues that, to the contrary, reproductive autonomy can be refashioned such that it 
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includes connectivity and community: "a relational perspective can weave its way 
through shifting relationships and novel reproductive arrangements without jeopardizing 
the reproductive autonomy of the individuals involved" (p. 34). The intercorporeal 
phenomenology of pregnant bodies should disrupt conceptions of self such that we no 
longer limit autonomy analysis to the sphere of individuals, for instances of 
intercorporeality should deconstruct, rather than simply be understood as exceptions to, 
normalized embodiments. With this frame of reference in mind, we can more readily 
account for how reproductive decision-making happens within a vast context of 
interrelations: 
Advocates of relational autonomy highlight the ways in which 
interpersonal connections and influences from intimates can enable rather 
than present obstacles to an individual's autonomy. If our selves are 
connected in this way, the requirements for autonomy cannot simply 
exclude the needs and interests of our loved ones from influencing our 
decisions. Though relational autonomy theorists can recognize that the 
influence of some intimates can present obstacles to autonomy ... they also 
argue that supportive personal relations provide the conditions under 
which autonomy is even possible (Goering, 2009, p. 12). 
When identity is no longer understood to be singular, when boundary lines between 
persons blur, decision-making becomes more nuanced and collaborative, where 
autonomy is borne out of the support and advice ofloved ones (Jackson, 2001). 
Grandmother raised me Catholic, and an abortion would break her heart; my mother is 
ecstatic, even offered to move in and help; my boyfriend and I are just not ready to settle 
down yet; my wife and I have been trying to have a baby for years: the concept of 
relational autonomy makes these concerns, these other people, much more relevant to 
decision-making. Such a perspective, too, can identify other influences, perhaps those 
that are unwelcome: namely, the ideologies of technology and patriarchy that are 
internalized and incorporated into reproductive decisions. 
2.3.2. Reproductive Autonomy in Law 
Morgentaler 
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These considerations have not entered into reproductive autonomy jurisprudence, 
for the landmark case in Canada, R. v. Morgentaler (1988), upheld the body-defined 
boundaries between rights-bearers. In this case, Drs. Henry Morgentaler, Leslie Frank 
Smoling, and Robert Scott were charged with illegally inducing miscarriages at a Toronto 
clinic, thus violating s. 251 ( 4) in the Criminal Code. Under the Criminal Code, abortion 
was considered an indictable offense unless it was performed in a hospital by a doctor, 
and was approved by a committee of physicians who determined that the medical 
treatment would serve the purpose of saving a pregnant woman's life. Initially, the 
appellants argued that the Criminal Code was "inconsistent with s. 1 (b) of the Canadian 
Bill of Rights" (p. 3 ), but as their cases proceeded the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
was introduced into Canadian jurisprudence. The Supreme Court of Canada considered 
whether s. 251 infringed on s. 2(a) freedom of conscience; s. 7 rights to life, liberty, and 
security of the person; ands. 12 right not to be subject to cruel and unusual punishment. 
The Supreme Court majority of five to two agreed that s. 251 infringed on women's s. 7 
right, and the deprivation of this right was not in accord with the principles of 
fundamental justice. It was also determined that the violation did not satisfy s. 1 of the 
Charter. 
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Introduced by then Justice Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau in 1969, the amendment 
to the Criminal Code was progressive for its time, for it paved the way for the 
decriminalization of abortion. Previously an offense for which women could receive life 
imprisonment, abortion came to be legal as long as a committee comprised of at least 
three medical professionals could determine that the pregnant woman's physical, mental, 
or emotional health was endangered by the pregnancy: "[abortion was possible ifJ the 
continuation of the pregnancy of such female person would or would be likely to 
endanger her life or health" (s. 251, 4c). Morgentaler and his associates violated the 
Criminal Code by setting up "a clinic to perform abortions upon women who had not 
obtained a certificate from a therapeutic abortion committee of an accredited or approved 
hospital" (R. v. Morgentaler, 1988, pp. 2-3). They did so because, as indicated by their 
public statements, they questioned "the wisdom of the abortion laws in Canada and 
[asserted] that a woman has an unfettered right to choose whether or not an abortion is 
appropriate in her individual circumstances" (p. 3). 
Those in the Supreme Court majority wrote three different rulings. Accompanied 
by J. Lamer, C.J. Dickson wrote thats. 251 "forces women to carry a foetus to term 
contrary to their own priorities and aspirations and which imposes serious delay causing 
increased physical and psychological trauma to those women who meet its criteria" (p. 
63). Justice Beetz, with whom J. Estey was in agreement, wrote that by amending s. 251 
in 1969, Parliament had acknowledged that "the objective of protecting the foetus is not 
of sufficient importance to defeat the interest in protecting pregnant women" (p. 126); s. 
251 was "manifestly unfair" (p. 11) because it failed to meet Parliament's objective. 
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According to J. Wilson16, s. 251 violated s. 7 rights to security of the person and liberty; 
she explained the violation of liberty in the following way: "liberty in a free and 
democratic society does not require the state to approve the personal decisions made by 
its citizens; it does, however, require the state to respect them" (p. 167). She further 
argued that the decision to terminate a pregnancy was "essentially a moral decision, a 
matter of conscience" (p. 175) and thus s. 251 also violated the Charter's s. 2(a) freedom 
of conscience. 
Justice Wilson cited autonomy when ruling that s. 251 violated the right to liberty: 
"the right to 'liberty' contained in s. 7 guarantees to every individual a degree of personal 
autonomy over important decisions intimately affecting their private lives" (p. 37). For 
her, every right and freedom in the Charter is underpinned with the idea that "the state 
will respect choices made by individuals and, to the greatest extent possible, will avoid 
subordinating these choices to any one conception of the good life" (p. 3 7). According to 
her interpretation of the Charter, every right and freedom, including s. 7, to some degree 
is designed to respect autonomous decisions, as long as autonomy is understood as self-
direction, the condition by which people make choices freely. By J. Wilson's logic, then, 
reproductive decision-making should in part be grounded by the principle of personal 
autonomy. 
Granted, the other Justices in the majority did not argue that s. 251 of the 
Criminal Code violated the Charter's s. 7 right to liberty, nor did they argue that the s. 7 
16 Justice Wilson was the only female Supreme Court Justice presiding over the case. 
When it comes to the question of the moral permissibility of reproductive rights, there is 
value in considering who-which gender-grants the permission. 
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right to security of the person should be interpreted so widely as to include the promotion 
of personal autonomy despite the argument made by the defence. Rodriguez (1993) 
associated security of the person with corporeal autonomy, but Morgentaler happened 
long before Rodriguez set the precedent. In Morgentaler, the appellants' counsel Mr. 
Manning had used American constitutional theory to argue their case: "[section 7] is a 
wide-ranging right to control one's own life and to promote one's individual autonomy. 
The right would therefore include a right to privacy and a right to unfettered decisions 
about one's life" (p. 51 ). Manning was referring to the landmark American case on 
abortion rights, Roe v. Wade (1973), in which it was ruled that under the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause, women are entitled to privacy in reproductive 
contexts, at least until the fetus becomes viable at twenty-eight weeks of pregnancy. In 
response to counsel, C.J. Dickson cautioned against interpreting s. 7 through the lens of 
American theories: "we would, in my view, do our own Constitution a disservice to 
simply allow the American debate to define us, all the while ignoring the truly 
fundamental structural differences between the two constitutions" (p. 53). 
Indeed, it would be problematic to draw a one-to-one comparison between 
security of the person found in the Canadian Charter and privacy protections from the 
American Constitution. Within the Roe. v. Wade (1973) ruling, privacy was linked to 
"personal liberty embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment" (V). Although the term is not 
explicitly found in the Constitution, "the Court ... recognized that a right of personal 
privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the 
Constitution" (VIII). This was possible because the right to privacy was understood to 
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have broad applications: "the Constitution nowhere mentions a specific right of personal 
choice in matters of marriage and family life, but the 'liberty' protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment covers more than those freedoms explicitly 
named in the Bill of Rights" (I). The concept of privacy has historically related to self-
disclosure: "common law secures to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, 
to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others" 
(Warren & Brandeis, 1980; as cited in Leino-Kilpi et al., 2000, p. 80). Broadly, at least 
in the US, the principle has been applied in an effort to protect individuals from 
interference when making decisions. In Canadian law, security of the person has a more 
specific application, grounded in the protection of persons from physical and 
psychological harm: 
The appellants submitted that 'security of the person' protected by the 
Charter is an explicit right to control one's body and to make fundamental 
decisions about one's life. The Crown contended that 'security of the 
person' is a more circumscribed interest and that, like all of the elements 
of s. 7, it at most relates to the concept of physical control, simply 
protecting the individual's interest in his or her bodily integrity (R. v. 
Morgentaler, 1988, p. 54). 
Despite C.J. Dickson's caution, s. 7 can still be understood as a set of rights that 
upholds reproductive autonomy. Canadian theorist McLeod (2002) discusses the effect 
of interference with reproductive autonomy: "if little respect is given to women's 
autonomy ... they will lack control over how they reproduce or attempt to reproduce." (p. 
2). She thus links autonomy with reproductive control. Indeed, reproductive decisions 
are necessarily grounded in women's bodies and reproductive capacities, and how freely 
made those decisions are has a tremendous impact on the physical and psychological 
hardship a woman might endure. Purdy (2006) explains the significance of ensuring 
women control their own bodies: "autonomy is particularly important for 
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women ... because reproduction still takes place in women's bodies, and because they are 
generally expected to take primary responsibility for child rearing" (p. 287). If a woman 
lacks access to abortion services, she must carry a pregnancy to term, resulting in a 
drastic transformation of her body and a lack of control over what happens to her body. 
Women may experience these hardships because, as C.J. Dickson held, the 
criminalization of abortion ran contrary to women's priorities and aspirations. The Chief 
Justice acknowledged that in reproductive matters, reproductive control involves a degree 
of self-direction, of acting in accordance with one's own values. Therefore, even a 
narrow definition of the right to security of the person is framed with concepts associated 
with autonomy, such as self-direction. 
Analysis 
While the 1988 Morgentaler case marks an historic victory for reproductive rights 
in Canada, the decision framed reproductive decision-making as strictly a medical issue, 
one which unfolds between a woman and her physician: "the victory was ... contradictory 
in that the Court reinforced the notion that abortion is a medical matter" (Gavigan, 1992, 
p. 222). While Morgentaler has served as a cultural icon and champion for reproductive 
rights since this first case and many more thereafter, this case questioned the guilt of 
physicians involved in performing abortions, not the women seeking abortions out. The 
decision rendered was meant to protect not only women but also physicians. 
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This decision reflects how intimately involved physicians are in reproductive 
decision-making processes. They need not be since they have not always been; as Katz 
Rothman ( 1991) notes, "the transition from almost all births taking place at home to 
almost all births taking place in the hospital took just over two generations. In those two 
generations, birth changed from being an event in the life of a family to being a medical 
procedure" (p. 29). Pregnancy has come under the auspices of the medical field, and as 
such has been ideologically reshaped: "the primary characteristic of the modem medical 
model of health and illness in general is that it is based on the ideology of technology, 
that appropriate to the technological society, with its values of efficiency and rationality, 
practical organization, systematizing, and controlling" (p. 34). When reproductive 
practices are medicalized, women are understood to enact reproductive autonomy by 
consenting to or refusing treatments, by choosing to heed or to neglect physician advice, 
by availing themselves of or declining healthcare services. 
When reproduction becomes entirely a healthcare issue, the pregnant woman is by 
implication removed from family contexts where she once, historically, would make 
decisions regarding her pregnancy. In medical contexts, the pregnant woman is an 
individual patient, and her entitlements in such an exchange are individualized. The 
resultant "rights-based, neo-liberal, privatized argumentation that characterizes Supreme 
Court jurisprudence on reproductive autonomy" (Rodgers, 2006, p. 275) has not gone 
without criticism. 
It should be said though: the emphasis on individualism in rights discourse, at 
least in the Canadian context, does not lead to the individuation of the fetus for the 
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purpose of ascribing it rights. A comparison might be helpful. In the US, the woman's 
right to privacy is balanced against the state's interest in protecting viable life, when the 
fetus is "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid" 
(Hellman & Pritchard, 1971; as cited in Roe. v. Wade, 1973, IX). The Supreme Court of 
Canada does not recognize viability, and so a woman's right to security of the person is 
not limited by any state interest in protecting viable life. In Tremblay v. Daigle (1989), 
for example, physically abusive Jean-Guy Tremblay sought an injunction against a 
pregnant Chantal Daigle, who had ended her relationship with Tremblay and was seeking 
an abortion; Tremblay held that he was protecting his unborn child's right to life. It was 
determined that the fetus had no legal status-relegating questions of biological and 
human status to the realms of philosophy, theology, and linguistics-and so Charter 
rights did not apply. It is clear that Canadian jurisprudence is not interested in balancing 
fetal and maternal rights. 
Even so, Morgentaler (1988) and subsequent rulings have been predicated on the 
isolation of the pregnant woman as rights-bearer. In her analysis of Morgentaler, 
Rodgers (2006) holds that reproductive control ought to be grounded in the rights of 
women as a marginalized minority: "we must continue to place emphasis on the nature of 
reproduction as 'social' reproduction, not individual liberty" (p. 289). Gavigan (1992) 
argues that Canadian case law on reproductive rights belies a formulation of autonomy 
that is associated with individualism, and this rhetoric is inconsistent with the language 
taken up within the feminist movement: 
The language of the Morgentaler judgments of the majority was a ringing 
restatement of an individual right to life, liberty, and security of the person 
and is thus consistent with the emphasis on abortion as a private and 
individual matter. While this reflects the language of lawyers and judges, 
it has not been the characterization of Canadian pro-choice and feminist 
activists, who have consistently framed abortion as an issue of equality 
and access (p. 222). 
There are important implications to characterizing reproductive rights as 
individual rights to be fulfilled only in medical contexts. According to Dunsmuir' s 
(1998) analysis of J. Wilson's decision: "the state is required only to respect such 
decisions [to terminate pregnancies], or to refrain from interfering with them, not to 
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approve or facilitate them" (unpaginated). That is, in the case of reproductive rights, s. 7 
protections cannot guarantee positive state obligations that would provide the resources 
women need in order to make reproductive choices. Section 7 has no power to protect 
women from the "creeping privatization" (Gilmour, 2002, p. 267) of healthcare, the effect 
of which has been that abortion is at risk of being quietly removed from our list of 
medically necessary (and therefore covered) health services. Some provinces have 
entered into agreements promising to cover some or all of the costs associated with 
abortion procedures, but these arrangements remain complex and confusing, far from 
uniform (Downie, 2011 ). As demonstrated in the previous chapter, abortion access is 
already varied depending on the province or territory due to this lack of regulation and 
administrative clarity. 
According to Gilmour (2002), the Health Services Restructuring Committee 
(HSRC) poses another impediment to abortion access given its role in advising the 
Minister of Health on which hospitals to close: "in some instances in Ontario, HSRC 
decisions resulted in the 'winning' hospitals (the survivors) being those with Roman 
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Catholic affiliations" (p. 287). She cites the merger of Pembroke Civic Hospital with 
Roman Catholic Pembroke General, and the redirecting of funds from the closed 
Wellesley General Hospital to Saint Michael's Hospital. As a result, "access to a number 
of reproductive health care services previous available at the Wellesley [has been 
eliminated]" (p. 288). In effect, women have the right to reproductive control but lack 
options, and reproductive choices should at minimum be facilitated by meaningful 
options provided within one's social context. They might also be facilitated if 
reproductive autonomy was understood to function within relations, and pregnancy was 
not understood to be entirely a health matter, to be undermined whenever healthcare 
policy is adjusted in the interest of tightening budget lines. Decisions that favour 
Catholic hospitals in the restructuring of healthcare not only limit women's options, but 
also express a judgment about abortion which may be internalized: 
[These institutional policies] carry with them an inherent judgment, the 
judgment of a publicly funded institution charged with carrying out 
government policy to provide comprehensive health care, that those 
seeking such services-primarily women-are also morally in the wrong, 
or at best misguided. That is not a silent presence but an active judgment 
with real consequences and ramifications (p. 288). 
For Jackson (2001 ), the state is responsible for facilitating reproductive choice by 
providing access to the necessary services. She holds that this responsibility is consistent 
with reproductive autonomy, and she fashions the principle with the use of feminist 
advocates ofrelational autonomy: "autonomy is ... ' a capacity that requires ongoing 
relationships that help it flourish"' (Nedelsky, 1993; as cited in Jackson, 2001, p. 6); 
"Young's participatory model of empowerment. .. emphasizes the social constraints upon 
the options from which an individual is able to choose" (Young, 1997; as cited in 
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Jackson, 2001, p. 6). Such a reworked principle accounts for how reproductive decisions 
can be made freely when communities provide valuable options. Respect for autonomy 
thus requires not merely the removal of barriers, but the active facilitation of choice and 
the disruption of influences, overt and systemic, that undercut the authenticity of choice: 
"[the principle] should sharpen society's responsibility to ensure that each pregnant 
woman has ... a range of valuable options from which to choose" (p. 115). Jackson's work 
points to the inadequacies inherent in reproductive protections in Canada, for our current 
notions of reproductive autonomy have been ill-equipped to handle provincial efforts to 
curtail abortion access and the pervasive religious framing of pregnancy in terms of the 
individuated fetus and irresponsible mother. The Morgentaler (1988) decision triggered 
what Petchesky (1987) has described in the US as a "rightward drift" (p. 57) of public 
opinion, or at least of a vocal minority, fuelled with powerful imagery like Nilsson's 
photography (1965, 1986). This movement has operated effectively outside the courts to 
chip away at abortion access in both the US and Canada. Says Gavigan: 
The legalization of abortion contributed to the ascendance of an aggressive 
antiabortion movement, one that has continued to organize in the churches 
and religious schools. Their discourse of the unborn child has become a 
dominant ideology of our time. Their ability to present all pregnant 
women as risky, possibly irresponsible, always potentially hostile to their 
own pregnancies, has in my view become pervasive and I believe socially 
shared (2009, p. 32). 
2.4. Reproductive Autonomy and Disability De-Selection 
This chapter will conclude with an analysis of how reproductive technologies 
designed to de-select fetal impairment affect the autonomy principle framing 
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reproductive decision-making. Maternal-fetal relationships and all their constituent 
maternal responsibilities are produced or at least sharpened through the use of 
technology, and how these relationships and responsibilities are constructed vary 
depending on what is identified through the technological lens. That is, when a diagnosis 
is rendered, the conversation around reproductive decision-making changes, and the 
principles grounding that conversation are used differently. 
This section will begin with a presentation of how scholars have addressed the 
introduction of technologies into reproductive decision-making; I will consider 
specifically whether they enhance or hinder autonomy. I will then consider legal cases 
that shape the parameters of responsibility: Winnipeg Child and Family Services 
(Northwest Area) v. G. (D.F.) (1997), where the Supreme Court of Canada explored the 
implications to detaining a pregnant woman for treatment against her will; and Arndt v. 
Smith (1997), a suit where a mother was not financially compensated for wrongful birth 
because, according to the Court's analysis, she would not have terminated her pregnancy 
even if informed of impairment-related risks. 
2. 4.1. Reproductive Autonomy and Disability De-Selection in Bioethics 
Reproductive Autonomy Model 
According to a common theme in bioethics, reproductive autonomy is enhanced 
through the use of technologies that might identify impairments, for they enable potential 
parents to make better informed decisions: 
One of the principal values that is offered in support of prenatal screening 
is autonomy. The value of autonomy, often framed in terms of women's 
choice, is widely recognized by those who fund, research, develop, and 
implement prenatal screening and is central in obstetrics and genetics 
departments and public information pamphlets (Seavilleklein, 2009, p. 69). 
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Buchanan and colleagues (2000) as well as Lippman (1993) refer to this justification for 
the use of reproductive technologies as the reproductive autonomy model: "prenatal 
diagnosis is presented as a means of giving women information to expand their 
reproductive choices" (Lippman, 1993, p. 22). As an example, Ruddick (1988, 2000) 
implicitly endorses the reproductive autonomy model when he argues that prenatal 
disability de-selection is a decision that should be left to the pregnant woman to make, for 
the difficulties that prospective mothers might encounter when raising a disabled child 
are significant factors to consider in the decision-making process; technologies that can 
identify or rule out fetal impairment risks can thus empower her by informing her. 
Autonomy is facilitated through better informed decision-making, specifically through an 
agent understanding her situation and options. 
There are nevertheless tensions between the promotion of reproductive technology as a 
means of enhancing autonomy, and the "degree of autonomy available to a woman 
regarding [its] use" (Sherwin, 2004, p. 369). As McCoyd (2007) argues, the provision of 
technologies is not neutral, but ambivalent: 
Prenatal diagnostic techniques both enable and force women and couples 
to make decisions about whether to continue a pregnancy where the fetus 
has an anomaly. These decisions are considered individual, yet they are 
made in a medical culture that pushes for the most sophisticated diagnosis 
and treatment (p. 3 7). 
Hubbard (1982), Katz Rothman (1987), and Rapp (2000) concur; says Katz Rothman: 
"new technology ... offers new choices, but it also creates new structures and new 
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limitations on choice" (1987, p. 14). It is my hope that this section explores this 
ambiguity, which complicates efforts to promote reproductive technologies on autonomy 
grounds alone. 
While ultrasounds, genetic screening and testing, and pre-implantation genetic 
diagnosis are designed for the purpose of providing more information, it may be that 
women are misinformed regarding the employment of these tools. That reproductive 
technologies have been featured in pregnancy rituals and routines in such a prominent 
way has led to pregnant women assuming that their use is standard, even compulsory 
(Lippman, 1993; Tremain, 2006; Vassy, 2006). Recall that in the previous section, Kukla 
(2005) and Mitchell (1994, 2001) were noted for discussing the ritualization of these 
procedures, meaning that their necessity is constructed. Further, information derived 
from reproductive technologies is framed with the language of "risks and likelihoods" 
(Kerr & Shakespeare, 2002, p. 132), and thus should not be trusted as a guarantee for the 
outcome of a pregnancy or a predictor of the specifics of an impairment (Goodling et al., 
2002; Parens & Asch, 2000; Shakespeare, 2005). 
What is the function of this misinformation regarding reproductive technologies 
and their diagnoses? For McDonough (1990; as cited in Masden, 1992), contained within 
diagnoses of impairment risks is an "action imperative" to terminate or to avoid the 
pregnancy. Testing and screening tend to take place in cases of wanted pregnancies, 
when prospective parents take every precaution to guarantee fetal health; but many of 
those pregnancies are transformed when risks are identified, and the decision-making 
shifts to questions around termination and de-selection (Asch, 2001; de Melo Martin, 
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2006; Parens & Asch, 2000). This shift indicates that the diagnosis delivered is not 
neutral, but instead carries with it social expectations: "a woman's decision to abort a 
fetus after a particular prenatal diagnosis is not taken in a vacuum, and may be shaped by 
both society's attitudes to disability, and by medical advice" (Jackson, 2001, p. 98). 
Framing a pregnancy as risky has the power to move prospective parents along in their 
decision-making process, not to more available options, but to specific questions around 
disability de-selection. 
The reproductive autonomy model may still appear persuasive despite 
misinformation regarding whether technology use is compulsory or diagnoses are 
ironclad. The action imperative implicit in the provision of reproductive technologies is 
not tantamount to Hobbesian coercion (1985). A woman may refuse the technologies in 
Canada without legal consequence: "in most nations, no laws forbid or mandate 
ultrasound for pregnant women. No woman is explicitly coerced by her physician or 
anyone into accepting ultrasound; rather, most pregnant women are eager for the 
opportunity" (Sherwin, 2004, p. 369). Alternatively, she may decide on her own 
volition-based on other factors besides medical advice--that she would like to have an 
ultrasound or amniocentesis; she might also, upon discovery that her pregnancy is risky, 
opt to terminate because she does not want to raise a disabled child, again, for reasons 
that exist outside medical advice (Baily, 2000). The choice is hers to make, which seems 
consistent with the argument that reproductive technologies enhance women's 
autonomous decision-making, as long as autonomy is understood to be unimpeded 
choice--an interpretation of autonomy that has been promoted in liberal theory (Hobbes, 
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1985; Locke, 1980; Mill, 1978). When considering how reproductive technologies 
complicate decision-making, it is not enough to say that a woman is simply deceived, or 
that her hand is forced. 
Unpacking the Action Imperative 
It is my contention that the use of reproductive technologies not only misinforms, 
but also reshapes a woman's reality, given the ideological motivations to offering and 
ritualizing the technologies. In the previous section, I explained through Gavigan (1992, 
2009), Kukla (2005), Mitchell (1994, 2001), and Petchesky (1986, 1987) that visual 
culture has made a public spectacle of the womb and has elevated the status of the fetus. 
The fetus is culturally rendered not only a person, but a vulnerable one, at the mercy of 
its carrier's whims (MacDonald, 1994). That the mother might have a relationship with 
her offspring, a relationship constituted by two individuals, legitimizes pregnancy 
management because she must rely on technology wielded by medical professionals to 
facilitate introductions and interactions, and technology provides evidence that she is 
responsible for the care of another: "ultrasound windows are influential in shaping the 
social relationships of pregnancy, including medicine's claim of authority over the 
management of pregnancy and the relationship between a pregnant woman and her fetus" 
(Mitchell, 1994, p. 147). 
Ultrasounds are only effective as ritual insofar as they produce imagery that is 
universal and publicly recognizable (Kukla, 2005). The normalized experience of 
pregnancy includes obtaining the same picture every other pregnant woman has received 
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of her fetus: "our pleasure in these first 'encounters' with our 'baby' is inextricably 
bound up with our pleasure in the conformation of our experience to the shared norm" (p. 
116) This can only happen when the fetus lives up to health expectations, where health is 
the absence of disease and disability (Katz Rothman, 1987; Mykitiuk & Nisker, 201 O; 
Roeher Institute, 2002; Tremain, 2006). According to Taylor and Mykitiuk: 
Biology and medicine equated the 'normal' with the study of health. The 
normal healthy state was thought to exist in opposition to the pathological. 
As such, health was theorized as the mean between excesses and 
deficiencies in the body. Deviations from the normal state of health were 
construed as abnormal and as 'disease.' Falling squarely within the 
category of those considered to be abnormal and of ill health were 'the 
disabled' (2001, p. 2). 
In the case of impairment diagnoses, the ultrasound ritual deviates, for when the fetus 
cannot be idealized the experience is no longer about facilitating the relationship between 
mother and child. Reproductive technologies as a component of overall maintenance of 
pregnancy are used for the purpose of producing normalized children and avoiding 
disability: "the theory is that if normal physiology is subjected to rigorous control, 
pathological deviations from the norm can be minimized" (Jackson, 2001, pp. 119-120). 
Outlined by Mykitiuk and Scott (2011), there are many ways in which medical 
practitioners and social media recommend a woman manages her pregnancy, or has her 
pregnancy managed, to minimize the risk of disability and disease. She might carefully 
control her diet: caffeine has been known to cause miscarriages (Munson & Gutfield, 
1994); fish consumption is controversial, condoned for the benefits of omega-3 fatty 
acids and condemned for traces of mercury (Health Canada, 2009a; Murphy, 2002). She 
might take supplements, including folic acid to prevent neural tube defects (Health 
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Canada, 2009b ), and iron lest iron-anaemic women give birth prematurely (Health 
Canada, 2009c ). Especially frowned upon are alcohol, for causing fetal alcohol 
syndrome; and smoking, the effects of which include stillbirth, cancer, and learning 
disabilities (March of Dimes, 2010). Mykitiuk and Scott (2011) note: "women who 
smoke or drink alcohol during pregnancy are subject to intense public scrutiny, as they 
are constantly judged by family, friends, and strangers, in a transformation of pregnant 
bodies into objects of public concern" (pp. 319-320). These practices of regulating 
pregnancy are meant to safeguard fetal health: 
We demand that mothers regulate the natures of their offspring with 
precision, and we hold them responsible for failure to maximize their 
chances for fetal perfection where there exist public knowledge and 
personal disciplinary practices whose invocation might increase these 
chances (Kukla, 2005, p. 126). 
When a normalized pregnancy is impossible to achieve, the responsibilities of the 
mother change such that she is expected not to nurture and protect her offspring, not to 
ensure it is healthy, but to abandon the pregnancy. That is, responsibilities shift to 
disability de-selection: not pursuing pregnancy in the case of genetic screening and pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis, and abortion when fetal impairments are diagnosed in 
utero. Some scholars have gone so far as to consider whether it is morally wrong to 
reproduce or to refuse to access reproductive technologies when the risks for a genetic 
disease or disability are high (McMahan, 2002; Purdy, 1996; Rhodes, 1999, 2006). 
Purdy (1996), for example, argues "it is morally wrong to reproduce when we 
know where there is a high risk of transmitting a serious disease or defect" (p. 41 ). She 
makes an argument for why termination would be at least morally acceptable: since 
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women are still largely and unduly responsible for raising children, they should not be 
further expected to take responsibility for the complications associated with raising a 
disabled child. In her own words: "caring for a child with serious health problems can 
add immeasurably to a mother's burden" (p. 83). Her argument is reasonable even if the 
characterization of disability as burden is not well received in disability theory. 
Economic, political, and social conditions continue to pin the responsibilities for child 
rearing on mothers 17; expecting women to further take responsibility for disability may 
well be too much to ask. Being morally excused from one set of obligations, however, is 
not identical to being morally responsible to another set, for Purdy is arguing that women 
are morally obligated to avoid disability. She specifically analyzes Huntington's Disease, 
a late-onset genetic condition that shortens life expectancy and results in the loss of 
mobility and cognitive abilities. The likelihood of inheriting the disease can be identified 
via genetic screening technologies prior to birth, even prior to pregnancy. Purdy claims 
that women have the responsibility to make use of these technologies and to terminate 
17 Women face myriad obstacles when they raise children-obstacles which are amplified 
for single mothers, who are reportedly poorer compared to dual income households and 
single fathers (Gaszo & McDaniel, 201 O; Gurstein & Vilches, 2010). These obstacles, 
this lack of a safety net or support system, are grounded in a (liberal) ideology that 
assumes mothers, or at least parents, should take financial and social responsibility for 
their own children. For example, "in both [Canada and the US], lone mothers' 
experiences of poverty were attributed to their individual failings through the rhetoric of 
dependency" (Gazso & McDaniel, 2010, p. 373), and this misattribution has justified 
income support claw-backs and welfare-to-work requirements built into policy, as seen in 
Alberta (Baker & Tippin, 1999) and British Columbia (Guerstein & Vilches, 2010). The 
message is that the state will not finance child-raising. Nor will the state subsidize 
childcare when mothers need to return to work but can only access low-paying jobs: "in 
Canada there is no coherent system for childcare services .... Childcare costs are seen as a 
private parental responsibility, except where parental incomes are so low that payments 
are not feasible" (Mason, 2003, p. 44). 
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pregnancies when the risk for impairment is high, on the grounds that prospective parents 
owe their children minimally satisfying lives, with "health as a prerequisite" (p. 45). 
Women who refuse to participate in this practice of disability de-selection run the 
risk of being considered irresponsible for not doing everything within their power to 
promote fetal health (Blank, 1993; Lemke, 2002; McDonnell, 2003; Overboe, 2007). 
Sherwin (2004) argues that while women are not coerced into consenting to ultrasounds, 
"it is so commonly used and so generally valued that it is difficult for anyone to resist its 
use without being judged irrational and irresponsible" (p. 369). Questioning a woman's 
understanding of the situation and appreciation for the stakes, casting into suspicion her 
rational evaluation of her pregnancy-these are concerns which call into question a 
woman's very capacity to make decisions and to give consent. Lemke (2002) fears that 
the institutionalization and routinization of reproductive technologies means women may 
find it is increasingly more difficult to justify their refusal: "the use of genetic diagnoses 
is not up to individual freedom or personal choice. The will not to know about your 
genetic make-up or risk profile could be regarded as no will at all: the sign of a deficient 
or illegitimate will, or even (why not?) the first symptom of a genetic 'disorder"' (p. 
287). How can we say that reproductive technologies enhance autonomy when the 
refusal to use them is fast becoming a non-option? That is, how are women acting 
autonomously when social pressures render alternative choices difficult, if not 
impossible, to choose? 
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Public Health Model 
There is another justification for the promotion of reproductive technologies, an 
alternative to the autonomy model which might better account for instances of maternal 
responsibility; this is called the public health model (Buchanan et al., 2000; Lippman, 
1993). According to this model, women are responsible with making use of reproductive 
technologies in order to prevent the production of disability and disease: "prenatal 
diagnosis is presented as a way to reduce the frequency of selected birth defects" 
(Lippman, 1993, p. 22). Use of technology would therefore be a moral and civic 
responsibility, and less so a way of informing decisions and maximizing autonomy. 
Peters and Lawson (2002) discuss the implications: "under the public health 
model, the routinized use of testing comes the potential to cast women as the genetic 
gatekeepers of society, not only responsible, but also accountable for the birth of disabled 
children" (p. 3). Women serve as gatekeepers by barring the entry of disabled persons 
into society, preventing their very coming into existence through disability de-selection 
and abortion. Mykitiuk (2002) also considers the theme of woman as gatekeeper: "since 
women's bodies are the predominant site of prenatal genetic testing and screening, the 
process of biological production will likely render women the principal gatekeepers of 
'social cost"' (p. 324). There is a social cost to the production of disability because 
pregnancy is classified as a health matter, and our current health paradigm "assumes that 
to be disabled is to be unhealthy" (Taylor & Mykitiuk, 2001, p. 67). Within this 
paradigm, disability presents as a social burden, as a threat to public health, for disability 
deviates from that which is considered normal or ideal. Women as gatekeepers safeguard 
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and maximize public health by denying passage to identifiable impairments, to deviations 
from the ideal. They are responsible for preventing, and thus to blame and at fault for 
reproducing, disability. 
Maternal responsibility is conceived in a context that medicalizes both disability 
and pregnancy. For instance, the rituals thus far outlined are built around the framing of 
pregnancy as risky: take folic acid to decrease the risk of defect; terminate pregnancy 
when at risk for reproducing disabled infants. A pregnancy may be classified as high risk 
if a woman deviates from a seven to nine and a half pound weight gain, if she is thirty-
five years or older, "if she is too young, had no children or had too many, even if she is 
simply poor" (Katz Rothman, 1991, p. 132). Katz Rothman goes on: "even if a woman 
does have all the healthy characteristics medicine can ask for, she still won't be called 
healthy, or even normal. She will be classified 'low risk'" (p. 132). Pregnancy is the 
very purpose of female reproductive anatomy, and yet it is treated as a contagion in need 
of medical management. The result is the prioritization of health maximization, where 
health is a hegemonic standard that excludes and regulates pregnant and disabled bodies, 
those bodies that fall short of the ideal. The language of risk has ideological grounding, 
for the co-optation of pregnancy and disability under the healthcare model has served to 
reify and call by another name what was once reproductive control under patriarchy. 
Only under this model, women are thought radically responsible for reproductive 
decisions, and by extension, health maximization; liberal reproductive autonomy aids in 
justifying these subtler instantiations of reproductive control. 
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Mykitiuk (2001) explains why women are more than ever making use of 
reproductive technologies, the means by which they might identify impairments: "as 
patients are exhorted to take greater responsibility for their own health, they are 
demanding more information on which to base their decisions" (p. 324). With the 
increasing privatization of healthcare and the continued offloading of responsibilities for 
child-rearing onto women, women are left with the costs-emotional, financial, 
medical---of a disabled child, should they so choose to produce one, because their 
cultural context largely deals with disability by offering only the means by which it might 
be avoided: "fault and blame ... are cast onto the woman, as the responsibility for the 
health of her future child becomes privatized" (Mykitiuk & Scott, 2011, pp. 329-330). 
Far from enhancing reproductive decision-making, technologies aid in social efforts to 
paint women into comers; they become an ever increasing necessity as women scramble 
to consider whether they could handle a disabled child with very little support, and how 
they might answer to social pressures to prevent disability (Lippman, 1993; McDonnell, 
2003; McDonough, 1990; Shrage, 2003). 
2.4.2. Reproductive Autonomy and Disability De-Selection in Law 
G. (D.F.) 
Maternal responsibilities may not directly translate into legal sanctions against 
reproducing disability. Since Morgentaler (1988), abortion decisions have been federally 
protected. SOGC (2007) guidelines outline why reproductive technologies should be 
offered to women-in order to enhance their decision-making-and these technologies 
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have been rendered more available, though not mandatory: "it is our belief that to deny 
women access to any information about the health or development of their child, when 
this information is readily available, is wrong and a disservice to Canadian women and 
their families" (unpaginated). Nonetheless, there have been legal discussions around 
responsibility and the extent to which the state should intervene. 
In Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) v. G. (D.F.) (1997), a 
young Aboriginal woman called D.F.G. continued her habit of sniffing glue even while 
pregnant, although doing so can potentially damage the fetal nervous system. She had 
already given birth to three children, two of whom were disabled as a result of her 
substance use and had become wards of the state: "two of her previous children were 
born permanently disabled and are permanent wards of the state" (p. 2). The organization 
Winnipeg Child and Family Services had the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench order 
that G. be placed in custody "and detained in a health centre for treatment until the birth 
of her child" (p. 3), a decision which was appealed. She gave birth shortly thereafter, but 
the case still went to the Supreme Court of Canada. The Supreme Court upheld the 
appeal, according to which "the existing law of tort and of parens patriae did not support 
the order and, given the difficulty and complexity entailed in extending the law to permit 
such an order, the task was more appropriate for the legislature than the courts" (p. 3). 
The Court had to explore two issues: tort law and parens patriae jurisdiction. The 
first question they asked was as follows: "does tort law, as it exists or may properly be 
extended by the Court, permit an order holding a pregnant woman against her will in 
order to protect her unborn child from conduct that may harm the child?" (p. 14). Tort 
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law is a body of law that compensates for civil wrongs occurring within contractual 
obligations: "the essential purpose of tort law .. .is to restore the plaintiff to the position he 
or she would have enjoyed but for the negligence [or action] of the defendant" (Athey v. 
Leonati, 1996, p. 14). A person may sustain a tort or legal injury due to a breach in the 
duty of care she is owed. Tort law applies in instances where duty of care is built into a 
relationship between two legally recognized persons, and there has been a breach in duty 
of care, either by an act or by negligence, that can be shown to cause injury (Kerr, Kurtz, 
& Olivo, 1997). Gilmour (2006) articulates the criteria for finding negligence in tort law: 
A plaintiff must prove on a balance of probabilities that: (i) the defendant 
owed him or her a duty of care; (ii) the defendant breached the standard of 
care established by law; (iii) the defendant's breach caused injury or loss 
to the plaintiff; and (iv) the plaintiffs injuries are not too remote to be 
recoverable in law (p. 56). 
The majority in G. (D.F.) (1997) determined that revising tort law to detain and 
treat G. would require a drastic change in legal principles, for Canadian jurisprudence 
would have to legally recognize the unborn child in order to posit duty of care as well as 
its breach: "once a child is born, alive and viable, the law may recognize that its existence 
began before birth for certain limited purposes. But the only right recognized is that of a 
born person. Any right or interest the fetus may have remains inchoate and incomplete 
until the child's birth" (p. 3). Judicial change is not meant to be drastic, but incremental: 
"judicial change to common law principles is confined to incremental change based 
largely on the mechanism for extending an existing principle to new circumstances" (p. 
3). The extension of tort law, because it would require such a radical shift in legal 
principles, would have "complex ramifications impossible for a court to fully assess" (p. 
137 
4 ), such as incarcerating pregnant women in order to protect fetal life. Other speculated 
implications included the disproportionate effect on pregnant women in lower socio-
economic categories; the policing of pregnant women by their own loved ones; and 
pregnant women avoiding medical treatment for fear of legal consequences, thus 
endangering their own health. Extending liability to pregnant women would 
undermine women's autonomy "because the fetus is physically located inside the body of 
the pregnant woman, indeed, it is part of the body of the pregnant woman, and because 
the pregnant woman can never be alone" (Mykitiuk & Scott, 2011, p. 342). Ifliability 
were established, every action conducted by a pregnant woman in relation to her own 
body would be subject to scrutiny and grounds for liability, thereby undercutting her right 
to autonomous decisions and bodily integrity. 
Further, the Court considered whether to rule in favour of the appellant agency by 
extendingparens patriae: 
Does the power of a court to make orders for the protection of children (its 
parens patriae jurisdiction), as it exists or may properly be extended by 
the Court, permit an order detaining a pregnancy woman against her will 
in order to protect her unborn child from conduct that may hann the child? 
(G. (D.F.), 1997, p. 14). 
As already explained, parens patriae is legal intervention in order to protect those who 
lack capacity in decision-making scenarios where it is found that their caregivers are not 
acting in their best interest: "the parens patriae jurisdiction is ... founded on necessity, 
namely the need to act for the protection of those who cannot care for themselves" (E. 
(Mrs.) v. Eve, 1986, p. 45). 
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In G. (D.F.), in dispute was whether the respondent had a mental illness, for the 
trial judge had established parens patriae jurisdiction based on her mental health. That 
is, this judge determined that G. had a mental disorder, and ordered her supervision and 
treatment under Manitoba's Mental Health Act: "the trial judge ordered the respondent 
detained for treatment as she was suffering from a medical disorder within the meaning 
of the Manitoba Mental Health Act ... and second on the court's parens patriae power that 
permits it to act in place of the parent for the protection of a child" ( G. (D.F.), 1997, p. 
48). As articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada, "the Court of Appeal held that the 
evidence did not establish incompetency under the Mental Health Act. The trial judge 
had wrongly relied on the court's parens patriae jurisdiction oflunacy" (p. 13). Parens 
patriae did not apply because, firstly, there was no evidence to suggest that G. was 
mentally ill, and secondly, the jurisdiction does not extend to unborn children. On this 
latter point, the Supreme Court of Canada was concerned that the extension of parens 
patriae would lead to the violation of women's liberty interests, because until the child is 
born it is corporeally inseparable from its mother: 
A pregnant woman and her unborn child are one and to make orders 
protecting fetuses would radically impinge on the fundamental liberties of 
the mother, both as to lifestyle choices and how and as to where she 
chooses to live and be. .. .Extension of the parens patriae jurisdiction of 
the court to unborn children has the potential to affect a much broader 
range of liberty interests since the court cannot make decisions for the 
unborn child without inevitably making decisions for the mother herself 
(p. 4). 
Writing the dissenting opinion, J. Sopinka discussed the state's interest in 
intervening when the pregnant woman in extreme cases conducts herself irresponsibly: 
When a woman chooses to carry a fetus to term, she must accept some 
responsibility for its well-being and the state has an interest in trying to 
ensure the child's health. Since the pregnant woman has the right to 
decide her lifestyle, a court's ability to intervene to protect the fetus must 
be limited to extreme cases where her conduct has, on proof to the civil 
standard, a reasonable probability of causing serious irreparable harm to 
the unborn child (pp. 5-6). 
He noted that the potential mother has the right to forfeit responsibility by having an 
abortion, but should she so choose to carry through with the pregnancy, she ought to 
commit by conducting herself appropriately, such as ceasing substance use. It would 
appear, then, that reproductive autonomy serves an important function in the rhetoric 
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taken up by at least the minority ruling in this case. An autonomy framework can render 
women responsible for the decisions that they make; a woman who opts not to terminate 
her pregnancy in effect chooses to commit to it. 
Analysis 
Although J. Sopinka was in the minority, his ideas still resonate in theory; 
reflecting on the case, Turk and Koren (2007) explain (and endorse) the position that 
"women's choice to have a baby, in and of itself, justifies restricting her actions for the 
welfare of the baby" (p. 1). While Turk and Koren's biases are laid bare inasmuch as 
their article is published in a journal entirely devoted to ending fetal alcohol abuse, 
Mackenzie's (1995) approach is subtler. Mackenzie argues that a woman values her 
pregnancy once she decides to carry through with it; inasmuch as she makes that 
decision, the implication is that she is responsible for upholding it: "there is a genuine 
moral requirement upon a woman to protect and nurture a fetus once she has assumed 
parental responsibility for its future well-being" (p. 49). 
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Vehmas (2002) also discusses "standards for parental autonomy and 
responsibility" (p. 4 7), asking "do parents have an indisputable right to autonomous 
reproductive choices despite the possible unfortunate outcomes for their future children?" 
(p. 47). In response to literature which pins on potential parents the moral responsibility 
to avoid reproducing disability, Vehmas argues instead: "parents should commit 
themselves to the project of parenthood if and when they decide to procreate and ... at the 
same time, they should undertake obligations which are inseparable from that project" (p. 
53). His response addresses arguments made by those in agreement with Purdy (1996) 
and proponents of the public health model; and given his work in disability theory 
Vehmas might well find G. (D.F.) problematic for building a component of disability 
avoidance into maternal responsibility. Nonetheless, Vehmas is interested in defining 
parental responsibility as that which parents should accept when they decide to 
reproduce. Even though he and J. Sopinka might disagree on the substance of the 
responsibilities, they are both arguing that responsibility materializes with the choice not 
to terminate. Despite the tension between the two positions of disability advocacy and 
disability avoidance, there is agreement regarding when maternal responsibility begins: 
with autonomous choice (as though reproductive decisions can always be so freely 
made). 
Should we be so quick, in theory and law, to deem the mother irresponsible based 
solely on her substance use? Setting aside the discrimination inherent in deeming 
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substance users prima facie irresponsible, even incompetent in the case of the original 
trial 18, I would hold that to the contrary, the respondent in this case had in fact attempted 
to demonstrate responsibility according to even J. Sopinka' s standards. It was noted in 
the case that G. had in fact sought treatment at a stage in the pregnancy when substance 
use would have affected the fetal nervous system, but was turned away due to lack of 
facility capacity: 
The responded points out that damage to the fetal nervous system occurs 
in the early stages of pregnancy long before the order was sought or made, 
that at an earlier stage of her pregnancy she had voluntarily sought 
treatment but had been turned away due to lack of facilities, that when 
asked to take treatment she agreed and only later refused because she had 
fallen into a state of intoxication, and that once taken to hospital, she 
remained until discharged, although the custodial order requiring her to 
remain had been stayed (G. (D.F.), 1997, p. 12). 
This is an important point to note, for G. did what was within her power to comply with 
and conform to social expectations of pregnant women. She was five months pregnant 
by the time she was taken to court. It was long after all else had failed, and the window 
for the substance use to have an effect had passed, when the appellant agency thought to 
step in. Questions around detainment and coerced treatment would not have been raised 
18 Although I am setting this point aside for the sake of argument, a footnote is in order. 
Fullilove, Lown, and Fullilove (1992) identify types of trauma that substance-dependant 
women (specifically dependant on crack cocaine) experience: "(1) a trauma that predated 
the ... onset of crack use (e.g., being injured in a traffic accident); (2) trauma that were the 
direct sequelae of crack use (e.g., being raped or having one's children taken); or (3) 
stigma trauma (being regarded as a crack 'ho' or as an inadequate mother by members of 
the community)" (p. 284). In a study conducted by Reid, Greaves, and Poole (2008), 
women who identify as mothers challenged by substance use discuss how they have 
internalized social stigma. In addition to stigma related to substance use, women 
experience subtler forms of discrimination based on their race and class. Mykitiuk and 
Scott (2011) note that expectations of pregnant woman disregard racial and class 
considerations given that those from disadvantaged minority groups may lack the 
wherewithal to engage in pregnancy regulation rituals, least of all to quit substance use. 
in the Canadian Supreme Court, at least this case might not have come to pass, if the 
agency or similar social structures had initially provided support. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada ruled in favour of the respondent, but cases in the 
US have had different outcomes. Hewson (2001) discusses American cases in which 
pregnant women who regularly used drugs were prosecuted: "in South Carolina and 
California, drug-addicted pregnant women attending antenatal clinics have been arrested 
and charged with criminal offences, after they tested positive for drugs whilst pregnant" 
(p. 1113). It was not until 2001 that testing pregnant women in South Carolina for drugs 
covertly, without their knowledge or consent, was ruled unconstitutional. In Whitner v. 
State (1997), Cornelia Whitner, indicted for cocaine use while pregnant, was convicted of 
criminal child neglect for failing to provide proper medical care, and was sentenced to 
eight years of imprisonment. She appealed on the grounds that her counsel was 
ineffective, though the Supreme Court upheld the original ruling. 
Pollitt (1994) explores the legal preoccupation with the substance use of pregnant 
women, and how this preoccupation is an inroad for fetal rights: "drugs and alcohol are 
only the latest focus of a preoccupation with the fetus and its 'rights' that has been 
wandering around the zeitgeist for the past decade" (p. 291 ). She argues that the 
application of "duty of care" to pregnancy reflects pro-life movement principles, which 
pit the fetus and woman at odds with one another and characterize the woman as "selfish, 
confused, potentially violent, and incapable of making responsible choices" (p. 295). 
Pollitt goes on to question this focus when there are so many other conditions which are 
necessary for healthy pregnancies, conditions outside a pregnant woman's realm of 
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control: "why does maternal behaviour, a relatively small piece of the total picture, seem 
such an urgent matter, while much more important factors-that 1 in 5 pregnant women 
receive no prenatal care at all, for instance--attract so little attention?" (p. 292). She 
further argues: "although duty of care theorists would impose upon women a virtually 
limitless obligation to put the fetus first, they impose that responsibility only on women 
[while placing] no corresponding duty upon society" (p. 299). As we see in the Canadian 
case, G. was brought to court for the purpose of detainment and forced treatment, on the 
grounds that she was too irresponsible--and for the trial judge too incompetent-to 
nurture her pregnancy on her own. The time window for the effect of substance use had 
long passed before she would be remanded into custody and treated, and she was turned 
away when she initially sought assistance, yet Winnipeg Child and Family Services 
thought her complicit in the possible reproduction of disability. Women in similar 
situations in South Carolina could face legal punishment for what is considered failing in 
their responsibilities, not upholding their duty of care. These cases push fetal rights in 
through the back door of court systems, for demands of pregnant women correspond to 
fetal entitlements. 
In this particular Canadian case, the Court ruled that it would not intervene, a 
victory for women's reproductive rights, but important support systems like drug 
rehabilitation programs continue to provide inadequate services. Further, women from 
Aboriginal communities continue to experience high levels of substance use, which have 
been linked to poor healthcare and a dearth in educational opportunities (Neil, 2003). 
The rationale for the ruling was that Canadian law protects women's rights to make 
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decisions regarding their pregnancies and bodies (and so the establishment of fetal rights 
would represent a drastic change in jurisprudence), thereby isolating women as rights-
bearers, shielding them from interference. It does not always serve in the woman's best 
interest to be so isolated. In G.'s case, she gave birth to her fourth child, possibly a third 
child in need of complicated and potentially expensive accommodations that she would 
be responsible as caregiver for providing (or else she would lose her child to the state, 
another method of intervention that is far harsher than building preventative measures 
and social supports). She also gave birth while still struggling with substance use, 
because she was turned away when she sought to enroll in a rehabilitation program. The 
Court may have ruled in G.'s favour, but its ruling was in essence to stand down, not to 
intervene, when there are methods of intervention which may support women's 
reproductive choices and activities. 
That same year, the Supreme Court of Canada heard the suit Arndt v. Smith 
(1997). In this suit, Carole Arndt gave birth to a child with congenital varicella 
syndrome, the result of maternal chicken pox. She sued her physician Dr. Margaret 
Smith for not informing her of the more serious, though less frequent, risks to having 
chicken pox while pregnant: "she contended that had [Smith] properly advised her of the 
risk of injury to her fetus, she would have terminated the pregnancy and avoided the costs 
she now incurs" (p. 1). Smith's defense was that Arndt "would not have terminated the 
pregnancy even if she had been fully advised, and therefore asserted that the loss claimed 
was not caused by the failure to advise risk" (pp. 1-2). The judge at the original trial 
ruled in favour of Smith, as explained in the Supreme Court case: 
Evaluating her testimony at trial that she would have had an abortion 
against the fact that she desired a child, that she was skeptical of 
'mainstream' medical intervention, that an abortion in the second trimester 
held increased risks and that an abortion would have required the approval 
of a committee on health grounds, the trial judge concluded that [Arndt] 
would not, on a balance of probabilities, have aborted the pregnancy (p. 2). 
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In the Court of Appeal, the judge "held that the trial judge had applied the wrong test" (p. 
2). The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed Amdt's case after applying the modified 
objective test for causation and determining that Arndt would have opted to give birth 
regardless of medical advice. 
This case is an example of a wrongful birth suit, a kind of suit in tort law which is 
pursued in order to hold physicians responsible for negligence that results in birth. 
Negligence may manifest in nondisclosure; relevant to this study, nondisclosure includes 
the failure to inform of risks of fetal impairment (Arndt v. Smith, 1997), or of 
technologies which may identify fetal impairment (Mickle v. Salvation Army Grace 
Hospital, 1998; R.H v. Hunter, 1996). Information provision is both part of the 
physician's duty of care and a condition for patient consent, and so failure to disclose 
robs a patient of fully informed consent. Originally a mechanism in tort law for dealing 
with, as examples, botched abortions (Cherry v. Bors man, 1992) or sterilizations 
( Cataford et al. v. Moreau, 1978) that resulted in birth, wrongful birth in recent years has 
become an avenue for dealing with the progress of reproductive technologies: "the rapid 
pace of technological innovation in the area of genetic testing ... has forced courts, 
willingly or otherwise, to respond to cutting-edge issues striking at the core of the 
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disability rights movement" (Hensel, 2005, p. 150). The plaintiff in Arndt argued that she 
was unable to make a fully informed decision regarding her pregnancy due to her 
physician's failure to provide sufficient medical advice. Whether Amdt would have 
made the decision to carry through with the pregnancy regardless of medical advice was 
thus in question. 
The modified objective test used in this case is designed to strike "a reasonable 
balance, which cannot be obtained through either a purely objective or a purely subjective 
approach" because "a purely subjective approach fails to take into account the inherent 
unreliability of the self-serving assertion of a plaintiff, while the purely objective 
standard might result in undue emphasis being placed on the medical evidence" (p. 3 ). 
That is, the plaintiffs subjective position could change after consent was given, due to 
the unforeseen results of the medical treatment (self-deceit and self-revision of the 
narrative); it could also change in court to suit the plaintiffs argument (lies impossible to 
invalidate because the matter is so personal). Further, while the physician's medical 
advice constitutes the reasonable course of action (for, the physician's duty of care entails 
providing reasonable medical advice regarding specific risks associated with treatment 
options), the Court had to acknowledge that particular patients· would weigh that advice 
against other personal factors when making the decision to consent to or to refuse 
treatment. The modified objective test was developed in Reihl v. Hughes (1980) 19, to 
19 John Reihl had a stroke during surgery to treat severe migraines, after which he was 
impotent and partially paralyzed. He no longer qualified for the pension he was eighteen 
months away from receiving at the time of the surgery. In Reihl v. Hughes (1980), Reihl 
accused his surgeon, Dr. Robert A. Hughes, of negligence and battery for implying the 
risks to not having the surgery outweighed the risks to having the surgery. Reihl claimed 
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determine causation in cases of potential medical malpractice. In this earlier case, the 
Court set the precedent to ask when applying the test what a "reasonable person in the 
plaintiffs position" (p. 882) would do. Subjectivity is incorporated into the question, and 
the baseline of the question is objective. Subjectivity is thus the modification. The Court 
further explained in Reihl: "although account must be taken of the patient's practical 
position, a position which will vary with the patient, it must be objectively assessed in 
terms of reasonableness" (p. 900). 
When Arndt (1997) reached the Supreme Court of Canada, the crucial question 
examined was whether Arndt would have had an abortion had she been informed of risks 
associated with her contracting chicken pox during pregnancy. Upon application of the 
modified objective test, the Court found the following: 
While [Arndt] did make a very general inquiry concerning the risks 
associated with maternal chickenpox, there was nothing to indicate to the 
doctor that she had a particular concern in this regard. Further, factors 
such as [Arndt' s] desire for children and her suspicion of the mainstream 
medical profession can be taken into consideration when determining what 
a reasonable person in her position would have done if informed of the 
risks. As found by the trial judge, the failure to disclose some of the risks 
to the fetus associated with maternal chickenpox did not affect [Arndt' s] 
decision to continue the pregnancy to term (p. 3). 
The Court determined that the physician's failure to disclose would not have affected 
Arndt' s decision not to terminate. That is, a reasonable person in Arndt' s position would 
have carried through with the pregnancy regardless of the advice Smith could have given. 
Given the information withheld was moot, Smith was not liable for wrongful birth. 
that he had not given informed consent for the surgery, for he would have at least delayed 
the surgery in order to quality for his pension. Hughes was found guilty of negligence. 
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Analysis 
Wrongful birth suits shed some light on the legal framing of responsibility. 
Firstly, these suits help explain medical pressure to diagnose and de-select disability, for 
they have the power to render physicians financially liable for the births of disabled 
children. Duty of care now includes SOGC (2007) recommendations to make disability 
de-selective technologies available to all women. The guidelines were designed to 
facilitate reproductive autonomy, but the effect has been that the guidelines become a 
physician's responsibility; indeed, this expansion of responsibilities under duty of care 
means that physicians promote these technologies for fear of civil suits. The promotion 
of reproductive technologies takes place in physician/patient relationships, though, where 
there ·is a clear power dynamic, a trust based on the physician's supposed superior 
knowledge about pregnancy, and this aids in the routinization of the technologies as well 
as the value judgments underlying their use: "the availability of prenatal screening and 
the fact that it is being offered by a physician, carries normative implications a.bout the 
desirability of prenatal screening" (Pioro, Mykitiuk, & Nisker, 2008, p. 1028). 
Secondly, elements of maternal responsibility are identifiable. The argument 
made in Arndt (1997) demonstrates that the mother's decision to terminate pregnancy is a 
necessary criterion to satisfy in order to justify wrongful birth: "wrongful birth ... claims 
do not compensate every individual who is deprived of the ability to make an 'informed' 
reproductive choice" (Sheth, 2006, p. 666). Lacking information is therefore not the sole 
basis for wrongful birth claims, because a plaintiff must also argue that had she been fully 
informed, she would have opted for an abortion: "it is not lost choice in the abstract that 
is actionable, but the lost opportunity to abort the impaired child or to prevent 
conception" (Hensel, 2005, p. 167). Indeed, if the harm were simply the lack of 
reproductive choice, then it would not matter what the choice was. 
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Some theorists (Akazaki, 1999; Andrews & Hibbert, 2000; Hull, 2006) hold that 
wrongful birth suits involving disability contain a devaluing of disability, a framing of 
disability as an injury or burden for which someone must be held liable. This framing is 
consistent with Oliver's (1990) individualistic model of disability, according to which the 
"problem" of disability is individually allocated; this has the effect of excusing legal, 
political, and social institutions of any responsibility for creating the conditions which 
disable people. Hahn (1994) articulates the problem in the following way: "the notion 
that a disability is unique and personal. . .implies that it is an essentially private problem 
to be resolved, conquered or overcome by individual effort rather than by public policies 
or social services" (supra note 19). Hensel (2005) notes the discomfort discernible in the 
rhetoric employed by trial judges who presided over wrongful birth cases involving 
disability. There was hesitation in these cases, including Arndt (1997), to make any 
pronouncements regarding the quality of life for someone who is disabled. Nevertheless, 
belying the case, and belying wrongful birth suits of this nature, was a legal practice of 
localizing the responsibility for disability. Arndt was seeking financial compensation 
from someone she blamed for the birth of her child. The case pertained to holding 
someone liable for the birth of a disabled child. 
Wrongful birth, though, may be one of few recourses women have to drum up 
financial support should they find themselves raising a disabled child. Households that 
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include disabled children have been shown to be economically disadvantaged (Emerson, 
2003). Disability supports are inadequate, while the costs of raising a disabled child 
include myriad accommodations. In R.H. v. Hunter (1996)20, a wrongful birth suit the 
plaintiff won, the sum total of financial compensation physicians had to pay 
approximated three million dollars. While the breakdown of costs included controversial 
components such as pain and suffering, more practical concerns included medical needs, 
daily living, accommodations, attendant care, education, professional services, 
respiratory assistance, transportation, and vocational work. Such a breakdown should 
make clear how extensive the costs of care for a disabled child can be. Since policies that 
would aid parents are being reined in, or have never been offered adequately, laying 
blame may be one of few ways to guarantee that the costs of care are covered. 
The set of wrongful birth suits relevant to this study may offer one of few avenues 
for covering the costs of care, but inasmuch as they operate within an ableist climate, 
liability can only be established if the plaintiff can convince the court that she would have 
chosen to terminate her pregnancy: "no matter how compelling the need ... no assistance 
will be extended to the family who would have chosen to embrace or simply accept the 
impaired child prior to his birth" (Hensel, 2005, p. 172). Whether the consent given was 
fully informed is irrelevant as long as the decision made matches the decision that would 
have been made. This means that ultimately, women still function as the gatekeepers for 
disability production. If they choose to grant passage, to compromise public health, then 
20 In R.H. v. Hunter (1996), physicians were found negligent for failing to inform 
prospective parents of the availability of prenatal screening technologies, which would 
have identified the risk of muscular dystrophy; as well as genetic counselors, who based 
on the diagnoses would have recommended abortion. 
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the burden is theirs to bear, however more complicated or expensive a disability can 
render child-rearing. Wrongful birth is meant to safeguard and promote reproductive 
autonomy by ensuring that consent is fully informed, that the choice to carry through 
with a risky pregnancy entirely belongs to the pregnant woman to make, but this 
autonomy framework has disastrous implications for women who would choose 
disability. Our reproduction industry, built on the assumption that its tools will aid in 
disability avoidance, has become so prominent that it is included in a physician's duty of 
care; physicians must discuss the available technologies for fear of a legal suit being 
brought against them. Women who do not avail themselves of these tools are made 
responsible for the consequences. Autonomy as it is currently conceived in law and 
medicine has therefore had the effect of doing harm to women, for it localizes 
responsibility for disability. The rhetoric of responsibility masks the insidious ways in 
which women internalize discrimination and are directed when making very personal 
decisions about their own bodies and their plans for parenthood. 
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Chapter 3: Equality 
This chapter entails the evaluation of equality as either an alternate or 
supplementary principle for grounding reproductive decision-making. Of particular 
interest is whether and which tensions exist between concepts of equality and autonomy, 
especially in reproductive contexts involving disability. The chapter will commence with 
theories of equality, including critiques from feminist disability discourses. Equality 
theory will then be situated in bioethics (in association with the principle of justice); and 
jurisprudence (under the Charter's s. 15). I will examine the case made for reproductive 
equality, and will outline how reproductive autonomy grounded ins. 7 has not done the 
work that s. 15 could: to promote reproductive access, especially to members of 
disadvantaged minority groups. I will finally consider what equality means when 
reproductive decision-making revolves around the question of disability avoidance, for 
some key disability critiques of selective abortion indicate that these practices express 
ableist attitudes. Is there a conflict between women's reproductive autonomy, even their 
reproductive equality, on the one hand, and disability equality on the other? 
3.1 Theories of Equality 
This section will explore key advances in equality theory. Elements of the 
Aristotelian interpretation of formal equality are still relevant to contemporary concepts 
of equality. Since there have been myriad models of equality developed since, as well as 
many interpretations of each model, I will focus on developments that have bearing on 
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current formulations in medicine and law (how they have bearing will be considered later 
in the chapter). Equality of opportunity, grounded in concepts of luck and metit, borrows 
rhetotic from liberal autonomy theoties; these models have become increasingly more 
substantiated, but continue to divide social and natural conditions in problematic ways, 
and still operate within distributive frameworks. There are feminisms which have 
suggested that equality is substantive, grounded in notions of oppression and subjugation 
rather than the distribution ofresources. My purpose in this section is two-fold: I will 
present the conflicts and compatibilities between concepts of equality and autonomy; 
further, I will draw from feminist disability theory to engage each concept of equality 
cri ti call y. 
3.1.1. Formal Equality 
Overview of Aristotelian Theory 
Formal equality finds its roots in Aristotle, a classical Greek intellectual whose 
work in philosophy and science tremendously influenced both the ancient and medieval 
civilizations of Western history. He is largely attributed with developing natural rights 
theory, the conceptual framework Kant (2002) much later resisted: 
"commentators ... celebrate Aristotle as 'the philosophic founder of authentic natural law,' 
for whom natural rights represents 'the eternal laws of morality' and an 'immutable' 
standard of justice" (Trude, 1955; as cited in Yack, 1990, pp. 141-142). The attribution 
may be anachronistic, however. Stoics of the Hellenistic Period (Epictetus, 1972) and 
Christians of the Middle Ages (Aquinas, 1964) interpreting Aristotle may have lumped 
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him in with natural rights theorists like his own teacher Plato, but doing so requires that 
one overlook the disagreements and differences between Platonic and Peripatetic 
teachings (Jaffa, 1952; Yack, 1990, 1993). 
Plato argues in The Republic (1991) and The Crito (2007) that human laws are 
approximations of the form of Law, a perfect idea which transcends our reality, accessed 
via abstract thought. Aristotle may hold that law derives from both nature and 
convention, but he also argues that both types of law vary according to place and time: 
"while with us there is something that is just even by nature, yet all of it is changeable" 
(NE, 5.7). Yack (1990) argues that Aristotle's characterization of natural law as mutable 
defuses his "predecessors' strongest objection to the naturalness of justice: that standards 
of justice, unlike natural things, differ from place to place and time to time" (p. 218). 
That is to say, Aristotle deviates from Platonic legal theory in that he grounds natural law 
in reality rather than abstractions; by natural, Aristotle means biologicai2 1, not divine. 
His project in the Nicomachean Ethics is to investigate human causes, including telos, 
meaning the thing's purpose or design. Natural things change, but not because they are 
falling in and out of their approximations of the form of the Law. Rather, built into every 
existing thing is a teleological cause, a purpose that the thing is working to actualize; 
"tree" is the telos built into an acorn, for instance. So too in ethics, every human action 
has a purpose meant to be realized: "for example, health is the end of medicine, the vessel 
of shipbuilding, victory of generalship, and wealth of estate management" (NE, 1.1 ). 
21 
This biological grounding is further complicated, though, by the Aristotelian 
idealization of human beings: male, white, nondisabled, rational, and so forth. Aristotle's 
ethics is certainly abstract, even if his theory of natural law is not grounded in the divine, 
as posterity would later misinterpret. 
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Aristotelian teleology grounds ethics in human matters, and in so doing eschews Platonic 
forms. For Aristotle, we are not working to approximate something outside our reality, 
but are actualizing purposes inherent within us. His theoretical framework is thus meant 
to concretize ethics, that is, to make ethics meaningful for human affairs. 
Within such a framework, justice must be politically relevant. Indeed, Aristotle 
situates justice within human relations: "justice exists between men whose mutual 
relations are governed by law" (NE, 5.1). Justice as lawfulness implies good order, for 
right reasons. The principle is enacted so as to ensure the happiness of those individuals 
constituting a political community. Happiness is the telos for all human activity, the 
ultimate end or purpose in all that we do. Health as the object of medicine and victory as 
the object of generalship, as examples, are instrumental goods; we pursue particular, 
instrumental goods in order, ultimately, to be happy. Since "man is naturally a political 
animal" (Pol. 1.2), his purposes are best realized within a political context that facilitates 
his most promising opportunities for personal growth. Indeed, it is only through 
community and cooperation that one might practice medicine or pursue a military career, 
for the institutions of medicine and the military do not exist outside human society. 
These institutions must be just, or lawful, so that men might perform the activities they 
would like to do and are best suited to do. A man cannot carry out his intended pursuits 
when injustices stand in the way: he may be jailed, for example, for insufficient reasons, 
or barred from participation because positions are distributed based on nonsensical 
criteria. 
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Aristotle on Equality 
Equality plays an important role in the Aristotelian theory of justice. Because 
standards of justice are subject to change, even improvement, equality serves a corrective 
function: "the equitable is just, but not the legally just but a correction of legal justice . 
... And this is the nature of the equitable, a correction oflaw where it is defective" (Pol. 
3 .10). In order to expand on how equality is corrective, I must explain the two types of 
equality found in Aristotle. One type is formal in character. By formal, I mean lacking 
in substantive moral content (Westen, 1982; Williams, 2005). The principle structures 
political relations, not prescribing any particular treatment but recommending only the 
consistent application of treatment deemed to be moral or just. According to this 
principle, "things that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are unalike 
should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness" (Pol. 3 .9). In other words, 
those who are similar in a relevant moral and legal respect are entitled to the same 
application oflaw. Westen (1982) explains: 
To say that people who are morally alike in a certain respect 'should be 
treated alike' means that they should be treated in accord with the moral 
rule by which they are determined to be alike. Hence 'likes should be 
treated alike' means that people for whom a certain treatment is prescribed 
by a standard should all be given the treatment prescribed by the standard. 
Or, more simply, people who by a rule should be treated alike should by 
the rule be treated alike (p. 547). 
The principle of formal equality structures distributive relations. Aristotle is 
credited with developing a concept of distributive justice, according to which property, 
rights, opportunities, and so forth may all be meted out by the institutions of a political 
community to its citizens. How might goods be distributed, then? The ancient 
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philosopher suggests two ways, beginning with numerical distribution, according to 
which every person within the polis is indistinguishable from the other. In other words, 
everyone receives the same quantity regardless of merit, need, or any other way in which 
we might differentiate between persons. This form of equal distribution makes no room 
for the possibility that differential treatment is just, but as Aristotle has stipulated in the 
corollary to his definition of formal equality, unalike things should be subject to a 
different rule or form of treatment. Further, numerical equality is impractical in the case 
of scarce resources. 
Aristotle proposes instead that proportional equality frames distribution, which 
would allow for just inequalities. Proportional equality requires that persons be treated in 
relation to their due-what they merit or deserve: "all men agree that what is just in 
distribution must be according to merit" (NE, 5.3). Westen (1982) notes that Aristotle's 
concept of proportional equality implies formal equality: "to say that 'every person 
should be given his due' means 'persons who are alike should be treated alike' and 
'persons who are unalike should be treated unalike'" (p. 556). In other words, those who 
are considered alike fall under a standard of justice; formal equality demands the 
consistent application of this standard, while proportional equality ensures that those who 
are subject to this standard deserve to be so. Standards of justice may change over time 
or depending on the politics of a place, but equality serves a corrective function by 
framing these standards, and by course-correcting when it can be shown that someone 
does not deserve the treatment to which he is subjected. 
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A mechanism is needed by which persons might be classified as alike, as subject 
to the same moral or legal treatment. The mechanism Aristotle identifies, according to 
Frank (1998), is merit: 
A distribution will be just if the difference in the amount allocated to the 
parties to the distribution is in proportion to some relevant difference 
between them. It is the difference between parties, measured in terms of 
some particular quality (which Aristotle calls desert or merit) .. .that shows 
the parties to be unequal for the purposes of the distribution, that is 
necessary for Aristotle's understanding of equality proper (p. 787). 
What constitutes Aristotelian merit? While Nussbaum (1982) suggests that need is 
related to the concept, other scholars (Fleischacker, 2005; Frank, 1998; Woldron, 1995) 
would disagree: "Aristotle allows the meaning of 'merit' (axia) to vary quite widely ... but 
it always describes something good about a person, something that that person, and 
others, can value about him- or herself. No one, including the needy person him- or 
herself, values neediness" (Fleischacker, 2005, p. 14). Frank (1998) argues instead that 
excellence is a requirement for merit. By excellence or virtue--the terms are 
interchangeable-Aristotle basically means that an activity is performed well (you are 
not praiseworthy if you perform an activity poorly), and voluntarily (there is no moral 
responsibility or praise for involuntary acts). In other words, virtue requires skill and 
choice22• 
22 Free will and autonomy are inventions which were developed long after Aristotle, but 
we might understand Peripatetic choice to be something like autonomy. I would hold 
that choice is at least a precursor to later, more sophisticated theories of freedom. This is 
important to note because later egalitarian theories grounded in a condition of merit very 
much so rely on autonomy language, and in so doing echo Aristotle. 
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Critique of Formal Equality 
Merit determines proportions within a distributive justice framework, and 
excellence determines merit; such a set-up could lead to vast differences in how rights, 
goods, and opportunities are parcelled out. This is certainly the case for Aristotle, who 
develops different standards of justice according to the gender, racial, and class fault lines 
running through his antiquated culture. Regarding slaves, he argues "there will be 
different kinds of justice appropriate to a ruler and the justice appropriate to the ruled" 
(Pol. 3.4). This is acceptable because slaves are better disposed for physical labour than 
intellectual pursuits, and so they are naturally, biologically built to serve: "that which is 
able to plan and to take forethought is by nature ruler and master, whereas that which is 
able to supply physical labour is by nature ruled, a slave to the above" (Pol. 1.2). 
Women, too, are unlike men (considered at the time to be deformed versions of men, in 
fact), and equal treatment entails that those who are unalike ought to be subject to 
differential treatment in proportion to their unalike-ness. In this case, differential 
treatment entails subjugation: "as regards male and female, the former is superior, the 
latter inferior; the male is ruler, the female is subject" (Pol. 1.5). These are lawful 
relations between persons and nonpersons, as defined by what each deserves, desert here 
being grounded in intelligence or other such qualities thought to be biologically endowed. 
While it is a common mistake to assume that by formal equality Aristotle means same 
treatment across the board, we should instead be wary of the implications to the 
differential treatment he would sanction. 
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Indeed, thousands of years later, Westen (1982) makes this point all too clear in 
his defence of equality as an empty concept: 
Consider how one would go about deciding whether monstrously 
deformed neonates or human embryos23 or stroke victims in irreversible 
comas should be treated as 'persons' for purposes of the right to respect. 
In trying to make the decision, one gets nowhere by intoning that all 
persons are equal, because the very question is whether the three 
candidates are indeed 'persons' within the meaning of the rule. Nor does 
it do any good to saying that likes should be treated alike, because the very 
quest is whether the three candidates are indeed alike for purposes of 
human respect. Rather one must first identify the trait to ascertain 
empirically whether the trait appears in one or more of the three candidates 
(p. 549). 
Westen is arguing that equality only functions to frame justice, only forces the consistent 
application oflaw, but the blanks, like "personhood," must first be filled in or else 
equality means nothing. The implication belying his argument is that "monstrously 
deformed neonates" or "stroke victims in irreversible comas" may not qualify as persons, 
that is, may not be members of the category entitled to the respectful treatment meant for 
persons. At least, their status as persons is in question. Depending on how Westen 
would see the concept substantiated, Aristotelian formal equality could justify the 
classification of those disabled as nonpersons. Long since Aristotle, civil rights and 
feminist movements have fought for the inclusion of racialized persons and women, 
respectively, within the category of personhood, so that they might be treated equally. At 
least by legal standards, racialized persons are no longer regarded as intellectually 
23 
While two ofWesten's (1982) three examples pertain to disability, it is interesting to 
note that the third example implies that Westen questions the personhood of embryos, in 
which case, he might endorse some of the theorists found in this study who defend 
women's reproductive autonomy by radically individualizing the woman and 
dehumanizing that which she carries. 
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inferior, and women are no longer medically understood to be defo1med versions of men. 
Part of the work to include them under the banner of personhood has been to negate all 
associations with disability. It should come as little surprise, then, that efforts to include 
those with disabled embodiments or mental states have been less successful. 
3.1.2. Equality of Opportunity 
Formal Equality of Opportunity 
Modem egalitarian models-egalitarianism involving an exclusive focus on the 
principle of equality-continue to borrow Peripatetic concepts of formalism, distribution, 
and desert. Central to many egalitarian theories is equality of opportunity, a concept 
situated within distributive justice models that have been married to free market 
economies (Nozick, 1974). The principle is designed to be corrective or redistributive 
insofar as it provides a strategy for equalizing unjustly hierarchical politics. Egalitarian 
theories must account for just inequalities, or at least account for what to do about scarce 
resources, and many do so by supposing that a just society is liberal and competitive, 
where some goods must be earned (Dworkin, 1981b; Nozick, 1974; Rawls, 1999). 
Equalized opportunity, at least formally defined, means that everyone in a society may 
apply for scarce social goods-a luxury, an employment position-and the best or most 
deserving wins those goods. Says Jacobs: 
Equality of opportunity as a regulative ideal focuses on the fair use of 
competitive procedures as a means for achieving an egalitarian distribution 
of some scarce resources or goods. Competitive procedures mean that, as 
in most games, there are winners and losers. Winners enjoy the resources· 
or goods at stake; losers either do not enjoy them at all or only in much 
more limited ways than winners (2004, p. 13). 
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Equality is meant to keep the competition fair, but how so? According to 
formalistic interpretations of the principle, equality of opportunity requires an element of 
procedural fairness, a focus on the rules which, when consistently practiced, apply to 
everyone (Cohen, 1989; Jacobs, 2004; Joseph, 1980; Rioux, 2003). A just society makes 
opportunities available to all by keeping the rules of the game fair. Put another way (with 
Aristotelian language), everyone within the game is subject to the same standards, or is 
treated alike by virtue of their entitlement to like treatment. 
Substantiated Equality of Opportunity 
Such a narrow conceptualization of the principle may be insufficient given that 
despite investment in and attention to procedural fairness, inequalities may still exist 
between the players in the game. Key egalitarian theorists (Arneson, 1989; Dworkin, 
1981 b, Rawls, 1999) would explain these inequalities by differentiating between goods 
endowed by luck and circumstance, such as "physical health or lack thereof, intelligence, 
and imagination" (Rawls, 1999, p. 54); and those acquired by choice, including "liberties, 
opportunities, income, and social bases of self-respect" (p. 54 ). The former are 
distributed disproportionately according to a hypothetical birth lottery or auction. This 
means that it is by sheer luck and circumstantial conditions that one inherits natural 
advantages and disadvantages, and resultant inequalities produced are unearned, or 
undeserved. Inequalities can be compensated for through redistribution of social goods 
until equilibrium is achieved, or until those least advantaged, the worst off, are envy-free 
(Dworkin, 1981 b ). 
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These ideas can be traced back to Rawls, whose "legacy is one of the most 
significant contributions to contemporary theories of equality" (Malhotra, 2006, p. 70). 
For Rawls (1999), social and economic inequalities are just in a liberal society when they 
satisfy two conditions. Firstly, they must be "attached to offices/positions open to all 
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity" (p. 42). Fairness requires that 
background conditions are taken into account (Jacobs, 2004) and natural competitive 
advantages, those advantages bestowed by virtue of luck, are counter-balanced. 
Secondly, the "greatest benefit [must be allotted to] the least advantaged members of 
society (the difference principle)" (Rawls, 1999, p. 43). The difference principle ensures 
that those with the fewest natural privileges have a leg-up in the competition. These two 
conditions have the effect of levelling the playing field, an illustrative term often invoked 
in reference to equality of opportunity (Arneson, 1989; Cohen, 1989; Dworkin, 1981 b; 
Roemer, 1995, 1998). A race is fair not only procedurally, not only when the rules are 
applied consistently, for contestants enter with different inherited advantages and 
disadvantages; they all have different starting points. A just society redistributes 
resources in order to ensure that the only advantages that matter are those which are 
chosen, not those which are the product of circumstance. When this happens, in the 
metaphor, the competitors are all brought to the same starting line, then the best runner 
wins the race, not the competitor with a head-start. 
Liberty is therefore essential to just distribution: ''justice [for Rawls] requires that 
liberty may only be limited for the sake of liberty and not for the sake of other social and 
economic advantages" (Hart, 1989, p. 61 ). An opportunity is the means by which one 
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might pursue one's own purposes or interests. The prize made available by the 
opportunity can be neither conferred nor imposed; it must first be chosen, and ultimately 
won. Under models where equality and liberal autonomy are interwoven, a person has 
the freedom to choose his life course, but with that freedom comes the personal 
responsibility to rise to the occasion. Therefore, an additional, related condition of merit 
is built into equality of opportunity models (Miller, 1999; Nozick, 1974; Rawls, 1999). 
Kymlicka (1990) explains: "in a society that has equality of opportunity, unequal income 
is fair, because success is 'merited', it goes to those who 'deserve' it" (p. 56). 
Is equality of fair opportunity enough to correct unjust inequalities, and legitimize 
merit-based inequalities as just? Williams (2005) criticizes at least formal equality of 
opportunity when he discusses a hypothetical example of a warrior class where 
membership depends on physical skill and birthright. This society might change the rules 
in order to open membership up to every citizen across class lines, and in so doing 
maintain procedural fairness. Despite reform, however, those members of the supposedly 
defunct pedigree possess the wealth and privilege to develop their physical advantage, 
and so they continue to be the most qualified for the position: 
The wealthy families still provide virtually all the warriors, because the 
rest of the populace are so under-nourished by reason of poverty that their 
physical strength is inferior to that of the wealthy and well nourished. The 
reformers protest that equality of opportunity has not really been achieved; 
the wealthy reply that in fact it has, and that the poor now have the 
opportunity of becoming warriors-it is just bad luck that their 
characteristics are such that they do not pass the test (p. 110). 
Rawlsians may have the answer to the problem: a more substantiated principle of equality 
of opportunity can redress the problem of natural inequalities. The warrior society may 
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be rendered fairer by ensuring that the poorest citizens are well fed so that they might 
qualify for membership to the class. The example illustrates how the strategy of 
redistributing social resources brings opportunities within reach for those who are 
otherwise barred due to circumstance. 
Critique of Equality of Opportunity 
The solution, though, requires that we treat some inequalities, such as talent and 
intelligence, as native, and divided up by luck. When advantages are so conceived, there 
is neither acknowledgment nor analysis of which skills and intelligences are socially 
valued. For example, historical proponents of innate intelligence once used standardized 
tests measuring logic and mathematics to rank racialized, impoverished, as well as 
intellectually and learning disabled persons as intellectually (as well as morally) inferior24 
(Burt, 1935; Goddard, 1912; Hermstein & Murray, 1994). The authors cited valued 
particular intelligences and assumed that these intelligences were inherited by particular 
persons: typically white, wealthy, and nondisabled persons. 
To explore Williams's example (2005) further, suppose that instead of a warrior 
caste, our hypothetical society is ruled by an intellectual trust: academics, experts, and 
philosopher kings. Intelligence is the condition for entry into this class. If a man born 
into this society cannot perform well on qualifying examinations, he will be understood 
to be naturally disadvantaged, as though disability is an internal setback. The opportunity 
to join may be available to him, along with myriad educational opportunities. Perhaps he 
24 
While standardized tests ostensibly no longer serve this purpose, they are still used as a 
way of quantifying and ranking intelligence within current Western education systems. 
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does not avail himself of these opportunities, or perhaps he does and yet he still falls 
short on testing day. The fault lies with him because for all the social advantages at his 
disposal, he is simply unable to overcome his natural condition. 
The language here is anathema to disability rights activists and theorists, but 
appropriate, for redistribution serves the purposes of correcting and overcoming what has 
been deemed innate disadvantage: "[the model] presumes that the natural characteristics 
of people with disabilities can somehow be overcome, when in fact this is neither 
possible ... nor in many cases desirable" (Rioux & Valentine, 2006, p. 54). Indeed, Rawls 
(1985) believed there were some conditions that were impossible to overcome. His 
theory of justice is primarily concerned with equality for citizens, those cooperating, 
contributing members of the community; and he excludes from the definition of citizen 
those who are disabled so severely "as to prevent persons from being normal and fully 
cooperating members of society in the usual sense" (p. 233). People who score low on 
intelligence tests might not be considered contributing members of a community that 
highly values (what has been defined and reified as) intelligence. Reflecting on the 
implications, Anderson ( 1999) notes that equality of opportunity "disparages the 
internally disadvantaged and raises private disdain to the status of officially recognized 
truth" (p. 306). 
Malhotra (2006) seeks to salvage Rawlsian theory by erasing the distinction 
between natural and social goods: "a rejection of the distinction between social primary 
and natural primary goods leads directly to a substantive duty to accommodate in order to 
overcome the effects of arbitrary barriers created by social institutions" (p. 80). Silvers 
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(1998), too, believes that an equality of opportunity model, even formally framed, can be 
used to dismantle barriers to access for disabled persons: "formal equality requires 
sameness of opportunity in respect to securing equitably effective instrumentalities" (p. 
127). She explores the social model of disability in order to demonstrate that 
redistribution of resources is a strategy that can redress social conditions affecting 
disabled people's access to opportunities: 
Disability is not a 'natural kind', nor is the disadvantage attendant on it an 
immutable fact of nature. None of this is to deny that, in the main, 
disablement correlates with anomalous, nonideal, or troubling biological 
conditions. But once it is recognized that no biological mandate or 
evolutionary endorsement warrants the dominant group's fashions of 
functioning as being optimally effective or efficient, we can see that the 
main ingredient ofbeing (perceived as) normal lies in being in social 
situations that suit one--that is, in a social environment accustomed to 
people like oneself (p. 76). 
However, removing external barriers will not ensure equalized access as long as "we are 
concerned about access to the means of satisfying an individual's interests" (Mahowald, 
1998, p. 269). That is, an egalitarian model that is only concerned with levelling the 
playing field may overlook what the particular goals are for all the players. The 
substance of the model is at risk of being loaded with normative assumptions about what 
ought to be valued. 
Merit is an excellent example of a normative assumption that complicates equality 
theories. A society can legitimize inequalities by framing justice as distributive and 
competitive, such that there are winners and losers, the deserving and the undeserving. 
MacLeod (2005) argues that there are clear counter-examples that complicate, if not 
render absurd, such a model. He discusses those convicted of crimes, often popularly 
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understood to be undeserving: "what is presumably intended .. .is that they 'deserve' the 
punishments meted out by the law for the offenses they have committed" (p. 424). Yet, 
they are still legally protected from police beatings (even if this protection is abstractly 
conceived and inconsistently enforced): "the protections afforded the members of a just 
society by the ideal of equality under the law-and many rights that are plausibly 
subsumable under the ideal-are not desert dependent" (p. 424). People requiring 
financial support are often judged as undeserving of social welfare or a passerby' s spare 
change because they did not earn, that is, did not work for, the money. Although a 
proponent of equality of opportunity and sympathetic to ideas about desert, Arneson 
(1997) is critical of its practicality, holding that current social institutions, including 
social assistance, do not actually operate according to this standard: 
Given that we do not in fact care enough about deservingness to scrap the 
market [based on supply and demand principles] and reshape the family 
[which offers care according to blood and marriage ties] in order to try to 
tailor individual good fortune to individual deservingness, why does this 
issue suddenly loom in importance when we are discussing social welfare 
policies that address the alleviation of poverty? (p. 350). 
In other words, our social institutions do not determine resource distribution according to 
whether the recipient is deserving, although there is a strong theoretical and populous 
attraction to determining distribution in this way. When explaining the ideology of 
desert, Arneson notes that those considered deserving of a broader range of social 
supports are often disabled, while "assistance to the able-bodied, non-aged poor should 
be offered only in the form of opportunities to work. .. and never in the form of cash 
supplements" (p. 337). Disabled people may be further divided into deserving and 
undeserving categories according to, as examples, how socially inconvenient the 
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disability is or how the impairment was acquired. The effect is that people are 
instrumentalized, that is, valued according to their social contributions, weighed against 
the various and arguably arbitrary ways in which their contributions are limited. 
As seen in these examples, the equalization of opportunities reinforces old 
hierarchies because it does not address why certain kinds of people are under-resourced. 
Under the standard of desert, some inequalities are naturalized as unfortunate 
happenstance; even if Malhotra (2006) and Silvers (1998) can fix this problem, the 
inequalities that arise from their corrections under an equality of opportunity model are 
thought to be due to, in large part, personal failing. What is missing from these models is 
the ways in which value systems and ideologies play a significant role in not only who is 
naturally unfortunate, who loses out in the birth lottery, but also who ultimately wins the 
game. 
3.1.3. Feminist Theories on Equality 
Feminist-Grounded Critiques of Distributive Justice 
Underpinning the equality concepts discussed is a distributive justice framework: 
equality functions as a regulative ideal overseeing resource distribution, and inequalities 
are resolved by adjusting distribution patterns. As already indicated, however, 
ideological organization plays a key role in equality matters. Anderson (1999) explores 
what equality models (equality of opportunity, specifically) are missing: 
There must be a better way to conceive of the point of equality. To do so, 
it is helpful to recall how egalitarian political movements have historically 
conceived of their aims. What have been the inegalitarian systems that 
they have opposed? Inegalitarianism asserted the justice or necessity of 
basing social order on a hierarchy of human beings, ranked according to 
intrinsic worth. Inequality referred not so much to distributions of goods 
as to relations between superior and inferior persons (p. 313). 
Inegalitarianism may more broadly pertain to the subordination of persons within 
relationships of power. These relations may produce disproportionate resource 
distributions, as poor income distribution and limited employment opportunities may 
certainly be symptoms of 
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inequality. The remedy, however, is not simply to redistribute those goods, because not 
all manifestations of subordination can be understood to be resources. The aim of 
egalitarian justice is, arguably, "to end oppression [and] to create a community in which 
people stand in relations of equality to others" (pp. 288-289). Inequality limited to 
resource distribution fails to redress the ways in which people are rendered unequal 
within relations of power. 
Granted, within some feminist theories, power is treated as a resource, and its 
redistribution is proposed as a solution to oppression. Olkin (1999), for instance, argues 
that the institutions of marriage and the family are unjust due to the unequal distribution 
of "critical social goods [between husband and wife, such] as work (paid and unpaid), 
power, prestige, self-esteem, opportunities for self-development, and both physical and 
economic security" (p. 136). Her solution is to reorganize how the goods associated with 
these institutions are parcelled out. Feminisms interested in developing a standard of 
rights often operate within the same sort of distributive framework (MacK.innon, 1987; 
Wollstonecraft, 2004). Rights distribution has the effect of isolating rights-bearers 
inasmuch as rights are not articulated as manifesting and functioning within relationships 
between persons (Davis, 2006; Dillon, 1992). Women's rights are associated with 
freedoms, such as freedom from violence and reproductive control, and freedom to 
control property, as examples. Indeed, rights so framed are themselves property, their 
ownership in dispute. 
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Young (1990) has been critical of defining power as a distributable resource, 
"something identifiable and assignable" (p. 23), "possessed by individuals in greater and 
lesser amounts (p. 31 ). When power is understood in this way, it separates individuals 
from one another, for they only function in dyadic relationships with the institutions 
providing goods, and power has no role to play within wider contexts of relations: "in the 
distributive logic ... there is little room for conceiving persons' enablement or constraint as 
a function of their relations to one another" (p. 23). Power cannot be properly 
understood, however, outside a vaster context of relations, for it exists in actions rather 
than as a tangible, substantive entity (Harvey, 1999; Young, 1990). Further, distributive 
justice models of power are often employed to correct the disproportionate assignment of 
power, that is, the high concentration of power in upper classes of people to the detriment 
of everyone else. However, power is diffuse, reaching and affecting the most intimate 
interpersonal relations. 
Feminisms on Unequal Power Relations 
How can power be so diffuse? Smith (2005) discusses ruling relations, or "forms 
of consciousness and organization that are objectified" (p. 13), that is, external to 
consciousnesses and bodies. Ruling relations function as tacit ideology, socially 
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organizing knowledge and producing values to regulate other consciousnesses (Smith, 
1990, 2005). These relations coordinate everyday life, as people internalize how 
defective they feel in contrast with that standard external to them. Their identities are 
produced relative to this standard, through discursive power differentials. The category 
of femininity, for instance, has been associated with empathy and the capacity for 
interpersonal relationships, among other qualities (weakness, sentimentality, 
irrationality). The category is reinforced through interpersonal and institutional 
expectations. There are feminisms that have even embraced some of these characteristics 
as essential, natural, feminine markers, thereby perpetuating the stereotype (Gilligan, 
1982; Lorde, 1980). Resisting essentialism, Young (1990) argues that some identities, 
femininity being an example, are produced via power relations. She suggests that women 
are members of a social group, or a collective "of persons differentiated from at least one 
other group by cultural norms, practices, or way of life. Members of a group have a 
specific affinity with another because of their similar experience or way oflife" (p. 43). 
A social group may come together based on shared experiences of oppression, or their 
identification with one another produced via oppressive relations. 
Not all women's experiences of oppression are uniform, because ruling relations 
target other identity characteristics. Indeed, a key internal criticism of feminist theories 
has been that women experience overlapping membership to other social groups, and as 
such experience different kinds of oppression. When feminisms overlook overlapping 
experiences of oppression, they tend to protect only certain categories of women: white, 
wealthy, nondisabled, with a heteronormative orientation. A tool was introduced to 
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feminist theory, called intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1998; Davis, 2008; Yuval-Davis, 
2006), to highlight "silences, tensions, and failures within identity based movements" 
(Cole, 2008, p. 445). Initial proponents of intersectionality were interested in the 
integration of class and colour into feminist analysis (Collins, 1990; Crenshaw, 1991; 
Fuss, 1989; hooks, 1982; Walker, 1995). Their purpose was to criticize those theories 
which objectify and privilege only certain women's experiences, and in effect naturalize 
the feminine identity such that some women inevitably fall short of the standard: 
"intersectionality theory examines the social divisions, identifications and power relations 
that structure people's lives, particularly those people deemed to be marginalized" 
(Cronin & King, 2010, p. 879). These feminisms are largely grounded in monolithic 
categories that have been produced by ruling relations. 
Intersectionality disrupts the standard by which equality, at least formally 
characterized, is so often measured because the identities by which people might be 
determined to be alike are "unstable, multiple and contextually produced" (Cronin & 
King, 20 I 0, p. 877). Says Jhappan: "instead of making the old formal equality argument 
that women are essentially similarly situated, in effect, women now argue that they are 
not similarly situated because of their socially constructed inequality" (1998, p. 74). The 
theoretical work underlying intersectionality further challenges equality of opportunity 
models that would seek to naturalize some inequalities. Shared identities are not 
grounded in happenstance, but are constructed based on internalized oppressive ideology 
and shared experiences of subjugation. The correction of "natural" inequalities through 
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redistribution is a superficial fix, for it does not identify or redress the ways in which 
people are rendered unequal. 
What is needed is a relational theory of equality, and a restorative theory of 
justice. Llewellyn (2011) calls for such a theory of justice, one which seeks to redress 
oppression, only it does not do so through redistribution of goods. Rather, restorative 
justice seeks equality of relationship, taking "the fact of relationship, of connectedness, as 
our starting point" (p. 90). In contrast with liberal theories of justice, relational theories 
do not study inequalities in isolation and can account for the affects of power. Koggle 
(2011) explains: 
A relational approach [to equality] (1) is contextual in that it allows us to 
attend to the details of the lives of those affected by various kinds of 
unequal and oppressive relationships-relationships that are in tum shaped 
by particular social practices and political contexts; (2) uncovers the 
governing norms and practices that sustain various inequalities for those 
who are powerless and disadvantaged; and (3) reveals the importance of 
the perspectives of those adversely affected by relationships of power as 
sources for learning about various kinds of inequalities and the structures 
that sustain them (p. 74). 
To see these tenets of relational theory brought to life, it is helpful to tum to 
Young's (2000) analysis of systemic oppression. Young lists and explains manifestations 
of oppression, the ways in which categories of persons are devalued and mistreated. 
These manifestations include marginalization, which involves the deprivation of material 
resources, a problem resolved through redistributive efforts; but marginalization is also 
"unjust because it blocks the opportunity to exercise capacities in socially defined and 
recognized ways" (p. 41 ). She cites as an example liberal frameworks according to 
which "all rational autonomous agents [are entitled] to equal citizenship" (p. 41 ). The 
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definition marginalizes, or excludes, people considered to be too dependent: "poor 
people, women, the mad and the feebleminded, and children were explicitly excluded 
from citizenship, and many of these were housed in institutions modeled on the modem 
prison: poorhouses, insane asylums, schools" (p. 41 ). Those equality models grounded in 
liberal ideals are by virtue of those ideals not fully inclusive, but create demarcations by 
which inequalities might be deemed justifiable. 
Another face of oppression, exploitation entails "a steady process of the transfer 
of the results of the labour of one social group to benefit another" (Young, 1990, p. 49). 
It is through exploitation that inequalities are structured and rendered possible, as some 
social groups gain privileges by profiting from the fruits of the labour of other social 
groups. For example, within hetemormative, patriarchal marriages, men have historically 
benefitted from women's labour without bothering with remuneration; that is, men might 
explore career opportunities more freely because women have been historically relegated 
to the supportive work of maintaining the household and raising the children (Delphy, 
1984; Kingston, 2005). Another example of exploitation, this time in the context of race, 
is when racialized persons are understood to be well suited for, and forced to perform, 
menial labour: "in our society there remains strong cultural pressure to fill servant jobs-
bellhop, porter, chambermaid, busboy, and so on-with Black and Latino workers. 
These jobs entail a transfer of energies whereby the servers enhance the status of the 
served" (Young, 2000, p. 40). Menial labour thus functions as a modem manifestation of 
slavery, a practice justified under the Aristotelian equality model. Exploitation is unjust 
because it "consists in social processes that bring about a transfer of energies from one 
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group to another to produce unequal distributions, and in the way in which social 
institutions enable a few to accumulate while they constrain many more" (p. 41 ). The 
injustice can only be corrected through institutional reorganization and structural change. 
Finally (for the purpose ofthis section, although Young lists five faces of 
oppression), oppression is made manifest in systemic violence, "the knowledge that 
[members of some groups] must fear random, unprovoked attacks on their persons or 
property" (p. 46). Violence becomes systemic when the practice targets people by virtue 
of their membership to social groups: women have been targeted for rape; racialized 
persons have come to expect harassment; members of the LGBT community have 
experienced assaults (Young, 2000); disabled people have been subject to physical, 
sexual, and verbal violence and abuse as well as neglect (Roeher Institute, 1995). Young 
(2000) considers violence to be unjust because social context renders violence possible, 
even tolerable. She points out that "violence is a form of injustice that a distributive 
understanding of justice seems ill equipped to capture [which may be] why contemporary 
discussions of justice rarely mention it" (p. 4 7). 
These examples of oppression are structural, found in institutions and ideologies 
that frame or facilitate inequalities by sanctioning domination and subordination. While 
distributive models have lost their veneer in light of their inability to redress these kinds 
of oppression, is autonomy still a useful concept to link to equality? Indeed, as seen, 
autonomy has been central to many egalitarian models that have been developed in the 
context of liberal politics and capitalist markets, and yet liberalism is targeted by Young 
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as an ideology that marginalizes, and capitalism as a system that legitimizes exploitation. 
The autonomy of distributive models comes to be as untenable as corrective distribution. 
However, feminist notions of justice are compatible with autonomy as long as 
autonomy is relational, borne out of discursive relations of power. How free a person is 
greatly depends on the sorts of privileges and oppressions she faces by virtue of her 
membership to various social groups. The systemic privileging of one social group over 
another has the effect of disempowering the dominated, that is, of depriving them of their 
agency, of their ability to pursue their interests, and even of their self-respect. Someone 
who is marginalized, for instance, is excluded from resources and opportunities; someone 
targeted by systemic violence may be prevented from pursuing a life project, and may 
even avoid the pursuit because of fear. This fear, while not equivalent to direct 
Hobbesian coercion, still limits autonomous actions. Indeed, the concept of ruling 
relations helps to explain self-trust and lack thereof: some social groups internalize 
oppression, their identities the result of internalized standards, and are internally blocked 
from fully functioning within their communities. 
3 .2. Equality in Bioethics and Law 
This section will consist in the application of equality theories to the two fields of 
interest to this study. Alongside autonomy, justice is a canonical principle often 
grounding bioethics, and there are clear associations with formal and distributive notions 
of equality. Canadian equality jurisprudence has varied interpretations, beginning with 
the use of Aristotelian rhetoric to interpret equality rights under the Canadian Bill of 
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Rights (1960); equality rights are currently protected under s. 15 of the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms (1982), and Charter interpretation has built gradually through case law. 
This section will include both the explication of equality theories in medical and legal 
discourses and their associations with autonomy formulations. 
3.2.1. Equality in Bioethics 
Formal Equality in Bioethics 
Justice is central to principle-based bioethics, and is generally defined as resource 
allocation according to standards of desert, or what is owed: "the tenns fairness, desert 
(what is deserved), and entitlement have been used by various philosophers in attempts to 
explicate justice. These attempts interpret justice as fair, equitable, and appropriate 
treatment in light of what is due or owed to persons" (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p. 
241 ). By equitable, Beauchamp and Childress refer to the way in which distributive 
justice might be structured, and in so doing they appeal to a formal notion of equality, or 
consistent application of a rule: a person is owed a resource by virtue of membership to a 
group that is owed the resource. 
Nozick (1974) employs an empty or formal notion of equality in his entitlement 
theory: "the entitlement conception of justice in holdings makes no presumption in favor 
of equality, or any other overall end state" (p. 233). When no one conception of the 
good, even in healthcare, is enforceable, "the state does not coercively take anyone's 
personal property to benefit another" (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p. 246). Nozick's 
notion of just healthcare involves the freedom of providers to set prices ·and to agree to 
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services, as well as the freedom of patients to seek insurance plans that best suit them. 
While his concept of equality employs a standard of desert more closely resembling 
Aristotelian merit (in that merit involves skill and choice), Beauchamp and Childress, 
Daniels (1995), and Williams (2005) discuss desert in relation to need. Nozick is critical 
of characterizing need as the driving internal goal of medicine, citing and evaluating 
Williams's position: 
Leaving aside preventative medicine, the proper ground of distribution of 
medical care is ill health: this is a necessary truth. . .. When we have a 
situation in which, for instance, wealth is a further necessary condition of 
the receipt of medical treatment, we can once more apply the notions of 
equality and inequality: not now in connection with the inequality between 
the well and the ill, but in connection with the inequality between the rich 
ill and the poor ill .... This is an irrational state of affairs (Williams, 2005; 
as cited in Nozick, 1974, p. 233). 
-Nozick (1974) argues in response that no other profession (a barber, for instance) requires 
that the practitioner be limited in pursuing his own goals: "why should he [a medical 
practitioner] bear the costs of the desired allocation, why is he less entitled to pursue his 
own goals, within the special circumstances of practicing medicine, than everyone else?" 
(p. 234). Daniels (1995) considers approaches like Nozick's to be untenable because 
they leave needs unmet. When need qualifies desert, autonomy-at least in the strictest 
of liberal terms-becomes problematic when packaged with a healthcare model that 
strives to be just: "it is the belief of many that health care is special which forces us to 
examine the reasons we have for extending to providers their traditional autonomy and 
power" (Daniels, 1995, p. 16). 
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Equality of Opportunity in Bioethics 
Daniels (1995, 2008) proposes that the Rawlsian (1999) theory of justice be 
applied to healthcare, which would take the shape of a two-tiered system: in the first tier, 
everyone has access to basic healthcare; in the second tier, privatized options are made 
available to those who can afford to go above and beyond basic care. The model is just 
as long as fundamental needs are met for even those who are worst off. Once those needs 
are satisfied, more limited, less necessary resources are open to choice, and can be 
provided according to wealth. Beauchamp and Childress (2009) call this threshold the 
decent minimum standard: 
The moderate egalitarian point of view requires equal access only to 
fundamental health care and health-related resources. . .. The decent-
minimum approach entails acceptance of a two-tiered system of health 
care: enforced social coverage for basic and catastrophic health needs (tier 
1 ), together with voluntary private coverage for other health needs and 
desires (tier 2) (p. 260). 
Daniels (2008) connects Rawls to healthcare by expanding the notion of 
opportunity: "my claim about the relationship between health and opportunity ... provides 
a way of extending Rawls' s theory to address the inequalities created by disease and 
disability, a key issue that Rawls had deliberately avoided" (p. 21 ). He does so by 
defining health as functional: the absence of those disabilities, diseases, and injuries that 
would limit functioning and render various opportunities impossible to choose. 
Functional health is normative, allowing for "an explanation of disease in relation to 
value-judgments" (Schramme, 2007, p. 124). According to a normative account of 
health, being unhealthy is a condition that would not have been chosen, and is 
undeserved. Rioux (2003) notes that a functional approach to disability grounds the 
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cause for disability in individual deficit, just as seen in a biomedical approach, except 
here the condition is understood in terms of its impact on functional capacity: "the ways 
of treating or addressing the functional incapacity are broader and include both 
ameliorating the condition and developing ways to enable people to develop their own 
potential" (p. 330). 
One such ameliorative strategy is healthcare, the means by which one might 
overcome or manage those obstacles to social functioning (Matcha, 2000; Parsons, 1951 ). 
A functional approach to health thus justifies entitlements under a distributive framing of 
healthcare. This is because normative health "acts not only to describe and explain, but 
also to enjoin to action [by indicating] a state of affairs as undesirable and to overcome" 
(Engelhardt, 1975, p. 127); and distributive justice provides the tools for overcoming 
undesirable states of affairs. Schramme (2007) explains the egalitarian justification for 
healthcare: "differences in these circumstances should ideally result only from 
autonomous choices. Since disease is usually a matter of brute bad luck, ill people have a 
justified claim on health care resources" (p. 125). That is, the purpose of health resource 
allocation is to cure, to fix, or at least to manage disability, disease, and injury: "health 
needs are those things we need in order to maintain, restore, or provide functional 
equivalents (where possible) to normal species functioning" (Daniels, 2008, p. 42). 
Granted, Daniels (2008) opposes a strongly normative conceptualization of health, 
pointing to notable exceptions where the onset of disability merely instigates functional 
changes in a value-neutral way: "some of our most important goals are not necessarily 
undermined by ill health or disability. Moreover, many people adjust their goals to fit 
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better with their dysfunction or long-term disability" (p. 35). Khushf (2007) and 
Schramme (2007) describe the debates around normative and naturalistic accounts of 
health as indeed contentious. Nonetheless, Daniels (2008) ultimately argues that people 
tend to prefer "normal functioning" (p. 41 ), achieved at peak health, and when healthcare 
provisions that facilitate normal functioning are denied, a normative element to health 
develops: "we may still be able to improve the situation-by curing the condition or 
moderating its outcomes and its effects. . .. We should not allow misfortune to beget 
injustice" (p. 13). Should distributive justice shape healthcare provisions, then, the 
standard of entitlement to unequal provisions requires a conceiving of disability, disease, 
and injury as functional limitations to opportunity. People only need and thus deserve a 
disproportionate allocation of healthcare provisions when their condition is functionally 
problematic, in that it interferes with opportunity maximization, that is, with how they 
would choose to live their lives. 
Poor health is undeserved because it would not be chosen, and it interferes with 
life choices. Inasmuch as this is the case, personal responsibility creeps into the notions 
of desert central to egalitarian healthcare models, and is raised as a deciding factor for 
resource allocation when needs are many and resources are scarce. Examples include 
activities that induce high blood pressure, tobacco use, and obesity (Sharkey & Gillam, 
2010). According to Moss and Siegler (1991), and Thornton (2009), in the name of 
fairness (a Rawlsian condition to opportunity provision) alcohol related End Stage Liver 
Disease (ARESLD) should be grounds for prioritizing liver transplantation, given that the 
resource is limited and the procedures are expensive. That is, those who reach ESLD due 
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to alcohol rather than a more natural circumstance should be de-prioritized on the liver 
transplantation list, because they chose substance use and could have therefore chosen to 
stop using the substance affecting their livers: 
In view of the distinctive circumstances surrounding liver transplantation, 
we propose as a general guideline that patients with ARESLD should not 
compete equally with other candidates for liver transplantation. . .. We 
propose that a priority ranking be established for the use of this dire, 
absolutely scarce societal resource and that patients with ARESLD be 
lower on the list than others with ESLD (Moss & Siegler, 1991, p. 1296). 
In response to the objection that alcoholism is a chronic disease, they and Glannon (1998) 
maintain that like diabetes mellitus, "alcoholism requires the patient to assume 
responsibility for participating in continuous treatment" (Moss & Siegler, 1991, p. 1296). 
Beauchamp and Childress (2009) qualify the condition, arguing that prioritization of 
organ transplantation should be grounded in the failure to take personal responsibility for 
maintaining the organ. This would mean that people with ARESLD should not drop in 
the priority list of organ transplantation recipients unless they refused to improve their 
condition: 
Examples of conditions under which personal responsibility should affect 
priorities and lead to a lower rating are the following are the following: (1) 
The alcoholic who fails to seek effective treatment for alcoholism and 
develops alcohol-related ESLF [end stage liver failure] should receive a 
lower priority, but unlike Moss and Siegler, we do not view a diagnosis of 
alcohol-related ESLF as itself categorically sufficient for a lower priority 
score. (2) A transplant recipient who through personal negligence does 
not take sufficient immunosuppressant medication, causing the transplant 
to fail, should be given a lower priority or be rejected for a second 
transplant (pp. 263-264). 
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Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 
Questions around the role of personal responsibility indicate that bioethics 
discourses have taken a sharply liberal tum since early associations with feminist theory. 
The feminist movement developed alongside, and had early influences on, bioethics, as 
initial intellectual currents in bioethics focused on the health concerns of marginalized 
groups; but feminists have noted that this focus has gradually been pushed to the 
peripheries of bioethics discourses (Holmes, 1999; Purdy, 2001; Shildrick, 2004). While 
bioethics continues to deal with the normative imperatives to healthcare, these 
imperatives are all too often oriented toward ameliorating natural conditions and 
competitive disadvantages, and such an onentation tends to overlook those with chronic 
. conditions, as well as conditions that are "chosen." Purdy (2001) and Sherwin (1992) 
express concern for the focus of "mainstream bioethics ... on specific issues, narrowly 
defined, and, for analytic convenience, accompanied by minimal consideration of the 
broader social context" (Purdy, 2001, p. 129). That bioethics is no longer committed to 
ending oppression is an indication that "most of the writings of contemporary medical 
ethics must be judged as lacking from the perspective of feminist ethics" (Sherwin, 1992, 
p. 84). 
Feminist bioethics reorients toward justice by dealing more readily with healthcare issues 
in relation to subordination and oppression (Colker, 2009; MacKinnon, 1989), and by 
concretizing bioethics problems. Early instantiations of bioethics (Caplan, 1980; Christie 
& Hoffmaster, 1986; Engelhardt, 1986) were clear about not overly relying on theoretical 
principles: "the principles of moral philosophy are simply too abstract and too formal to 
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contribute to the resolution of concrete cases" (Christie & Hoffinaster, 1986, p. xv). 
Currently, Beauchamp and Childress (2009) are leading authorities on bioethics, and their 
seminal work outlines the canonical principles used to frame healthcare. 
How might bioethics be re-concretized? How might justice be social, rather than 
abstract? Shildrick (2004) points the way, clarifying what feminisms can bring to 
bioethics discourses: 
That assumption of a given sovereign subject whose agency precedes and 
acts on particular contexts, rather than emerging from and being immersed 
in them, has been successfully challenged by feminist bioethics. That 
emphasis has been redirected to the specificity of the needs and desires of 
each person, to the mutuality of the biomedical encounter, and to an ethics 
of interconnection and care which deliberatively extends the focus of 
bioethics to encompass everyday issues of bodily well-being as well as the 
more dramatic scenarios of life and death (p. 150). 
The approach she recommends moves away from the biomedical focus on patient 
pathology, and would not posit that the driving purpose behind healthcare is to ameliorate 
those conditions that impact functional capacity. With a focus on connectivity, there is 
room for Wendell's (1996) theory on the construction of disability, built within medical 
contexts by physicians. Wendell's work points to an injustice within the context of 
healthcare itself-an instance of a ruling relation within which the physician subordinates 
the patient. Shildrick's characterization of feminist bioethics has the capacity to identify 
and condemn such a relation. 
With an emphasis in bioethics on cultivating interconnectedness, care may figure 
more prominently into healthcare models and notions of justice. Indeed, Wendell (1996) 
notes that feminists have been grappling with how medical contexts should incorporate 
notions of care, despite the focus in bioethics discourses on distributive healthcare 
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models, on the dyadic relationship between individual, isolated persons and the 
healthcare system. That healthcare services do not focus on care has led to an offloading 
of care-giving responsibilities onto the mothers of children with complex medical needs 
(Hillyer, 1993). From the perspective of those who are cared for, ideas of privacy, 
individualism, and liberal autonomy may be internalized as impossible standards, and 
may produce feelings of shame (Wade, 1994). The denigration of care and 
connectedness has been done in the name of pursuing cures to disabilities, diseases, and 
injuries, leading to a lack of investment in and commitment to facilitating health through 
access to stable living conditions, decent food, and job security; through preventing the 
poor health that is the result of poverty, unstable political conditions, and violence, as 
examples (Raphael, 2006). In Wendell's (1996) own words: 
Few of us would criticize someone who sought a lung transplant for 
emphysema caused by air pollution, or spinal cord regeneration (a long-
promised development) for paraplegia caused by an automobile accident, 
but the fact remains that such 'cures' function not only as benefits to 
individuals, but also as ways of depoliticizing health, safety, and ability for 
those who are privileged enough to have access to high-technology 
medicine. The very existence of' cures' which are available to a few 
people places some onus on individuals to buy solutions to problems that 
have social causes and could have social solutions (p. 161 ). 
3.2.2. Equality in Law 
Formal Equality in Bliss 
In Bliss v. Canada (Attorney General) (1979), equality jurisprudence drew from a 
formal notion of the principle. Stella Bliss challenged the constitutionality of the 
Unemployment Insurance Act. Section 46 of the Act guaranteed fifteen weeks of 
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unemployment insurance benefits to pregnant women (eight weeks prior to giving birth 
and six weeks after). Those who qualified had to satisfy the conditions under s. 30: they 
had to carry out insurable employment for at least ten weeks prior to the employment 
interruption. Bliss left work abruptly due to her pregnancy (she gave birth four days 
later), then applied for unemployment insurance six days after giving birth. Her claim 
was denied because she did not meet the qualifying condition in the Act, that is, she had 
not completed ten weeks of insurable employment. She had to wait six weeks before she 
was entitled to insurance. 
Bliss argued that the Act violated s. 1 (b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights (1960), 
which read: "in Canada there have existed and shall continue to exist without 
discrimination by race, national origin, colour, religion or sex ... the right of the individual 
to equality before the law and the protection of the law". She held that she had been 
denied equality before the law: 
[Section] 46 denied 'equality before the law' for the period therein 
specified to pregnant and child-bearing women who failed to fulfil the 
conditions required bys. 30(1) because it denied them the benefits 
available to all other claimants both male and female, who had eight weeks 
of insurable employment and who were capable of and available for work 
(p. 184). 
The phrase "equality before the law" refers to identical treatment regardless of the 
characteristics specified in the Bill. Equality thus required that people be similarly 
situated, entitled to like treatment by virtue of belonging to a like category: Canadian 
citizen, all those protected by the Bill. Bliss alleged that she was discriminated against by 
virtue of her sex, a characteristic specified in the Bill. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada ruled unanimously that the Bill of Rights' 
provision of equality before the law had not been violated. There was determined to be 
no discrimination on the basis of sex because under the Act, the qualifications for 
unemployment insurance pertained to the claimant's pregnant condition rather than her 
sex. Any sex-based inequality in the area of pregnancy "is not created by legislation but 
by nature" (p. 184). Cited in the Supreme Court's ruling, J. Pratte from the Federal Court 
of Appeal found the Act did not discriminate on the basis of sex and so was not in 
violation of the Bill of Rights: 
Assuming the respondent to have been 'discriminated against', it would 
not have been by reason of her sex. Section 46 applies to women, it has no 
application to women who are not pregnant, and it has no application, of 
course, to men. If section 46 treats unemployed pregnant women 
differently from other unemployed persons, be they male or female, it is, it 
seems to me, because they are pregnant and not because they are women 
(as cited in 1979, p. 190). 
In Young's (2006) words: "Bliss remains tagged as an artefact of equality days 
gone by, of an earlier overly formal and thin equality zeitgeist" (p. 50). Equality as 
understood under the Bill was formal in character, according to which law was applied to 
both men and women in equal measure, the same manner; legislation was equal for those 
who were similarly situated, while differences like pregnancy could be attributed to 
nature and were thus not grounds for legal intervention. Boyd and Sheehy (1989) note 
that liberal feminist scholars were critical of"the Supreme Court of Canada's abysmal 
record of women's equality claims under the Canadian Bill of Rights" (p. 2), a record 
which included this case. These early scholars still used the Court's formal language to 
describe equality, arguing along with Bliss that women were entitled to like treatment 
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regardless of the natural conditions that characterize their sex. These early arguments 
sought to expand protections against unequal treatment, so that pregnancy could not be 
used to mark women as different. Whether these arguments were effective or cogent is 
suspect, given that a "problematic aspect of equality as consistency is its treatment of 
difference. Only 'likes' qualify for equal treatment; there is no requirement that people 
be treated appropriately according to their difference" (Fredman, 2011, p. 13). It would 
be more effective to critique the concept applied in Bliss, not whether it was applied 
appropriate I y. 
This case may also be critiqued from the perspective of equality of opportunity, 
and indeed, the rhetoric of equality of opportunity would be taken up later in case law 
critiquing Bliss (1979). The case demonstrates that the principle of formal equality 
cannot produce gender-specific legislation because formal equality is a negative concept, 
one which does not lead to the amelioration of disadvantage, such as those disadvantages 
women experience when pregnant (Porter, 2006). As long as liberal feminists critical of 
the case are interested in maintaining that equality is formal and calling merely for a 
category expansion, their argument deflates in the face of instances where women are no 
longer similarly situated. The biological differences between men and women should not 
be ignored, for pregnancy puts women at a competitive disadvantage, especially in the 
workplace. Equality of opportunity ensures that those who are naturally disadvantaged 
might have "a legitimate claim to compensation-in such forms as affirmative action and 
employment equity-to enable them to start in a relatively similar position as others" 
(Rioux, 2003, p. 299). Unemployment insurance that discriminates on the basis of 
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pregnancy misses the point, for unemployment insurance should in part be designed to 
redress the inequalities that result from pregnancy. Legislation is meant to level the 
playing field that has been rendered rocky by natural conditions, to smooth over the 
uphill climb some face by virtue of circumstance. 
Rejection of Formal Equality in Andrews 
In Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia (1989), Bliss was criticized and 
equality legislation shifted in light of the replacement of the Bill of Rights with the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In Andrews, Mark David Andrews, a British citizen 
and permanent resident in Canada, argued against citizenship as a requirement for 
qualification for the provincial bar. The Supreme Court of Canada ruled that s. 15(1) of 
the Charter had been violated and could not be saved by s. 1. This became a landmark 
case for s. 15 interpretation. 
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms replaced the Bill of Rights in 1982 and 
served as a redress for some of the shortcomings in equality legislation. Equality rights 
are protected under s. 15 of the document: 
15( 1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right 
to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination 
and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic 
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has 
as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or 
groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or 
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. 
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In Andrews it was noted that Charter equality rights have broader application than those 
found in the Bill of Rights, which only covered equality before the law. The Charter 
expanded the scope of equality to the following: "(I) the right to equality before the law; 
(2) the right to equality under the law; (3) the right to equal protection of the law; and (4) 
the right to equal benefit of the law" (p. 30). Equality before and under the law means 
that Canadians are subject to the same entitlements; an individual or group is neither 
privileged nor disadvantaged in contrast with other Canadians as a result of laws that 
would unfairly discriminate on the basis of the identity characteristics identified or read 
into the section. Section 15(1) protects Canadians from unjustly discriminatory laws and 
ensures Canadians are all entitled to the same beneficial results of these laws. Subsection 
2 ensures that it is possible to design legislation that benefits an already disadvantaged 
group so that conditions preventing people from enjoying the protections and benefits 
enjoyed by other members of society may be redressed. 
During Andrews, the Court rejected the "similarly situated" test used in early 
interpretations of s. 15 (Reference Re Family Benefits Act, 1986; Reference Re Use of 
French in Criminal Proceedings in Saskatchewan, 1987; Smith, Kline & French 
Laboratories Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1987; R. v. Ertel, 1987; as cited in 
Andrews, 1989). The test was explained by J. McLachlin in the Court of Appeal: "the 
essential meaning of the constitutional requirement of equal protection and equal benefit 
is that persons who are 'similarly situated be similarly treated' and conversely, that 
persons who are 'differently situated by differently treated"' (as cited in Andrews, p. 26). 
This rhetoric was used long before early Charter interpretations, found in Bliss to justify 
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the Unemployment Act. The Court traced the formal concept of equality invoked here to 
Tussman and tenBroek (1949), and originally to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. 
In Andrews (1989), it was found that "the 'similarly situated should be similarly 
treated' approach will not necessarily result in equality nor will every distinction or 
differentiation in treatment necessarily result in inequality. The words 'without 
discrimination' ins. 15 are crucial" (p. 3). A new test was needed, with discrimination 
serving as the key condition for determining inequality, because discrimination could be 
the result of similar treatment. In Bliss, for instance, the Unemployment Insurance Act 
applied to men and women in equal measure, and this resulted in inequality because the 
similar treatment was discriminatory. It was acknowledged by the Court in Andrews that 
"every difference in treatment between individuals under the law will not necessarily 
result in inequality and, as well, that identical treatment may frequently produce serious 
inequality" (p. 25). Justice Kerans was quoted from Mahe v. Alberta (Government) 
(1987): 
The test accepts an idea of equality which is almost mechanical, with no 
scope for considering the reason for the distinction. In consequence, 
subtleties are found to justify a finding of dissimilarity which reduces the 
test to a categorization game. Moreover, the test is not helpful. After all, 
most laws are enacted for the specific purpose of offering a benefit or 
imposing a burden on some persons and not on others. The test catches 
every conceivable difference in legal treatment (p. 244). 
The Andrews test was developed in order to identify s. 15 violations. It asked 
whether the law made a distinction based on any of the enumerated and analogous 
characteristics protected under s. 15; and whether the distinction resulted in 
discrimination. Justice Mcintyre defined discrimination in the following way: "a 
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distinction ... which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on 
such individual or group not imposed upon others, or which withholds or limits access to 
opportunities, benefits, and advantages available to other members of society" (p. 34). 
This definition marked a shift away from Bliss, for it redressed the problems inherent in a 
formal formulation of equality. Indeed, the rhetoric of undeserved disadvantage and 
denied opportunity more closely resembles Rawlsian models of equality. 
Equality Jurisprudence after Andrews 
The concept of equality employed in this case was comparative, "the condition of 
which may only be attained or discerned by comparison with the condition of others in 
the social and political setting in which the question arises" (p. 25). The basis for 
Andrews' s claim was that he was discriminated against as a non-citizen, as compared to 
citizens. Underscoring comparative equality are categories of entitlement. One must 
identify with a group and claim that this group is discriminated against in contrast with 
another group. The concept moves away from formal notions of equality in that 
entitlement does not necessarily entail being treated alike, for similar treatment may 
result in discrimination. The concept was not only comparative but compensatory for its 
focus on identifying and remedying discrimination. The implication was that equality 
protections should involve positive action with the purpose of erasing disadvantage: 
The Supreme Court of Canada's approach to the constitutional right to 
equality, because it is based on remedying disadvantage rather than 
treating likes alike, means that laws that have not benefited disadvantaged 
groups must now do so. The justice system must provide adequate 
protection against sexual assault and racial violence, women must not be 
disadvantaged by reproductive capacity, society must be reorganized to 
allow full participation of disabled people (Orten, 1990, p. 302). 
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Nonetheless, Porter (1998) questions whether Andrews did enough to move away 
from formal equality, noting that no framework was established for positive action: 
Such an approach [in Andrews] may ensure that positive measures 
addressing particular needs arising from disability, pregnancy or systemic 
discrimination will not be found to be discriminatory, but does not 
establish the framework for establishing when such positive measures are 
required. There is a significant further step involved between rejecting a 
'same treatment' model of equality and accepting needs arising from the 
distinctive or pressing needs of disadvantaged groups protected by section 
15 (p. 73). 
In his review of case law after Andrews, he demonstrates that "the relatively open-ended 
comments in Schachter and Haig25 with respect to the broader ambit of positive 
obligations were replaced by comments suggesting that the issue of positive obligations 
had somehow been decided in the negative" (p. 74). As examples, he quotes J. 
L'Heureux-Dube in Thibaudeau v. Canada (1995)26: "although s. 15 of the Charter does 
not impose upon governments the obligation to take positive actions to remedy the 
symptoms of systemic inequality, it does require that the government not be the source of 
further inequality" (p. 446); and C.J. Lamer in Egan v. Canada (1995)27: "it is clear that 
25 
In Schachter v. Canada (1992), Shalom Schachter challenged the Unemployment 
Insurance Act for denying paternity benefits to an adoptive parent on the basis that he 
was not available for work. The Court in this case reaffirmed that s. 15 entailed both 
negative and positive rights. The same interpretation of s. 15 was reiterated in Haig v. 
Canada (1993), which concerned Graham Haig's ineligibility to vote in the 
Charlottetown Accord due to his moving out of the province. 
26 
In Thibaudeau, the Income Tax Act was challenged for requiring that alimony 
payments be included as a woman's taxable income. The Court determined that that the 
Act was not in violation of s. 15. 
27 
In Egan, James Egan and John Norris Nesbit, who were in a long-term relationship, 
challenged the Old Age Security Act, which did not include spousal benefits for spouses 
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Parliament does not have any constitutional obligation to provide benefits" (p. 596). The 
concept of equality was to be substantiated, but the substance remained vague. 
In Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1999)28, a further 
explanation of s. 15 was attempted: "to prevent the violation of essential human dignity 
and freedom through the imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social 
prejudice" (p. 88). The term "dignity" refers to an inalienable attribute to human beings, 
something worthy of esteem (Basser, 2011, p. 17). Fredman (2011) describes dignity as 
"valuable in underscoring the role of equality in situations in which there is no obvious 
comparator, making it impossible to demonstrate the demand of formal equality" (p. 22). 
She discusses the example of sexual harassment: 
Because sexual harassment is uniquely bound up with sex, there is no easy 
answer to the question of whether the harasser would have treated a man in 
the same manner. Substantive equality does not require a comparator in 
the same way: it simply prohibits sexual harassment because it is 
inconsistent with respect for a woman's basic dignity and humanity (p. 
22). 
The concept of human dignity may solve the problem of tricky comparisons, but it moves 
further away from the framework for positive action recommended by Porter (1998). In 
and for some time after Law, the process for determining a s. 15 violation required not 
only that discrimination or disadvantage be found, but that it be found to undermine 
human dignity. The move to regard human dignity as "an independent element in 
of the same sex. Although their appeal was dismissed, this was a landmark case for 
establishing that sexual orientation was an analogous prohibitive ground for 
discrimination under s. 15. 
28 
In Law, thirty-nine-year-old widow Nancy Law challenged the Canada Pension Plan 
on the grounds that she was denied survivor benefits due to her age. The Court 
determined that there was no violation under s. 15. 
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discrimination law" (Fredman, 2001, p. 23) translated into extra work for those claiming 
Charter violations (Fredman, 2001; Fyfe, 2007). This standard was associated with 
freedom-the freedom to make decisions and determinations unburdened by legal 
constraints. Lawrence (2003, 2006) argues that the rhetoric of freedom found in Law was 
used to the detriment of the larger scope that s. 15 was meant to encompass: 
The Supreme Court has said that the interests protected by human dignity 
relate to the realization of personal autonomy and self-determination, self-
respect, and physical and psychological integrity and empowerment. This 
statement of purpose tends to obscure the possibility that section 15 is 
meant to prevent the subordination of groups, whether through systemic or 
other forms of discrimination (2006, p. 117). 
She goes on to critique the liberty paradigm: "it does not simply thwart the claims of 
equality seeking groups-it actively retrenches societal mechanisms which serve to 
support inequalities, whilst detaching these inequalities from plausible claims of 
discrimination" (p. 132). Systemic disadvantage, manifest in Young's (2000) faces of 
oppression, fall the wayside because they cannot be accounted for with the language of 
personal autonomy used to articulate the human dignity standard. Legal equality requires 
comparatives; the comparison should be between subordinate and dominant groups, 
rather than a formalistic ideal (MacKinnon, 1989; Mcintyre, 2006; Pothier, 2006; 
Reibetanz Moreau, 2006). 
Substantive Equality in Kapp 
In R. v. Kapp (2008), the Supreme Court of Canada reinforced the formulation of 
equality put forward in Andrews, and paved the way for a more concrete account of 
positive legal obligations to redressing inequalities. In this case, a communal fishing 
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license was granted exclusively to Indigenous people; commercial, mainly non-
Indigenous fishermen contested the license when they were arrested for fishing at a time 
prohibited by the license. At trial, "they argued that the communal fishing license 
discriminated against them on the basis of race" (pp. 5-6). The Court ruled that the 
license was not a violation of equality rights because s. 15(2) enables governments to 
create programs that are meant to ameliorate situations for disadvantaged groups: "the 
government program at issue here is protected by s. 15(2) of the Charter. The communal 
fishing license was issued pursuant to an enabling statute and regulations and qualifies as 
a 'law, program or activity' within the meaning of s. 15(2)" (p. 7). 
The Court examined and revised the s. 15(1) test developed in Law (1999). It was 
acknowledged that Law had unified "what had become, since Andrews, a division in this 
Court's approach to s. 15" (p. 28). This was accomplished by reiterating that the 
principle of equality would be substantive, not formal; would entail positive obligations 
to facilitate equality, and not just negative obligations to protect against inequalities. 
Nonetheless, the establishment of human dignity as a standard and legal test was 
criticized: 
Human dignity is an abstract and subjective notion that, even with the 
guidance of the four contextual factors29, cannot only become confusing 
and difficult to apply; it has also proven to be an additional burden on 
equality claimants, rather than the philosophical enhancement it was 
intended to be. Criticism has also accrued for the way Law has allowed 
for formalism of some of the Court's post-Andrews jurisprudence to 
29 
Those four contextual factors were as follows: "(I) pre-existing disadvantage, if any, of 
the claimant group; (2) degree of correspondence between differential treatment and the 
claimant group's reality; (3) whether the law or program has an ameliorative purpose or 
effect; and ( 4) the nature of the interest affected" (Law, 1999; as cited in Kapp, 2008, pp. 
27-28). 
resurface in the form of an artificial comparator analysis focused on 
treating likes alike (Kapp, 2008, pp. 28-29). 
The purpose of s. 15(1) was thus restated in such a way that it reaffirmed the Andrews 
ruling: "preventing governments from making distinctions based on enumerated or 
analogous grounds that have the effect of perpetuating disadvantage or prejudice or 
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imposing disadvantage on the basis of stereotyping" (Kapp, 2008, p. 6). It was further 
determined that the purpose of s. 15(2) was to enable "governments to pro-actively 
combat discrimination by developing programs aimed at helping disadvantaged groups 
improve their situation" (p. 6). 
Kapp reaffirms Canada's commitment to substantive equality, a notion of equality 
which involves the acknowledgement that resources and opportunities are not already 
distributed equally, and equal treatment thus sometimes entails treating groups differently 
in order to redress disadvantage. In the words of Hughes (1999), substantive equality is 
"a form of equality which is satisfied only if policy or law is made meaningful for all 
members of society, including those who have been racialized or systemically defined by 
gender, sexuality, or disability or similar characteristics, as well as intersecting identities" 
(note 1). Quoting Raphael (1976), she describes Canadian equality jurisprudence with 
the familiar rhetoric found in equality theory: 
The recognition that 'certain basic capacities and needs are possessed by 
all' led (eventually) to a concomitant principle to respond to the inability 
of everyone to enjoy those needs because of natural inequalities. Some 
reconciliation between liberalism's equality of opportunity (underlying its 
economic strand) and the reality of both conventional and natural 
inequalities was needed. If people were to enjoy commonly recognized 
needs and were to realize an equal opportunity for self-development which 
was at the heart of the evolving liberalism, some account must be taken of 
different needs. As Raphael points out, everyone needs food, but a 
diabetic needs insulin; every child needs education, but visually impaired 
children require 'special, more costly facilities'" (Hughes, 1999, p. 18). 
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She lauds this shift, arguing along with others (Minow, 1991; Rioux & Valentine, 2006) 
that modem inequalities tend to be systemic rather than overt or ostensible, the result of 
the failure to recognize difference: "in this sense, the concept of 'substantive equality' is 
a major value in the organizing of Canadian society" (Hughes, 1999, p. 22). 
Hughes criticizes, however, the Court's reliance on identity categories to 
determine inequalities, a practice carried out because legal equality is a comparative 
concept. The categories used are not only socially produced (Smith, 1990, 2005; Young, 
1990), but are also reductive. Those persons who have overlapping membership to 
several categories may have very different experiences of inequality, according to 
intersectionality theory (Crenshaw, 1998). Their experiences may therefore be 
inexplicable relative to the categories framing legal inequality: "it is impossible to dissect 
an experience such as gendered disability discrimination into neat, separate categories of 
gender and disability, just as it is impossible to dissect the claimant into neat, separate 
components of gender and/or disability" (Sampson, 2005, p. 45). Says Hughes: 
A fully realized substantive equality concept requires an appreciation of 
the flexibility and overlapping nature of identity and of the distinction 
between an externally imposed and an internally derived identity. Here 
the structure of section 15 and its roots, through wording and 
interpretation, in human rights or anti-discrimination jurisprudence make it 
less useful as a guide (1999, p. 43). 
Not only is equality law category-specific, but it is site-specific in that it advocates an 
"individual approach to redressing inequality (this person was refused accommodation or 
a job or denied a promotion)" (p. 43). Inasmuch as this is the case, the substance of 
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equality still largely draws from equality of opportunity models and more liberal 
approaches that take an individualist focus, and that stress competition and responsibility 
(Rioux & Riddle, 2011 ). A more robust substantive equality would draw more readily 
from feminisms to account for systemic inequalities, that is, the production of social 
categories via ruling relations (Smith, 1990, 2005) and the manifestations of entrenched 
oppression (Harvey, 1999; Young, 2000). 
Bliss went awry because social practices and legal policies have historically subordinated 
women based on their reproductive capacities, pushing them out of the workplace due to 
a failure to respect and an effort to control women, not because a natural condition put 
Bliss at a competitive disadvantage. How the subordination of women is grounded in 
reproduction will be elaborated on in the next section, but the point to be made here is 
even a substantiated notion of equality does not fully address the injustice that Bliss 
experienced. 
3.3. Reproductive Equality 
In the next section I will apply the principle of equality to reproductive decision-
making contexts. I will begin by situating reproductive equality in bioethical discourses, 
considering the tensions between Rawlsian and feminist health models. I will then 
determine how s. 15 has been applied to Doe et al. v. The Government of Manitoba 
(2004). This section explores the tensions between reproductive autonomy and 
reproductive equality, specifically addressing how inequalities undennine autonomy 
rights, as well as how some concepts of autonomy can complicate and compromise 
equality jurisprudence. 
3.3.1. Reproductive Equality in Bioethics 
Formal Equality Applied to Reproduction 
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Interpretations of reproductive equality, and the effectiveness of each 
interpretation, vary depending on the formulation of equality employed. To begin, 
Daniels's healthcare model (1995, 2008), framed as an expansion of opportunity, is not 
easily applied to reproductive health. He is relying on the work of Rawls, a philosopher 
who did not himself tackle healthcare, although in Political Liberalism (2005, originally 
published in 1993) he did consider abortion as an example of a political problem-a 
moral disagreement in the public arena. Interpreting Rawls, Gutmann and Thompson 
(1997) classify abortion as a non-deliberative moral disagreement, irresolvable "because 
the best moral understanding that citizens can muster does not show them which position 
should be rejected" (p. 74). Claims made in these disagreements "cannot be defended 
except by appeal to principles drawn from what [Rawls] calls 'comprehensive doctrine'" 
(George, 1997, pp. 1390-1391). By comprehensive doctrine, he means ideology, both 
secular and religious, rooted in culture and context rather than reason: "background 
culture is the culture of the social, not of the political. It is the culture of daily life, of its 
many associations: churches and universities, learned and scientific societies, and clubs 
and teams, to mention a few" (Rawls, 2005, p. 468). 
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For Rawls, in a just (read, liberal) society, political decisions are not made based 
on background conditions. George (1997) explains: 
To analyze the problem of abortion in Rawlsian terms, people who believe 
that abortion is wrongful killing (and as such a violation of human 
rights) ... should ... desist from the exercise of political power to secure legal 
protection for abortions' unborn potential victims. As a violation of the 
liberal principle of legitimacy, advocacy and action to restrict abortion are 
contrary to political justice and, in that way, unreasonable (pp. 1391-
1392). 
In other words, positions taken against abortion violate a principle that is foundational to 
liberal society. The liberal principle of legitimacy justifies the exercise of power over 
citizens, and is read as follows: "our exercise of political power is fully proper only when 
it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free 
and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals 
acceptable to their common human reason" (Rawls, 2005, p. 393). Rawls believes a just 
society can be built on procedural, formal principles to which all persons, ideally, find 
reasonable. Rather than appeals to the substantive particulars of a moral problem, these 
principles inform policy-making. 
The philosopher advocates a reasonable balance of the values at stake in the 
disagreement, and in the context of abortion, "any reasonable balance of these three 
values [respect for life, the ordered reproduction of political society over time, and 
equality of women as equal citizens] will give a woman a duly qualified right to decide 
whether or not to end her pregnancy during the first trimester" (p. 243 ). He holds the 
opinion that a liberal society would permit abortion because there are no legitimate, or 
reasonable, grounds for limiting women's equality, at least early in the pregnancy. Any 
215 
balance of the three values that would lead to anti-abortion legislation might be not only 
unreasonable but also "cruel and oppressive" (p. 243). There may be dissentients whose 
comprehensive doctrines are incompatible with abortion provisions, but "this does not 
mean that they must reject the political legitimacy of the law or of the constitution" 
(Freeman, 2007, p. 409). Wherever a person might stand in the moral disagreement, that 
background culture informing his position has no place in political decision-making. 
Rawls only invokes abortion as an example to illustrate political decision-making, 
and does not discuss what should follow from the point of permission. That is, he does 
not specify how one might strike a reasonable balance between equality for women, 
respect for life, and a social responsibility to manage reproduction and the family (read, 
the point at which women's equality may be reasonably limited by fetal life and social 
control). Nor does he justify these three values in the footnote where this discussion is 
found. In a follow-up to the footnote, he writes that he did not intend to argue for the 
right to abortion; he is not even willing to say with certainty that the right to abortion 
ought to be granted in a liberal society. He explains further: 
I used three political values (of course, there are more) for the troubled 
issue of the right to abortion, to which it might seem improbable that 
political values could apply at all. I believe a more detailed interpretation 
of those values may, when properly developed at public reason, yield a 
reasonable argument. I won't say the most reasonable or decisive 
argument; I don't know what that would be, or even if it exists (1997, p. 
140). 
By stopping at (or perhaps just shy of) permission, he cannot elaborate on how abortion 
provisions ought to be distributed in order to further facilitate equality; and indeed, as an 
empty concept, one which cannot recommend positive action, formal equality may have 
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nowhere to go beyond the granting of permission. Further, Rawls explores the example 
of abortion by first presupposing that society is "well-ordered" and that the women 
seeking abortions are "mature" and "adult" (2005, p. 243). He considers equality for 
women only in the context of an example involving a certain kind of woman. 
Equality of Opportunity Applied to Reproduction 
In order to better understand how reproductive health provisions might be 
distributed under a Rawlsian model, we return to Daniels (1995, 2008), who appeals to a 
more substantiated notion of justice in order to work out the more practical details 
involved in healthcare: equality of fair opportunity. To review, according to this model, 
healthcare is an entitlement in a just society because it redresses the :functional limitations 
of disability, disease, and injury; curing or at least managing these conditions ensures that 
people do not miss meaningful social opportunities. Does the condition of pregnancy, 
which is by Daniels' s own admission "not a disease" (2008, p. 42), not complicate the 
characterization of health as a normative lacking? 
While women seeking to terminate unwanted pregnancies might not consider 
pregnancy to be pathology, they do frame their condition in terms of functional 
limitations. That is, an unwanted pregnancy presents as an obstacle in the way of one's 
full range of opportunities: "when women seek to terminate unwanted pregnancies, 
whether through a morning-after pill or an abortion, ... [they and the medical 
professionals treating them] view unwanted pregnancies as the result of normal-perhaps 
all-too-normal-functioning" (p. 41 ). Prohibiting abortion would serve as an 
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unreasonable limit to a woman's freedom to determine her life course, and inasmuch as 
this is the case it may be analogous to disability, disease, and injury. 
A distributive model of healthcare must also account for wanted pregnancies, 
which are not ostensibly framed as unhealthy or undeserved. What would then account 
for women's entitlement to healthcare resources? As Daniels notes in the case of 
disability, not all conditions need to be characterized as normative lacking. Like chronic 
illness, pregnancy is managed in order to minimize risk, in the case of the latter risk to 
the pregnant woman and developing fetus. Provisions may include, as examples, myriad 
gynaecological appointments, dietary recommendations, or prenatal vitamins, all of 
which are designed to stave off complications and reduce risk. The point is not to cure 
but to maintain and prevent. Justice (so framed) demands this sort of resource 
distribution in order to facilitate a woman's liberty. 
However, through resource distribution we have not merely expanded 
opportunity, but we have also constructed pregnancy as a medical matter, and pregnant 
women's bodies as in need of medical attention. There are implications to likening 
pregnancy to disability, and indeed, to medicalizing both phenomena. While healthcare 
provisions are offered on the basis of need, the language of risk in association with 
pregnancy constructs women's need, and builds a relationship of dependency on medical 
professionals (Lippman, 1991 ). Those professionals, propped up as authorities over 
medical matters (Kukla, 2005; Wendell, 1996), offer advice and services in order to 
maintain women's "vulnerable and poorly bounded bodies" (Kukla, 2005, p. 85). 
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Feminist Approaches Applied to Reproduction 
While Rawlsian healthcare is rooted in correcting "natural conditions" and 
fulfilling "medical needs," it fails to account for how the condition of pregnancy is at the 
root of patriarchal politics. There is little consideration over which material 
disadvantages and oppressions might render healthcare provisions necessary. Feminisms 
deal more readily with these considerations. Sherwin (1997), for instance, prioritizes the 
background culture Rawls rejects, arguing that feminist ethics is not concerned with 
resolving the moral intricacies of the grand abortion debate. She instead assumes that 
there are myriad reasons to terminate a pregnancy, many of which are tied to oppression 
on the basis of sex; women are therefore in the best position to make decisions about their 
own reproductive health, and ought to make those decisions in order to avoid further 
subjugation: 
Feminists recognize that women have abortions for a wide variety of 
reasons. Some women, for instance, find themselves seriously ill and 
incapacitated throughout pregnancy; they cannot continue in their jobs and 
may face enormous difficulties in fulfilling their responsibilities at home. 
Many employers and schools will not tolerate pregnancy in their 
employees or students, and not every woman is able to put her job, career, 
or studies on hold. Women of limited means may be unable to take 
adequate care of children they have already borne and they may know that 
another mouth to feed will reduce their ability to provide for their existing 
children30 (p. 320). 
30 It is worth noting (though its relevance will arise more so in the next section) that 
Sherwin (1997) continues listing reasons, and her latter set pertain to disability, located 
both in the pregnant woman and the fetus: "women who suffer from chronic disease, or 
who feel too young, or too old, or who are unable to maintain lasting relationships may 
recognize that they will not be able to care properly for a child at this time. Some who 
are homeless, or addicted to drugs, or who are diagnosed as carrying the AIDS virus may 
be unwilling to allow a child to enter the world under such circumstances. . .. Some 
women have learned that the fetuses they carry have serious chromosomal anomalies and 
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Colker (1992) elaborates on why the decision belongs to women: "it is because women 
are saddled with virtually all of the expenses of pregnancy and childbirth, as well as the 
costs of childcare, that we must insist women be allowed to choose the conditions under 
which they become pregnant" (p. 85). Not merely a biological condition that gets in the 
way of functioning, pregnancy has historically been used as grounds for social 
subordination. 
Sherwin (1997) goes on to say that there are ways in which healthcare provisions 
(whether there is an overabundance or a lacking) can render women's choices authentic 
or otherwise: "feminist ethics directs us to look at abortion in the context of other issues 
of power and not to limit discussion to the standard questions about its moral and legal 
acceptability" (p. 325). A lack of abortion services, for instance, can serve as a hindrance 
to facilitating reproductive health. Abortion policy framed simply as permission involves 
a negative right, where governments agree not to regulate. This dearth of regulation leads 
to inadequacies in services. The services that are more uniformly made available in the 
Canadian reproductive health context pertain to women opting to carry through with their 
pregnancies. Pregnancy management is a manifestation of social inequality in that 
women have been historically disadvantaged by socially produced responsibilities 
associated with pregnancy and parenting, which include the responsibility to make use of 
the provisions made available: make your appointment, take your vitamins, listen to your 
doctor. The guise of responsibility has shrouded the ways in which reproductive 
consider it best to prevent them from being born with a condition bound to cause 
suffering" (p. 320). 
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capacities have been taken up as justification for subordination (Metzger, 2007; Rodgers, 
2006c). 
For Colker (1992, 2009), autonomy and equality are indivisible principles in the 
context of reproductive decision-making to the extent that social inequalities work to 
render choices inauthentic, not autonomous. Critical of literature on abortion for 
predominantly focusing on individuating the woman or the fetus, she argues that 
reproductive issues should be grounded instead in equality theory because equality theory 
stresses connectivity: 
And equality perspective, by contrast, does not rely on such assumptions 
about lack of connectedness. Equality doctrine, at its core, requires that 
people be treated with equal respect, irrespective of group status. Thus, 
equality doctrine ... insists that women be allowed to choose to have 
abortions because of women's position in society-the roles and 
responsibilities of women in society in relation to others (1992, p. 85). 
Colker focuses on a specific notion of equality, arguing that an anti-subordination 
approach to equality, as opposed to an anti-differentiation approach, best meets the needs 
of women making reproductive decisions. Her understanding of the two approaches 
corresponds with the conceptual division of formal and substantive equality. Anti-
differentiation, or formal equality, protects individual interests regardless of presenting 
characteristics (think of the Rawlsian position on abortion-reasonable, bereft of 
contextual considerations). She considers this perspective problematic because it 
"focuses on the motivation of the individual institution that has allegedly discriminated, 
without attention to the larger societal context in which the institution operates"; further, 
it "focuses on the motivation of the specific effect of the alleged discrimination on 
discrete individuals rather than on groups" (p. 87). An anti-subordination approach, by 
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contrast, "seeks to eliminate the power disparities between men and women, and between 
whites and nonwhites, through the development oflaws and policies that directly redress 
those disparities" (p. 87); in so doing, this approach "focuses on society's role in creating 
subordination" and "on the ways in which this subordination affects, or has affected, 
groups of people" (p. 88). 
Subordination can lead to self-fulfilling prophecy, where women lack the faith in 
self to resist reproductive control. As explained in relational autonomy theories (Govier, 
1993, 1997; McLeod, 2002; McLeod & Sherwin, 2000), self-trust is a vital component to 
autonomous reproductive decision-making. Self-trust is difficult to cultivate in situations 
of inequality, where ruling relations are internalized and enacted. As an example, 
McLeod (2002) describes Lee, a nurse and counsellor who "entered an infertility program 
feeling confident about where her boundaries lay in terms of how much she was willing 
to go through emotionally, spiritually, and physically in trying to become pregnant" (p. 
2). Lee left the program feeling "powerless and objectified" (p. 3) because she had little 
bodily control, due to the team-based approach that made no guarantees regarding who 
would examine the patient, and left for little room to develop relationships with the 
medical practitioners. In a letter Lee later wrote to a physician who performed her 
hysteroscopy, she describes problems with care: 
When you did the informed consent over the phone, I specifically asked 
you how many people would be in the O.R. [operating room] suite. You 
told me there would be three people--the anesthetist, the circulating nurse, 
and yourself. This was a very important issue for me because of my past 
history of trauma. . .. When I was wheeled into the room I counted eight 
people (men and women) there cleaning instruments, laughing and 
showing no signs of finishing up before you got started (with my entire 
lower body fully exposed and my legs in stirrups). I looked at you to help 
me in this and to try to honor my need for control and personal dignity, 
and you responded in defense of the staff that were cleaning instruments 
rather than on my behalf I still remember crying and begging the 
anesthetist to knock me out because what I was feeling at that moment was 
unbearable. ...It was another episode where I felt objectified (p. 4). 
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McLeod notes that Lee was unable to leave on her own, and instead turned to a medical 
authority for help. Although not. coerced into staying in the operation room, she 
remained because she lacked the confidence to leave. McLeod is careful to explain the 
ways in which Lee was made to feel throughout her time enrolled in the program that she 
lacked control, arguing that these conditions led to Lee's inaction. This narrative 
illustrates the "many obstacles that oppression can pose to the ability of patients to trust 
themselves" (p. 5). It also speaks to the ways in which autonomy cannot be exercised in 
a context where the agent is disadvantaged. 
3. 3. 2. Reproductive Equality in Law 
Doe et al. 
An attempt to ground reproductive rights in s. 15 was made in Doe et al. v. The 
Government of Manitoba (2004), although the way in which equality was framed is worth 
consideration. This case went to court because, firstly, Jane Doe 1 "personally paid the 
cost of [her] abortion in the sum of $375" (p. 2). She did so because she was told by the 
Health Services Centre, a Winnipeg hospital, that the wait time for an abortion procedure 
would be six to eight weeks, when she was seven and a half weeks along at the time of 
her diagnosis of pregnancy. She understood that the hospital would have paid for her 
procedure if she could wait, and that she would have to pay out of pocket if she had the 
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abortion at the Morgentaler Clinic. Her decision to use the clinic's services rested on the 
following reasons: "having to wait six to eight weeks would be stressful for her, both 
physically and emotionally. Jane Doe 1 was also aware of the increased health risks 
associated with a delay in having an abortion" (p. 3). 
Another claimant in this case, Jane Doe 2, was also pregnant and had been 
informed that her procedure, if conducted at the Health Sciences Centre, would be 
delayed by four to six weeks and would require three appointments. She was on social 
assistance at the time, and when she expressed concern that a delay would "cause her 
severe emotional stress and increased physical risk" (p. 4), her case worker helped her 
obtain an appointment at the Morgentaler Clinic. The province paid a substantial amount 
of her fee for the procedure, which according to the case transcript was "a most 
interesting fact especially in light of the position taken by the Government that it will not 
fund abortions at the Morgen taler Clinic" (p. 4 ). 
Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 challenged s. 2(28) of the Manitoba Regulation 46193 
and ss. l 16(l)(h) and 116(2) of Manitoba's Health Services Insurance Act. Section 2(28) 
"excludes as a benefit under the Plan a therapeutic abortion that is not performed in a 
hospital" (p. 5). Denied or limited access to safe and timely abortions, the claimants 
argued, violated their Charter rights to s. 2( a) freedom of conscience, s. 7 security of the 
person, and s. 15 equality. The Court determined that s. 2(28) of the Regulation as well 
as ss. 116(1 )(h) and 116(2) of the Act "are of no force and effect insofar as they pertain to 
therapeutic abortions because they are in violation of the rights and freedoms as 
guaranteed by sections 2(a), 7 and 15 of the Charter" (p. 24), and could not be saved by 
s. 1. This judgment has been set aside, however, and the decision has not served as a 
precedent for subsequent cases pertaining to reproductive rights (Richer, 2008). 
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Section 2(a) freedom of conscience was invoked by J. Wilson in her dissenting 
ruling in the 1988 Morgentaler decision. The claimants in this 2004 case argued that 
their right to s. 2(a) was violated because the Regulation "interferes with a woman's 
ability to make a moral or ethical decision as to whether or not she wishes to terminate a 
pregnancy" (p. 11 ). Regarding s. 7, they relied on the precedent set in Morgentaler 
(1988), in which C.J. Dickson (as noted in Doe et al., 2004) held that "state interference 
with bodily integrity and state-imposed psychological stress infringed the right of women 
to security of the person as guaranteed by s. 7 of the Charter" (p. 9). With respect to s. 
15, Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 claimed that "because women are the only persons who 
can access abortion services, any legislated restrictions on women's ability to access 
abortion services uniquely affects women as opposed to the general population" (p. 10). 
In other words, current policies on abortion provisions violate women's substantive 
equality, the right to differential treatment. 
Their argument, however, was complicated by what equality jurisprudence was at 
the time, for Law (1999) set the standard. In order to meet the conditions for an equality 
violation, the claimants argued that the "right to reproductive freedom is central to a 
woman's autonomy and dignity as a person [and] the ability to assert that autonomy and 
to exercise self-determination regarding one's own body is fundamental to the 
preservation and protection of women's dignity" (Doe et al., 2004, pp. 10-11 ). Rhetoric 
from Law manifested in the judge's ruling as well: "Judge Oliphant tethered his equality 
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rights analysis to a conception of dignity rooted in liberty-based values of reproductive 
freedom, autonomy, and self-determination" (Erdman, 2007, p. 1100). 
Analysis 
This account of equality is rooted in an autonomy that has liberal associations. 
This interpretation of equality affects the relationship between state and citizen, for the 
state's interest in equality remains negative, a matter of non-interference. In general, 
Judge Oliphant understood Charter protections to serve as a shield rather than a sword, 
that is, as a collection of negative rights instead of positive obligations: "a narrow 
interpretation of constitutional rights in the health care context is routinely defended by 
evoking fears of judicial meddling in the complexities of health budgeting and allocation" 
(Erdman, 2007, p. 1115). Such an interpretation has been long criticized for its 
implications in the context of reproductive health: "the experience of the Canadian 
abortion legislation illustrates both the very real limitations of formal equality and the 
very real need to continue to defend and extend women's legal rights" (Gavigan, 1987, p. 
279). 
Ordolis (2008) notes the problems inherent in the Canadian legal concept of 
reproductive equality-the crucial missing elements-when comparing Canadian and 
Colombian rulings on reproductive rights. Standing in stark contrast with the history of 
Canadian jurisprudence on reproductive health from Morgentaler (1988) to Doe et al. 
(2004), the Constitutional Court of Colombia struck down the complete prohibition of 
abortion on equality grounds, recognizing "the connections between discrimination and 
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lack of access to abortion, [and] emphasizing the disproportionate impact of forced 
pregnancy and unsafe abortion on adolescent, poor, rural, and indigenous women, and 
displaced victims of internal conflict" (Ordolis, 2008, p. 264). Here we see far more so 
than in Canadian claims to substantive equality that equality must meet the needs of 
persons disadvantaged on the basis of overlapping, intersecting memberships to social 
groups. It is not enough to say that women are entitled to bodily control when barriers to 
access continue to exist, and are more prominent for women who are marginalized on 
other grounds. Further, equality requires structural change rather than merely 
distribution, for Ordolis also notes that the Colombian Court "highlighted the systemic 
aspect of unsafe abortion, outlining intersecting forms of discrimination that place certain 
women in positions of greater vulnerability" (p. 269), as well as the structural 
connections between sexual violence and the need for available, safe abortions. This case 
outlined Colombia's positive obligations to facilitate reproductive options, as demanded 
by international law-a commitment Canada has failed to make. Ordolis explains the 
Canadian context in contrast: 
While Canadian feminists and intervenors such as the Women's Legal 
Education and Action Fund have argued for an equality-based 
understanding of reproduction, the courts have failed to adopt such an 
analysis. Despite legal victories in relation to the decriminalization of 
abortion, Canadian feminists have strongly criticized the 'rights-based, 
neo-liberal, privatized argumentation that characterizes Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on reproductive autonomy'. More specifically, it has been 
suggested that the focus on liberty has led to a failure to recognize the 
multiple and systemic forms of discrimination that limit women's access 
to abortion in Canada (Rodgers, 2006b; as cited in Ordolis, 2008, p. 281 ). 
The concept of equality used in Doe et al. (2004) may have changed since Kapp 
(2008); human dignity no longer functions as a standard in determinations of s. 15 
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violations. Neve11heless, as Stang Dahl and Snare (1978) indicated long before the 
introduction and interpretations of the Charter, "law reforms have to be accompanied by 
a 'delivery system' which in essence means a political and economic reorganization of 
society" (p. 14). Doe et al. (2004) is merely a late development in a long history of 
Canada's inadequate delivery system. Rodgers (2006a) elaborates on this gap between 
legislation and delivery: 
Discriminatory delivery of medically necessary health services needed 
only by women is clear sex discrimination. Where discriminatory delivery 
of medically necessary services disproportionately impacts racialized, 
immigrant, aboriginal, and poor women it violates s. 15 of the Charter on 
the grounds ofrace and citizenship (p. 121). 
She goes on to conclude: 
Despite Charter protections, access to abortion services has proved elusive 
at best for Canadian women. The costs, delays and lack of public funding 
to advance further legal challenges to inadequate services, and the limited 
impact of the victories that have been achieved, suggest that it is women 
who will continue to bear law's limitations despite their right to law's 
protection. For women who find themselves pregnant, access delayed is 
justice denied (p. 122). 
Indeed, despite Morgentaler' s victory in 1988, there have been many 
shortcomings related to abortion administration. In response to Morgentaler' s 
announcement that he would open an abortion clinic in Nova Scotia, the province 
prohibited abortions outside hospitals, and denied funding for abortions performed in 
clinics. In court, he challenged the newly passed legislation, and it was duly struck down 
in a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada ruling, the legislation found to be ultra vires, 
or beyond the provincial mandate (R. v. Morgentaler, 1993). In Morgentaler v. New 
Brunswick (1994), he again challenged and won against provincial law, this time the New 
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Brunswick Medical Act, which characterized abortion in a non-hospital setting as 
professional misconduct. In 1995 (Morgentaler v. Prince Edward Island), Morgentaler 
applied to have a regulation under Prince Edward Island's Health Services Payment Act 
declared ultra vires. According to this regulation, abortions would be paid for only if 
performed in a hospital and if the Health and Community Services Agency deemed it 
medically necessary. The application was granted, although as indicated earlier in this 
study, access to abortion provisions remains limited on PEI. As recently as 2008, 
Morgentaler challenged New Brunswick law again: the New Brunswick Medical Services 
Payment Act excluded abortions performed in non-hospital settings from the definition of 
"entitled services." He claimed the regulation violated the Canada Health Act as well as 
Charter ss. 7 and 15; the case has not yet proceeded (Richer, 2008). 
It would seem, then, that.Morgentaler's cause requires a life-long commitment. 
This set of cases demonstrates that the legal protection of reproductive health has been 
insufficient. One could claim that these insufficiencies are due to the current grounding 
of the right to terminate in personal autonomy; however, appeals to equality might not 
adequately redress problems with delivery to the extent that the substance of Canadian 
legal equality is kept vague, or is coloured with personal autonomy rhetoric. This is not 
to say that equality jurisprudence should be devoid of autonomy considerations, 
especially since women's inequality has been historically rooted in who controls their 
reproductive abilities (Cook & Howard, 2007; Metzger, 2007). Says Rodgers: 
Reproductive autonomy is key to women's equality and essential to 
women's full and constitutionally protected membership in the Canadian 
state .... Women's reproductive capability, the biological ability to 
conceive, to carry and to birth children and the socially assigned obligation 
to nurture and to care for them to maturity, has been and remains a primary 
location for the subordination of women (2006c, pp. 1-3). 
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The concepts are connected, for reproductive autonomy has been impossible to achieve in 
any authentic way because of inequalities. These inequalities have not been redressed 
because the concepts have been framed in unhelpful ways: autonomy as personal, liberal 
decision-making; equality as negative, formal non-interference. 
3.4. Reproductive Equality and Disability De-Selection 
This section will consider whether there are tensions between reproductive 
autonomy and reproductive equality in relation to disability diagnostic technologies. I 
intend to explain how distributive justice models (grounded in either fonnal equality or 
equality of opportunity) apply to defences of disability de-selective reproductive 
technologies. Specifically, I will consider the seminal work From Chance to Choice: 
Genetics and Justice (2000), in which Buchanan and colleagues analyze genetic 
technologies through a liberal lens. To problematize their framework, I will explore how 
the technologies are made available especially on the basis of race, class, age, disability, 
and other such characteristics, and why this uneven distribution happens. I will further 
explore how geneticization has been built into the provision and promotion of 
reproductive technologies. My purpose here will be to consider tensions between 
reproductive autonomy (and in some cases equality) on the one hand, and disability 
equality on the other. Finally, through an analysis of E. (Mrs.) v. Eve (1986) I will 
uncover how involuntary sterilizations have affected legal equality for both women and 
disabled people. 
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3. 4.1. Reproductive Equality and Disability De-Selection in Bioethics 
Access to Services 
In From Chance to Choice (2000), four internationally renowned bioethicists 
consider the advent of what they call the new genetics: recent developments in 
technologies that can identify risks for or diagnose instances of genetic impairments 
before birth, even before conception. The new genetics are explored through a Rawlsian 
lens, with a reliance on concepts of distributive justice and equality of opportunity. 
Specifically, co-author Daniels's (1995, 2008) interpretation of Rawls is used, according 
to which health is defined as species typical functioning; healthcare prevents, cures, or 
manages impediments to this standard. Kirby and Sherwin (2003) elaborate on the use of 
Daniels' s theoretical work: "they [Buchanan et al.] advocate promoting justice through 
systematic attempts to help all individuals achieve a state of 'normal species functioning' 
in order to enable them to be effective participants in society's cooperative scheme" (p. 
209). 
This concept of species typical functioning means that genetic impairments are 
impediments to equal opportunity and full functionality. By aiding in the prevention or 
de-selection of genetic impairment, reproductive technologies foster greater equality of 
opportunity: 
Recently ... some theorists, including Ronald Dworkin and John Roemer, 
have suggested that justice requires redistributing social goods in order to . 
compensate those with less desirable natural assets. But they have not 
considered the possibility that justice might sometimes require altering the 
natural assets themselves, perhaps for the simple reason that until very 
recently this has been unthinkable (Buchanan et al., 2000, pp. 63-64). 
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Redistribution of resources facilitates justice by adjusting conditions for those who are 
worst off from the birth lottery. Buchanan and colleagues argue that advancements in 
genetic technologies revolutionize goods redistribution because these technologies have 
the power to affect natural goods. 
This is not to say that there is no longer a need for redistribution of social goods, 
only that we ought to strike a balance between inclusivity (the social response to 
disability) and maximization (directly affecting natural conditions rather than socially 
compensating for them), both of which are morally legitimate interests. This balance is 
required because genetic technologies cannot-yet, Buchanan et al. hold-guarantee the 
elimination of all instances of disability. Genetic technologies aid in this maximizing 
interest: "see genetic technologies as resolving the problem of inclusion by finding ways 
to avoid the very existence of (or to fully restore to 'normality') those who might be 
difficult to include in important social structures" (pp. 209-210). Unless or until 
technological advances can fully maximize health (read, fully eliminate disability), 
inclusivity remains important in the interest of justice; that is, inclusivity functions as an 
alternative interest only because total maximization is impossible (although it may not 
always be) with the current tools at our disposal: "at present...biomedicine's powers of 
prevention are very limited. The requirement that workplaces be modified to 
accommodate persons with disabilities is a reasonable response to the inadequacy of the 
preventative strategy" (p. 292). 
The maximization of health is not merely an entitlement, but is also an obligation: 
"new knowledge about the risk of genetic transmission of diseases and other harmful 
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conditions will give individuals both the opportunity and the responsibility to choose 
whether to transmit such harms to their offspring or to risk doing so" (p. 204). Genetic 
technologies represent first an opportunity in that a just Rawlsian society is liberal, and 
technologies inform decision-making, thereby increasing autonomy: 
Among [the grounds Buchanan et al. provide for reproductive freedom] 
are the claims that reproductive freedom contributes to individual 
happiness and well-being, and that reproductive control encourages the 
equality of men and women. But their most powerful argument is that 
reproductive freedom is a particular expression of the political value of 
personal liberty (Scully, Banks, & Shakespeare, 2006, p. 28). 
Seeing no incompatibility with this autonomy ground, the authors of From Chance to 
Choice also provide grounds for the framing of genetic technologies as morally 
obligatory: "parents are regarded as having permission, and some would say an 
obligation, to [make the choices that] produce the 'best' children they can" (Buchanan et 
al., 2000, p. 156). A liberal society does not only preserve the liberty of women, but also 
requires that the potential liberty of the developing fetus be considered. Its right to an 
open future, one that is not hindered by disability, requires that women make use of 
technologies that might identify and eliminate disability. Equality of opportunity thus 
operates in such a way that it must balance the liberty interests of discrete, competing 
parties. Kirby and Sherwin (2003) explain: 
The only constraints proposed are that the child's 'right to an open future' 
is respected and 'the potential advantage' so gained is, by Rawls' 
difference principle, to the benefit of the least well off in society (e.g., the 
productive earnings of 'the enhanced' are redistributed to the 
disadvantaged through government taxation) (p. 210). 
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Ideological Framing of Distribution 
Buchanan et al. (2000) admit that reproductive technologies should be available to 
all, but what happens when technologies are pushed onto specific populations, or policy 
on their distribution overlooks the different impacts that the technologies have on 
different social groups? Kirby and Sherwin (2003) are critical of From Chance to 
Choice's premises that justice is distributive, and equality a matter of opportunity. They 
argue that the appropriate justice model would "take more seriously the impact of genetic 
technologies on existing patterns of oppression involving gender, race, class, sexuality, 
and disability" (p. 210). They go on: 
The injustice created by existing biases against vulnerable social groups is 
likely to be exacerbated, not diminished, by a program that attends only to 
conditions of choice and re-distribution of wealth. Social justice involves 
more than the proper distribution of material resources; it also requires 
appropriate mechanisms for valuing the humanity of all types of citizens 
(p. 210). 
Previous chapters have already demonstrated that reproductive access remains a 
theoretical and legal problem; nonetheless, some segments of the population must 
contend with not only a dearth in services related to reproductive health, but also the 
overabundant provision of certain reproductive technologies that might lead to selective 
abortion. Rodgers-(2009) describes reproductive health provisions, and how they are not 
evenly distributed: 
There was documentation of racist delivery of abortion and reproductive 
health care services and of imposed contraception and sterilization. The 
young, the poor, women with disabilities and aboriginal women, refugees 
and women of colour were noted as being particularly mistreated. There 
was documented evidence of pressure to terminate a pregnancy or to use 
permanent forms of contraception such as sterilization or Depo-Provera for 
some women (p. 26). 
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The assumption belying these uneven distribution patterns is that some women more than 
others, some with certain intersecting identities, might be at risk for producing children 
with undesirable characteristics. Those women are targeted due to a tacit social mandate 
to prevent the reproduction of disability. 
Consider the historical treatment of racialized minorities: the Aboriginal women, 
refugee women, and women of colour Rodgers mentions. Davis (2001) and Roberts 
(1994) discuss the birth control movement of the 1970s, spurred by the invention of a 
contraceptive pill to prevent pregnancy as well as positive changes in abortion law. This 
movement heralded technological advancements and legal reform for facilitating 
autonomy, but overlooked the social inequalities between women that still hinder 
reproductive control: 
The birth control movement has seldom succeeded in uniting women of 
different social backgrounds, and rarely have the movement's leaders 
popularized the genuine concerns of working-class women. Moreover, 
arguments advanced by birth control advocates have sometimes been 
based on blatantly racist premises (Davis, 2001, p. 453). 
Davis goes on, echoing Rodgers: "the movement, for example, has been known to 
advocate involuntary sterilization-a racist form of mass 'birth control"' (p. 454). 
Racialized persons were historically subjected to sterilization procedures because 
low intelligence was associated with race, as well as class and immigrant status. For Burt 
(1935), Goddard (1912), and Herrnstein and Murray (1994), low intelligence was thought 
to be a genetically inheritable trait, passed down to people of inferior moral fibre. 
Herrnstein and Murray (1994) associated cognitive class with the following range of 
social behaviours: poverty, unemployment and idleness, welfare dependency, and crime. 
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Scientists have since discounted the theoretical links forged between intelligence, 
minority status, and moral character (Gardner, 1994; Gould, 1996; Kamin, 1995), but the 
geneticization of intelligence led to policies on reproductive control for the purpose of 
minimizing disability (DA WN-RAFH Canada, n.d.; Park & Radford, 1998). 
Although sterilization is no longer the primary mechanism employed in Canadian 
contexts for the purpose of reproductive control, other technologies are arguably 
promoted for the purpose of reducing disability, this mandate evident in the groups 
targeted for the use of these technologies. The conditions for risky pregnancies earlier 
discussed concern risk for disability; potential parents who are disabled or whose genetic 
makeup might result in disability may be warned through the use of reproductive 
technology. Even those women who are outside the ideal maternal age see their 
pregnancies classified as risky for the possibility that they might produce a child with 
Down Syndrome. Grant's study in Canada 's Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies (1993) concludes that the increased availability of technologies for women 
of advanced maternal age has changed their utilization patterns. While the women who 
participated in the study did not claim they were coerced, they did say they felt at least 
covert pressure to diagnose disabilities and to terminate pregnancies. This pressure is the 
result of a system of relations that devalues disability and constructs maternal need: 
women need ultrasound technology, they need amniocentesis, they need physician 
advice, until they reach the point where they need to terminate (Lippman, 1986, 1991, 
1993). A Rawlsian healthcare model may on its face further opportunity and fulfill 
medical needs, but within this model equality of opportunity amounts to little more than 
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liberal rhetoric used to gloss over who truly has reproductive control, as well as how 
racist, classist, and especially ableist medical discourses have framed, even created, needs 
for the medical field to fulfill. 
Geneticization 
Underscoring this deliberate targeting of women with intersecting marginalized 
identities is the trend toward geneticization, or the reduction of persons to their genetic 
codes31 (Lippman, 1991, 1993; Rapp, 2000; Rose, 2007). Certain women have been 
targeted and encouraged, even forced, to submit to technological surveillance and 
intervention due to ideas around the inheritability of disability. According to Rapp, 
"geneticization is an historically consonant ideology linking individual attributes and 
social problems as if they could be effectively reshaped or eliminated only in the realm of 
biomedicine now reduced to genetic diagnosis" (2000, p. 215). Gould (1996) calls this 
phenomenon biological determinism, or a theory of limits, which rests on fallacies of 
reification: "tendency to convert abstract concepts into entities"; and ranking: "propensity 
for ordering complex variations as a gradual ascending scale" (p. 24). That is, 
geneticization hinges on abstract formalism and hierarchical thinking. 
31 
Reproductive technologies may identify non-genetic disabilities. The previous chapter 
explored ultrasound technology in great detail, for instance, and ultrasound may identify 
physical anomalies that have no genetic basis. Further, not all disabilities have a genetic 
basis. Disabilities may be the result of delivery, as an example, or of injury. Literature 
nevertheless points to the medical ambition to ground as many human differences as 
possible in genetic causes, and often focuses on genetic technologies as the means by 
which disability might be prevented. 
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Like the ultrasound ritual discussed in an earlier chapter, geneticization yields 
visual representations. Extracted chromosomes are taken to be identical throughout a 
biological entity, and so those chromosomes build a karyotype profile (Martin, 2002). 
These profiles may be limited because firstly, the technologies developed to date remain 
and may always be (despite Buchanan et al.' s assurances) imprecise (Hubbard & 
Lewontin, 1996; Marshall, 1995); and secondly, they are reductive when one considers 
all that human identity entails: "the human at the level of the species as well as that of the 
individual person, while in co-evolution and co-adaptation with nature, is more than the 
sum total of biological or prosthetic components" (Knoppers, 2006, p. 9). And yet, the 
pictures that are produced mark "the body from which the cells were extracted ... by 
difference" (Martin, 2002, p. 15). Fyfe and Law explain how imagery has a naturalizing 
effect: 
A depiction is never just an illustration. It is the material representation, 
the apparently stabilised product of social difference. To understand a 
visualisation is thus to inquire into its provenance and into the social work 
that it does. It is to note its principles to exclusion and inclusion, to detect 
the roles that it makes available, to understand the way in which they are 
distributed, and to decode the hierarchies and differences that it naturalises 
(p. 1). 
What then, is being naturalized? Genetic information aids in the construction-
what Scully (2008) calls the essentialization and reification-of a species typical 
functioning. Taylor and Mykitiuk (2001) criticize associations of health with normalcy, 
and disease with genetic failings: "when genetic mutations are implicated in the 
development of our knowledge of disease, our understanding of health risks becomes 
effectively geneticized. Genetic knowledge incorporates and builds upon the concept of 
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normalcy" (pp. 4-5). This concept effaces any social inequalities disabled people 
experience. With the rise of technological innovation, "more and more human variation 
is attributed to genetic difference", and so "it becomes easier to foreground the biological 
and background the social, as if they were separable, reproducing and sustaining classic 
nature/culture dichotomies" (Rapp, 2000, p. 215). Recall that this is precisely Buchanan 
and colleagues' (2000) project: to see technological advances increase so that disability 
might be eliminated, at least cured; and social accommodations come to be eclipsed, and 
supposedly unnecessary. Taylor and Mykitiuk (2001) explain how geneticization 
legitimizes equality of opportunity models that disempower disabled people: 
The assumption that we should strive to remove the barriers to opportunity 
that arise due to diseases is being fuelled by geneticization. Traditional 
notions of equality of opportunity, based on socio-economic standing, race 
or ethnicity, are being expanded by genetic knowledge to include genetic 
makeup, viewed as a social asset that determines one's ability to compete 
for resources (p. 3). 
Tensions between Activisms 
Disability critiques have been mounted against de-selective reproductive 
technologies. These critiques often hold that reproductive technologies yield information 
that expresses a devaluation of disability and a discriminatory attitude against disabled 
people (Amundson, 2005; Kerr & Shakespeare, 2002; Melo-Martin, 2006; Parens & 
Asch, 2000; Saxton, 2000). The decision to terminate based on a diagnosis of fetal 
impairment has more social meaning than termination on some other basis because there 
is "professional support for testing and abortion" (Asch, 2001, p. 307) in the case of the 
former. Termination on the basis of disability indicates "that one cannot accept and 
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welcome the opportunity to nurture a life that will have a potential set of characteristics-
impairments perceived as deficits and problems" (Asch, 1989, p. 82). While Herissone-
Kelly (2007) and Wolbring (2003) compare disability de-selective abortion and sex 
selective abortion, the literature still demarcates between terminating due to a devalued 
identity characteristic and terminating because of life circumstances (a woman being too 
young, too poor, not ready, unwilling). 
Buchanan et al.' s (2000) recommendation that a balance be struck between 
genetic technologies and social accommodations is controversial in bioethics discourses 
that aim to further disability rights. Steinbock (2000), for example, holds that 
reproductive technologies can be developed as long as the social context does not 
discriminate against disability: "there is no reason why society cannot both attempt to 
prevent disability and to provide for the needs of those who are disabled. As a matter of 
fact, the rise of prenatal screening has coincided with more progressive attitudes toward 
the inclusion of people with disabilities" (p. 121). Asch (2003) claims, in contrast, that 
promoting technologies for the purpose of de-selecting disability and building an 
inclusive society are fundamentally incompatible goals: 
Is it possible for the same society to espouse the goals of including people 
with disabilities as fully equal and participating members and 
simultaneously promoting the use of embryo selection and selective 
abortion to prevent the births of those who would live with disabilities? 
As currently practiced and justified, prenatal testing and embryo selection 
cannot comfortably coexist with society's professed goals of promoting 
inclusion and equality for people with disabilities. Nonetheless, revamped 
clinical practice and social policy could permit informed reproductive 
choice and respect for current and future people with disabilities (p. 315). 
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These discourses concern how reproductive technologies affect disability 
equality, and although Asch (1989) and Rioux (1996) explicitly hold that disability 
equality-based critiques are compatible with women's reproductive rights, conflicts 
nevertheless exist. Steinbock (2000) argues that if abortion is morally pennissible for the 
purpose of "avoiding other unwanted consequences (having a child too young, having to 
give up school, a job, etc.)" (p. 110), disability is just as morally permissible a reason for 
termination. Sharp and Earle (2002) caution that there are tensions between women's 
reproductive autonomy and disabled persons' equality in that rendering abortion morally 
permissible means that women cannot be questioned for their decision to terminate 
regardless of their reasons. They hold that the two movements are fundamentally 
. incompatible as a result, and designed in such a way that bridging the gap would be 
impossible. 
The document Bridging the Divide: Disability Rights and Reproductive Rights 
and Justice Advocates Discussing Genetic Technologies (Generations Ahead, 2009) was 
the result of focus group discussions on this tension. These discussions yielded a 
characterization of how the goals of the two movements, disability rights advocacy and 
reproductive rights advocacy, diverge: 
For disability advocates, concerned with challenging structural oppression 
facing people with disabilities and advocating for their increased social 
access, genetic testing has proved worrisome in its potential for selecting 
out fetuses based on disability. For reproductive rights advocates, the 
affirmation of reproductive autonomy is paramount, and genetic 
technologies are generally supported for increasing reproductive options 
for women and families (p. 1 ). 
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This conflict seems to reflect a conflict of principles: disability equality and reproductive 
autonomy. The conflict only holds as long as the concepts invoked are grounded in 
liberal ideologies, rather than theories involving relations of power and support. 
Should the two movements be each grounded in theoretical models other than 
liberalisms, they might share important common goals. For disability rights advocacy, 
the social model of disability-explained in a previous chapter-locates disability in 
social inequalities and policies and practices of exclusion rather than genetic variance (or 
defect, depending on the model). Feminist reproductive justice counters the traditional 
grounding of reproductive rights in personal, legal rights, instead using "an intersectional 
analysis that recognizes the multiple factors that affect people's lives and offers an 
understanding of the intersectional nature of economic, social and political forces that 
shape the lives of women, their families and communities" (p. 5). What they share in 
common is as follows: 
Both recognize the relationship of individual lives to larger social, 
political, and economic factors, and the intersectional and contextual 
nature of individual and family decision-making. They appreciate that the 
difficult decisions that women and people with disabilities make must be 
understood in terms of structural and pervasive inequality, mistreatment 
and bias (p. 5). 
Alliance building, or at least conflict resolution, would require the recognition of 
a woman's right to reproductive control and a dismissal of the devaluation of life with 
disability. Working together might concretely entail "securing the financial resources 
and social support to raise children and care for family members with disabilities" (p. 7). 
Consider that the geneticization of disability not only naturalizes disabled people's 
inability to participate in exclusionary contexts, but also overlooks the responsibilities 
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with which mothers are saddled when they birth disabled children to a world that has 
absconded all social responsibility to accommodate difference. In this light, reproductive 
autonomy is not in conflict with equality, but rather, cannot be understood without 
equality. The feminist model of relational autonomy requires an understanding of 
relations of power, and of overlapping interests in social equality. 
3.4.2. Reproductive Equality and Disability De-Selection in Law 
Eve 
The intersectionality approach aids in a refashioning of reproductive equality: 
"the necessary rethinking of equality requires that unintended pregnancy and its 
consequences be approached from the perspective of not only women in general, but of 
different subgroups of women, particularly those who are marginalized due to income, 
age, or race" (Cook & Howard, 2007, p. 1056). Intersectionality analysis is important 
because barriers to reproductive health provisions more significantly affect "socially 
vulnerable women-the young, less well educated and newcomers to Canada" (Badgley, 
1977, unpaginated). 
This phenomenon is demonstrable in the case of E. (Mrs.) v. Eve (1986), in which 
Mrs. E. from Prince Edward Island was concerned that her intellectually disabled 
daughter Eve might "innocently become pregnant" (2). Eve's disability was described 
thusly: "Eve ... suffers what is described as extreme expressive aphasia. She is 
unquestionably at least mildly to moderately retarded. She has some learning skills, but 
only to a limited level" (p. 9). Expressive aphasia is "the inability to communicate 
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outwardly thoughts or concepts which she might have perceived" (p. 9). Eve struck up a 
friendship with a boy from school and he spoke of marriage. The school convinced the 
boy to abandon the pursuit, but "the situation naturally troubled Mrs. E." (9). A twenty-
four-year-old Eve was described as "attracted and attractive to men" (9). Her mother 
feared her daughter would become sexually active when not under supervision. Mrs. E. 
explained that she would have to take responsibility for Eve's child and she could not do 
so as a widow nearing sixty years of age. 
She applied for "(I) a declaration that Eve was mentally incompetent pursuant to 
the Mental Health Act; (2) the appointment of Mrs. E. as committee of Eve; and (3) an 
authorization for Eve's undergoing a tubal ligation" (p. 2). A tubal ligation procedure 
would have constituted non-therapeutic sterilization. Eve was appointed a guardian while 
the case was litigated; during the appeal process, the Supreme Court of Prince Edward 
Island "ordered that Eve be made a ward of the Court pursuant to the Medical Health Act 
solely to permit the exercise of the parens patriae jurisdiction to authorize the 
sterilization" (p. 3), a decision which was appealed at the level of the Supreme Court of 
Canada. 
The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that non-therapeutic, forced sterilization 
does not fall under the jurisdiction of parens patriae: 
Sterilization should never be authorized for non-therapeutic purposes 
under the parens patriae jurisdiction. In the absence of the affected 
person's consent, it can never be safely determined that it is for the benefit 
of that person. The grave intrusion on a person's rights and the ensuing 
physical damage outweigh the highly questionable advantages that can 
result from it (p. 4). 
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Parens patriae, as characterized in this case, is "founded on necessity, namely the need to 
act for the protection of those who cannot care for themselves" (p. 45). Provincial courts 
may intervene and supplant guardians to make decisions that are "in the 'best interest' of 
the protected person, or again, for his or her 'benefit' or 'welfare"' {p. 45), and it can be 
determined that the guardian is not acting in that person's best interest. 
The case revolved around who ought to make the decision on Eve's behalf, based 
on who had Eve's best interest in mind. Eve could not make the choice to either consent 
to or to refuse sterilization because "choice presupposes that a person has the mental 
competence to make it" (p. 55). The Court acknowledged that they could not guess what 
Eve's choice would have been had she met Canadian competence criteria to make it, and 
cited Eberhardy (1981) to establish a best interest standard: 
We conclude that the question is not choice because it is sophistry to refer 
to it as such, but rather the question is whether there is a method by which 
others, acting on behalf of the person's best interests and in the interests, 
such as they may be, of the state, can exercise the decision. Any 
governmentally sanctioned (or ordered) procedure to sterilize a person 
who is incapable of giving consent must be denominated for what it is, that 
is, the state's intrusion into the determination of whether or not a person 
who makes no choice shall be allowed to procreate (as cited in E. (Mrs.) v. 
Eve, 1986, pp. 55-56). 
While its scope is deliberately left vague so that it may be broadly applied, there are clear 
limitations to the jurisdiction: "a court can act not only if injury has occurred but also if it 
is apprehended" (p. 3 ). The respondent in the Supreme Court case could not demonstrate 
that Eve had been or was guaranteed to experience injury, and so there were no grounds 
to intervene. Examples of justification, or proposed injuries, such as the trauma of birth, 
lack of fitness as a parent, and hygienic problems, were dismissed: "the justifications 
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advanced are the ones commonly proposed in support of non-therapeutic sterilizations . 
. . . Many are demonstrably weak" (p. 50). 
While the Court was able to settle on a common law basis, Charter applications 
were considered. According to the argument made by Mrs. E. 's counsel, women have the 
fundamental right "to choose not to have children and to implement that choice by means 
of contraception" (p. 56). A violation of that right would constitute a violation of the s. 7 
right to liberty. Eve's counsel also invoked s. 7, noting that Eve would not be making the 
choice to be sterilized, and so the decision to sterilize would violate rather than uphold 
her entitlement to procreate: "a court-ordered sterilization of a mentally incompetent 
person, by depriving that person of the right to procreate, would constitute an 
infringement of that person's rights to liberty and security of the person under s. 7" (p. 
56). These arguments expand reproductive rights to encompass not only termination but 
also procreation and contraception. More than that, though, they problematize legal 
autonomy when the woman whose reproductive rights are being scrutinized is deemed 
incapable of making the decision on her own. 
In response to the appellant's s. 7 argument, Mrs. E. 's counsel invoked s. 15: "the 
most appropriate method of ensuring the mentally incompetent their right to equal 
protection under s. 15(1) is to provide the mentally incompetent with a means to obtain 
non-therapeutic sterilizations" (p. 56). That is, the denial of a medical procedure on the 
basis of disability when such a procedure is otherwise offered to nondisabled women 
would constitute unequal treatment. The argument revolved around the right to access 
reproductive services, and noted how access differs according to minority categories. 
The counsel for the Public Trustee of Manitoba was quoted: 
Denial of [a mentally incompetent person's] right to have his or her case 
presented by a guardian ad !item to a Court possessing jurisdiction to give 
or refuse substituted consent to a non-therapeutic procedure such as 
sterilization, would be tantamount to a denial to that person of equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law. Such a denial would constitute 
discrimination on the basis of mental disability, which discrimination is 
prohibited by Section 15 of The Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (p. 57). 
Analysis 
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The Supreme Court of Canada chose to avoid this debate between autonomy and 
equality, between the right to procreate and the right to access reproductive technologies 
that would prevent procreation: 
[The duty to protect those who are unable to take care of themselves] must 
not, in my view, be transformed so as to create a duty obliging the court, at 
the behest of a third party, to make a choice between the two alleged 
constitutional rights-the right to procreate or not to procreate--simply 
because the individual is unable to make that choice" (p. 57). 
In so doing, the Justices overlooked how central inequality was to Eve's reproductive 
rights and abilities, and indeed, how autonomy and equality are not in conflict, but are 
interdependent. 
The equality analysis employed by the respondent implied formal equality, where 
services ought to be distributed evenly and consistently, regardless of one's identity 
characteristics. And yet, identity characteristics had been targeted by historical 
sterilization programs. Alberta's Sexual Sterilization Act of 1928 justified the systematic, 
involuntary sterilization of people diagnosed as disabled until its repeal in 1972. 
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Christian (n.d.) describes the practice as "the institutionalization of racial and puritanical 
prejudice under the guise of beneficent science" (pp. 122-123). Park and Radford (1998) 
explore the case files from 1929 to 1972, written up by the Alberta Eugenic Board: a 
panel of four (some medical experts, others laymen) who were responsible for mandating 
sterilization procedures. Upon analysis, the case files revealed telling reasons for 
sterilization: "behavioural difficulties", "deprivation of family support", "impoverished 
family environment", "precondition to institutional release", and "parental request" (p. 
326). People lacking economic support from their families were sterilized, for instance, 
as were women who experienced sexual assaults. Here we see a collision of racism, 
classism, sexism, and ableism, where social behaviours that were deemed deviant and 
medically deficient were used to justify the denial of reproductive control. 
The reasons often provided for sterilization-the guise of beneficent science--
included "danger to the transmission of the progeny of 'mental disability' or 'mental 
deficiency,' and the danger that the exercise of the power of procreation may involve risk 
of mental injury either to the patient or to her progeny" (p. 325). Long after the repeal of 
the Act, this rhetoric was latent in Eve: the fear of the inheritability of disability, and the 
paternalist protection of women thought unfit to mother. 
Alberta policy was resisted in Muir v. Alberta (l 996), in which Leilani Muir filed 
a law suit years after having been sterilized in the Provincial Training School for Mental 
Defectives (PTS). She argued that a later intelligence examination demonstrated that she 
was mentally competent, which meant that she had no disability to pass along to 
offspring, and she was fit to mother. The Court ruled that Muir had been wrongfully 
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sterilized and her confinement at PTS resulted in "loss of liberty, loss of reputation, 
humiliations and disgrace, pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment oflife, loss of normal 
developmental experiences, loss of civil rights, loss of contact with family and friends 
[and] subjection to institutional discipline" (p. 2). In Muir we see the language of liberty, 
but there is no tackling of the issue of discrimination on the basis of disability, for her 
confinement and loss of reproductive freedom were wrongful only because she could 
demonstrate she did not have below-average intelligence. Without any acknowledgment 
that discrimination on the basis of disability has happened, what is to happen to future 
Eves? 
Although the Court ruled in Eve's favour, and ground their decision in common 
law, Rodgers (2006c) contends that the decision recognized her equality rights, but used 
equality rhetoric to reinforce ableist social inequalities: 
The impact of [the] decision is to allow Eve's (assumed) physiological 
capacity for pregnancy to prevent her broader engagement with her 
community. [The] reliance on overstated respect for women's 
reproductive role effectively precludes Eve from engaging in a sexual life 
because of fears that her sexuality might result in a child alleged by others 
not to be in her interest-nor in theirs. Here ... apparently equality 
enhancing recognition of reproductive capacity is used to the anti-
egalitarian effect of denying Eve a full life (p. 14). 
The Court opted not to intervene, when the case transcript already indicated that Eve had 
been separated from her friend, and possibly her lover. Her mother and school denied her 
a sexual life for fear that sexuality equated with procreation. Eve already existed within 
power relations that disadvantaged her. Even if she wanted to bear a child, her 
reproductive rights were bound up in a responsibility to care for the child herself, or the 
responsibility of her mother to do so. The services to support her and her mother should 
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she want to reproduce were inadequate or nonexistent. The Court may have saved Eve 
from sterilization by choosing not to intervene, but they failed to address the ways in 
which inequality renders it impossible for Eve to live as a full citizen, to participate fully 
in her community. 
Policy 
While sterilization has been an overt, violent medical recourse for de-selecting 
disability, this study has explored subtler technological advances. To review, recent 
SOGC (2007a) guidelines recommend "all pregnant women in Canada, regardless of age, 
should be offered, through an informed consent process, a prenatal screening test for the 
most common clinically significant fetal aneuploidies in addition to a second trimester 
ultrasound for dating, growth, and anomalies" (p. 49). The guidelines mark a revision of 
the SOGC's original position, which was to recommend only pregnant women of 
advanced maternal age be provided with genetic testing. 
They give the following reason for their recommendation: "it is our belief that to 
deny women access to any information about the health or development of their child, 
when this information is readily available, is wrong and a disservice to Canadian women 
and their families" (SOGC, 2007b, unpaginated). The appeal to reproductive access is 
reminiscent of a formalized, liberal notion of equality, such that historical and current 
professionally supported disability de-selection is not acknowledged. Equality is here 
synonymous with access to a wide range of options or opportunities, for the purpose of 
furthering autonomy (though, note that autonomy is furthered only through the narrow 
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window of informed consent). Although these guidelines appeal to the principle of 
equality and are dealing readily with disability, there is no discussion around how to 
respect the equality entitlements of disabled persons, nor those of women who opt not to 
avail themselves of technologies to diagnose or de-select disability. Says Miceli (2007) 
of the 2007a guidelines: 
The SOGC ... noted in their tenth recommendation that 'screening programs 
should show respect for the needs and quality of life of persons with 
disabilities. Counselling should be nondirective and should respect a 
woman's choice to accept or to refuse any or all of the testing or options 
offered at any point in the process' (p. 154). Unfortunately, there is no 
information in the document as to how the screening programs would 
show respect towards persons with disabilities, leading one to speculate 
that such a sentence is merely a throwaway line, devoid of any real 
substance (p. 6) 
In this case, the gaps in the discussion are especially important. The policies are 
meant to uphold equality and autonomy, and yet no mechanisms are put into place to 
safeguard against routinzation and ritualization of the recommended procedures, nor is 
there an acknowledgment of how technologies function in social contexts rife with 
inequalities. Key stakeholders are missing. Moreover, while the framing of equality 
remains rooted in formalistic, liberal concepts, the principle still only lurks in the 
background of reproductive issues, while autonomy remains the primary principle 
grounding reproductive health policy. Canadian law and policy will continue to struggle 
with how to frame reproductive equality if there is no discussion on equality, no 
recognition that inequalities affect, and are central to, reproductive control. 
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Chapter 4: Respect for Difference 
In this chapter I introduce the principle of respect for difference. I will begin with 
a review ofliberal traditions, and from a postmodern32 feminist perspective I will critique 
their assumed premises about what persons hold in common. I will next examine what it 
would mean to respect difference in bioethical and legal contexts, considering 
specifically the potential of and limitations to the s. 15 right to equality, and more 
generally how our medical and legal systems are structured according to ideals about 
human sameness. Respect for difference, I will show, is of tremendous importance to 
reproductive health, even if theoretical and legal discourses fall short of honouring the 
principle, as is evident in examples of sterilization abuses and controversies around sex 
selective abortion. Finally, I will consider how respect for difference factors into a 
comprehensive conceptual framework when one reflects on the use of reproductive 
technologies to increase, rather than to decrease, the likelihood of disability. I am 
interested in whether there is an assumption in bioethics and law that reproductive 
technologies should be used for the purpose of disability de-selection, and whether this 
(either implicit or explicit) bias reflects tension between reproductive autonomy and 
equality on the one hand, and respect for difference on the other. 
32 Throughout this study I have claimed to be engaging postmodern theory. I recognize 
that the terms "postmodernism" and "post-structuralism" tend to be erroneously conflated 
in rhetoric and literature, and that this chapter makes use of philosophers who have 
identified or been identified as post-structuralist. My choice to use "postmodern" is 
deliberate, for this chapter especially discusses theory in response to modernity. 
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4.1. Respect for Difference in Theory 
The introductory section to this chapter will provide an account of the traditions 
that feature personal autonomy and egalitarianism-theories I have considered in the 
previous chapters. These traditions, I will go on to demonstrate, are rooted in 
assumptions about what human beings hold in common. This starting point reflects a 
hegemonic standard that excludes myriad identities associated with gender, class, race, 
sexual orientation, and disability. Drawing from postmodern feminist and disability 
theory, I will argue that we are in need of a politics of difference, that is, a conceptual 
model that anticipates and respects variations in the human condition. Such a model 
makes use of the principle of respect for difference to contextualize and enhance both 
relational autonomy and restorative justice. 
4.1.1. Liberal Traditions and the Foundation of Sameness 
The Autonomous Self 
Autonomy has become integral to political philosophies since Kant introduced the 
concept and liberal traditions expanded its meaning. Recall Kant characterized autonomy 
as "the only original right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity" (1996, 
6.237), and in so doing he declared that autonomy is an essential component to the 
human condition. The property was central to his ethics, qualifying human beings as 
deserving of respect, respect equating to non-interference: "act in such a way that you 
treat humanity ... as an end and never merely as a means" (1993, 2.429). 
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Liberal theories broke away from Kantian philosophy by associating autonomy 
not with a moral doctrine but instead with personal intentions. Kant's concept of 
autonomy was moral in character, and was realized when man acted according to reason, 
a universal will, rather than external motivations. Liberal versions of autonomy posit the 
possibility for plurality, that is, for multiple, varied reasons for choosing or acting. What 
they retain from Kant is only the mode by which man might govern himself: "a person is 
free in so far as his actions are his own, that is, in so far as they result from decisions and 
choices which he makes as a free agent, rather than as an instrument or object of 
another's will" (Lukes, 1973, pp. 127-128). 
This move toward personal, pluralistic autonomy has led to associations with 
rugged individualism; autonomous choice belongs to the radically isolated agent, he who 
is marked with self-sufficiency and rationality. The right to autonomy requires that one 
satisfy the conditions for membership to this identity (Locke, 1980; Rawls, 1999). In this 
way, liberal models of autonomy still rely on the Kantian dichotomy between the subject 
and object-he who acts and that which is acted upon: "rational beings are called persons 
inasmuch as their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves" (Kant, 1993, 
2.428). So while autonomy might involve myriad intentions, preferences, or reasons-
many substantive motivations for acting-the mechanism by which one might make 
autonomous decisions is what subjects must hold in common. 
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Their Kingdom of Ends 
Presuppositions about what it means to have subjectivity have factored into 
models of egalitarianism. To review, these models reflect the antiquated conception of 
equality as formal, or as sameness: "things that are alike should be treated alike, while 
things that are unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness" 
(Aristotle, Pol. 3.9). The principle was built into Aristotle's account of proportional 
equality, which for him frames distributive relations between men. Goods are to be 
distributed according to desert or merit: "all men agree that what is just in distribution 
must be according to merit" (NE, 5.3). In tum, merit is determined by excellence: when 
an act is voluntarily chosen and performed well. 
Choice and skill continue to belong to the subject under egalitarian models, and 
serve as justification for inequalities. That is, an equality model may legitimize goods 
distribution patterns by appealing to the recipient's membership to the category of 
autonomous agency, subjectivity, or personhood; while those historically considered 
nonpersons have been marked as unalike or different, and therefore undeserving. 
Consider how these implications arise even in many liberal egalitarian models 
that came long after Aristotle. Rawls (1999) performed a thought experiment in which 
he imagined how a society would be built by and for people who live behind a veil of 
ignorance. This veil, or the original position, is a hypothetical starting point for 
humanity, one devoid of social knowledge or standing: "no one knows his place in 
society, his class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution 
of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like" (p. 13 7). The 
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purpose of this experiment is to determine how resources ought to be distributed, and 
consequently, how social justice might be achieved. Rawls means to construct an ideal 
society, a utopia for the best in men, or that which men hold in common. His theoretical 
society is not constructed in such a way that human differences would be acknowledged, 
accepted, or accommodated, for Rawls is interested in what renders men the same 
(Roemer, 2002). 
Difference is understood by Rawls (1999), among others (Arneson, 1989; 
Dworkin, 1981 ), in two ways. Firstly, traits such as "physical health or lack thereof, 
intelligence, and imagination" (Rawls, 1999, p. 54) are natural advantages or 
disadvantages, the result of circumstance or the birth lottery. The disadvantages function 
as obstacles to be overcome. Equality operates as a tool that levels the playing field, or 
renders those who are naturally different, essentially the same (Arneson, 1989; Cohen, 
1989; Dworkin, 1989; Roemer, 1995, 1998). A Rawlsian egalitarian system would 
redistribute goods until natural inequalities are compensated, such that those least 
advantaged are without envy, for they would have the minimum goods necessary to act 
freely (Dworkin, 1981 ). 
Secondly, once natural differences are remedied, any other differences may be 
attributable to choice, and thus are understood to be deserved. They might include 
"liberties, opportunities, income, and social bases of self-respect" (Rawls, 1999, p. 54). 
Equality models thus use autonomy, and the accompanying notions of personhood, to 
justify inequalities-those anomalies that might be shaken loose from ideal theories 
(Miller, 1999; Nozick, 1974; Rawls, 1999). Liberty may be employed to explain why for 
all the opportunities made available, there are people who have yet to correct their 
shortcomings and rise to the standard (Hart, 1989). 
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It would appear, then, that modernity has not developed a concept of difference 
that would be worthy of respect. Respect is earned, according to these theories, for 
reasons of sameness, or compliance with a particular standard: sharing decision-making 
mechanisms in common, overcoming disadvantage, choosing right courses of action. To 
find anything like a call to respect difference, we must look elsewhere, beyond the 
modern age, to postmodern critiques. 
4.1.2. Postmodern Critiques of Liberal Traditions 
Modernity 
There are philosophers, oft called postmodern, who are critical of these liberal 
theories. Lyotard (1984) calls this process, this "incredulity toward metanarratives" (p. 
xxiv), the postmodern condition, by which the ideologies of modernity are challenged. 
By modernity, he means liberalisms to which the Enlightenment gave rise; and by 
metanarrative he means concepts that have been taken for granted as true but that all 
along have been built, and used to structure our theories, our societies, and our lives. 
They are the themes running through our theoretical models, the principles taken for 
granted as true. Although Derrida and Foucault do not identify as postmodernist, they 
nevertheless conduct projects that involve critiquing the theoretical work produced by or 
within the Modem Age. Their understandings of modernity may stretch further back than 
the 1700s: "for Derrida, Western philosophy is the product of ... the metaphysical tradition 
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in philosophy, from Plato to Hegel" (Noonan, 2003, p. 11 ). While this section focuses on 
liberalisms, which remain definitive for current political philosophies and relevant to my 
work, this study in general acknowledges that philosophers of antiquity (Aristotle, for 
example) made significant contributions to building the great myths of modernity. 
Modernity is rooted in classificatory thinking-the separation of the subject from 
the object, the self from the others, the persons from the things, as seen in the 
metanarratives on autonomy developed since Kant. It has been shown throughout this 
work that the primacy of selfhood has underscored dominant theoretical accounts of 
humanity as well as recommendations for social and political organization. The category 
of personhood comes with conditions for membership, such as competence, reasoning 
skills, independence, and the like. 
As Noonan (2003) explains, the identity of personhood can only be forged if 
differences are excluded: "the real goal of [category] thinking and the politics that 
follows from it is to eliminate differences, either absolutely or by reducing differences to 
inessential moments of an underlying essential identity" (p. 23 ). Consider what becomes 
of differences in egalitarian theories such as Rawls's (1999) so outlined above-
differences are overcome, or excused as the product of poor choices. The focus remains 
fixed on what might be the same. Rawls sought to correct some differences, to write 
others off, and even admits that his theory of justice does not include consideration of 
disabled people because they are simply too different, too far away from his essential 
premises about the human condition. He chooses to focus instead on those persons who 
are not prevented from acting as "normal and fully cooperating members of society in the 
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usual sense" (1985, p. 234). His standard excludes people with "permanent physical 
disabilities or mental disorders", rather than people who experience disease and injury "to 
be expected in the ordinary course of human life" (p. 234), as though it is possible to 
separate out kinds of difference: the normalized and the deviant sorts, the excusable and 
the excludable. Difference as disability is unacceptable when it affects the capacity to 
have "a particular conception of the good that they try to achieve" (p. 234). If someone is 
incapable of perceiving a worthy good, and incapable of striving for that good on his 
own, he cannot be understood to be free and equal, which are moral conditions for 
membership in a just society. 
Differance 
The postmodern condition challenges the assumptions and metanarratives about 
selfhood: "postmodern knowledge ... refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces 
our ability to tolerate the incommensurable. Its principle is not the expert's homology, 
but the inventor's paralogy" (Lyotard, 1984, p. xxv). In science, homologous 
characteristics derive from the same ancestor; what Lyotard means is that those 
responsible for reinforcing a hegemonic standard equate this standard with what they are, 
what they take to be, or what they aim to acquire as, their own characteristics. Paralogy, 
in the context of Lyotard's interpretation of the postmodern condition, is variation from 
the standard, or more precisely, a break from the long-standing reasoning for maintaining 
this standard. He argues that difference is what counters modernity's dominant 
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narratives. All those exceptions to the rule eventually cannot be ignored, and it is at this 
point that the rule can be challenged, perhaps transformed. 
Consider further Derrida's (1972) work on differance, that which "makes possible 
the presentation of the being-present" (p. 6). Differance is a non-concept, meaning it 
follows a neither/nor structure, while concepts take an either/or format. That is, concepts 
are understood in light of what they are not (it is either this or that), while differance has 
no opposite that might explain its meaning. It is all that has been excluded from a 
concept and that has yet to be classified, but it is required so that classifications are 
possible. That is, differance ensures that concepts have meaning or presence to the 
human mind, because a concept can only have meaning if it relates to that which is absent 
from its meaning. While concepts can only be expressed in light of the play of 
differences that brings them about, it is recognition of this play, this differance, that 
exposes and opens up conceptual limitations. Differance is both the condition for the 
possibility of meaning and the productive force by which meaning is eventually 
deconstructed or broken down. Again, exceptions transform the rule. 
Derrida compares differance to the sheaf that binds wheat, or an assemblage that 
"has the complex structure of a weaving, an interlacing which permits the different 
threads and different lines of meaning ... to go off again in different directions" (p. 3). His 
purpose for employing this imagery is to avoid describing diff erance as a concept that· 
moves through history, for differance is other to historical development. It is instead the 
context in which concepts are situated and foregrounded, and the space that makes their 
presence to mind possible. 
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Put another way, classificatory language for Derrida (2002) requires that there be 
an Other: "differance marks ... a relation to alterity, to the singularity of the other" (p. 93 ). 
The complexity and irreducibility of meaning is impossible to contain within the 
boundary lines of definitions, concepts, and theories, and so these attempts to enclose 
meaning must eventually break down in the face of all that exists beyond them, all those 
differences that had been excluded or regulated for the purpose of producing meaning. 
The Other calls to the subject, and calls for openness rather than the imposition of 
conceptual frameworks. Recognition of the Other, of those excluded from the standard, 
of the possibility for human difference, "ushers in an impetus to the re-conceptualization 
of the self [that] is based upon the primary care of the other" (Elliot, 2002, p. 191). In 
other words, to be open to others beyond and unlike oneself displaces the self. Selfhood, 
at least for a time, comes to be constituted by relations to people rather than (necessarily 
and inevitably) problematic metanarratives. 
Managing Diff erance 
Rare is the occasion that the call of the Other is answered in such a way. More 
commonly, according to Derrida, we do violence to the Other by imposing and managing 
specific identities and notions of the ideal self. In his own words: 
The rapport of self-identity is itself always a rapport of violence with the 
other so that the notions of property, appropriation, and self-presence, so 
central to logocentric metaphysics, are essentially dependent on an 
oppositional relationship with otherness. In this sense, identity 
presupposes otherness (as cited in Kearny, 1984, p. 117). 
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Derrida describes the imposition of identity as violent because what a person can be or 
become is limited considerably. When one must "give an account of everything, and 
only thematically" (1992, p. 25), the range of life projects and possibilities diminishes, 
and persons are silenced, adjusted, and regulated to fit the themes or roles that have been 
taken to be their totality. Says Noonan (2003) of Foucault's work, which also concerns 
the oppressiveness of thinking in terms of totalities: "the category of totality structures all 
contradictions and struggles according to [given theoretical] assumptions" (p. 18). 
The management and effacement of difference happens within relations of power 
that Foucault (1977) describes as subtle and diffuse. While Derrida uses the term 
"violence" in a specific, metaphorical way, Foucault considers how subjection can be 
accomplished through means other than "the instruments of violence or ideology" (p. 26). 
In his own words: "[power] may be calculated, organized, technically thought out; it may 
be subtle, make use neither of weapons nor of terror and yet remain of a physical order. 
... It cannot be localized in a particular type of institution or state apparatus." (p. 26). 
Power functions not as a possession to be distributed but as a strategy to be implemented, 
and when implemented it is internalized such that we enact and reinforce totalizing 
theories by regulating one another and ourselves. Bartky (1990) describes this 
phenomenon, comparing the regulatory mechanisms of everyday life to a prison 
structure: 
The project of control has brought into being a new individuality. In fact, 
Foucault believes that the operation of power constitutes the very 
subjectivity of the subject. Here, the Panopticon returns: knowing that he 
may be observed from the tower at any time, the inmate takes over the job 
of policing himself. The gaze which is inscribed in the very structure of 
the disciplinary institution is internalized by the inmate (p. 79). 
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Power, manifest in the machinery of modernity, operates as a strategy that 
disciplines bodies: "even if they do not make use of violent or bloody punishment, even 
when they use 'lenient' methods involving confinement or correction, it is always the 
body that is at issue" (Foucault, 1977, p. 25). Differences are managed in material, 
physical ways such that the bodies that modernity produces are rendered docile. Foucault 
invokes the example of the soldier: "by the late eighteenth century, the soldier has 
become something that can be made; ... posture is gradually corrected; a calculated 
constraint runs slowly through each part of the body, mastering it, making it pliable, 
ready at all times, turning silently into the automatism of habit" (p. 135). He elaborates 
on the implications: 
The human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, 
breaks it down and rearranges it. A 'political anatomy', which was also a 
'mechanics of power', was being born; it defined how one may have a 
hold over others' bodies, not only so that they may do what one wishes, 
but so that they may operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed 
and the efficiency that one determines. Thus discipline produces subjected 
and practised bodies, 'docile' bodies. Discipline ... dissociates power from 
the body (p. 138). 
The manipulation of bodies renders people the same, in conformity with the standard 
established within our metanarratives: the rugged individualism of autonomy theories, the 
sameness built into equality models. Differences might have transformative power when 
they are used to challenge entrenched metanarratives, but our theories persist because 
differences are ironed out through the systemic manipulation and production of the body. 
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4.1.3. Postmodern Feminisms 
Intercorporeal Embodiment and the Interruption of the Autonomous Self 
The postmodern condition has bearing on some feminist critiques of the 
management of gender. Bartky (1990) takes up such a task of incorporating 
postmodernism into her analysis, noting that Foucault's work on docile bodies could be 
(and should have been) applied to the category of woman: 
Foucault treats the body throughout as if it were one, as if the bodily 
experiences of men and women did not differ and as if men and women 
bore the same relationship to the characteristic institutions of modern life. 
Where is the account of the disciplinary practices that engender the 'docile 
bodies' of women, bodies more docile than the bodies of men? (p. 65). 
Bartky points to the difference of gender and how it might serve to deconstruct even 
Foucault. That is to say, the experiences women have of bodily treatment complicate 
assumptions made by Foucault about a unified, or at least similar, experience of body 
management for both men and women. Female bodies especially have been produced, 
manipulated, and rendered docile. Gender binaries-man and woman-often run along 
the fault-lines of subject and object, autonomous and dependent, rationality and 
corporeality. Female bodies are managed to reinforce these conceptual binaries. 
How is this accomplished? The body serves as a cultural medium: "it is the 
surface on which prevailing rules of a culture are written. . .. Cultural rules are not only 
revealed through the body; they also shape the way the body performs and appears" 
(Gimlin, 2001, p. 3). This is especially the case within the context of patriarchy, where 
social rules are inscribed upon the bodies of women. Under patriarchy, meaningful 
rituals associated with the female body include weight management, make-up 
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application, careful attention to clothing and hair care, and so on (Barkty, 1990; Wolf, 
1991 ). Beauty rituals function to produce an ideal femininity by engaging in an "art of 
disguise" (Bartky, 1990, p. 71 ): routines work to cover or change that which renders 
women different, where difference is associated with ugliness and lack of worth. The 
woman's body is produced as Foucault's soldier's body has been. 
Woman has undergone a process of objectification, a separating out of her 
subjectivity from her body as an object. Within patriarchal ruling relations, her value is 
attached to her body, specifically her beauty, beauty equating to success at ensuring her 
body approximates the idealized standard of femininity. This standard is understood to 
be what the heteronormative man would prefer or find desirable; the heteronormative 
male gaze has thus been compared to the panopticon-the prison structure Foucault 
(1977, 1980) describes as maintaining social control. Power acts as a strategy, as a subtle 
set of prescriptions for how to manipulate one's body in order to enact the ideal (Garland-
Thomson, 1997). Women's objectification, their reduction to mere bodies in contrast 
with the heteronormative male subject, occurs through the internalization of patriarchal 
narratives of gender. 
As already explained in detail earlier in this study, women are also objectified-
reduced to objects rather than subjects, bodies rather than minds-in reproductive 
contexts. When a woman is understood to be nothing more than her body, her purpose 
may come to be seen as solely reproductive. Her messy, leaky, pregnant body calls for 
management (Kukla, 2005; Shildrick, 1997). The differences that mark women and 
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hence constitute the gender divide justify medical and legal control over reproductive 
functions. 
Corporeal differences must often be regulated, and persons may be objectified 
under hegemonic standards on the grounds of their differences, but these differences also 
have the power to render our standards unstable: "the security of binary differences is 
constantly undermined by irreducible differance-the refusal of the self/other relation-
of the disabled [and I might add, female, at least pregnant] body" (Shildrick, 2009, p. 40). 
Differences constitute the condition for the possibility of normative theories and politics, 
for how would a dominant group become dominant without others to control; how would 
such a group be characterized without a contrast? And yet, even as the condition for the 
possibility of current traditions, differences might still challenge those traditions and 
point to a new way. The instability of different embodiments acts as "a device for 
destabilising all categories of identity" (Berube, 2002, p. x). 
How is this so? Lyotard (1984) describes why he is incredulous toward current 
metanarratives about the self-sufficient autonomous agent: "no self is an island; each 
exists in a fabric of relations that is now more complex and mobile than ever before" (p. 
15). Discussed at length already, intercorporeality, the condition of being bodily 
connected and dependent, is understood within liberalisms to be a weakness. Long 
associated with the characteristic of intercorporeality, disabled people and women have 
often been marked as inferior, non-ideal, and have been managed. Shildrick (2009) 
describes the phenomenon: 
Where physical and mental autonomy, the ability to think rationally and 
impartially, and interpersonal separation and distinction are the valued 
attributes of western subjectivity, then any compromise of control over 
one's own body, any indication of interdependency and connectivity, or of 
corporeal instability, are the occasion-for the normative majority--of a 
deep-seated anxiety that devalues difference (p. 2). 
There is a discomfort with intercorporeality, and rightly so, for the condition 
contradicts, perhaps even transforms, what it means to be human. No longer do we 
qualify as fully functioning members of our communities, not in the usual sense, when 
we are too readily dependent on and connected to others. Shildrick goes on to say that 
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"at the same time that the modernist focus on the boundaries of bodily difference gives 
way to a full recognition of the dimensions of embodiment.. .corporeality itself segues 
into the notion of intercorporeality" (p. 18). The totality of our corporeal experiences 
cannot be explained with the theories we predominantly use. They cannot account for 
important differences: for the material reality of pregnancy, where one becomes two; or 
for how independent living for some physically disabled people requires attendant service 
providers to aid in feeding, catheterization, even intimacy; or perhaps even a difference 
as trivial as our reliance on others to offer aid, advice, or support when we make 
decisions, acquire food, seek pleasure. The explicitly intercorporeal being complicates 
our theories of selfhood, breaks them down and opens them up so that we might account 
for how human beings cannot simply be conflated with the isolated individual or the 
abstract agent. 
Intersectionality and the Deconstruction of Identity 
Classificatory thinking, theorizing about the autonomous self, functions as a 
central component to equality models, and thus brings to those models the pitfalls noted 
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by postmodemists. For instance, the Rawlsian veil of ignorance depends on constructed 
bodies and presumptions of subjectivity. Recall that Rawls (1985) found those 
disabilities he deemed permanent and severe to be too inconvenient to include in his 
theorizing about the ideal society, for those disabilities impair an individual's capacity to 
have in mind a worthy good, as well as the capacity to make use of those opportunities 
that might enable him to reach that good. An ideal society, such as the society Rawls 
conceived, is only successful, only possible to imagine, if constituted by certain subjects, 
those who are understood to be free and equal. Kittay (1999) says the following about 
the idealization built into Rawlsian theory: 
It puts too much distance between the 'normal functioning individual' and 
the person with special needs and disabilities. Not a single citizen 
approaches the ideal of full functioning throughout a lifetime. The 
idealization, in contrast, suggests that those who are not fully functioning 
are relatively few, and that consequences of special needs is brokered only 
in monetary terms (p. 88). 
Rawls, among others (Dworkin, 1981; Harsanyi, 1953), built a theory based on what 
would best suit man from behind his veil of ignorance, and the theory only works ifthe 
condition behind the veil, understood to be empty, excludes certain anomalies. Belying 
even this seemingly vacuous starting point, then, are substantive assumptions about 
personhood (Roemer, 2002). Being the same in some meaningful way hinges on the 
exclusion of difference; having subjects to situate in distributive justice frameworks 
requires objectification of the Other. 
This critique was already explored in a previous chapter through a feminist lens. 
Feminisms have pointed to the difference gender poses to conventional politics and 
theories, and even within feminist circles differences have been invoked for the purpose 
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of internal critique. Intersectionality complicates experiences of oppression, for people 
with overlapping memberships to various minority groups can claim to have different 
experiences. There is an interplay built into their identities that produces something new. 
Says Knudsen: "intersectionality points towards the critical view on becoming 'the other' 
in a normative setting" (2007, p. 62). Social groups are the result of a binary relationship 
between the ideal and the non-ideal, and yet the binary is not enough to account for the 
inexhaustible experiences yielded by combinations of differences. 
Knudsen goes on to discuss the centrality of relationships to intersectional 
analysis: 
Intersectionality implies more than gender research, more than studying 
differences between women and men, and more than diversities within 
women's groups or within men's groups. Intersectionality tries to catch 
the relationships between socio-cultural categories and identities . 
... Gender, race, ethnicity, disability, sexuality, class and nationality are 
categories that may enhance the complexity of intersectionality, and point 
towards identities in transition (p. 61 ). 
The concept of intercorporeal embodiment might be described as one such identity in 
transition. The pregnant woman and what she is carrying is/are in a state of becoming, as 
an example. As Knudsen argues, this lens of analysis focuses not merely on 
combinations of identity, monoliths that themselves need to be deconstructed, but on the 
relations and connections moving between, reproducing, and sustaining identities. 
The concepts discussed here might be foundational to a politics of difference. 
Such a politics would anticipate and accept difference as "basic to the world" (Noonan, 
2003, p. 23). Such a politics would be open to otherness, meaning that infrastructure 
would be built according to particular needs. Social and political organization would 
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develop in response to difference, with a goal to include difference, rather than on the 
basis of a standard that necessarily excludes and regulates difference. Noonan elaborates: 
If universal definitions of human nature are always the products of the 
exercise of power, if every universal definition is made possible by the 
forcible exclusion and subordination of nonconforming differences, then it 
follows, postmodern political theory argues, that a radical politics must 
somehow do away with the idea of human nature. There is simply no 
underlying identity shared by all human beings. That identity ... is an 
illusion whose real function is to justify the remaking of the world 
according to the definition of human nature that suits the ruling power. 
Only by breaking with the belief that all human beings share an essence 
can differences speak in their own voice (pp. 4-5). 
Can this be done practically? That is, can a politics of difference be codified into 
law, or made manifest in medical contexts? Derrida (1972) argues that we need 
categories to enable human understanding. Even after deconstruction, what is built will 
be doomed to be broken down in the future. Does this mean that the critique and 
dismantling of current systems of power inevitably leads to more of the same, some new 
method of classificatory thinking that will inevitably do violence to some unanticipated 
Other? We will see in the sections that follow whether openness to the Other is 
pragmatically, politically possible. 
4.2. Respect for Difference in Bioethics and Law 
This section will explore how difference is accounted for (or not) in medical and 
legal contexts. Beginning with bioethics, based on work accomplished in the previous 
section, I will develop the components that a principle of respect for difference would 
include, then I will consider why no such principle can be found in work on bioethical 
principles. The principles that do exist and are prominent in bioethics, and thus this 
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work-autonomy and equality-rely on narratives that do not reflect efforts to respect 
difference. I will review these narratives, beginning with consent and capacity standards 
that promote and privilege a particular kind of autonomous person. For the second, I will 
explore how the othering of disability with the use of functional frameworks of health is 
foundational to equality models. 
In the realm of law and policy, I will present where we might find respect for 
difference in international documents, and will consider whether policy offers a 
foundation upon which we might develop a framework for respect for difference. In case 
law, we last analyzed the shortcomings to the Canadian juridical equality model, and I 
intend to continue the story in order to determine whether respect for difference is ever 
accounted for, if not called by name. I will examine Eldridge v. British Columbia 
(Attorney General) (1997), which characterized disability as a social phenomenon and 
paved the way for considerations of context in equality jurisprudence. I will move on to 
the cases that have followed, examining whether difference has been respected in Auton 
(Guardian ad !item of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General) (2004), and how context 
has been integrated into equality analysis in With/er v. Canada (Attorney General) 
(2011 ). Throughout I will question whether equality rhetoric does the work needed to 
account for difference. 
4. 2.1. Respect for Difference in Bioethics 
Defining Our Terms 
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A principle of respect for difference requires an understanding of the concept of 
difference as all differences, including those that are foundational to current oppressive 
practices and those not yet anticipated. Derridean differance might best account for the 
sort of difference imagined, and thus might point the way to how we frame strategies by 
which we might make respect for difference possible. Recall that differance for Derrida 
(1972) represents all that is other to categories and classifications. That which is outside 
our current ideas around the self in effect displaces the self, for difference functions as its 
condition for possibility and the catalyst for its critique. 
What I mean to say is that exceptions to our standards, all those who are othered 
by or absent from theoretical and legal benchmarks, challenge those standards, and a 
principle of respect for difference might aid us in recalibrating our systems, rather than 
acting as a method of including people within those systems. The concepts we have been 
using carry with them the baggage of liberal theory and classificatory thinking, but the 
call to be open to and respecting of difference has the force to reorient our concepts and 
challenge their embedded narratives. My concern, then, like Shildrick's (2002), is to 
"uncover the extent to which the western notion of the sovereign self, and of the bounded 
body, is, in general, both guaranteed and contested by those who do not, indeed cannot, 
unproblematically occupy the embodied subject position" (p. 5). 
Perhaps the principle of respect for difference is not a principle at all, as long as 
principles are understood to be abstract, general rules. Difference requires an 
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understanding of concrete particulars, and thus requires a contextual approach. General 
rules of action prove ineffective, for they inevitably engage in a process of othering. 
Their establishment requires conceptual boundary markers, and so some other must exist 
outside their meaning. Instead, respecting difference might more so resemble justice as 
corrective critique, or reflective response. 
Such a concept is not found in modem theory, for, as I have outlined, modernity 
consists of philosophies and politics of sameness. Principle-based bioethics, which saw 
its rise during the modem age, makes few explicit references to anything like respect for 
difference. Recall that the canonical principles of bioethics are autonomy and justice, 
beneficence and non-maleficence; there is no place in bioethics foundations for the 
concept just described, and there is little accounting for difference that is even implicit in 
the theoretical work that has developed around the existing principles. I have shown that 
theories of personal autonomy tend to posit a particular sort of person capable of 
autonomous choice and action, a particular sort of person capable of expressing 
autonomy through consent. Further, justice as distributive-so justice as formal equality, 
even equality of opportunity-in the context of health requires assumptions around the 
standards of health to which people on unequal footing are meant to be elevated. These 
metanarratives-consent and capacity work, and functional health paradigms-underlie 
our standards for the Rawlsian free and equal person, he who has entitlements in 
bioethics discourses. Metanarratives have the effect of distancing us from context, 
abstracting problems so that general, principle-based strategies might fit as solutions. 
They are purported to be theories of totalities, even if some other, some difference, 
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inevitably exists outside the totality. To understand what it means to be the subject, the 
free and equal person capable of consent and seeking to restore his status as disembodied, 
we must account for those standards by which nonpersons are excluded, and what it 
means to be different from and deviant to our standards. 
This section's analysis will thus begin with capacity determinations, returning to 
earlier work done on capacity in this study. I mean to demonstrate that not enough work 
is being done to respect difference, and to consider how the call to respect difference 
could potentially change our theoretical and legal discourses. 
Discursive Relations of Power and the Consenting Self 
As already argued, capacity determinations are rendered within relations of 
power, where medical and legal professionals are accrued authority (Stefan, 1993; 
Wendell, 1996). The cult of subjectivity has been central to capacity standards, such that 
only those who share in common the indications of a decision-making mechanism qualify 
as decisionally capable. Those indications include rationality, independence, 
individualism (Buchanan & Brock, 1989; Faden, Beauchamp, & King, 1986; Grisso & 
Appelbaum, 1998)-the properties of the subject borne out of liberal theories. 
The subject is disembodied, that is, the concept of the subject is abstracted from 
the body as object, because the identity of the subject requires a binary in order to be 
meaningful. The meaning production happening within the power relations of medical 
contexts is grounded in a dyadic understanding of the subject that acts and the object that 
is acted upon. The body is objectified, marked by docility and passivity, subjected to 
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examination, interpretation, and manipulation: "a body is docile that may be subjected, 
used, transformed and improved" (Foucault, 1977, p. 136). Shildrick (1997) considers 
this divide, and the importance of critiquing the abstraction of the body: 
The issue revolves round two seemingly disparate loci: first, the notion of 
what it is to be a moral agent at all, which devolves on questions of 
subjectivity; and second-and this is particularly relevant to health care--
what relationship exists between the 'I' who makes choices, who consents, 
and the body of that agent. Clearly any critique of consent which takes 
health care as its substantive field must inevitably come up against the 
materiality of the body (p. 81 ). 
Foucault (1980) describes how the body is objectified due to the 
institutionalization of the medical gaze. Power is invested in the body, operating 
continuously with minimal cost, meaning that subjects interiorize standards of normalcy 
and take on the responsibility of body management: "an inspecting gaze, a gaze which 
each individual under its weight will end by interiorising to the point that he is his own 
overseer, each individual thus exercising this surveillance over, and against, himself' (p. 
155). The panoptic medical gaze consists of recommendations and expectations that the 
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patient takes for granted as imperative. The strategy has proven so effective that 
medicine has come to assume "an increasingly important place in the administrative 
system and the machinery of power" (p. 176). 
Decisional capacity thus acts as a tool for managing bodies in at least two ways. 
Firstly, those determined to lack decisional capacity see medical decisions made for 
them, on their behalf. Shildrick (1997) notes that categories of people historically 
thought to lack capacity are also corporeally grounded: "women are both clearly 
identified with their bodies, and are paradoxically denied the capacity to exercise moral 
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agency over their bodies" (p. 81 ). Autonomy is diminished for those who are determined 
to lack the mechanism for decisional capacity, that is, for those who cannot be abstracted 
from their bodies. 
Secondly, decisional capacity can be used to justify disproportionate resource 
distribution in the context of healthcare, where those who experience illness due to their 
own choices rather than circumstance do not qualify for organ transplantation, as 
Beauchamp and Childress (2009) as well as Moss and Siegler (1991) discuss in the 
context of alcohol related End Stage Liver Disease. The consequence is rooted in a 
notion of justice: justice in the face of resource scarcity in this example. Justice can also 
manifest as punishment, as seen in the case of Ashley Smith (Ombudsman, 2008, p. 25), 
whose incarceration and treatment were in response to the diagnosis that she was 
decisionally capable, and therefore responsible for her actions. Here autonomy is 
diminished for those who share the mechanism in common but the content of their 
decisions is not in compliance with social order. The subject is not merely free to make 
decisions, but is responsible for making the right one, or at least responsible for the 
consequences of deviation. 
Consent and capacity standards are built on a conception of self that excludes 
certain kinds of people. Those who are different must be excluded, for they are the 
condition for the possibility of the capable and consenting, and thus autonomous, subject. 
Further, those who are different, either because they cannot be shown to have the 
mechanism for decision-making or the content of their decisions does not comply with 
standards for right or rational choice, are managed such that people are only considered 
autonomous when they are in some sense the same. It is in this way that consent and 
capacity standards, and by implication autonomy theory work, promote and reproduce 
status quo. 
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Respect for difference calls for a reorientation. A focus on treatment of those 
who are different opens up the standards by which people who fall short are managed. 
Perhaps a reorientation could make use of conceptual work developed around relational 
autonomy, for the interdependent, intercorporeal other, I have argued, renders explicit 
how decision-making operates within context. However, it might not be enough to re-
conceptualize autonomy so that it is more inclusive; respect for difference should entail 
critique of systems of power that are eventually, inevitably exclusionary. 
Disembodied Health and Equality Models 
In the context of medicine, the body as object is assumed to be fixed: "some kind 
of stable and unchanging given, differentiated simply by its variable manifestation of the 
signs and symptoms of health or disease, ability or disability, normality or abnormality" 
(Shildrick, 1997, p. 15). That is, until disability disrupts, differentiates, and draws 
attention, the body is understood to be stable and as such can be forgotten, relegated to 
the background; if the body is disabled, the assumption is that it should be fixed. It is 
described to us with medical rhetoric, which is "a language of distance" (Halifax, 2009, 
ft. 2) to the extent that having our bodies described to ourselves distances subject from 
object, active from passive, foreground from background. Our identities as subjects are 
defined in relation to that from which subjectivity has been abstracted-that materiality 
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of embodiment that serves as grounds for our existence and yet is bracketed out for the 
sake of meaning production. 
This distancing has aided in the personal and social conceptualization of the body 
as absent. Gimlin (2006) explains how various bodily phenomena are taken to be absent: 
Regions involved in perception and action are largely absent from 
awareness ... and those that remain unused recede into the corporeal 
background. Within the body's depths, internal structures too are largely 
inaccessible; neither organs nor physiological functioning is readily 
available to observation or control (p. 701) 
Gimlin is recounting work done by Leder (1990) on the absent body. Leder considers 
how despite the absence of the body, there are experiences that make us conscious of our 
bodies, or make the body dys-appear. The term dys-appearance derives from the Greek 
dys, meaning "away, apart, asunder" (p. 87). The body appears through what is 
understood to be disruption and obstacle, at least in contrast with how we expect our 
bodies to behave: "when the body [is] brought into the foreground by demands 
(pregnancy, fatigue, hunger, as well as states of illness), we are aware of demands made 
upon us: feed me, sleep. The dys-appearance of the body occurs when bodily demands 
require our attention" (pp. 167-168). Dys-appearance may be a complex experience, 
impossible to localize or to understand as fixed. Hunger, for example, "is a complex 
nexus of heaviness, exhaustion, conative urges, and discomforting sensations that, while 
gath~ring into notes of crystallization, ambiguously inhabits the entirety of the corporeal 
field" (p. 42). 
Disability, disease, and injury especially are "typified by complex patterns of 
dysfunction" (p. 81 ). The body can no longer be absent with such a drastic disruption. 
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Recall Clare (2007), whose body is always present because his engagement with the 
world is punctuated by "muscles knotted, tendons inflamed, vertebrae too sore to touch" 
(p. 77). Shildrick (1997) notes "the body is curiously absent to us during health, and it is 
only in sickness that it makes itself fully felt, and then as that which unsettles the sense of 
self' (p. 10). That is, when the body does not function as a properly absent object, it 
unsettles abstracted subjectivity by interrupting and reshaping active engagement. 
Shildrick (1997) and Scully (2008) suggest this means we should take the 
materiality of bodily difference as a starting point for bioethics. Shildrick advocates 
reshaping bioethics into "not so much a feminist reconstruction of the general principles 
or rules of behaviour, as an ethic in which differences are acknowledged, respected and 
allowed to flourish as the very basis of moral discourse" (p. 6). What we have instead, 
much more predominantly, are health models that are motivated by dys-appearance to 
manage difference, and push it back into the stage scenery: "one's 'whole being is 
forcibly reoriented' towards a new goal: to rid ourselves of bodily intmsion by whatever 
means necessary" (Leder, 1990; as cited in Gimlin, 2006, p. 701). Concepts of functional 
or normative health characterize difference as deviation, that which needs to be corrected. 
Equality comes to be a matter of managing difference, restoring the dys-appeared body 
back to the ideal standard so that it can again be forgotten. It is for this reason that 
"medicine has played an increasingly important role in the construction and regulation of 
'normal' subjects" (Marks, 1999, p. 75). 
Foucault (2003) notes that the language of medical management does the best it 
can to classify difference, regardless of how complex dys-appearance can be. Similarly 
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to the manifestation of hunger, disability and disease appear in varied combinations of 
symptoms throughout the body, subject to transformation over time. And yet, fixed 
labels are necessary for diagnosis and treatment, so "the space of configuration of the 
disease and the space of localization of the illness in the body have been superimposed, in 
medical experience" (p. 3). He goes on: "the medical gaze, open to these fine qualities, 
necessarily becomes attentive to all their modulations; the decipherment of disease in its 
specific characterizations is based on a subtle form of perception that must take account 
of each particular equilibrium" (p. 14). What he means is that medicine is framed with 
classificatory language to define and manage the complex and complicated ways in 
which the body materializes. 
Medical understandings of the body's equilibrium and dysfunction, as well as the 
medical goal to erase and render absent dys-appeared bodies are particularly problematic 
for those populations whose corporeal associations are entangled in social inequalities. 
Those bodies that are doomed never to comply or conform with the standard of the 
absent, functioning body are subject to heavy medical scrutiny and management: 
"normalizing individuals by imposing the standard of species-typical functioning may 
itself disadvantage ... any population that already has been made vulnerable because its 
members do not function in the normal, typical, or customary way" (Silvers, 1998, p. 65). 
Leder (1990) considers how social, rather than simply bodily, phenomena can produce 
dys-appearance, that is, can foreground the body: 
In social dys-appearance, this split [of the body away, apart, asunder from 
itself] is effected by the incorporated gaze of the Other. But not just any 
gaze will bring about such a rupture; it is the objectifying gaze that refuses 
contransendence. As long as the Other treats me as a subject-that is, 
experiences with me to the world in which I dwell, mutual incorporation 
effects no sharp rift. But it is different when the primary stance of the 
Other is highly distanced, antagonistic, or objectifying. Internalizing this 
perspective, I can become conscious of my self as an alien thing (p. 96). 
The medical industry responds to dys-appeared bodies by offering management and 
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curative strategies, and it is in this way that bodies marked by differences such as gender, 
disability, race, and sexuality, are disproportionately targeted and pushed to be docile 
when subjected to the leveling medical gaze. Says Dolmage: "the alien body could be 
publicly stigmatized and displayed, or removed to the back rooms ... for further medical 
inspection, or passed along, yet always formatively imbued with the spirit of the 
investigation and the power of the gaze" (2011, p. 36). 
Medical models have objectified and decontextualized the body (Halifax, 2009), 
and disruption of these efforts only leads to more forceful strategies to reorient and render 
absent; legal approaches to difference in large part rely on these models and are therefore 
also complicit in rendering bodies absent. Mykitiuk (1994) discusses how legal 
reasoning is a kind of classificatory thinking, "all about categorizing, characterizing, 
sorting and fitting complex social phenomena and relations into pre-existing legal pigeon 
holes" (p. 67). The category taken to be the benchmark is the liberal self, with a normal 
body (Karpin & Mykitiuk, 2008, 2011). Such a self can only serve as a benchmark when 
abstracted from the body or else it would be all too clear the particular body in which the 
liberal self is grounded. According to Mykitiuk: "at the center of liberal, legal discourse 
we find not an absent body, but a particular body, one who is white, male, heterosexual, 
able bodied, young, adult, and it is this body which has been generalized as the normative 
body of liberal discourse" (1994, p. 80). Discourses that reflect a politics of sameness 
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require that a specific sort of body be privileged as worthy of equal standing. The sort of 
body just described can only pass as the condition for the liberal subject because it "has 
accrued sufficient social, economic, cultural, and political resources to minimize the 
impact of its dependency and interconnection with others" (Karpin & Mykitiuk, 2011, p. 
121). 
To have a standard implies that those who are other to that standard need to be 
managed. Drawing from postmodern theory, Shildrick (2005) argues: "law is never 
impartial but always caught up with strategies of power and with a discursive violence 
that seeks to grasp and domesticate the troublesome other" (p. 31 ). She holds that even 
while this is the case, those who are other to the liberal self "not only escape the 
instrumental structure of the law, but radically disturb the very framework under which 
the juridical operates" (p. 39). She uses the Derridean Other, or "dispersed and 
undecidable subjectivity" as her entry point into a new legal approach, one which "might 
give way to an embrace of difference that was celebrated precisely in its uncertainty, its 
fluidity and its interconnections" (p. 39). A legal approach that embraces alterity would 
respond to difference rather than classify difference in advance. Pronger (2002) 
elaborates: 
The ethics of inclusion, which tries to bring otherness into a system while 
requiring it to manifest itself within the structure of the system, 
appropriates otherness, making it conform to the system. The ethics of 
alterity, in contrast, works not by inclusion, but by openness-openness to 
otherness in a way that allows the other to deconstruct the system to call 
into question the system's limits (p. 17). 
Are we moving toward anything like such an approach in Canadian law and policy? We 
see legal work to develop a concept of respect for difference more so than we see in 
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bioethics, and yet are these developments promoting a shift in the structure of our legal 
approaches? 
4. 2. 2. Respect for Difference in Law 
The CRPD: Respect for Difference and Supported Decision-Making 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (2006b ), 
or CRPD, was ratified in Canada in 2010. Estey (2011) provides a more detailed account 
of the process: 
In December 2006 the United Nations adopted the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities. On March 30, 2007, the government 
of Canada was one of the first countries to sign. The Convention became 
international law with respect to ratifying states on May 3, 2008, when 20 
member states of the United Nations ratified the Convention. On March 
11, 2010, Canada became the 82nd country to ratify it (unpaginated). 
In the CRPD (2006b) eight principles are recommended for codification into law. 
Included in these principles is respect for difference, defined in the following way: 
"respect for difference and acceptance of persons with disabilities as part of human 
diversity and humanity". The Law Commission of Ontario (LCO)'s Project on Disability 
Law Reform (2012a, 2012b) takes a principle-based approach that adopts the CRPD's 
framework, and has thus reflected on what it means to respond to diversity in human 
abilities: 
This principle requires recognition of and responsiveness to the reality that 
all people exist along a continuum of abilities in many areas, that abilities 
will vary along the life-course, and that each person with a disability is 
unique in needs, circumstances and identities, as well as to the multiple 
and intersecting identities of persons with disabilities that may act to 
increase or diminish discrimination and disadvantage (2012b, p. 17). 
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The LCO goes on to say: "persons with disabilities are not 'the other', but are part of the 
range of human experience" (p. 17). Disability as an identity is by no means 
homogeneous, covering a vast range of disabilities, and the experience of disability 
changes in relation to other identity categories. Respect for diversity entails not 
redressing disability as a shortcoming, but acknowledging that abilities exist on a 
spectrum-as opposed to within a hierarchy. Differential treatment in such a context is 
not necessarily ameliorative but entails a valuing of and openness to all persons. 
Also of interest are the controversies surrounding the development of Article 12, 
according to which, "State Parties reaffirm that persons with disabilities have the right to 
recognition everywhere as persons before the law". Specifically, the Article calls for 
recognition of "legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life" and the 
obligation to "provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require 
in exercising their legal capacity". Reservations to Article 12 have been noted by some 
state parties that have adopted the CRPD. These reservations have posed the following 
questions: "how has legal capacity been constructed in the CRPD? Does it include both 
the capacity to have rights and the capacity to act? If yes then has this legal capacity 
been extended to all persons with disabilities or have certain persons been excluded?" 
(UN, 2008, p. 1). In response, the UN declared that "a reservation on article 12 is 
antithetical to each of [the principles listed in the CRPD]" (p. 3), including equality, non-
discrimination, respect for dignity, and autonomy. Rather than demarcating between 
persons, the CRPD advocates a supported decision-making model that highlights the 
contexts and relations within which decision-making takes place (Dhanda, 2006-2007). 
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The UN (2007a) identifies the province of British Columbia as "one of the 
leading jurisdictions in incorporating supported decision-making into law, policy and 
practice" (p. 90). In British Columbia, under this model, a person in need of support 
when making decisions may enter into a representation agreement with a support 
network. This agreement is a legal document that authorizes members of the support 
network to assist the individual or to act on her behalf (Nidus, n.d. ). This arrangement is 
laid out in the 1996 BC Representation Agreement Act, the purpose of which is cited 
under s. 2: 
(a) To allow individuals to arrange in advance how, when and by whom, 
decisions about their health care or personal care, the routine management 
of their financial affairs, or other matters will be made if they become 
incapable of making decisions independently, and 
(b) To avoid the need for the court to appoint someone to help adults make 
decisions, or someone to make decisions for adults, when they are 
incapable of making decisions independently. 
Under s. 3 .1 of the Act, decision-making capacity is presumed: "until the contrary is 
demonstrated, every adult is presumed to be capable of (a) making, changing or revoking 
a representation agreement, and (b) making decisions about personal care, health care and 
legal matters and about the routine management of the adult's financial affairs". The UN 
(2007a) has referred to the supported decision-making model as an innovative alternative 
to traditional guardianship laws, hence its incorporation into the CRPD. 
Even so, the wording in Article 12 has been left ambiguous, and its ambiguity 
reflects a history of difficult discourses around its development. During the early stages 
of writing the Convention, a footnote was included in Article 12: "in Arabic, Chinese and 
Russian, the term 'legal capacity' refers to 'legal capacity for rights,' rather than 'legal 
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capacity to act"' (UN, 2006a). The footnote was meant to draw a distinction between 
recognizing disabled persons as persons, and recognizing them as possessing the capacity 
to act. A disabled person may still be entitled to rights, except for those that require 
consent, should she be diagnosed as lacking in capacity. This distinction would justify 
legal systems continuing to employ paternalistic models of guardianship, where 
guardians substitute in their judgment in the best interest of disabled persons who have 
been declared incompetent or incapable. Dhanda (2006-2007) notes that "the 
introduction of this distinction between legal capacity for rights and legal capacity to act 
was strongly questioned by representatives of civil society and non-governmental 
organizations" (p. 443). 
The Article certainly promotes supported decision-making, although it leaves 
open the possibility that member states adopting the CRPD may continue to endorse a 
substituted decision-making model. The Coalition of Individuals, Organizations and 
Agencies of the People for the People and by the People with Disabilities in Eastern 
Europe (2003) proposed that an early draft of the Article include the clause: "where as a 
person with intellectual disability is not able to exercise this right, the legal guardians of 
that person shall be entitled to exercise the right on behalf of and in the interests of, that 
person" (Art. 25(3)). The non-governmental organization Inclusion International 
objected to "the introduction of any reference to paternalistic guardianship laws in the 
Convention" (Dhanda, 2006-2007, p. 439). Debate over the language of the Article 
continued into the Seventh Session on the development of the CRPD, during which time 
modified text was proposed in an attempt to "combine some of the safeguards required 
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for guardianship with some of the standards desired for supported decision-making" (p. 
450). 
This text was accepted, and stands as the language currently found in the CRPD 
under Article 12, meaning that although the Article advocates supported decision-
making, and although this was reiterated in the UN response to recent reservations, 
Article 12 "does not prohibit substituted decision-making" (p. 439). Indeed, when 
Canada adopted the CRPD, it took the position that "the article only requires that denial 
of capacity should not happen on a discriminatory basis" (p. 455-456). The Canadian 
statement made on the adoption of the Convention reads as follows" "[the Article] is not 
a prohibition on substitute decision-making regimes [although] it does place particular 
emphasis on the importance of supported decision-making" (UN, 2007b, unpaginated). 
So Article 12 leaves the door open for substitute decision-making models, which 
are built upon determinations of incapacity. This is a problem because with such a model 
disabled people begin at a starting point where their capacity is questioned and tested. 
Their status as consenting selves can be called into question. A substitute decision-
making model requires state investment in mechanisms for determining in/capacity, for 
differentiating between persons with and without capacity. A supported decision-making 
model, in contrast, accounts for a wide range of persons with a variety of needs, and 
assumes that capacity is not a qualification for the enjoyment of rights or recognition, but 
a capability that varied supports cultivate: 
If support was to be provided proportionately to the actual needs of the 
person with disability, then it would encompass the entire range of 
support, from the lowest to the highest level of support. The fact that a 
person requires high support was not a reason to surmise absence of 
capacity (Dhanda, 2006-2007, p. 445). 
The Convention does indeed embrace a progressive model, one that reflects 
respect for difference. However, there is prudence in a.cknowledging the history of 
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Article 12, as this history demonstrates that the rhetoric is open enough to function as a 
sort of back-door for substitute decision-making-a model that reorients our approach to 
disability in such a way that does not signify respect for difference. Already we can see 
how despite the adoption of the CRPD, countries can justify problematic positions on 
disability through wider interpretations of Convention language. 
Respect for Difference in Other UN Instruments 
The CRPD is one of several themed covenants that have been written since the 
1960s to address how "distinct groups of people in the global community [are] not able to 
enjoy their rights in the same way as others" (Estey, 2011, unpaginated); examples of 
distinct groups include racialized and Indigenous persons, and women. We might look to 
instruments of this sort to determine where in policy a principle ofrespect for difference 
has been articulated or implied. 
For example, in the UN Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice (1982), despite 
beginning with an appeal to commonality-"all human beings belong to a single 
species"-article 2 claims that "all individuals and groups have the right to be different, 
to consider themselves as different and to be regarded as such", and further, "the diversity 
of life styles and the right to be different may not, in any circumstances, serve as a pretext 
for racial prejudice". Contained within this article is recognition of racial diversity. A 
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commitment to non-discrimination should not be reduced to inclusion as assimilation; it 
should entail an openness and flexibility to human difference. 
As another example, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(2007c) affirms "that indigenous peoples are equal to all other peoples, while recognizing 
that right to all peoples to be different, to consider themselves different, and to be 
respected as such". The preamble goes on to affirm ''that all peoples contribute to the 
diversity and richness of civilizations and cultures, which constitute the common heritage 
of humankind". A framework for addressing the oppression that Indigenous people have 
experienced and continue to experience cannot stand on a foundation of sameness when 
that oppression is rooted in colonialist strategies of aggressive assimilation, displacement, 
and effacement. Recognition of sovereignty entails recognition of the entitlement of a 
civilization or a people to be different. 
Further, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (1979) recognizes differential impact, even if only implicitly. The 
Convention recognizes that some freedoms and protections must be tied to reproductive 
function, and so these entitlements must be designed differently compared to the 
entitlements men enjoy. For instance, article 11 recognizes the "right to protection of 
health and to safety in working conditions, including the safeguarding of the function of 
reproduction", and article 12 declares that "State Parties shall ensure to women 
appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement, and the post-natal 
period". 
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Of note, however, is that throughout the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women, the rights put forward seem to be designed for 
the purpose of leveling that playing field, elevating women to the same plane men 
occupy. According to the preamble, human beings are entitled to rights and freedoms 
"without distinction of any kind, including distinction based on sex". The very real, 
bodily distinction of reproductive capacity may thus be framed not as a difference to be 
respected, but a disadvantage to be redressed and overcome. 
Indeed, the UN policies outlined here, despite paying heed to difference, all 
ground entitlement in our common humanity. Respect for differences in culture and 
gender is justified by an essential sameness, which indicates that our standards still hold 
even when framing respect for difference in policy. Space can be made for 
acknowledgment of difference, but the imagination for and anticipation of difference 
remains limited because international policy contains necessarily empty concepts, yet to 
be filled, applied, and enforced at the time of drafting. We are entitled to respect because 
we qualify as members of the human race-which remains an Aristotelian category, and 
a classification invented within the context of modernity. That is, we are entitled to 
respect for our differences, but only because we as human beings, as persons, are 
essentially all the same. It is not enough to speak of respect for difference in the abstract, 
when the principle has the force to challenge and critique the pitfalls to abstraction. It is 
not enough to ground respect for difference in modem classificatory justifications and 
appeals to essential commonalities as though differences are mere attributes, when 
respect for difference could instead be grounded in concrete particulars, nuanced 
contextualization, and transformative postmodern politics. 
Eldridge 
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If we are to search for where difference is respected in Canadian law, we might 
consider how the principle is implicitly present in equality analysis, where s. 15(2) is 
designed to allow for positive action, or ameliorative differential treatment. As explained 
in the previous chapter, however, allowing for positive action does not mean that the 
Charter requires it, and this gap is highly problematic. Also of note, positive programs 
and policies are meant to be corrective (R. v. Kapp, 2008) so that people who are 
disadvantaged rise up to a standard; this rhetoric does not necessarily imply that 
differences are respected as central to the human condition, only that differences can be 
overcome. This approach does not properly reflect a politics of difference, which would 
involve the acknowledgment, accounting for, and celebration of diversity. 
Might there be some other track to take regarding respect for difference in 
equality analysis? Might we use a robust concept of equality, one sufficiently distanced 
from equality of sameness, even equality of opportunity, to assert a politics of difference? 
I will pick up where I left off in the story of equality jurisprudence, considering what has 
come of the more rigidly defined, category-dependent concept of intersectionality. 
In Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General) (1997), Robin Susan Eldridge, 
along with John Henry Warren and Linda Jane Warren (the latter two a married couple), 
were each born Deaf and preferred sign language as their primary means of 
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communication. Eldridge was hiring interpreters for important medical appointments, 
but alleged that she could not afford to bring her own interpreters for every appointment. 
These visits without interpretation she found to be "very stressful and confusing" (p. 17) 
due to communication barriers with her medical providers. Her physician, too, found 
communication "inhibited and frustrating" (p. 17). Linda Warren's physician testified 
that communication by handwritten notation was "time consuming, impractical and has 
the potential to result in harm in some circumstances" (p. 17). In the Warrens' case, 
communication was especially essential for Ms. Warren's reproductive health since she 
had given premature birth to twins: 
Adequate communication .. .is particularly critical for childbirth. If the 
doctor33 can communicate with the patient so that the patient is able to 
help with the delivery ... complications are less likely to occur and the 
patient is less apt to have a traumatic birth. In [the physician's] view, 
writing notes is not effective in these circumstances; an interpreter is 
necessary for proper communication (pp. 17-18). 
While the trial was taking place, Ms. Warren was pregnant again, and could not afford 
the hire an interpreter for the delivery, "or for other visits to their doctor" (p. 18). 
British Columbia funds medical services under the Hospital Insurance Act, which 
grants hospitals as private corporations discretion with delivery; and under the Medical 
Services Plan, when benefits are core medically required services. Eldridge and the 
Warrens challenged the leeway given to hospitals under ss. 3, 5, and 9 of the Hospital 
Insurance Act to determine provision and delivery of services. These sections, they 
claimed, failed "to require that hospitals provide medical interpreter services for the deaf' 
(p. 3). Further, they challenged the definition of "insurable benefit" under s. 1 of the 
33 Midwives could have also been identified in this passage. 
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Medical Services Plan for "failing to include medical interpreter services for the deaf' (p. 
3). They claimed that these provisions were in violation of s. 15 of the Charter. They 
held that the absence of sign language interpreters "impairs their ability to communicate 
with their doctors and other health care providers, and thus increases the risk of 
misdiagnosis and ineffective treatment" (p. 2). The Supreme Court mled unanimously 
that s. 15 should be expanded to apply to hospitals, and that sign language interpretation 
is a core medically necessary service. The failure to provide interpretation services 
violated s. 15(1) and could not be saved bys. 1. 
Regarding the Hospital Insurance Act, the Court determined that discrimination 
against the claimants was "intimately connected to the medical service delivery system 
instituted by the legislation" (p. 6) in question. That hospitals were not required to offer 
interpretation was found to be in violation of equality rights. Social services like sign 
language interpretation are a necessary component to healthcare delivery, and an 
obligation that hospitals must meet inasmuch as healthcare is a legislative mandate: 
The Legislature, upon defining its objective as guaranteeing access to a 
range of medical services, cannot evade its obligations under s. 15(1) of 
the Charter to provide those services without discrimination by appointing 
hospitals to carry out that objective. In so far as they do so, hospitals must 
conform with the Charter (p. 6). 
Regarding the Medical Services Plan, during the original trial, interpretation services 
were defined as ancillary and therefore nonmedical; and nonmedical services would not 
qualify as an insurable benefit. This approach to the service led to a grave 
mischaracterization of "the practical reality of health care delivery" insofar as 
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"miscommunication can lead to misdiagnosis or a failure to follow a recommended 
treatment" (p. 54). 
The rhetoric of equality of sameness could not account for the discrimination, for 
the Canadian healthcare system could claim to be treating Deaf and hearing populations 
alike by offering the same services to both. It was argued instead that a general 
application of law can result in adverse effects discrimination, and the failure "to provide 
benefits ... without ensuring that disadvantaged members of society have the resources to 
take full advantage of those benefits bespeaks a thin and impoverished version of s. 
15(1 )" (p. 8). The ruling goes on: 
Even in imposing generally applicable provisions, the government must 
take into account differences which in fact exist between individuals and 
so far as possible ensure that the provisions adopted will not have a greater 
impact on certain classes of persons due to irrelevant personal 
characteristics than on the public as a whole (pp. 51-52). 
The approach taken does use language associated with equality of opportunity, where 
disadvantaged people are brought up to an equality standard. Though rejecting equality 
of sameness, or general rule application equality, as thin and impoverished, the Court did 
not take that further step toward substantive equality, leaving aside the possibility that 
sign language interpretation qualifies as a positive obligation to treat differentially: "the 
question raised in this case is of a wholly different order. This Court has repeatedly held 
that once the state does provide a benefit, it is obliged to do so in a non-discriminatory 
manner" (p. 56). Sign language provisions were understood only to be a resource 
necessary to access a good that should be available to all. 
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The Supreme Court considered the relevance of adverse effects discrimination for 
disabled persons especially: 
This historical disadvantage [disabled people experience] has to a great 
extent been shaped and perpetuated by the notion that disability is an 
abnormality or flaw. As a result, disabled persons have not generally been 
afforded the 'equal concern, respect and consideration' that s. 15( 1) of the 
Charter demands. Instead, they have been subjected to paternalistic 
attitudes of pity and charity, and their entrance into the social mainstream 
has been condition upon their emulation of ablebodied norms (p. 47). 
It was acknowledged that Deaf persons experience disadvantage as a result of social 
barriers to communication, and these barriers are based on the assumption that everyone 
can communicate orally. The case involved recognition that disability is a social 
phenomenon, that is, that people are disabled by social conditions; the ruling thus 
acknowledged the amelioration of disability-related disadvantage and the full inclusion of 
Deaf persons into our society require that the law respects the very different ways in 
which Deaf persons may communicate. Comish and Faraday (1998) reflect on the ruling: 
The obligation to prevent adverse effects discrimination is especially 
relevant to the disabled as the Court noted that discrimination often arises 
not from singling out the disabled for special treatment, but from the exact 
reverse-the government's failure to understand and address the adverse 
effects on the disabled caused by laws of general application (p. 4). 
The Court applied a social model of disability, one which understands disability as 
entirely imposed by external forces that uphold standards of normativity (Oliver, 1990, 
1996; Priestley, 1976; Siebers, 2008). This marks a significant step forward in 
jurisprudence on disability. 
Of note, however, is that the classic social model of disability fails to account for 
the phenomenology of embodiment, the possibility that experiences of pain, immobility, 
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madness, or learning frustrations are meaningful and impactful. Deaf advocates (Crouch, 
1997; Lane & Grodin, 1997) often characterize Deafness as a linguistic and cultural 
minority rather than identifying with disability models (to be discussed further in a later 
section), so they too might overemphasize external disadvantage, but it would be folly to 
continue to erase how disadvantages are intimately and importantly tied to embodiment. 
Dolmage (2011) says of the social model, in an effort to locate bodies at its centre: 
"bodies ... are undeniably material, yet they are also undeniably rhetorical" (p. 28); even 
when exploring the social constructions of disability, then, he acknowledges materiality, 
corporeality, bodily presence. We can look to how bodies are shaped and transformed by 
social forces, and how they respond and resist. 
The work accomplished in Eldridge was allegedly undone in Auton (Guardian ad 
/item of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General) (2004), although the allegation 
necessitates further examination of the way in which Auton interpreted disability and 
equality. Parents of Connor Auton sought funding for Applied Behavioural Analysis 
(ABA) or Intensive Behavioural Intervention (IBI) therapy when they could no longer 
afford the treatment. They and four sets of parents with autistic children challenged the 
refusal on the part of British Columbia's provincial government to fund ABA/IBI, 
invoking s. 15(1). 
The Supreme Court of Canada determined that s. 15 had not been violated, a 
ruling that was based on two premises. Firstly, "the claim for discrimination is based on 
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the erroneous assumption that the [Canada Health Act] and the relevant British Columbia 
legislation provided the benefit claimed" (p. 9). The trial judge characterized ABA/IBI 
as a core medically necessary service. As such, the service must be made available with 
costs covered in order for provincial governments to qualify for federal healthcare 
funding (Finley, 2005). The Supreme Court of Canada determined that the treatment is 
not a core medically necessary service, and as such would be delivered according to the 
province's discretion: 
The legislative scheme does not promise that any Canadian will receive 
funding for all medically required treatment. All that is conferred is core 
funding for services provided by medical practitioners, with funding for 
non-core services left to the Province's discretion (Auton, 2004, p. 21). 
Secondly, "on the facts here and applying the appropriate comparator, it [was] not 
established that the government excluded autistic children on the basis of disability" (p. 
10). 
The trial judge accepted the claimants' comparator, used to demonstrate that denial of a 
medically necessary service to a disadvantaged group constitutes discrimination: "by 
denying a 'medically necessary' service to the disadvantaged groups (autistic children, a 
subset of the mentally disabled), while providing 'medically necessary' services to non-
autistic children and mentally disabled adults, the government discriminated against 
autistic children" (p. 13 ). The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment, drawing a broader 
comparison with all members of the provincial Health Services Plan. However, the 
Supreme Court of Canada found that the comparator was problematic: 
An overly technical approach to s. 15(1) is to be avoided. In 
Andrews ... Mcintyre J. warned against adopting a narrow, formalistic 
analytical approach, and stressed the need to look at equality issues 
substantively and contextually. The Court must look at the reality of the 
situation and assess whether there has been discriminatory treatment 
having regard to the purpose of s. 15(1 ), which is to prevent the 
perpetuation of pre-existing disadvantage through unequal treatment (p. 
17). 
The Supreme Court rejected the comparators used and supplanted the following 
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comparator instead: "non-disabled people or people suffering from disabilities other than 
mental disabilities seeking or receiving funding for a non-core therapy important for 
health, which is emergent and only recently becoming recognized as medically required" 
(p. 28). This comparator was built because comparators "must be like the claimants in all 
ways save for characteristics relating to the alleged ground of discrimination" (p. 28). 
Eberts, a Friends of Children with Autism representative who testified during the 
case, held that the Supreme Court decision had "tom the guts out of s. 15" (as cited in 
Finley, 2005, p. 236). The ruling has been criticized for contradicting Eldridge (1997) by 
interpreting equality narrowly (Cousins, 2009; Finley, 2005). In the earlier case a service 
for disabled people was characterized as a core medically necessary service, part of and 
essential to a complex healthcare delivery system, and as such could not be left to 
provincial discretion. In Auton, a service for disabled people was not classified as a core 
service, and so whether it would be insured remained a matter for provinces to decide. 
Cousins (2009) explains the contrast between the two cases: 
In Eldridge ... the Supreme Court held that a failure to provide sign 
language interpretation where this was necessary to ensure equal access to 
health care was in breach of the equality provisions in section 15(1) of the 
Charter. However, in the subsequent case of Auton ... the Court rather 
narrowly circumscribed the limits of this approach (p. 717). 
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Called into question is the type of equality analysis employed. Cousins 
characterizes the contrast between Eldridge and Auton as swinging "between 
interventionist and non-interventionist policies" (p. 717). Leaving the decision to fund 
ABA/IBI to provincial governments arguably points to the shortcomings of s. 15, that is, 
the way in which equality rights function as a shield rather than a sword, a negative rather 
than a positive entitlement. Though the Eldridge ruling suggested that jurisprudence was 
moving in the direction of substantive equality, Auton has been framed as a throwback to 
the formal interpretation of equality found as far back as 1979 Bliss (OJEN, n.d.). Finley 
argues: "though the Supreme Court has repeatedly pledged itself to a substantive 
approach to equality, the reasoning in Auton reflects a formal definition of equality" 
(2005, p. 224). 
Perhaps worthy of note is why ABA/IBI was not classified as a core medically 
necessary service. The behavioural therapy, targeting children between the ages of three 
to six, involves "the repetitive use of stimuli and emphasized cues" (p. 10). The method 
is "intensive and therefore expensive", and that intensity consists in "crude and arguably 
painful stimuli" (p. 10). Its success rates are marginal: "the trial judge found only that in 
'some cases' it may produce 'significant results'" (p. 10). Perhaps more important than 
its results is its purpose: "changing the child's mind and personality" (p. I 0). Indeed, the 
urgency behind targeting children at such a young age has to do with changing 
behaviours, even identities, during formative years. 
A self-advocate, or an activist who identified as autistic, testified during the 
appeal to argue against the therapy. This self-advocate was not alone. Baker notes: 
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"some members of disability groups fundamentally objected to the creation of an 
environment in which the right to ABA could be promoted because of their tendency to 
equate autism with disease and to emphasize the suffering of individuals with autism" 
(2008, p. 579). The therapy is an example of an effort to cure or nonnalize autistic 
people. A ruling in favour of the petitioners, at least in regard to this first premise, might 
have further sanctioned the medicalization of disability, the work to erase difference. 
Critics also target the second ground for the Auton ruling-the work around 
comparators. According to Gilbert and Majury: "the contextual analysis, which would 
consider unfairness in a more nuanced and sophisticated way, is lost, in favour of an 
analysis that says that the claimants must find a group to whom they could belong but for 
the personal characteristic that separates them" (2006, p. 130). This "but/for" framework 
harkens back to the condition of being similarly situated: "this is the essence of the 
critique of the 'but/for' approach-that it precludes complexity, intersectionality or any 
analysis oflayers of oppression" (p. 130). All "similarly situated" can truly mean is "like 
the dominant group," the group with privilege or status. Disabled person must compare 
with the supposed counter-part, the non-disabled person in the same situation. Gilbert 
and Majury elaborate: 
Equality, as an inherently comparative concept, confirms dominant groups 
as the standard for comparison and essentializes the grounds upon which 
comparisons are made. From this perspective, equality's comparative 
nature renders it extremely limited and limiting, as a tool and as an 
aspiration. Essentialism and the imposition of dominant standards are 
unquestionably some of the risks that arise from the use of the concept of 
equality in trying to address oppression (pp. 112-113). 
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So given the complications built into the Auton ruling, we might conclude that if we were 
to look for an entry-point for the principle of respect for difference into equality analysis, 
we must look elsewhere. 
Withler 
In Withler v. Canada (Attorney General) (2011), Hazel Ruth Withler and Joan 
Helen Fitzsimonds were widowed by spouses whose occupations were in the Civil 
Service and the Canadian Armed Forces, respectively. They both saw reductions in their 
federal supplementary death benefits-a lump sum payment provided for deceased 
members' beneficiary-due to the ages at which their husbands died. Withler and 
Fitzsimonds contested the reduction of the Supplementary Death Benefit by 10% "for 
each year by which the plan member exceeded a prescribed age" (p. 4). That is, the 
reduction was the result of the ages at which their husbands died, past sixty (the limit in 
the Public Service Superannuation Act) and sixty-five (the limit in the Canadian Armed 
Forces Superannuation Act). The age restrictions were challenged on the basis of s. 15. 
It was ruled that there was no violation. 
The Supreme Court of Canada determined that comparators constituted an 
inappropriate approach to equality analysis. Marking an important step for this study, it 
was legally acknowledged that comparators run the risk of formalizing equality: 
The 'minor comparator group' analysis may become a search for 
sameness, may shortcut the substantive equality analysis and may be 
difficult to apply. . .. A minor comparative approach can fail to 
identify .. .the discrimination at which s. 15 is aimed. What is required is an 
approach that takes account of the full context of the claimant group's 
situation, the actual impact of the law on that situation, and whether the 
impugned law perpetuates disadvantage to or negative stereotypes about 
that group (pp. 4-5). 
The doing away with comparators "provides the flexibility required to accommodate 
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claims based on intersecting grounds of discrimination" (p. 5). This can be done because 
monolithic identity categories no longer function as a standard. It might well be possible 
to legally conceive of identity as overlapping and fragmented. Without such a 
conceptualization of identity, some forms of discrimination fall through the cracks, 
because "discrimination .. .is neither reducible to a single inequality nor simply additive" 
(LEAF, 2010, unpaginated). Overlapping memberships to various sorts of identities may 
yield different kinds of oppression. Says Pothier: "people at the intersection of grounds 
are not just more vulnerable to discrimination, they also experience discrimination in 
different ways and/or in such a different context as to add an entirely new dimension to 
the problem" (2001, p. 62). 
The Supreme Court determined that the purpose of equality jurisprudence has 
been to build a "substantive and contextual approach and a corresponding repudiation of 
a formalistic 'treat likes alike' approach" (With/er, 2011, p. 5). The ruling elaborates: 
Whether the s. 15 analysis focuses on perpetuating disadvantage or 
stereotyping, the analysis involves looking at the circumstances of 
members of a group and the negative impact of the law on them. The 
analysis is contextual, not formalistic, grounded in the actual situation of 
the group and the potential of the impugned law to worsen their situation 
(p. 24). 
This approach enables the courts to account for, perhaps eventually require, differential 
treatment for the purpose of redressing the systemic discrimination permeating one's 
context: 
The focus of the inquiry is on the actual impact of the impugned law, 
taking full account of social, political, economic and historical factors 
concerning the group. The result may be to reveal differential treatment as 
discriminatory because of prejudicial impact or negative stereotype. Or it 
may reveal that differential treatment is required in order to ameliorate the 
actual situation of the claimant group (p. 25). 
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Bay reflects on the importance of this landmark case: "complexity .. .is what is needed. It 
is the recognition of how power relationships interplay and inequalities co-exist 
simultaneously that provides real insight into disadvantage and discrimination" (2011, p. 
3). Indeed, with Withler we see a contextualization and substantiation of identity and 
equality, a recognition of the interplay of inequalities and oppressions. 
The ruling is fresh, though. Despite showing much promise, a contextual 
approach has not yet been applied to healthcare. In the sections that follow I will 
consider how such an approach might take shape, specifically in the case of reproductive 
health, keeping in mind Shildrick's (1997) call to avoid general principles and to instead 
render contextualized, material embodiment central. 
4.3. Reproductive Justice 
In this section I will consider the importance of acknowledging difference and 
recontextualizing embodiment. The experience of pregnancy is rooted in very clear 
biological differences between men and women34--differences which have served as the 
34 
This section moves into an analysis of gendered difference with a focus on the 
man/woman dichotomy that has been historically established and oft-discussed. I will be 
concentrating on the oppression of women through the construction of gender and the 
discounting of their reproductive bodies; I do so for the purpose of remaining within the 
scope of this study. I acknowledge, though, that work has been done to complicate and 
redefine the male/female divide with the introduction and analysis of trans gendered 
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grounds for interpretative, ideological work to construct gender-based inequalities. 
Through an investigation of context, I will claim that reproductive justice can accomplish 
what principles with a liberal gloss have failed to effect. When considering law and 
policy, I will review case law on reproductive autonomy and equality, and I will 
investigate sex selective abortion in the context of Canadian policy, healthcare delivery, 
and public opinion. 
4.3.1. Reproductive Justice in Bioethics 
Reproductive Difference and the Impossibility of the Autonomous Subject 
Beauvoir (1956) considers how women are othered by virtue of biological 
difference. For her, gendered differences are rooted in the bodily differences between the 
sexes. This occurs in the case of menstruation: "it is during her periods that she feels her 
body most painfully as an obscure, alien thing; ... woman, like man, is her body but her 
body is something other than herself' (p. 57). Invoking language already used in this 
study, we might characterize the phenomenology of menstruation as the body dys-
appearing, or being tom apart and asunder, brought to the foreground of consciousness 
(Leder, 1990). 
This experience of dys-appearance also manifests during pregnancy: 
It is especially noteworthy that the pregnant woman feels the immanence 
of her body at just the time when it is in transcendence; it turns upon itself 
in nausea and discomfort; it has ceased to exist for itself and thereupon 
becomes more sizable than ever before. The transcendence of the artisan, 
of the man in action, contains the element of subjectivity; but in the 
reproductive bodies (AHRA/LGBTQ Working Group, 2008; Brothers & Ford, 2000; De 
Sutter, 2001; Jones, 2000). 
mother-to-be the antithesis of subject and object ceases to exist; she and 
the child with which she is swollen make up together an equivocal pair 
overwhelmed by life (Beauvoir, 1956, pp. 477). 
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Beauvoir's characterization of pregnancy is meant to challenge concepts of self that have 
been critiqued throughout this chapter. The notion of the independent agent is 
annihilated in the context of pregnancy (Young, 1984), such that "it is not too clear when 
the new individual is to be regarded as autonomous: at the moment of fertilization, of 
birth, or of weaning" (Beauvoir, 1956, p. 50). 
There is a gendered35 differentiation of the roles men and women play during the 
reproductive process (O'Brien, 2007). Whereas the alienation of woman from fetus-
turned-infant is mediated by labour, men are separated from their seed in such a way that 
they might legitimize concepts of individuation: "the sperm ... becomes a stranger to him 
and separates from his body; so that the male recovers his individuality intact at the 
moment when he transcends it" (Beauvoir, 1956, p. 50). O'Brien (2007) explains: 
Men are free in both the sense of freedom which liberal thought has 
developed: there are positive and negative aspects of paternal freedom, 
freedom from and freedom to. Men are aware of parenthood but free from 
reproductive labour. They are also free to choose paternity, or, as they 
have liked to put it, to 'acknowledge' the child as theirs (p. 74). 
Although there are clear biological differences between men and women in 
reproductive contexts, gendered differentiation requires interpretive work, that is, work to 
fit these. differences into particular narratives. Already we see that the interpretation of 
the role men play suits liberal theories of personhood. Men are understood to be free in 
all the liberal senses throughout the reproductive process, situated at a distance and 
35 O'Brien (2007) uses the term "genderic." 
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afforded some choice in acknowledging paternity. Beauvoir (1956) contends that women 
enjoy no such freedom, and this cannot be explained by simply appealing to biology, 
even if biology serves as our starting point. 
Woman as Other, Object, and Slave 
Woman comes to be understood as the inessential Other because of the 
interpretive work invested in her reproductive capacity: "women are controlled by 
lashing us to our bodies" (Rich, 2007, p. 64). That is, she comes to be reducible to her 
body, an object bereft of subjectivity: "the Other [is] regarded as the object in the eyes of 
the subject" (Beauvoir, 1956, p. 161). Beauvoir grounds this subject/object dichotomy in 
the Hegelian master/slave dialectic. According to Hegel's (1977) analogy, the master and 
the slave represent two extremes that "are opposed to one another, one being only 
recognized, the other only recognizing" (pp. 112-113). The master as subject does the 
active work of recognizing, while the slave as object-as body only-is passively 
recognized. The identity of the slave is defined relative to the master, until it is sublated 
or consumed: "on approaching the other it has lost its own self, since it finds itself as 
another being" (p. 111 ). Applied to gender dynamics, women as metaphorical slaves are 
recognized while men as masters do the recognizing, and consequently, the defining. The 
relationship is doomed to be unequal, and efforts to challenge or transform the 
relationship are met with interpretive resistance. Even when a woman seeks to redefine 
her body or to cast it to the background, her identity and acts are translated in relation to 
the master status: 
Neither the 'pure' nor the 'lascivious' woman, neither the so-called 
mistress nor the slave woman, neither the woman praised for reducing 
herself to a brood animal nor the woman scorned and penalized as an 'old 
maid' or a 'dyke,' has had any real autonomy or selfhood to gain from this 
subversion of the female body (and hence of the female mind) (Rich, 
2007, p. 21). 
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There are feminists who have advocated for gender neutrality. Wittig (1992), for 
instance, seeks to universalize the Hegelian subject in an effort to eliminate the slave 
status and elevate women to the status of master alongside men. Butler (1999), too, 
argues that gender differences are bound up in the subject's act of recognition, and thus 
should be set aside: "there is no reason to divide up human bodies into male and female 
sexes" (p. 143). Beauvoir (1956) herself, whose position for a time defined the liberal 
feminist approach to reproductive rights, argued that women should be liberated from 
their reproductive roles: "[feminists since Beauvoir often assume that] women are 
naturally trapped in the childbearing function. Therefore the liberation of women 
depends on their being freed from this trap" (O'Brien, 2007, p. 49). 
O'Brien describes this position as retaining the premise of the master/slave 
dialectic "but alter[ing] the conclusion" (p. 49). By taking the Hegelian premise for 
granted, we continue to miss the mark; universalization of the subject simply entails 
sublating the slave, or effacing all of the slave's differences. Chandler (2007) instead 
challenges the primacy of subjectivity, holding that supposed gender neutrality only 
masks privilege: "my concern is that in destroying the categories of sex and gender, what 
is created is a separated autonomous subjectivity as the only acceptable conceptions of 
selfhood. . .. The self as in-relation will become further marginalized" (p. 533). She 
readily admits that during pregnancy women lose their sense of self, their agency, but 
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"the problematic lies not in the equation of motherhood with non-subjectivity"; instead, it 
exists "in the privileging of an emancipated individuated subjectivity" (p. 535). She goes 
on: "the mistake lies not so much in equating motherhood with a loss of freedom and 
autonomy, but rather in adopting autonomy as an ideal" (p. 536). So gender neutrality 
goes astray for its reliance on the narrative of the subject. Women cannot liberate 
themselves or be liberated from the status of the Other by seeking elevation to the status 
of the One, not when the dichotomy itself-and the polemics that constitute it-is 
problematic. 
This phenomenon, according to Jhappan (1998), is an equality pit. The problem 
with feminists seeking equality without questioning the liberal interpretation of equality 
is that their purposes come to be bound up in becoming Beauvoir's One, Hegel's master, 
or the autonomous subject. She grounds this argument in MacKinnon, who claims: 
"being the same as men or being different from men are just two ways of having men as 
your standard" (as cited in Finley, 1986, p. 1156). Feminists should be challenging their 
standard rather than seeking elevation to it. This latter strategy is ineffective for several 
reasons, according to Jhappan (1998). Firstly, it presents "an essentialist and gender-
neutral model of the liberal citizen who, as it turns out, is an essentialized man" (p. 69). 
Secondly, "gender is not irrelevant; it is deeply relevant although in varying degrees, 
depending on context" (p. 69). And finally, assumptions are made about the category of 




We have seen already how equality models go astray when they take as their 
standard the quintessential man; how, then, is gender differentially impacted depending 
on context? Mahowald (2000) contends: "because of unchangeable biological 
differences, women experience burdens and risks that men do not experience in 
reproduction and genetics, and those burdens and risks are not equal" (pp. 70-71). 
Women are not afforded distance from reproduction, such that the conditions of 
pregnancy are manifest in and on their bodies. Gender cann~t simply be neutralized 
within reproductive contexts, for women are unavoidably, differentially impacted by 
reproductive decisions when pregnant. Complications to and conditions of pregnancy are 
theirs to bear. 
Jhappan (1998) spoke of a third way in which liberal equality theories miss the 
mark, and this critique has been raised earlier in this study: namely, that there is no 
universal category of woman, that woman as Other represents a vast range of identities 
and experiences. In the context of race, Mahowald (2000) notes: "if respect is to be 
tendered to both autonomy and cultural differences [the principles are] incompatible" (p. 
113). Many equality models struggle to move away from same treatment, and same 
treatment is bound up in notions of that autonomous subject, that essentialized, 
individuated normate. Within such models, differences do not belong. 
And yet, "for Native American, African-American, Hispanic, and Asian-
American women, motherhood cannot be analyzed in isolation from its context" (Hill 
Collins, 2007, p. 311 ). Central to debates around intersectionality, Black feminists (Hill 
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Collins, 2007; hooks, 2007) argue that we need to move away from the traditional 
feminist call to liberate women from reproductive roles, because this supposed liberation 
would be irrelevant to the struggles that racialized women face. Their concerns differ 
greatly from the concerns of the woman serving as standard, she who best approximates 
the One: "had black women voiced their views on motherhood, it would not have been 
named a serious obstacle to our freedom as women. Racism, availability of jobs, lack of 
skills or education ... but not motherhood" (hooks, 2007, p. 145). Indeed, far from needing 
to be liberated from motherhood, women marked by difference (whether that difference 
is race, class, sexual orientation, or disability) have encountered challenges to 
reproducing. Those challenges include sterilization abuse, sub-par reproductive 
healthcare, and the criminalization of parenting (Hill Collins, 2007; hooks, 2007; 
Roberts, 1999; Salmon, 2007). 
The overemphasis in liberal theories on choice requires that women be "deemed 
legitimate choice-makers" (Smith, 2005a, p. 128). Smith goes on to explain, citing an 
historical example: 
In 1960, Planned Parenthood commissioned a study which concluded that 
poor and working-class families lacked the rationality to do family 
planning, and that this lack of 'rationality and early family planning as 
middle-class couples' was 'embodied in the particular personalities, world 
views, and ways of life' of the poor themselves (Rainwater, 1960; as cited 
in Smith, 2005a, p. 128). 
Here we see a notion of subjectivity that suits only a certain sort of woman, while all 
other women-their otherness the result of their deviations from this standard-are not 
deemed to have equal moral worth. Struggles for reproductive rights, for personal 
autonomy and liberal equality, have too often only involved the elevation of some women 
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to the status of the subject; the struggle has been abstracted, oversimplified, 
decontextualized, and as a result our theories have proven ill-equipped to contend with 
variations in reproductive injustice. 
If autonomy and equality theories have proven ineffective, where do we go from 
here? Roberts (1999) claims the experiences of racialized women point the way to the 
social transformation ofliberty and equality. Jhappan (1998), however, cautions against 
a framework making use of principles that have been ideologically constituted in 
problematic ways. The purpose of her critique is to point to how "the essentialist 
definition of the 'problem' of gender (race, sexual identity, or disability) as an 
equality/inequality problem constrains the search for broader remedies to injustice" (p. 
65). She holds that an alternative approach would be to recast "the issues in a justice 
frame" (p. 65). Theories of justice have been historically conflated with equality, but 
they do not have to be; indeed, when teased out of equality models, justice might better 
frame oppression within context (Young, 1990). Honouring context requires that theories 
adjust to differences in culture, class, gender, sexual identity and orientation, and so on. 
Applied to reproduction, Smith (2005a, 2005b) and West (2009) suggest that an 
approach rooted in abstract principles of autonomy and equality has not served women 
well, not when these principles are entrenched in ideologies that individuate persons and 
justify inequalities on the basis of notions of worth. An alternative approach exists in 
reproductive justice, which "recognizes that reproductive oppression is the result of the 
intersection of multiple oppressions and is inherently connected to the struggle for social 
justice" (Mendez, 2006, unpaginated). Reproductive justice is contextual rather than 
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rights-based, with a social rather than individual focus, and can account for-instead of 
effacing, overlooking, or even essentializing--diff erences. 
Might we then locate respect for difference in discourses on reproductive justice? 
Proponents of reproductive justice frame their work in ways that account for variations in 
identities, experiences, and oppressions. They draw attention to concrete particulars and 
contextual conditions that complicate reproductive decision-making. If we intend to 
salvage autonomy and equality, perhaps to reframe the concepts with feminist language, 
we must account for how they function within relations of power that influence freedom 
of choice and determine whether one has equal moral worth. This network of power 
relations acts as the sheaf that binds the wheat, or the context that invests meaning in 
differences-privileging some, managing others. Feminist justice has critical and 
corrective force because it is sensitive to difference. 
4.3.2. Reproductive Justice in Law 
Case Law Review 
Can reproductive justice be accomplished, even acknowledged, in Canadian law? 
Hard to say, when no legal case has reached this point. Recall that our benchmark can be 
found in R. v. Morgentaler (1988), which grounded reproductive rights in the s. 7 right to 
security of the person. Section 7 was described as "a more circumscribed interest [that] 
at most relates to the concept of physical control, simply protecting the individual's 
interest in his or her bodily integrity" (p. 54). Gavigan (1992) calls this rhetoric "a 
ringing restatement of an individual right ... and is thus consistent with the emphasis on 
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abortion as a private and individual matter" (p. 222). This limiting of abortion rights to 
bodily integrity and control requires that we understand the body to be a static object to 
be managed. The body is framed as an entity in isolation, its skin serving as the 
boundary markers for personhood. Reproductive rights have come to be hemmed in, 
narrowly defined as individual, and grounded in the assumption that as long as the state 
withdraws, deregulates, and vows non-interference, the decontextualized woman will be 
liberated and in control. 
Gavigan (1987, 1992) and others (Erdman, 2007; Ordolis, 2008; Rodgers, 2006a, 
2006b, 2006c) see more promise in reproductive equality, although legal attempts to 
make this connection have fallen flat. Recall that in Doe et al. v. The Government of 
Manitoba (2004), despite appeals to the s. 15 right to equality, the argument made 
included a notion of personal autonomy: "the right to reproductive freedom is central to a 
woman's autonomy and dignity as a person" (p. 10). This grounding renders the concept 
of equality applied formal, negative, and useless in light of the challenges women face in 
reproductive contexts. Granted, Doe et al. made use of now outdated equality 
jurisprudence. With/er v. Canada (2011) represents the latest evolution in our narrative 
of equality, and promises the acknowledgment of context. Will this new precedent 
eventually make a difference for reproductive health? Can it effect some approximation 
of reproductive justice? 
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Speculations on the Potential of Equality 
What would such a reframing look like? We might tum to the Women's Legal 
Education and Action Fund (LEAF) for insight into the direction a contextual approach to 
equality analysis should take in future case law. This organization has intervened in 
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia (1989), which marked a turning point for 
equality jurisprudence, as the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the previously employed 
formal model in favour of a more substantive version of equality; and Eldridge v. British 
Columbia (Attorney General) (1997), another important milestone, foundational to the 
contextual approach taken in With/er (2011 ). 
Jhappan (1998) praises LEAF for "a considerably more sophisticated and 
historically grounded understanding of inequality as being rooted in gendered social 
relations, not in women's similarity to, or difference from, men" (p. 72). In a LEAF 
publication on substantive equality, Sampson (2006) criticizes formal versions of equality 
for not accounting for "the ways in which different groups in society have experienced 
systemic disadvantages" (p. 246). She instead endorses the following: 
Through a contextualized approach, equality claimants can educate the 
judiciary about their actual experiences, contributing to the broadening of 
the theoretical base of the legal concept of equality, and providing for 
improved legal reasoning on more informed understandings of experiences 
of discrimination (p. 24 7). 
A contextualized, relationship-grounded approach avoids the pitfalls to which some 
equality approaches fall prey when autonomy is used to justify inequalities: "choice 
limited by a context of inequality; coercion labeled as choice; choice restricted by access 
to money, resources, and education; qualified choice as part of a struggle for 
emancipation-these are women's choices" (Majury, 2006, p. 218). 
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How would such an approach be applied to reproductive health? Cook and 
Howard (2007) try to carry out some of this work, characterizing the problem of abortion 
as "societies' inability to accommodate women's biological differences and to redress the 
social discrimination women face based on those differences" (p. 1040). For them, 
reproductive equality necessarily involves respecting-and not simply overcoming-
difference: "accommodating differences in the abortion context requires learning how to 
reframe law and policies to construct an inclusive standard of equality that values sex and 
gender distinction" (p. 1040). They go on: "women's equality requires both the 
acknowledgment and accommodation of women's actual differences, as well as the 
elimination of discriminatory treatment based on gender stereotypes" (p. 1044). What 
they are advocating for is a positive concept of equality that can respect without 
essentializing difference, and can redress the ways in which difference is socially othered. 
These differences are not just gender-based, but are also cultural, class-based, and rooted 
in disability and sexuality: "the necessary rethinking of equality requires that unintended 
pregnancy and its consequences be approached from the perspective of not only women 
in general, but of different subgroups of women, particularly those who are marginalized 
due to income, age, or race" {p. 1056). 
Nevertheless, Jhappan (1998) remains wary of the equality pit, holding that the 
framework of the Charter requires comparison, even when case law and legal analysts 
seek to reinvent equality: "equality means always having to say who you are equal to, 
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always comparing one group against another, almost invariably on one axis, and, for this 
reason, it will not let claimants out of the similarly situated, likes alike, 
sameness/difference traps, regardless of the new language used" (p. 74). The identity 
categories written and read into s. 15 are identities that mark difference relative to a 
standard. It may prove difficult to move a contextual approach forward within a legal 
framework that has historically relied on abstract principles and comparisons against 
normative, privileged standards. Jhappan questions feminists who "have almost 
invariably attempted to squeeze all issues into the equality box, even when equality is not 
necessarily what is missing or wanted and even when it has meant distorting the concept 
beyond recognition" (p. 82). Applied to reproductive health, Smith (2005a) and West 
(2009) argue that reproductive justice is not simply an upgraded model of legal equality, 
but is more broadly an economic, political, and social project. While some feminists 
have worked to repackage the principles of autonomy and equality, respect for difference 
may yet be the key ingredient missing in a comprehensive, effective approach to 
redressing disparities in the context of reproductive health. 
Policy on Sex Selective Abortion 
Respect for difference is not itself entrenched in Canadian law but is in some 
limited way bound up in substantive equality (or, we might say, has fallen into the 
equality trap). Further, as I have indicated, given the dearth in case law, we can only 
speculate on how to take a contextual approach to reproductive health. There might be 
value at this point in turning to Canadian policy. Where case law provides a form of 
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redress, dependent on particular cases that point to problems within the legal system, 
policy offers the promise of Canadian commitments. Further, it has only been in policy 
at the international level that we have seen the explicit use of the tem1 respect for 
difference, even if I argued that it is not enough to speak of difference in abstraction. 
Perhaps policy is doomed to abstraction as long as it finds no application. In an 
example then, Canada has encountered controversy around sex selective abortion. A 
recent study (Almond, Edlund, & Milligan, 2009), based on the 2001 and 2006 Canada 
Census long-form questionnaires, presented a higher incidence of first and second born 
births being boys for families of Indian and Asian origin, and speculated that this was the 
result of sex selective termination. In another study that reviewed singleton live births in 
Ontario 2002-2007, Ray, Henry, and Urquia "found a significantly higher male:female 
ratio among infants of multiparous women originally born in Indian than among infants 
of multiparous women born in Canada" (2012, p. 2). The two studies target Indian and 
Asian immigrant populations because these cultures are identified as showing a "strong 
son-preference" (Rogers, Ballantyne, & Draper, 2007, p. 520). 
Ray, Henry, and Urquia (2012) recommend that disclosure of the sex of the fetus 
be withheld until later in the pregnancy, when abortion comes to be unavailable. This 
recommendation might already be in effect: of the sixteen major hospitals in the Greater 
Toronto Area that offer prenatal ultrasounds, six do not disclose sex, or are not 
forthcoming until disclosure is requested. Yang (2012) notes: "whether by coincidence 
or by design, all six hospitals are located in or near areas with high concentrations of 
South Asian immigrants--one of the ethnic communities at the centre of a mounting 
concern over female feticide" (unpaginated). 
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The variation in hospital practices can be explained by the open-ended approach 
the SOGC has taken to disclosure of fetal sex. The SOGC opposes sex selective 
abortion, and recommends that ultrasounds be used only for health diagnoses (except in 
those cases where sex can be tied to greater likelihood of a genetic condition): "the 
SOGC also strongly opposes the non-medical use of ultrasound to view or photograph the 
fetus or for the sole purpose of determining fetal sex when there is no medical indication 
to scan" (2007b, p. 1 ). However, the organization leaves the decision to disclose to the 
discretion of health professionals, either because those professionals are more acutely 
aware of the context and conditions their patients face, or due to the authority vested in 
physicians: "a small number of pregnant women may consider abortion when the fetus is 
the unwanted sex; however, this is best addressed by the health professionals who are 
providing care for these women" (2007 a, p. 1 ). 
While the SOGC takes a stand against sex selective abortion, it does not prohibit 
disclosure of sex, in part for patient-centred reasons. They cite Mcinerney v. MacDonald 
(1992). In this case, a physician refused a patient's request "to produce copies of 
consultants' reports and records she had received from other physicians who had 
previously treated the patient" (p. 2). She held that the records "were the property of 
those physicians and that it would be unethical for her to release them" (p. 2). The 
Supreme Court of Canada determined that the relationship between physician and patient 
is "fiduciary in nature" (p. 2), meaning held in confidence. The physician has the 
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fiduciary duty "to grant access to the information used in administering 
treatment ... grounded in the nature of the patient's interest in the medical records" (p. 2). 
Granted, the Court ruled that this right to access records is not absolute: "if the physician 
reasonably believes it is not in the patient's best interests to inspect the medical records, 
the physician may consider it necessary to deny access" (p. 3). Based on this case, the 
SOGC concludes on the topic of disclosing fetal sex: "it is legally difficult to defend 
nondisclosure. Disclosure of fetal sex upon request respects a woman's rightful 
autonomy over personal health information" (2007a, p. 1); though a physician has the 
leeway to refuse to disclose if she feels doing so would be in the patient's best interest. 
While the right to know is left up to the physician's discretion, and the right to 
terminate remains sacrosanct, Canadians lack the right to make use of reproductive 
technologies such as pre-implantation genetic diagnosis for the purpose of selecting a 
particular sex. According to the Assistive Human Reproduction Act (2004), use of 
reproductive technologies for this purpose is prohibited. Under s. 5( 1 )( e ), the Act 
prohibits citizens from the following: 
Knowingly ... for the purpose of creating a human being, perform any 
procedures or provide, prescribe or administer anything that would ensure 
or increase the probability that an embryo will be of a particular sex, or 
that would identify the sex of an in vitro embryo, except to prevent, 
diagnose or treat a sex-linked disorder or disease. 
Thiele and Leier (20 I 0) note that this policy pertains to producing sex rather than 
terminating pregnancy once sex is discovered, but they hold that the next step is logical, 
and needed: "although this policy concerns the creation of embryos rather than their 
termination, it is not unreasonable to assume that the values that drive the prohibition of 
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sex selection are addressing the goal of sex selection itself, rather than the technical 
means to achieve that end" (p. 55). 
Rogers, Ballantyne, and Draper (2007) argue that sex selective abortion is not 
morally justified, and should be prohibited in Canada. Drawing from conceptual work 
reminiscent of feminist relational autonomy models, they hold that choice is inauthentic 
when made in oppressive contexts: "broader accounts of autonomy place less emphasis 
upon specific choices, but rather examine the wider context of a person's whole life 
situation" (p. 521 ). They argue that sex selective abortion reflects discrimination against 
women: 
SSA [sex selective abortion] reinforces discrimination against women by 
explicitly perpetuating two views. The first is that women are valuable 
only as the mechanisms for producing sons, such that absent a son, a 
woman is of no value; and second, that female children are such a 
worthless burden that their births should be prevented. As such, SSA is a 
particularly discriminatory and oppressive practice that fails to accord 
women the respect they deserve as ends in themselves (p. 522) 36. 
Further, they hold, should this supposed trend toward sex selective abortion continue, the 
resultant gender imbalance will eventually lead to too few women available to marry 
men, depriving men of opportunities for partnerships and family-building--opportunities 
which constitute a "fundamental good, enshrined as a right in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights" (p. 522)37. In the final leg of their argument, they claim that abortion 
when not autonomously chosen constitutes assault. 
36 
Note that Rogers, Ballantyne, and Draper, despite their attempt to ground their work in 
relational autonomy, invoke Kantian language when they call for women to be respected 
as ends in themselves. 
37 This argument requires a heteronormative lens, and there is no indication that this 
social practice would hold should there be a shortage of women. Katz Rothman (1987) 
330 
Is the solution to deny women the use of reproductive technologies for the 
purpose of selecting sex? Consider that concerns centre around racialized persons. As 
mentioned, Mahowald (2000) wrestles with how to temper autonomy with respect for 
cultural difference, and how to reconcile the conflicts between the two principles. Work 
of this sort is criticized in Vogel: 
Some physicians are uncomfortable wagging a finger at their patients' 
cultural practices, explains Bowman. 'We're given very strong messages 
in Canada that we need to be as respectful to people's cultural differences 
as possible, and the risk with trying very hard to accommodate those 
differences is that we can overlook something that's largely unethical' 
(Bowman; as cited in Vogel, 2012, p. 164). 
Herein lies the crux of our supposed rights conflict: can we simultaneously respect 
cultural and gender differences; and can respect for difference reconcile the right to 
autonomous choice with gender inequality? 
It may be that rights conflicts are resolvable when contextualized-or, perhaps 
rights rhetoric proves ineffective when applied to context. In this example, assumptions 
are being made around who deserves the right to choose. Racialized communities and 
their supposedly backwards ideas about gender are targeted in the studies cited. To 
suppose that cultural and gender differences are locked in conflict is an 
overgeneralization, given how women are differentially impacted in reproductive 
contexts, and how racialized women have experienced all the barriers to reproduce listed 
argues that a gender imbalance would not actually result in a shortage because "a 
'shortage' is social defined" (p. 135). She goes on: "if for example a 'shortage' of 
women were to make male homosexuality and female prostitution more socially 
acceptable ... then the fact that there would not be enough women to be distributed in 
heterosexual monogamous mating might very well come to be 'a fact of life,' and not a 
shortage or a problem" (p. 135). 
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in the above section. It seems counterintuitive, then, that we can effect reproductive 
justice by creating an additional barrier to reproduce that targets racialized women. 
Granted, Rogers, Ballantyne, and Draper (2007) demonstrate theoretical consistency with 
feminist relational theorists when they hold that choice needs to be understood within 
context, but the solution is to address context, to promote gender equality in education, 
employment, health, and so on, and to redress the racist overtones built into the 
mechanisms and strategies of reproductive control, so that women might be empowered 
when they mean to exercise autonomous choice, not to deny them the choice entirely. 
While policy and practice seek to prohibit sex selection in the interest of gender 
equality, there is a failure to acknowledge, firstly, how racialized groups have been 
differentially impacted by policy and practice; and secondly, how identification of fetal 
sex operates in patriarchal contexts. Katz Rothman (1987) describes disclosure of fetal 
sex as an embedded social practice, not just in particular ethnic communities--one which 
affects pregnancy: "knowledge of fetal sex is something to reckon with, something which 
by its very existence changes the pregnancy experience. Knowledge of sex helps tum a 
fetus into a baby" (p. 123). In other words, the use of technologies to identify sex has 
had the effect of facilitating the personification and individuation of the fetus-a 
phenomenon that carries all the baggage discussed in previous chapters. More than this, 
though, disclosure of sex "implies gender" (p. 127), that is, assigns gender, marks the 
fetus, and changes the ways in which the fetus is perceived and treated. Due to 
technological intervention, gender is inscribed before birth, and social forces go to work 
early shaping identity and relationships. This interpretative work is based on the mere 
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"luck ... that sex is such an obvious chromosomal difference" (p. 128) that can currently 
be identified. Of the myriad ways in which a fetus may be chromosomally differentiated, 
it is sex that is especially subject to rigorous interpretive work. 
When examining the use of reproductive technologies capable of identifying 
chromosomal markers of sex and genetic conditions, Katz Rothman (1998) challenges the 
distinction made between prohibition of sex selection and promotion of disability de-
selection. And yet, the SOGC (2007b) and the Assistive Human Reproduction Act (2004) 
both take the position that there is a clear distinction between determining sex and 
diagnosing health risks. While reproductive technologies may be used to select sex, they 
should be used to de-select disability. Sex selection comes to be morally excusable when 
links can be made between sex and genetic conditions. In the section that follows, I will 
consider how policy is turned on its head when families choose disability. 
4.4. Reproductive Justice and Disability De-Selection 
In this final section, I will consider whether theories of reproductive justice can 
account for and appropriately respond to disability as difference, especially instances of 
deliberate selection of disability. At this point in the project, my purpose will be to 
determine whether it is possible to develop a framework for approaching reproductive 
decision-making; whether this framework requires autonomy, equality, and respect for 
difference; and if so, how each principle should then be characterized. With such a 
purpose in mind, I will review the work previously accomplished in this study to account 
for how autonomy and equality-based approaches have been applied to the use and 
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normalization of reproductive technologies. I will further explore how to incorporate 
respect for difference into a comprehensive feminist approach. When discussing legal 
praxis, I will return to policy on sex selection to note assumptions about the purpose of 
reproductive technologies being tied to disability de-selection. I will also investigate 
scholarly and public reactions to the use of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis to select 
disability, as these reactions reflect the socially and medically implicit purpose of 
reproductive technologies-a purpose, however, that could be transformed. 
4. 4.1. Reproductive Justice and Disability De-Selection in Bioethics 
Woman as Autonomous Self, Woman as Responsible 
Chapters past, I explored rationales for using reproductive technologies for the 
purpose of disability de-selection, beginning with the oft-invoked reproductive autonomy 
model. Recall that this model concentrates on liberating women by ensuring choices are 
better informed: "prenatal diagnosis is presented as a means of giving women 
information to expand their reproductive choices" (Lippman, 1993, p. 22). I considered 
at length the sort of autonomy employed-liberal in character, belonging to individual, 
consenting selves. 
Reproductive autonomy so framed in effect decontextualizes reproductive issues, 
focusing on an early liberal feminist agenda to promote women's right to terminate, when 
women encountering ableism, racism, and heteronormativity have had different 
experiences of oppression. According to Wagner: "in the absence of historical and socio-
political context, abstract notions of choice and individual autonomy may have little 
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meaning, particularly for women from marginalized communities" (2008, p. 238). The 
women Wagner is identifying are marginalized from the concept of Self Beauvoir (1956) 
would have us become-the abstracted woman entitled to autonomy. Beauvoir's 
autonomy entails liberation from reproductive function, and the Self of reproductive 
autonomy models studied here is thought to be liberated or abstracted from her body. 
What we find when we unearth the experiences of marginalized women, of these Others, 
is that choices are embodied and contextual, even when our models do not account for 
bodies or externalities. 
Should the reproductive autonomy model fail to retain meaning when situated in 
context, I previously discussed the public health model as an alternative explanation 
socially employed to encourage women to make use of disability diagnostic technologies. 
This model operates in such a way that pressures women into preventing disability: 
"under the public health model, the routinized use of testing comes the potential to cast 
women as the genetic gatekeepers of society, not only responsible, but also accountable 
for the birth of disabled children" (Peters & Lawson, 2002, p. 3). Reproductive choice in 
such a context, where disability as difference conflicts with health standards, ceases to be 
authentic choice. This model might aid in explaining the pressures weighing on women's 
decision-making in relation to disability diagnoses. 
Recall that Foucault (1980) wrote on the continuous investment of power in 
bodies at minimal cost; the cost is minimal because under the panoptic medical gaze, 
people are expected to discipline themselves in order to approximate standards of 
normalcy: "an inspecting gaze, a gaze which each individual under its weight will end by 
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interiorising to the point that he is his own overseer" (p. 155). The energy required for 
managing and producing species typical bodies is minimized in a social order wherein 
people are responsible for their own management. Pregnant women are socially, 
medically, and legally expected to take responsibility for their bodies. Reproductive 
autonomy only functions in such a way that justifies social pressure to comply with a 
mandate to prevent the dys-appearance of bodies (Leder, 1990). Not only are women 
expected to manage their own dys-appeared bodies (to the extent that they are women, 
and pregnant-social and biological dys-appearances that call for management), but they 
are expected to prevent dys-appearance and disability in their offspring. 
Equality between Certain Selves 
Through a Foucauldian lens, then, we could claim that the public health model 
serves as a regulatory standard that reflects inequalities, and yet this standard is often 
hidden under the guise of autonomous choice, as though the autonomous self must as a 
rule accept certain responsibilities attached to autonomous decision-making. Previously 
discussed, equal distribution for Buchanan and colleagues (2000) was meant to ensure 
women have the freedom to make reproductive decisions, and children have the right to 
an open future. They thus frame the act of making use of reproductive technologies as 
simultaneously a means for enhancing autonomy and a moral obligation: "parents are 
regarded as having permission, and some would say an obligation, to produce the 'best' 
children they can" (p. 156). They can accomplish this contradiction because disability, 
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for them, is a difference unlike other differences-a difference of lesser worth. Karpin 
and Savell say of their seminal work: 
[They] argue for a distinction between the disability rights movement and 
other civil rights movements on the grounds that, unlike the sexual or 
racial minorities, the able-bodied majority have a 'morally legitimate 
interest' in 'avoiding the costs of changing society' to better accommodate 
people with disabilities" (Buchanan et al., 2000; as cited in Karpin & 
Savell, 2012, p. 284). 
Further, Anstey (2002) explains why the distinction was defended: 
No matter what perspective one takes on the phenomenon of disability, it 
must be acknowledged that some conditions may inherently produce 
limitations at the level of bodily functioning, social activities or 
participation. Several bioethicists use this fact of inherent limitation to 
support the normative view that bodily impairments ought to be avoided 
where possible (p. 235). 
We could call this normative viewing of disability geneticization, which arguably 
influences the purpose built into the use of reproductive technologies: "genetic 
knowledge incorporates and builds upon the concept of normalcy" (Taylor & Mykitiuk, 
2001, p. 5). Through geneticization, these inherent limitations to persons Anstey (2002) 
identifies justify assignations of worth; species typical functioning comes to be reified, 
and all else that dys-appears is atypical. Rapp (2000) claims that with the rise of 
geneticization, "it comes easier to foreground the biological and background the social, as 
if they were separable" (p. 215)-a process which is reminiscent ofLeder's (1990) theory 
of dys-appearance. 
It is my contention that geneticization, while clearly an example of a practice that 
perpetuates inequality, underscores formalized equality models. At least those models 
that are developed with the purpose of facilitating liberal autonomy, there are 
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assumptions being made about who is equal. Those selves who share similar properties, 
perhaps properties that are genetic, may enjoy equal rights. Fineman (1992) explains 
how gender-based difference once was (and might still be) compatible with concepts of 
equality: 
Difference was the rationale and the justification for this exclusion which 
was based on the belief that women's unique biological role demanded 
their protection from the rigors of public life. It was no surprise, therefore, 
that...assimilation became the goal and equality the articulated standard (p. 
1 ). 
While women have sought to transcend the ways in which their biology determined their 
social roles (in problematic ways, granted, as noted in critiques of Beauvoir (1956) 
outlined in my last section), biology is still drawn from in order to build rationales for 
excluding disabled people. 
Bringing Valued Difference to Bear on our Principles 
We might ask at this juncture, are these principles necessary for building a just 
approach to reproductive decision-making? Or, do feminists err in trying to refashion 
concepts that just have too much baggage, that are unrecognizable after their re-haul? 
Does a politics of difference require these concepts, or is it better served engaging a 
radical conceptual approach that breaks from the language found in modernity? 
Indeed, where reproductive autonomy and reproductive equality have fallen short, 
reproductive justice can explain how current uses of reproductive technologies constitute 
a failure to respect difference. One difference we might discuss is gender. Fineman 
(1992) considers the value of a gendered approach to reproductive health: "I suggest that 
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the concept of a 'gendered life' can be helpful in urging cooperation among women 
across our differences in areas where social and cultural definitions of 'Woman' operate 
to potentially oppress us all" (p. 4). She goes on: 
Any contemporary consideration of differences must first address the 
question of what are the legally relevant differences between men and 
women. It is now generally, though not universally, conceded that 
narrowly defined reproductive roles represent a 'significant' difference 
worthy of some legal accommodation (pp. 13-14). 
A gendered approach does not necessarily mean we would preclude different kinds of 
embodiments that affect reproductive decision-making, for an approach that takes female 
bodies as its starting point can account for bodily nuance. Indeed, feminists invested in 
intersectionality recognize that gendered approaches are not entirely limited to gendered 
difference, but are capable of and responsible for exploring other identity characteristics. 
Beginning with bodies means there is room for discussing disability, an identity which 
can certainly be read on the body and that readily marks bodies as different, dys-
appeared, and disruptive. Unlike Buchanan and co-authors (2000), we need not make 
value-based distinctions between identities-we need not understand disability as being 
of lesser worth. 
A gendered approach to reproductive health, one which takes for granted that 
women are necessarily embodied, and that their decisions do not happen in isolation, 
could use the feminist-framed concepts discussed throughout this study. Feminist 
relational autonomy better accounts for the decision-making transpiring in reproductive 
contexts, in contrast with liberal autonomy; for, relational autonomy is not conceptually 
closed off from notions of intercorporeality and interconnectivity. There can be no 
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relational autonomy without an acknowledgment of how power affects relations-women 
may interiorize and internalize the ways in which power is invested in their bodies and 
come to feel responsible for body management. Their lack of self-trust manifests in 
contexts where they lack power. Feminist equality models that account for power 
differentials can explain how self-trust is affected, and self-distrust in turn affects 
reproductive decision-making. Relational autonomy and substantive equality fit 
postmodern theory; they are just inadequate when not reoriented to serve the goal of 
promoting diversity. 
In the writing that follows, I consider what bearing such a framework has on 
Canadian law and policy, and how it-better than predominant theoretical and legal 
frameworks-can better account for the transformative potential of reproductive 
technologies. 
4.4.2. Reproductive Justice and Disability De-Selection in Law 
Review of Cases Concerning Reproductive Rights and Disabled Persons 
To review, in Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) v. G. (D.F.) 
(1997), the Supreme Court of Canada considered the trial judge's ruling that G. was 
incompetent due to a mental disorder-a ruling which justified the invocation of parens 
patriae: "the trial judge had wrongly relied on the court's parens patriae jurisdiction of 
lunacy" (p. 13). We might speculate over why G. 's competence was questioned; even 
though the Supreme Court of Canada struck down the ruling on the grounds that it was 
not in compliance with the Mental Health Act, there is value in questioning how we 
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arrive at discourses around determinations of capacity, when we discuss whether and 
which pregnant women are capable of making decisions about their pregnancies for 
themselves. Perhaps G. 's substance use was tied to questions of competence; or perhaps 
a mother who does not comply with good pregnancy practice has questionable decisional 
capacity, as Lemke (2002) and Overboe (2007) warned against. Also of note, G. was of 
Aboriginal descent. Aboriginal persons in Canada have historically seen their decisional 
capacity questioned in the context of land disputes, religious choices, and their ability to 
raise, even bear, children (Orkin, 2003). 
In E. (Mrs.) v. Eve (1986), Eve's mother sought to declare her daughter 
incompetent so that she could authorize a non-therapeutic sterilization procedure without 
Eve's consent. She pursued this course of action because Eve interacted with a male 
peer, and because Eve was "attractive and attracted to men" (p. 9). There was a concern 
that Eve would be incapable of raising a child because she was disabled. There was also 
concern on her mother's part that she (the mother) would have to raise Eve's child, 
because as a woman who produced a disabled child she would be radically responsible 
for all that followed. We might also consider that intellectually disabled people have 
been historically subjected to forced sterilization procedures due to a fear that disability is 
inheritable (Park & Radford, 1998). 
If we were to compare these cases, we would find that both question a disabled 
woman's ability to mother. Both concern women whose identities have historically been 
associated with sterilization abuse, identities that would not readily benefit from the so-
called liberation of women from reproductive roles, not when those roles had been so 
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often denied to members of marginalized identity categories. Although both cases have 
positive outcomes regarding the promise of non-intervention, there is no accounting for 
context inasmuch as there are no supports put into place that might make reproduction a 
viable choice. Further, there is no promise that they will be protected from institutionally 
embedded discrimination: G. might have seen this child too become a ward of the state, 
and Eve's school might have continued to have convinced boys not to talk to her so as to 
avoid her experiencing romance, intimacy, and possibly pregnancy. There is no 
acknowledgment in the rulings of the differences that define G. and Eve, differences 
which have been historically and socially devalued in reproductive contexts. 
(Re )Producing Disability 
American couple Sharon Duchesneau and Candy McCullough, who both 
identified as Deaf, wanted to have a second child together and chose as their sperm donor 
"a deaf friend with five generations of deafness in his family" (Savulescu, 2002, p. 771). 
Their purpose was to increase the likelihood of producing a Deaf child. In 2001, Gauvin 
McCullough was born Deaf, "like his mothers and sister" (Wagner, 2008, p. 231 ). 
Wagner describes public reactions: 
The child's birth and more importantly his conception were widely 
publicized and met with a spectrum of reactions, from the joy of his 
parents to pity and abhorrence in the international media. . .. Since then, 
commentary in both the media and academia has grappled with the ethics 
of choosing to have a child with a disability (pp. 231-232). 
The discourses borne out of examples like this pertain to the supposed limits and 
purposes of reproductive technologies. These technologies have the potential to be used 
not only to facilitate the conditions that might ensure disability, but also for screening, 
testing, and thus deliberately selecting disability. When they are employed for the 
purpose of deliberate disability selection, media and scholarship raise the question: 
should they be? This particular "should" is of interest to my study because it builds 
greater nuance into expectations of maternal responsibility, or which reproductive 
decisions we are free to make within our given contexts. 
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Upon examination of context we see in this example, as we see in G. (D.F.) 
(1997), that the women involved identify as members of a marginalized minority, and 
though this point does not have direct bearing on the case, it is worth noting given how 
minority groups have experienced reproductive constraints. Like race, sexual orientation 
is an identity category that has been used to justify denial of the right to reproduce. 
Among other myths, non-heteronormative sexual orientation has historically been called 
unnatural, because that which does not equate with the social standard cannot be natural 
or right (Martin, 1988). Further, there have been fears that young persons can be 
influenced when exposed to people unlike themselves, which has led to efforts to bar 
members of the LGBT community from educational positions, and has kept them from 
adopting children or making use of reproductive technologies to produce children 
(Kallen, 1989). Although laws have relaxed and people from the LGBT community are 
no longer legally prevented from starting families (R. v. K. (B.), 1995), this legal and 
social history continues to function as a distant echo, affecting and reflecting 
discriminatory attitudes. 
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What also complicates this case is that Duchesneau and McCullough sought to 
select a particular disability that is not always called a disability. According to Savulescu 
(2002), the couple regarded "being deaf as defining their cultural identity and ... signing as 
a sophisticated, unique form of communication" (p. 771). Deafness is often seen within 
Deaf communities as a cultural and linguistic minority (Levy, 2002; Wagner, 2008). 
Perhaps it is worth noting that members of the Deaf community do not always identify 
with disability movements, the implicit assumption being that they still devalue disability 
as a limitation. Regardless of this tension between activisms, I would nevertheless hold 
that the Deaf cultural identity is an example of how disability can be valued differently 
rather than devalued, not as a lacking but as a minority-a difference that has been 
unnecessarily and unjustly accorded low worth. 
At issue is the assumption underscoring the backlash to Duchesneau and 
McCullough's decision-an assumption around the purpose of reproductive technologies. 
Savulescu (2002) asks in response to this case: 
What is the goal of reproductive decision making? We offer genetic tests 
to couples to allow them to select the child-from the possible children 
they could have-with the best opportunity of having the best life. Indeed, 
I have argued that couples have a moral obligation to select the child with 
the best prospects" (p. 772). 
Scholars have questioned whether deliberately selecting disability when conceiving 
violates what Buchanan and colleagues (2000) call a right to an open future (Davis, 1997; 
Feinberg, 1980). This right, for Davis (1997), involves autonomy: "[Deafaess] violates 
the child's own autonomy and narrows the scope of her choices when she grows up" 
(unpaginated). Anstey (2002) criticizes this characterization of autonomy in that it 
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"inappropriately essentializes disablement as a negative phenomenon", and an "emphasis 
on a right not to have one's range of opportunity narrowed too easily lends itself to the 
view that promoting autonomy is about securing more options" (p. 239). 
As noted, this case occurred in the United States, so we have cause to ask: what 
might happen in a Canadian context should a woman select disability as an identity 
characteristic in her child? How would Canadian policy respond? When developing a 
legal approach might we draw from international instruments that recommend the 
principle of respect for difference? 
Policy Beyond and Within Canada 
In a previous section, I reviewed where the principle of respect for difference can 
be found in international covenants on specific minority populations. We might also 
explore instruments pertaining to bioethics. The United Nations Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD, 1992) and the UN Declaration on the Human Genome and 
Human Rights (DHGHR, 1997) both recognize humanity's genetic diversity without 
"giv[ing] rise to any interpretation of a social or political nature which could call into 
question the 'inherent dignity and ... the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family"' (CBD; as cited in DHGHR, 1997, preamble). Although there is an 
appeal to sameness, we at least see acknowledgment that difference has in the past been 
politicized, and an attempt to avoid political assignations of worth to genetic difference. 
The DHGHR highlights this attempt at reconciling sameness and difference in 
Article 1: "the human genome underlies the fundamental unity of all members of the 
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human family, as well as the recognition of their inherent dignity and diversity". The 
instrument understands the human genome to be central and essential to humanity, and 
yet it avoids allegations of geneticization and biological reductionism by claiming that 
the genetic material that binds humanity can be different and diverse. At the heart of that 
which human beings hold in common is biological-and I might argue, embodied-
difference. 
Article 3 elaborates on the potential of the human genome: 
The human genome, which by its nature evolves, is subject to mutations. 
It contains potentialities that are expressed differently according to each 
individual's natural and social environment, including the individual's 
state of health, living conditions, nutrition and education. 
This Article explores the ways in which contextual factors invest in and shape the genetic 
body. With this recognition in mind, the DHGHR makes recommendations regarding 
genetic research such that member state parties are expected not to subject citizens to 
"discrimination based on genetic characteristics that is intended to infringe or has the 
effect of infringing human rights, fundamental freedoms and human dignity" (Article 6). 
Do we see national laws incorporating the principle of respect for difference that 
manifests in these international instruments? Is the priority in genetic technologies and 
research on recognition of genetic diversity and protection from discrimination on the 
basis of genetic difference? The most definitive legislation advocating disability de-
selection can be found in New Zealand. According to New Zealand's National Ethics 
Committee on Assisted Human Reproduction (NECAHR, 2005), pre-implantation 
genetic diagnosis cannot be used for the purpose of increasing the likelihood of disability: 
"PGD may not be carried out for the following: (1) social reasons, including sex selection 
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[and] (3) to select embryos with a genetic impairment seen in a parent" (s. 3). In order to 
avoid discrimination against disabled people, the NECAHR "supports the New Zealand 
Disability Strategy and considers that New Zealand should continue to recognise its 
obligations to support disabled people and continue to work towards the removal of 
barriers to full participation in society" (pp. 3-4). Nearby, Australia's Infertility 
Authority of Victoria has also prohibited ins. S(a) of their 1995 Jnfertility Treatment Act 
"the use of PGD to select in favour of genetic disease or abnormality" because "the 
welfare and interests of any person born or to be born as a result of a treatment procedure 
are paramount". 
Although Canada's policy on reproductive technologies-the Assistive Human 
Reproduction Act (AHRA}-is open-ended, with no outright prohibition of disability 
selection, there are similarities with policies from Oceania. According to s. 2 of the 
AHRA: "the health and well-being of children born through the application of assisted 
human reproductive technologies must be given priority in all decisions respecting their 
use". In both Canada and New Zealand, women's health and well-being are referenced, 
but there is thought to be little conflict or problem with prioritizing the right of the child 
to an open future (Wagner, 2008). Karpin and Savell (2012) argue: 
The New Zealand law and guidelines are similar to the laws that we have 
described elsewhere [such as Canada's, in that they] provide that PGD 
may only be used to prevent the transmission of 'serious' conditions but 
stop short of defining that limit legislatively, instead devolving that 
responsibility to the clinicians providing PGD (p. 230). 
There is an understanding underscoring our policy that disability is importantly different, 
as Buchanan and colleagues (2000) claim, from other identity characteristics. Sex 
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selection is prohibited in the AHRA and related documents outside Canada, unless sex has 
bearing on genetic risk. The arguments raised in the last section against sex selection are 
not thought to apply to disability, because disability is simply not the same, not similar 
enough. 
A Canadian report on biotechnology and human rights considers the selection of 
Deafness using pre-implantation genetic diagnosis: "is the right to reproductive autonomy 
broad enough to protect a woman's choice of PGD to select in vitro embryos on the basis 
of certain favoured genetic traits?" (Hunter, 2005, p. 3). Should reproductive rights be 
entirely framed as a right to autonomy, we see policy considering the limits to autonomy, 
with the underlying assumption that autonomy is personal in character, accorded to 
separate, isolated rights-bearers. The limits to autonomy are thus imagined to be 
conflicts with other rights-bearers. One such limitation has been invoked: an unborn 
child's right to an open future-a call to equality of opportunity, infringed upon when 
functional health standards are not met. 
Even though Canadian policy is not definitively prohibitive, the framing of the 
rights conflict so described above is implicitly present. Health Canada defines the 
purpose of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis as identification of "genetic markers for 
inherited disease [so that] physicians caring for individuals at risk of passing on a genetic 
condition to their offspring are able to select and transfer only those embryos that do not 
carry markers for the conditions in question" (2005, p. I). While sex selection is 
prohibited, because selecting against female births constitutes discrimination against 
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women, the AHRA claims the purpose of this reproductive technology is to select against 
disability. 
The federal government of Canada established a Biotechnology Advisory 
Committee, the CBAC, which is "an expert, arm's-length committee created under the 
renewed Canadian Biotechnology Strategy (CBS) to advise Ministers, raise public 
awareness and engage Canadians in an open and transparent dialogue on biotechnology 
matters" (CBAC, 1999, in Sherwin 2000 p. 6). This advisory panel aids the government 
in forming policy on reproductive technologies, such as the AHRA. According to 
Lippman (2000), the overarching strategy out of which the committee was borne co-
opted "women's demands for empowerment, for choice, and for gender-based care, 
research and policy ... playing on our reasonable fears of paternalism, overmedicalization 
and exclusion" (p. 35). Only paternalism, overmedicalization, and exclusion have not 
been redressed-they are merely more deeply entrenched in institutional frameworks, 
called another name, and invested in women's bodies. Recall that Foucault described 
how power is inculcated and embodied such that people are expected to self-manage, and 
are thought to be acting autonomously when they do: "within neo-liberalism, the best 
form of regulation is one which is self-governing" (Mykitiuk, 2000, p. 108). Mykitiuk 
goes on: 
Will this information [derived from genetic diagnostics] be used in 
invidious ways to mark certain citizens or prospective citizens, or their 
characteristics, as deviant, abnormal, socially undesirable or risky? Is 
there a sense in which the new genetic technologies are being used, or are 
capable of being used, as a means ofliterally creating the responsible, 
autonomy, citizen of neo-liberalism-that citizen who makes no legitimate 
claims on the state but rather, who freely exercises their capacity for 
choice and manages their own self care? (p. I 08). 
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A Way Forward 
Law informed by technology inscribes the body, both female and disabled. 
Gender and disability both are constructed and regulated by legal rules that shape 
interactions between them and medical practitioners (Frazee, Gilmour, & Mykitiuk, 
1996; Karpin, 1992-1993, 2005). Karpin (1992-1993) claims: "in the process of 
regulating the female body, the law legislates its shape, its lineaments, and its boundaries . 
... [The law] collaborates with other defining discourse such as science" (p. 325). Within 
medical contexts, these bodies are "usually all too fleshy, fluid, and uncontainable" 
(Shildrick, 2004, p. 150), and are in need of being shaped. 
This does not have to be so, however. Rose (2007) says of the potential of 
reproductive technologies: "these new technologies, then, do not just seek to cure 
organize damage or disease, nor to enhance health. . .. Their key feature is their forward 
vision" (p. 8). With the development of new technologies and their interpretation via a 
postmodern feminist lens, we could see "the emergence of a new form of person" (p. 
152). Shildrick (2004) goes on: 
The shifting relationship between genetics and identity deeply undermines 
any concept of the moral agent as an autonomous sovereign subject, not 
least to the extent that the conventional bioethical model understands the 
subject's interest in others to be contractual, and her interest in the body to 
be primarily that of property rights (p. 152). 
This emergent, transgressive embodiment, though constantly being reshaped and 
controlled through medical and legal discourses, has the power to challenge those 
discourses, by confronting the abstract self, that impossible regulatory standard. Through 
this confrontation, we see that "the subject is always irreducibly embodied" (p. 155). 
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Reproductive technologies put to other uses might reshape body boundaries, 
eliciting a complex definition of self, even displacing the self. Says Karpin: "genetic 
discourses, indifferent to the surface of the body as a marker of identity, demand a more 
complex understanding of the self in law. What happens, for instance, when genetic 
discourses reveal that we are all 'leaky,' boundaryless, and transgressive?" (2005, p. 
195). We could reorient our discourses, beginning with examples like Duchesneau and 
McCullough, "in order to open a space for subjects who are connected, vulnerable, and 
dependent on who cannot shed their dependencies in order to become the liberal subject" 
(p. 212). Does technology then have transformative potential? We have seen how it has 
been wielded in problematic ways, but technology itself, its meaning and purposes, are 
contingent on who wields it. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
We are at a point where final remarks are in order. The following concluding 
chapter will summarize the work accomplished, recounting previous chapters on the 
principles of autonomy, equality, and respect for difference. Throughout this recounting, 
I will evaluate whether I have adequately explored the study questions presented at the 
outset of this work. I will next consider the study' s limitations in scope, including the 
focus on literature and conceptual discourses at the expense of primary research. Further, 
I will consider whether the development of my own personal reflections and positions 
constitutes a limitation; that is, whether the explicit focus on my own analysis has led to a 
problem in consistency and cogency given that I have changed throughout the course of 
this project. Finally, I will consider my project's applications to and implications for 
future research: what comes next in the theoretical pursuit, and whether and how policy 
might change to reflect the framework I would most readily endorse. 
5.1. Summary 
This summary traces through the arguments made in chapters past. I sought to 
answer three study questions that probed the potential conflicts between the principles 
studied. By addressing these potential conflicts, it has been my intention that I fine-tune 
discourses on reproductive decision-making. I meant to account for how loaded the 
terms we use are, that is, I sought to identify the sorts of histories and ideologies they 
carry with them whenever they are invoked. All along the way I critiqued the liberal 
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narratives within which these principles can be found embedded. Rather than merely 
offer up a critique, however, I also proposed the development of a theoretical and legal 
framework that employs autonomy, equality, and respect for difference as they are 
reimagined in feminist theory. 
5.1.1. Autonomy 
This chapter addressed whether use of the concept of reproductive autonomy 
results in an offloading of responsibilities onto pregnant women, especially when 
disabilities can or have been diagnosed. 
Autonomy Theory 
In order to answer the question so stated above, the chapter began with a review 
of autonomy theories. Kantian moral autonomy entails commitment to moral duties, that 
is, acting in accordance with a universal law that is accessible only through a person's 
reasoning faculties. There is only one universal law, entirely formal in character-a 
categorical imperative against which all particular maxims for action can be measured. 
Ascertaining the categorical imperative requires that the moral agent be detached and 
abstracted from external, heteronomous factors that weigh on the will. Moral autonomy 
is defined in Kantian theory as compliance with universal law, acting in accordance with 
reason (Kant, 1993, 1999). Those who fail to comply-that is, those driven by 
externalities and deviating from unequivocal, categorical duty-may not be persons at 
all, may merely be things undeserving of moral respect and recognition (Kant, 1996). 
Here we see the autonomous self is only autonomous insofar as he complies with 
abstracted good. Autonomy consists in moral obligation. 
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The personal autonomies of liberal theories move away from this explicit effort 
on Kant's part to tie autonomy to obligation, by opening up and individualizing reasons 
for acting (Dworkin, 1988; Mill, 1978; Rawls, 1999). However, personalization of 
autonomy requires individuation and decontextualization (Berlin, 1969; Kymlicka, 1996; 
Lukes, 1973). The autonomous self is not imagined in such a way that accounts for 
oppressions and privileges, even though power differentials affect whether a choice is 
authentic, that is, whether it is the product of economic, political, social, even 
interpersonal pressures-not quite coercion, yet influential in far subtler ways. The 
liberal self must convey self-sufficiency, independence, and isolation to such an extent 
that interrelations are framed as weaknesses (Basser, 2011; Pateman, 1989; Sherwin, 
1998, 2011; Smart, 1989). This language of distance may well result in the offloading of 
responsibilities such that the autonomous self, in order to convey a liberal autonomy, is 
synonymous with the responsible self, the self who needs not depend on others. 
Relational autonomy is a concept developed by feminists convinced it is possible 
to strip autonomy of its liberal baggage, of its roots in rugged individualism (Christman, 
2004; Code, 1991; Downie & Llewellyn, 2001; Keller, 1985; Nedelsky, 1989; 1993; 
Sherwin, 1998, 2011). The autonomous subject is reimagined, such that her boundaries 
are not limited to and bound by her skin. Rather, she embodies a corporeality that is 
grounded in other corporealities, and she is situated within networks of interdependencies 
and interrelations. Such a concept redresses the implications to personalizing and 
abstracting the autonomous self. Such a concept may be what is needed to ensure that 
women are not rendered radically responsible for their reproductive choices. 
Autonomy in Bioethics and Law 
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The theories presented in the previous section were applied to bioethical and legal 
discourses, beginning with consent and capacity literature. In medical contexts, 
autonomy is expressed through free and informed consent, where the consenting subject 
must be decisionally capable (Engelhardt, 1986; Faden, Beauchamp, & King, 1986). 
Capacity models consist of elements largely related to the mechanism for decision-
making, namely understanding of the situation and appreciation for the stakes, as well as 
rational manipulation of raw data and the physical capability to execute or communicate 
a decision. Some capacity models include an additional, substantive criterion-a person 
is capable if his decisions coincide with a conception of the good (Beauchamp & 
Childress, 2001; Buchanan & Brock, 1989; Grisso & Appelbaum, 1998). 
Feminist critiques of capacity shed light on what is required to be declared 
decisionally capable in liberal cultures, and here we see the same baggage that the 
autonomy of liberal theories carries (Kerzner, 2006; Shildrick, 1997; Stefan, 1993). 
Conditions must be met in order for one to claim to be acting autonomously, and these 
conditions are meant to distance the subject. The subject may be re-contextualized by 
accounting for the ruling relations within medical and legal settings that affect consent 
and determine capacity (Brody, 1980; Blander & Hermoren, 1993; Leino-Kipli et al., 
2000; Seedhouse, 1992). 
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Starson v. Swayze (2003) unpacks current Canadian legal standards for capacity-
standards which invoke the same language and concepts used in the theoretical discourses 
outlined in this study. Starson confirmed that Canadians need only satisfy the minimal 
conditions for capacity: namely, understanding of the situation and appreciation for the 
stakes. It was ruled that neither physicians nor Consent and Capacity Boards could 
declare a person decisionally incapable on the basis of the substance of that person's 
decision. Starson was within his rights to refuse treatment no matter how misguided his 
reasons were, so the logic went. While this case marked a victory for disability law in 
that it stripped capacity standards down to the minimum threshold, it reaffirmed the 
Canadian commitment to a concept of personal autonomy. 
Ashley Smith's struggles in Canada's mental health system demonstrate the 
failings of personal autonomy. Smith was incarcerated for an indefinite amount of time, 
ended only when she took her own life, because she was declared to be decisionally 
capable (Office of the Ombudsman and Child Youth Advocate, 2008; Sapers, 2008). She 
was institutionalized for her own good, and perhaps even in the interest of public safety, 
because her actions were analyzed in isolation from the power relations that constituted 
her contexts. She was held responsible for her outbursts, and thus deserving of and 
accountable for the punishments meted out. 
Reproductive Autonomy 
This section entailed an overview of varied positions on reproductive autonomy. 
Liberal positions (including liberal feminists) have sought to address or invalidate a rights 
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conflict between woman and fetus: claiming the fetus may have the right to life, for 
instance, but not the right to make use of the body of an unwilling woman (Jarvis 
Thomson, 1971; Overall, 1987); or arguing that the fetus has no moral status, and thus 
has no stake in the rights conflict (Singer, 1979; Tooley, 1972; Warren, 1973). The 
underlying assumptions that, firstly, reproductive autonomy is entirely constituted by the 
grand abortion debate, and secondly, that the debate can be framed according to who has 
rights and which rights take priority, have had the effect of individuating the problem, 
and of rooting reproductive rights to personal, liberal notions of autonomy. Such a 
conception has required that the fetus and woman be individuated, that we draw boundary 
lines within pregnant bodies (Gavigan, 1992). 
This individuation has been reified through reproductive technologies such as 
ultrasound, where fetal imagery has been used to personify the fetus (Gavigan, 2009; 
Katz Rothman, 1987; Kukla, 2005; Mitchell, 2001; Stabile, 1992). Liberal positions on 
abortion err in having the terms of the debate set for them, because the conceptual 
bifurcation of woman and fetus does not accurately reflect the experience of pregnancy, 
nor does it serve the interests of women, who through bifurcation see their bodies 
reduced to nothing more than vessels, even cast as hostile. Put another way, bifurcation 
frames the responsibilities women do or do not have to their own bodies, and organize the 
question of reproductive autonomy around their entitlements from the state and 
obligations to another. 
Some feminist positions on reproductive autonomy, at least regarding the question 
of abortion (if that is to be our starting point), reject discourses on competing rights and 
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interests on the grounds that a theory is needed to account for the connection between 
woman and fetus, the way in which a pregnant body is simultaneously one-and-two, or 
one-becoming-two (Karpin, 1992-1993; Katz Rothman, 1990; Mackenzie, 1995; Warren, 
1989). The pregnant body may even serve as an entry point to a theory of 
intercorporeality, where we erase the boundary lines we have built between persons and 
instead allow for the possibility that bodies are interconnected and interdependent, that 
they might have mutual rather than competing interests. 
This discussion was applied to the legal case R. v. Morgentaler (1988), in which 
the limits to reproductive autonomy were simultaneously extended and defined according 
to body boundaries. In Canada, since Morgentaler, the right to reproductive autonomy 
has been grounded in the Charters. 7 right to security of the person. Feminist analysts, 
though they applaud the strides made in this case, critique the individuating effect of 
reducing reproductive rights to corporeal control (Dunsmuir, 1998; Gavigan, 1992). 
Since the case, reproductive rights have proven insufficient in the face of 
administrative efforts to curtail abortion. Women may be entitled to abortion in a 
negative sense, to the extent that they are entitled to protection from state interference in 
decisions pertaining to their bodies. However, they are not entitled to having the services 
made available to them, nor are they protected from the creeping privatization of 
healthcare, wherein financial constraints may pose as obstacles to reproductive autonomy 
(Downie, 2011; Gilmour, 2002). The effect of personalizing reproductive autonomy is 
that women are responsible for their bodies-responsible for their children should they 
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choose pregnancy, and responsible for finding safe and financially viable services should 
they choose to terminate in a context that does not regulate abortion provisions. 
Reproductive Autonomy and Disability De-Selection 
Reproductive autonomy has been used to justify the use of disability diagnostic 
technologies, the argument being that women can make better informed decisions when 
equipped with disability diagnoses. The more a woman knows, the greater her autonomy 
is enhanced (Buchanan et al., 2000; Ruddick, 1988, 2000). Despite how promising this 
argument seems, the provision of technologies and the delivery of diagnoses are not 
neutral, but ambivalent, forcing women into decisions and decision-making processes 
(Hubbard, 1982; Katz Rothman, 1987; McCoyd, 2007; Rapp, 2000; Sherwin, 2004). Not 
only is information ambivalent, but it is sometimes misconstrued in light of ableist 
assumptions around disability diagnoses (Goodling et al., 2002; Kerr & Shakespeare, 
2002; Parens & Asch, 2000; Shakespeare, 2005). Further, reproductive technologies 
(ultrasound, for instance) have come to be integrated into the rituals of pregnancy 
management, such that they, much like abstention from various foods, alcohol, smoking, 
and so forth, have become-at least in terms of social pressure-maternal obligations. 
Some scholars have gone so far as to claim it is morally wrong not to make use of 
disability diagnostic technologies, or not to terminate when diagnoses are rendered 
(McMahan, 2002; Purdy, 1996; Rhodes, 1999, 2006). 
Reproductive autonomy, then, is not enough to explain the prevalent use of 
reproductive technologies, especially given how their introduction to reproductive 
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decision-making expands and complicates the responsibilities of pregnancy maintenance. 
Underlying or accompanying the banner of autonomous decision-making is the mandate 
to maintain or uphold public health standards (Buchanan et al., 2000; Lippman, 1993). 
Women may be free from overt interference to make decisions, but with this freedom 
comes the responsibility of acting as genetic gatekeepers, where their vigilance, 
discipline, and choices are expected to maximize and protect the health of the citizenry to 
which their pregnancy would be contributing (Peters & Lawson, 2002; Mykitiuk, 2002). 
This work around the responsibility to promote public health (read, to de-select 
disability) was applied to case law. In Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest 
Area) v. G. (D.F.) (1997), the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the state has no right 
to detain a woman against her will for the purpose of protecting the fetus she is carrying 
to term. G. was entitled to bodily control, though she was not entitled to support in 
addressing her substance use when she first sought it out. Nor did it appear that G. was 
entitled to support raising the disabled children born to her, for she was declared unfit and 
they became permanent wards of the state. The rhetoric around autonomy that was 
foundational to this ruling rendered G. radically responsible for her decisions. 
Similarly, in Arndt v. Smith ( 1997), a woman's decision (or in this case, what the 
Court supposed her decision would be) to commit to a pregnancy despite a diagnosable 
disability resulted in rendering that woman responsible for the child born. The Supreme 
Court of Canada ruled that Arndt could not seek financial compensation through tort law. 
Smith might not have disclosed the serious risks to maternal chicken pox but the Court 
determined that disclosure would not have impacted Arndt's decision to terminate or to 
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let the pregnancy run its course. Because Arndt allegedly would have chosen to bear a 
disabled child, no legal wrong was committed against her, nothing worth reparations. 
Her choice, what she would have chosen, rendered her responsible. 
Throughout the course of this chapter, I sought to trace the instances and effects 
of personal autonomy in bioethical and legal discourses. In so doing I noted how the 
personal autonomy of liberal theory requires that the self be individuated, in isolation, 
distanced from social conditions; that the self admits of no dependencies but is sufficient; 
that the self bears the responsibility for his decisions. Situating reproductive rights 
squarely in liberal theory has the effect of reducing women's agency in medical contexts, 
of curtailing women's recourses pertaining to abortion provisions, and of glossing over 
the ways in which disability diagnostic technologies compound maternal responsibilities. 
5.1.2. Equality 
In this chapter, I considered whether there are tensions--or, as it turned out, 
whether there is a relationship--between reproductive autonomy and reproductive 
equality. Specifically, I focused on the potential conflict between reproductive autonomy 
on the one hand, and disability equality on the other. 
Equality Theory 
I began with an exploration of equality theory, highlighting the centrality of 
autonomy to these theories. My purpose throughout this chapter was to demonstrate that 
theories of equality have historically shared an organizing principle or purpose: to 
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enhance or ensure liberty. Formal equality, a concept found in Aristotle's Nicomachean 
Ethics and Politics, is an empty, regulatory concept that demands similar treatment of 
those persons belonging to like categories. Equal treatment is proportionately distributed 
according to merit, a standard which is in tum measured according to excellence (Frank, 
1998). Excellence is constituted by choice and skill. This ancient ethical system paved 
the way for later systems that employ equality as a regulatory principle, and importantly, 
that justify inequalities according to standards of desert-a standard tied to notions of 
choice. 
There are modem egalitarian models that advocate equalized opportunity over 
formalized characterizations of the equality (Arneson, 1989; Dworkin, 1981 a, 1981 b; 
Rawls, 1999). Equal opportunity serves to maximize liberty and level the playing field 
for those who are differently advantaged by virtue of a birth lottery. Theories of this sort, 
most notably Rawlsian egalitarianism (1999), have the effect of explaining inequalities as 
either naturally endowed before opportunities are offered, or chosen and thus deserved 
once opportunities are provided within competitive contexts. These theories are not in 
tension with liberty interests; rather, the centrality ofliberty to these theories means that 
egalitarianism too is mired in the baggage that accompanies personal autonomy. Equality 
serves merely a regulatory function, ordering the distribution of goods and rights to 
persons divided by their body boundaries. 
Feminist theories of equality critique this interplay between liberty and equality 
by noting power relations underpin the distribution patterns that equality principles 
regulate (Harvey, 1999; Koggle, 2011; Llewellyn, 2011; Young, 1990, 2000). Feminists 
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have advocated-in the stead of equalized opportunity and distributive justice-relational 
equality and restorative justice, established between persons rather than parceled out to 
each person. These theories also incorporate and account for, rather than stand in conflict 
with, autonomy, for relational autonomy is impossible to make sense of without first 
accounting for the power imbalances which facilitate or prevent autonomy, those power 
imbalances which are internalized, embodied, and enacted. 
Equality in Bioethics and Law 
The equality theories covered were applied to bioethics, beginning with Nozick's 
(1974) work on formal equality and entitlement theory in healthcare settings. Just 
healthcare for Nozick hinges on the autonomy of healthcare providers. A compelling 
critique has been that such a healthcare model does not account for patients' needs 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009; Daniels, 1995; Williams, 2005); the autonomy of the 
physician is maximized at the expense of the equality interests of the patient. 
Daniels (1995, 2008) incorporates need into his Rawlsian healthcare model. As 
explained, Rawls (1999) understands there to be two kinds of inequality: natural 
inequalities and deserved, or chosen, inequalities. Daniels' s two-tiered model maps onto 
this theory by supposing that everyone should have access to basic healthcare to deal with 
natural inequalities, and privatized options are made available to those who have earned 
the wealth to afford them. His system also supposes that healthcare heals or manages 
those hindrances to social opportunity. A just healthcare system, then, is just only insofar 
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as patient autonomy is maximized, that is, insofar as natural hindrances to autonomy are 
addressed. 
By way of contrast, feminist bioethics is reoriented and re-concretized by drawing 
attention to the interrelations of power that produce poor health (Colker, 2009; 
MacKinnon, 1989; Purdy, 2001). The focus is thus shifted to conditions that function to 
disempower people, to limit agency, and to affect decisions (Shildrick, 2004; Wendell, 
1996). Further, more emphasis is placed on notions of care, which has the effect of 
disrupting bioethical discourses that stress privacy, individuality, and patients operating 
in isolation (Hillyer, 1993; Wendell, 1996). Feminist refashionings of just bioethics 
might contrast with the autonomy of liberal theory, but they are designed to cultivate 
relational autonomy, decision-making within contexts that account for power 
differentials. 
The insufficiency of formal equality can be seen in early equality jurisprudence: 
in Bliss v. Canada (Attorney General) (1979), the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that a 
pregnant woman should be subject to the same treatment as men. The ruling in Bliss was 
criticized in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia ( 1989), and the Aristotelian 
"similarly situated" test used in Bliss was rejected. It was established that differential 
treatment can result in equality. But equality analysis was still not ironed out, and after 
Andrews subsequent cases struggled. The Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and 
Immigration) (1999) ruling (since overturned in R. v. Kapp, 2008) sought to tie equality 
to human dignity in cases where no comparator is easily discernible. The implication 
was that equality was de-substantiated, abstracted, and re-assigned the baggage of liberal 
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theory (Fredman, 2011; Lawrence, 2003, 2006). So far we see that far from tension lines 
running between the principles of equality and liberty, equality law has been limited by 
its ties to liberty. 
Reproductive Equality 
The section that followed investigated equality as a reproductive right. Whether 
or not that right could be framed formally was explored in an analysis of Rawls's 
consideration of abortion. Rawls (2005) seeks to balance competing interests in the 
context of a just, liberal society. The abortion dilemma cannot be resolved by appealing 
to comprehensive doctrines and background conditions, or so he claims. Daniels (2008) 
seeks to apply the more substantiated concept of equality found in Rawls-equality of 
opportunity-to healthcare, and discusses the example of pregnancy as a medical matter 
in need of management. Women are free to pursue more options only insofar as they 
depend on healthcare providers to manage their health. Liberty is facilitated by placing 
women in what feminists would deem disempowering relations (Wendell, 1996). 
Feminist approaches prioritize the background conditions Rawls would reject, 
looking to the reasons driving women's reproductive decisions (Sherwin, 1997). These 
reasons are embedded in relations of power, conditions which influence decisions. 
Autonomy and equality remain indivisible even in this theory work, although their 
connection is construed differently (Colker, 1992, 2009). Relational autonomy requires 
an analysis of relations that entail power differentials and social inequalities. These 
inequalities shape and limit choice, are internalized and enacted, and render choices 
inauthentic (McLeod, 2002). 
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In Doe et al. v. The Government of Manitoba (2004), an attempt was made to tie 
reproductive rights to s. 15 equality rights. Although such a connection would be 
promising, this case unfolded when equality jurisprudence was defined by Law (1999). 
That meant that equality was constituted by the tenets of liberal theory (Erdman, 2007). 
If equality is nothing more than a regulatory concept meant to promote reproductive 
autonomy, equality jurisprudence lacks the force to redress an inadequate delivery system 
in the context of reproductive health. Empty equality and negative autonomy can do little 
to mandate differential treatment in the form of abortion provisions (Cook & Howard, 
2007; Metzger, 2007; Rodgers, 2006). 
Reproductive Equality and Disability De-Selection 
This section consisted in an extensive analysis of the seminal work From Chance 
to Choice. The authors of this book (Buchanan et al., 2000) use Rawlsian theory to argue 
that disability diagnostic technologies simultaneously enhance women's freedom and 
constitute an obligation, in the interest of preserving a child's right to an open future-a 
future where opportunities are not closed off by disability. A liberal society must balance 
the liberty of women and the potential liberty of fetuses. Equality thus regulates the 
distribution of rights, and manages the competing interests of woman and fetus. 
The ideology underpinning this distributive model entails geneticization-the 
reduction and ranking of persons according to their genetic codes (Lippman, 1991, 1993; 
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Rapp, 2000; Taylor & Mykitiuk, 2001 ). The equality model advocated in From Chance 
to Choice assumes that persons are of differing worth based on their genes. 
Geneticization may be reinforced and reified due to the use of reproductive technologies 
like prenatal testing procedures, which offer genetic profiles and in so doing mark fetal 
bodies with difference (Martin, 2002). 
Here we see an exploration of the more specific study question posed, for with the 
introduction of disability diagnostic technologies and the disability studies-derived 
critiques of these technologies (Amundson, 2005; Kerr & Shakespeare, 2002; Melo-
Martin, 2006; Parens & Asch, 2000; Saxton, 2000), we see tension between autonomy 
and equality: the autonomy of the pregnant woman, and the equality of persons whose 
disabilities are targeted by reproductive technologies. I sought to demonstrate that the 
conflict only exists as long as we understand the principles of autonomy and equality 
within the contexts of liberal theories. When realigned with theories· that account for 
power relations, the conflict seems to be resolved (Generations Ahead, 2009). 
Should we advocate an equality-based approach to reproductive rights, we need a 
substantiated concept of equality, one which can contend with difference. When 
discussing the 1986 case E. (Mrs.) v. Eve, I argued that although the case marked a 
victory for disabled persons, it did not account for Eve's context, nor was it grounded in 
the history of Canadian sterilization policy, which dramatically disadvantaged disabled 
persons. That is, the case declared the state could not interfere with the reproductive 
capacities of disabled people, and yet, no further effort was made to make connections 
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between attempts to control Eve's reproductive capacities and the history of social and 
political inequalities responsible for denying disabled people reproductive control. 
There appears to exist a tension between reproductive autonomy and reproductive 
equality only if the principles derive from differing theories. When sharing conceptual 
baggage in common, the principles are in actuality indivisible. Should they share overlap 
in liberal language, for instance, equality lacks the force to mandate differential 
treatment, for it functions only to fulfill liberty interests-a negative liberty at that. 
Should the two principles both be framed as feminist, they stand a better chance of 
operating in such a way that effects justice, for the redress and restoration of context 
facilitates agency. Even when we move into specific applications, scholars engaged in 
the Generations Ahead project (2009) claim that feminists advocating reproductive rights 
and disability activists seeking disability equality should not be at odds, for they have 
mutual-not competing-interests. 
5.1.3. Respect for Difference 
My final substantive chapter considered whether the assumption that reproductive 
technologies be used for the purpose of disability de-selection reflects tensions between 
reproductive autonomy and equality on the one hand, and the principle of respect for 
difference on the other. 
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Respect for Difference in Theory 
The work done in this chapter sought to pull together the dissertation's threads. 
Each section consisted of reviews and critiques of the work done in chapters past, all 
through a postmodern lens. I began with a recounting of the metanarratives of modernity, 
and traced Kantian autonomy (Kant, 1993) through liberal traditions (Locke, 1980; 
Rawls, 1999). The personal autonomy of liberal theories bespeaks a certain sort of self-
one conceived in isolation, one capable of self-sufficiency. The autonomous self can be 
found at the heart of distributive models regulated by liberal egalitarian principles. The 
Aristotelian interpretation of equality as sameness (found in the Nicomachean Ethics and 
the Politics) presupposed that people earn equal treatment; and this presupposition 
underscores liberal theories that promote opportunity maximization. For, opportunity is 
thought to facilitate autonomous choice, but also has the effect of justifying inequalities; 
those who fail to enact the autonomous self are undeserving of equal treatment (Dworkin, 
1981 b; Rawls, 1999). 
I developed a postmodern critique for the purpose of establishing difference as the 
condition for the possibility of these oppressive ideological systems. I considered 
Lyotard's (1984) position that the philosophies explored above constituted 
metanarratives-myths that justify the classificatory thinking of modernity. Derrida 
(1972) does work in this vein, developing differance as that which makes presence 
possible, that which through juxtaposition imbues the self with meaning. But differance, 
all that stands other to the.self, is also a disruptive force that has the power to break down 
meaning, and to redefine. In the face of such a threat to order, current systems of power 
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have strategies in place to manage difference so as to mitigate its disruptive force. These 
strategies are embedded in regulatory mechanisms and practices that subtly work to 
produce and shape docile bodies (Derrida, 1992; Foucault, 1977). 
Postmodern feminisms have taken up these themes to consider how the gendered 
body is produced (Bartky, 1990; Gimlin, 2001). Patriarchal rules are inscribed on 
women's bodies, and work to objectify women, to reduce women to bodies in need of 
maintenance, discipline, and control. That women's bodies may be intercorporeal is 
taken to be a weakness in contrast with the privileged autonomous subject (Bebube, 
2002; Shildrick, 2009). That women's experiences overlap and intersect complicates the 
classificatory thinking that imagines the ideal self behind veils (Kittay, 1999). 
There are indeed tensions running between egalitarian theories that prioritize the 
autonomous self on the one hand, and politics of difference on the other. Modernity's 
metanarratives are only meaningful through a process of othering, and through the 
management of those others. 
Respect for Difference in Bioethics and Law 
This section looked back on specific applications of the metanarratives of 
personal autonomy and formal equality. I identified the familiar autonomous self in 
consent and capacity standards; the criteria for decisional capacity are the markers of 
selfhood (Buchanan & Brock, 1989; Faden, Beauchamp, & King, 1986; Grisso & 
Appelbaum, 1998). These criteria function as regulatory mechanisms by, firstly, denying 
some kinds of people the right to decision-making (Shildrick, 1997); and secondly, by 
justifying disproportionate resource allocation when the capable self is undeserving 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009). 
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The consenting, capable subject is separated out from the body, which is assumed 
to be a fixed, stable given (Shildrick, 1997). Health paradigms are in place to manage the 
dys-appearanc(}-the disruption--ofbodies that manifest disability, disease, injury, even 
pregnancy (Gimlin, 2006; Leder, 1990). Medical management classifies and treats bodily 
difference so the body might once again be relegated to the background, for the 
autonomous, deserving subject cannot be associated with body (Foucault, 2003). Liberal 
theories are maintained through the decontextualization and disembodiment of identity. 
I went on to consider the framing of respect for difference in international policy, 
specifically the Convention for the Rights of People with Disabilities (2006). I also 
investigated the UN Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice (1982), which recognizes 
lifestyle diversity and the right to be different; and the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (2007), which affirms that the right to be different contributes to the 
diversity of civilization, culture, and humanity. The Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979) implicitly recognizes that women are 
differentially affected in reproductive contexts. I considered the trouble with recognizing 
difference on the one hand, and appealing to common humanity on the other-it may be 
that our policies exhibit limited imaginations for difference and diversity. 
I looked to case law at home, specifically Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General) (1997). This case expanded equality analysis by considering adverse effects 
discrimination-the result of the general application of rules, or same treatment. 
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Disabled people especially need protection from adverse effects discrimination because 
of the ways in which disability has been socially and historically devalued and 
disadvantaged. 
The ruling in Auton (Guardian ad /item of) v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General) (2004) has been contrasted with that in Eldridge (Cousins, 2009; Finley, 2005). 
The ruling has been accused of employing a narrow equality analysis by justifying the 
delisting of ABA/IBI treatment from core medically necessary treatments, though the 
treatment itself raises questions around treatment of autistic children in healthcare 
contexts (Baker, 2008). Further, the use of comparators in Auton 's equality analysis did 
not honour the work done in Eldridge to move away from equality as sameness (Gilbert 
& Majury, 2006). 
With/er v. Canada (Attorney General) (2011) may mark the next evolution of 
equality jurisprudence, one where context overrides these past strategies of making 
comparisons and leveling playing fields. The contextualization of equality may move the 
principle away from liberal interpretations that have proven problematic, and in so doing 
re-situate that once isolated autonomous self. A politics of difference, in other words, 
may make use of the tensions previously identified between our principles, for the 
purpose of reorienting and reconstituting those principles. 
Reproductive Justice 
I began with an analysis of Beauvoir (1956), according to whom women are 
othered due to reproductive difference. The process of othering involves interpretive 
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work that reduces women to their reproductive functions (Rich, 2007). The solutions 
posed by liberal feminists include liberation from reproductive roles and the rendering of 
the concept of gender neutral, even useless (Butler, 1999; Wittig, 1992). Instead of 
distancing women from their bodies, however, the answer may instead be to challenge 
the assumptions that bodies signify weakness, that the displacement of self during 
pregnancy is problematic (Chandler, 2007; O'Brien, 2007). 
Jhappan (1998) frames gender neutrality as an equality pit, where equality is only 
distributed to those who can approximate privileged standards. The equality pit may be 
challenged by noting that women are differentially impacted during pregnancy by virtue 
of their biological, reproductive differences from men (Mahowald, 2000). Further, there 
is no essential, catch-all category for women, for reproductive contexts affect women 
differently based on race, class, sexual orientation, disability, and so forth (Hill Collins, 
2007; hooks, 2007). 
To avoid essentialism, then, and to revolutionize discourses around reproductive 
decision-making, we might employ theories of reproductive justice, which can account 
for contextualized, differential, and intersectional oppressions (Smith, 2005a, 2005b; 
West, 2009). We might locate respect for difference in such theories given the heed paid 
to concrete particulars and power relations. 
I next considered whether reproductive justice would have any currency in 
Canadian law. In a LEAF publication, Ma jury (2006) and Sampson (2006) critique 
formal equality and advocate taking a contextualized approach to substantiating equality. 
Applied to reproductive health, Cook and Howard (2007) promote accommodation of and 
382 
respect for biological and social difference. Nevertheless, some feminists would frame 
reproductive justice as an alternative to, rather than an extension of, equality analysis 
(Jhappan, 1998; Smith, 2005a; West, 2009). 
In addition to jurisprudence, I also investigated policy, specifically policy on sex 
selective abortion. Perhaps to prevent the practice, several hospitals in the Greater 
Toronto Area that service racialized communities are not forthcoming when it comes to 
disclosure of fetal sex (Yang, 2012). This variation in hospital practice is not regulated 
because, although SOGC guidelines (2007 a, 2007b) do not prohibit sex selective abortion 
outright, they do recommend that disclosure of fetal sex should be left to the discretion of 
physicians, and can be withheld in the best interest of the patient. While scholars 
opposed to sex selective abortion speak of sexism and reproductive choice (Rogers, 
Ballantyne, & Draper, 2007; Thiele & Leier, 2010), they overlook how racialized women 
have been discriminated against in reproductive contexts. 
Reproductive Justice and Disability De-Selection 
I began by reviewing the reproductive model used to justify the employment of 
disability diagnostic technologies, and I suggested that reproductive autonomy arguments 
decontextualize reproductive issues (Wagner, 2008). The public health model, too, is 
problematic for its pressure on women to prevent disability, for disability is framed as a 
deviation from health standards. The concept of reproductive autonomy works through 
these models as a mechanism that maintains power relations; it gives the impression that 
women are distanced from social pressures and radically responsible for their decisions. 
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I returned to Buchanan and colleagues (2000), who tie reproductive technologies 
and disability de-selection to equality rights. They claim that disability is an importantly 
different characteristic than other identity markers-a claim which devalues disability 
(Anstey, 2002; Karpin & Savell, 2012). Such a position reflects geneticization, where 
genetic identity is normatively framed (Taylor & Mykitiuk, 2001 ). 
Whereas reproductive autonomy and reproductive equality have been used to 
justify reproductive technologies, we might employ reproductive justice to explain how 
the routinization of the technologies marks a failure to respect difference. This approach 
is not necessarily antithetical to the principles of autonomy and equality, as long as these 
principles are conceptualized with feminist rhetoric. Reproductive justice models call 
attention to the contexts that women internalize when making choices, and acknowledge 
the differential impact of power relations on different identity characteristics. 
This section went on to explain the example of a lesbian Deaf couple who used 
pre-implantation genetic diagnosis to increase the likelihood of having a Deaf child 
(Savulescu, 2002; Wagner, 2008). My analysis acknowledged gender and sexual 
orientation as compounding factors in reproductive decision-making (Kallen, 1989), and 
considered claims that Deafness is the defining characteristic of a politically active 
linguistic minority (Anstey, 2002). While the Assisted Human Reproduction Act (2004) 
does not prohibit couples from deliberately selecting disability, it does make the 
assumption that technologies would be used to de-select disability, and only sanctions sex 
selection in cases where sex affects genetic risk. 
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Once again I looked to international law to determine whether the principle of 
respect for difference can be or has been applied to regulation of reproductive 
technologies. The UN Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) and Declaration on the 
Human Genome and Human Rights (1997) both recognize genetic diversity and resist 
imposing social or political interpretations of this diversity. Specifically, the DHGHR 
simultaneously recognizes humanity's fundamental unity and inherent diversity. 
Although the rhetoric of sameness is here employed, we also see an effort to respect 
difference. The UN instrument also takes a contextual approach by acknowledging that 
social conditions shape the human genome, and seeks to safeguard persons from 
geneticized discrimination. 
These instruments show promise, yet are they incorporated into national or federal 
legislation? I considered New Zealand's Ethics Committee on Assisted Human 
Reproduction (2005), which prohibits the use of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis for 
the purpose of increasing the likelihood of disability. In comparison, although Canada's 
Assistive Human Reproduction Act (2004) does not prohibit use of reproductive 
technologies for anything other than sex selection, the policy shares in common 
assumptions around the use of the technologies, and the prioritization of children's well-
being. 
How might we move forward from here? Perhaps, if we reframed our discourses, 
we could dispel our assumptions around the purpose of reproductive technologies. These 
technologies have transformative potential, for people who make use of them for the 
purpose of deliberately selecting an identity characteristic that has been devalued 
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challenge our politics, practices, and power structures (Karpin, 2005; Rose, 2007; 
Shildrick, 2004). And this is not to say that we need to abandon historically relied upon 
principles in our reframing, although our tools require recalibration. Autonomy should 
be understood in the context of relations of power that work on and through persons, so 
as to avoid use of the concept to decontextualize the subject. Equality should be 
substantiated by the acknowledgment of intersecting oppressions and should take an 
interest in correcting injustices rather than elevating persons to privileged, neutralized 
standards. The principles need not be in conflict as long as they are incorporated into a 
politics of difference. 
5 .2. Future Research 
The following section will account for the limitations in this study' s scope, noting 
the lack of primary research. Further, I will consider the troubles around my growing as 
a scholar alongside the development of the project. I will make recommendations for 
future research in an effort to point to how one might reach beyond my scope, and I will 
weigh the academic and political implications of my study. 
5.2.1. Limitation in Scope 
With all the dogged persistence of an ivory tower academic, I developed theory-
based work. My intention was to clarify the conversations we have on and around 
reproductive rights. I poured over the literature and analyzed legal transcripts and policy 
documents, making use of what needed to be a thoroughly established and defended 
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theoretical lens. While I ardently defend this line of work, I do acknowledge that it is 
difficult to produce something new; in lieu of primary research I might merely be 
reassembling and reordering the knowledges I have gathered. I can advocate a 
contextualization of theoretical and legal concepts, though I myself still tend toward a 
sort of abstraction. I can promote interdependence, interconnectivity, interrelatedness, 
and the like, all the while producing research in isolation. 
I further acknowledge that this research embodies my transformation as a scholar 
over the years. I changed as I wrote. Perhaps that is the mark of an effective dissertation, 
in that I was able to grow. Perhaps the dissertation is meant to be a living document that 
itself grows, shifts focus, and changes into something unexpected. My work came to be 
heavier, my analysis more complicated, as I read, and learned, and wrote; as I spoke with 
committee members, reassembled supervisory committees, and navigated political 
waters. I would like to think that as I became a more competent, confident scholar, my 
work's direction came to be clearer, and veered down worthwhile paths. And yet, I 
acknowledge that this dissertation was for a long while a work in progress, an 
exploration, rather than a cogent argument imagined at the outset. 
5.2.2. Implications and Recommendations 
I have already begun the process of breaking down portions of my work and 
submitting to scholarly journals. It is my hope that sharing my research will further the 
analysis of the current theory and law framing reproductive rights. Of whether it is 
possible for law to move in a postmodern direction I remain uncertain. But I have sought 
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to point out the possibility of a politics of difference, as well as the transformative power 
of reproductive technologies should they be reoriented, and should the systems and 
ideologies surrounding their use be reorganized. 
Disability law and policy has surely come a long way, but its open-endedness has 
been a detriment, for oppressions have a habit oflingering, taking root in ideology, and 
sneaking in through policies' rhetorical back doors. I would like to think I have pointed 
to theoretical and legal gaps, those hazy gray areas in need of clearer delineation. I 
would like to think that I have substantiated those gaps with theories that continue to 
lack-though they deserve-political recognition. As long as feminism remains on the 
political periphery, and postmodern theory continues to function merely as critique, we 
might continue to struggle with facilitating authentic agency, of accounting for power, 
and of acknowledging diversity in concrete ways. 
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